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Abstract
Article 226 is traditionally analysed as a forum ofnegotiation between the Commission and
Member States, and as such there is no comprehensive discussion of the tensions that lie at
the centre of the Article 226 infringement mechanism in the current political climate of
constitutionalisation of the European Union. It is no longer meaningful to discuss the
operation of the process presupposing it fulfils just one function within the European polity.
The role of Article 226 can only be understood if it is scrutinised in the context of the current
developments pertaining to the evolution of the EU as a polity and a legal order. This study
characterises Article 226 not simply as a single faceted legal provision, but as a unique space
of interaction for a multitude of actors. As the main actor in the enforcement mechanism,
the European Commission designs, manages and controls the enforcement mechanism. The
conflicting roles and divergent priorities of the Commission in relation to its role as
'guardian of the Treaties' undermines the overriding commitment to promoting good
governance as a means of increasing legitimacy in the EU. However it not only concerns the
Commission, but also other actors (such as the Courts, the Parliament, the Ombudsman and
complainants). This thesis considers to what extent these actors have significantly altered
the role of Article 226. Competing ideals of legitimacy, fairness and transparency need to be
balanced against numerous other concerns such as effective enforcement, uniform
integration, and efficient management ofpolicy; such tensions are only set to intensify and
must be given appropriate weight if the enforcement process is to retain any credibility in the
European Union. Bearing in mind the contribution of the Ombudsman to promote good
governance through good administration, Article 226 can be seen as a missed opportunity to
increase the legitimacy of the EU. Article 226 can be seen as an opportunity, if correctly
managed, to deliver greater accountability in the EU, and as a way of delivering in part the
promise of bringing Europe closer to its citizens.
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Article 226 EC is the central mechanism of enforcement in the EC Treaty, and has remained
unchanged since the original Treaty ofRome. It forms part of a triumvirate ofprovisions in
the EC Treaty that are dedicated to the enforcement of the broad spectrum ofMember State
obligations under the Treaties, along with Article 227 EC and Article 228 EC.1 Article 226
provides the European Commission, as guardian of the Treaty,2 with a broad power of
policing Member States' conduct, and confers jurisdiction on the European Court of Justice3
to pronounce whether or not the Member State's conduct is compatible with EC law.4 The
text of the provision is as follows:
'If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an
obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter
after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations.
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid
down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of
Justice'
The enforcement mechanism of Article 226 is split into two broad stages by the language of
the provision.5 The first stage is the administrative stage of Article 226. This consists of the
Commission investigation into the Member State's behaviour to provisionally determine
whether or not it is prima facie compatible with the Treaty. In order to make this
determination, the Commission and Member State enter into a dialogue, both formally and
informally, in order to establish the material facts of the situation. Formally, this consists of
the 'formal letter'6 and the reasoned opinion, which outlines the Commission's legal case
against the Member State, and provides a deadline by which the Member State must remedy
the situation. If the Commission and the Member State cannot come to an agreement in
11 will refer to the provisions in the EC Treaty hereinafter by simple number alone rather than
providing the full reference. Where I refer to Articles for the first time, or where I refer to provisions
from other Treaties, I will include the complete reference.
2 Article 211 EC 'the Commission shall ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures
taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied'.
31 will refer to the European Court of Justice as the Court of Justice and ECJ interchangeably.
41 will use the term 'EU law' in general to refer to all the Treaties and the associated legal obligations,
and will only differentiate between the EU and EC law where it is legally necessary to do so, i.e.
where I am referring to specific 'pillars' of the EU legal system. Article 226 applies only to legal
obligations within the EC Treaty, as there is no equivalent provision in the TEU, see D Chalmers et al,
European Union Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006) p 348, see also TC Hartley,
The Foundations ofEuropean Community Law (5th Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003)
p 307.
5 See P Craig and G De Burca, EULaw Text Cases and Materials (3rd Edition, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2003), pp 398-402, TC Hartley, The Foundations ofEuropean Community Law (5th
Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) pp 310-317, D Chalmers et al, European Union Law
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006) p 350, J Steiner et al, EU Law (9th Edition, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2006) p 225.
6 'after giving the State concerned an opportunity to submit its observations' Article 226 EC.
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order to remedy the suspected infringement of the Treaty, the administrative phase of Article
226 ends.
If the Commission wishes to pursue the Member State further, it may refer the case to the
ECJ for a judgment which definitively states whether or not the Member State has in fact
breached its obligations under the Treaty; the ECJ alone is responsible for interpreting EU
law.7 The judgment of the ECJ is declaratory in nature - it simply states there has, or has
not, been an infringement. If a Member State is found to have breached the Treaty, it must
rectify the situation by referring to the directions given by the Commission in the
administrative phase of Article 226. Since 2000, the Commission has on average referred
186 cases to the ECJ per year under Article 226.8
The Commission uses various methods in order to detect possible infringements. It devotes
considerable resources to developing efficient detection techniques, whether this is though
the development of databases which track Member States' transposition ofDirectives, or
systematic monitoring of compliance with particular measures by Commission staff. Many
infringement investigations begin on the basis of a complaint to the Commission from an
individual or interest group. Indeed the Commission continually comments upon the
importance of the complainant's role of informing the Commission of suspected infractions,9
and has developed a particular complaint form to facilitate this interaction.10 Figure 1 below
illustrates how significant the complainant is in bringing suspected infringements to the
Commission's attention.
7 Article 220 EC.
8 Source Eighteenth Annual Report on Monitoring the Application ofCommunity Law (2000) COM
(2001) 309 final, Nineteenth Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law
(2001) COM (2002) 324 final, Twentieth Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of
Community Law (2002) COM (2003) 669 final, Twenty-First Annual Report on Monitoring the
Application ofCommunity Law (2003) COM (2004) 839 final, Twenty-Second Annual Report on
Monitoring the Application of Community Law (2004) COM (2005) 570 final. For purposes of
comparative analysis, and to ensure consistency in the use of statistics, only data relating to the 'old
15' Member States will be quoted. Until the Twenty-Third Annual Report on Monitoring the
Application of Community Law (2005) COM (2006) 416 final, this data was collated separately by
the Commission.
9
Usually at the beginning of each Annual Report, see for instance the Twenty-Third Annual Report
on Monitoring the Application of Community Law (2005) COM (2006) 416 final, p 3.




Method of detection of all suspected infringements (1998-2004)
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Source: AnnualMonitoring Reports, 1998-2004.
If the Member State refuses to rectify the situation as directed by the Commission, this may
lead to the Commission instigating the Article 228 penalty process. Article 228 is a
supplementary enforcement mechanism in the Treaty, and is directly connected to the action
under Article 226. An action under Article 228 cannot be engaged until Article 226 has been
fully exhausted. Originally this provision of the EC Treaty was simply a further opportunity
for the Commission to obtain another judgment against the Member State, if the Member
State refused to adhere to the ECJ's judgment under Article 226. The Treaty ofMaastricht"
amended this provision to allow the possibility of the ECJ imposing a financial penalty
against the Member State, formally for non-compliance with the Court's judgment under
Article 226.12 The text of Article 228 reads as follows:
'If the Court of Justice finds that a Member State has failed to fulfil an
obligation under this Treaty, the State shall be required to take the necessary
measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice.
If the Commission considers that the Member State concerned has not taken
such measures it shall, after giving the State the opportunity to submit its
observations, issue a reasoned opinion specifying the points on which the
Member State concerned has not complied with the judgment of the Court of
Justice.
If the Member State concerned fails to take the necessary measures to comply
with the Court's judgement within the time-limit laid down by the Commission,
11
Treaty on European Union, signed 1992.
12
Formally this is still a provision concerned with punishing Member States for not complying with
the ECJ judgment, but in reality is directly related to the original infringement. This is evident when
one takes into account the method of calculating the penalty or lump sum, which is based on the
seriousness and duration of the infringement, rather than a set penalty for ignoring the Court's
judgment which would always be the same amount. See the Commission's latest Communication on
how it reaches an appropriate penalty in 'Commission Communication: Application ofArticle 228 of
the EC Treaty' SEC (2005)1658.
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the latter may bring the case before the Court of Justice. In doing so it shall
specify the amount of the lump sum or penalty payment to be paid by the
Member State concerned which it considers appropriate in the circumstances.
If the Court of Justice finds that the Member State concerned has not complied
with its judgment it may impose a lump sum or penalty payment on it.'
Article 228 has the same format ofArticle 226 and is split into two stages (administrative
and judicial). The Commission must once again provide the Member State with ample time
to bring its conduct into line with the judgment of the ECJ, and must again produce a formal
letter and reasoned opinion before moving to the judicial stage. The decision to move to the
judicial stage, as in Article 226, is not mandated by the Treaty, and the Commission may
simply abandon its attempts to bring the Member State into compliance. If the Commission
decides to refer the case to the ECJ, it may request a financial penalty, and may suggest the
amount of financial penalty, but it remains at the discretion of the Court as to the final
penalty imposed on the Member State (in form and amount).13 Article 228 actions are not
yet routinely pursued to their conclusion by the Commission, and in fact there have only
been five judgments to date against Member States under this provision since Maastricht.14
Article 227 is an enforcement provision of the Treaty that is rarely used. It is a mechanism
of enforcement that enables Member States to refer each other to the ECJ for non-fulfilment
of obligations. The text is as follows:
'A Member State which considers another Member State has failed to fulfil an
obligation under this Treaty may bring the matter before the Court of Justice.
Before a Member State brings an action against another Member State for an
alleged infringement of an obligation under this Treaty, it shall bring the matter
before the Commission.
The Commission shall deliver a reasoned opinion after each of the States
concerned has been given the opportunity to submit its own case and its
observations on the other party's case, both orally and in writing.
If the Commission has not delivered an opinion within three months of the date
on which the matter was brought before it, the absence of such an opinion shall
not prevent the matter from being brought before the Court of Justice.'
Due to the obvious political sensitivity of such an action by a Member State, it would be
politically expedient for Member States to resolve such differences in the numerous other
diplomatic meetings available to Member States as members of the European Union, or to
13 Case C-387/97 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR1-5047.
14 Case C-387/97 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR 1-5047, Case C-278/01 Commission v Spain
[2003] ECR 1-14141, Case C-304/02 Commission v France [2005] 12 July 2005 nyr, Case C-177/04
Commission v France [2006] 14 March 2006 nyr, Case C-l 19/04 Commission v Italy [2006] 18 July
2006 nyr. Although there are many more cases than this referred each year to the ECJ, most are
settled before the Court has any chance of imposing the financial penalty.
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bring the Commission's attention to a suspected infringement and encourage an action by the
Commission under Article 226. The action under Article 227 is similar to that of Article 226
and 228, in that there is both an administrative stage and judicial stage to the provision.
In an action under Article 227, the Commission acts as arbiter, rather than as prosecutor, as
both sides submit their views to the Commission, which must provide a provisional opinion
on the legality of the accused Member State's conduct. Regardless of whether the
Commission agrees or disagrees with the Member State who has initially brought the case,
that Member State is free to refer the case to the ECJ for a definitive answer. The few cases
that have been brought under this provision have had reasoned opinions that both supported
and disagreed with the complaining Member State.15 These three enforcement provisions in
the EC Treaty are the general enforcement actions of the EU legal system.16 Article 226 is at
the pinnacle of this enforcement triangle and as such is the focus of this study, with
discussion of the other two actions included only where relevant.
The enforcement articles in the Treaty do not exist in a legal and political vacuum, but are
shaped by the complex process of European integration. The process of European
integration has been one of constant change and renewal, beginning with sectoral economic
reform projects, and stretching right through to the current period of constitutional
reflection.17 Since the 1990s in particular, the process of intergovernmental conference
(IGC) followed by Treaty revision has been a constant stimulus for discussion and debate
about the nature of the European project.18 Although change has been constant, the
trajectory of European integration has not been uniform. The Community 'pillar' containing
15 For instance see Case 141/78 France v UK [1979] ECR 2923 where France had the support of the
Commission, and Case C-388/95 Belgium v Spain [2000] ECR 1-3123 which proceeded without the
support of the Commission. Although this provision is not a regularly used enforcement provision, it
should not be assumed it is entirely defunct, as the recent case between the UK and Spain
demonstrates, Case C-145/04 Spain v UK [2006] 12 September 2006 nyr. This case proceeded
without the support of the Commission.
16 Of course these are not the only enforcement provisions in the EC Treaty, but they are the only
generally applicable enforcement provisions. Other enforcement provisions which are relevant to
isolated parts of EU law, such as competition law or state aid, will only be referred to as necessary
throughout the thesis.
17 There have been numerous attempts to understand and explain the process ofEuropean integration
stretching from Haas' functionalist perspective, to neofunctionalism and the
intergovernmental/supranational dichotomy, to contemporary debates about the multi-level
governance, see P Craig and G De Burca, above n 5, pp 5-12. See generally JHH Weiler 'The
Transformation ofEurope' (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2403.
18 B de Witte, 'The Closest Thing to a Constitutional Conversation in Europe: The Semi Permanent
Treaty Revision Process' in P Beaumont, C Lyons and N Walker (eds), Convergence and Divergence
in European Public Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002).
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Article 226 remains the most supranational19 element of the Union.20 The EU legal system is
one element of supranationalism in the EU, particularly after the Court of Justice established
the principles of supremacy and direct effect.21 The EU has a supreme legal order, which
binds the Member States in relation to EC law, and subjects them to the jurisdiction of a
supranational authority (the ECJ) should the Member States not fulfil their obligations in the
Treaty. This is different from the traditional format of international agreements based on the
consent of sovereign actors, characterised as intergovernmental co-operation.22 Some policy
sectors however remain intergovernmental in nature; they are non-binding areas of political
co-operation.23 There has not been a simple progression from an international collaboration
ofMember States to a supranational entity and the so-called variable geometry has to some
extent always been present.24 The state of integration of different actors, institutions and
policy sectors has been, and continues to be, variable.25
The Maastricht Treaty26 was an important turning point in achieving greater political co¬
operation.27 From this point onwards, the rate at which renewal and debate about the nature
of the European project has greatly increased. The prospect of enlargement to include states
from Central and Eastern Europe focused attention on issues relating to institutional reform,
initially on a practical level of whether the existing institutions could cope with the increased
workload enlargement would bring.28 The Treaty ofNice and in particular the Declaration
19
Supranational means government above, or beyond, the state level of government where states do
not wield individual vetos.
20 This of course is a rather simplistic overview of the pillar structure, since the first pillar now
contains provisions on visa and asylum matters which retain some residual third pillar
(intergovernmental) characteristics.
21 See generally P Craig and G De Burca, above n 5 chps 5 and 7.
22
Intergovernmental means international co-operation based on solely on the consent of the each state
involved.
23
Mainly found in the second pillar.
24 The phrase variable geometry relates to the opt in or opt out policy sectors contained in the Treaties
allowing some Member States to co-operate without all Member States agreeing to new policy
initiatives. See J Usher 'Variable Geometry or Concentric Circles: Patterns for the EU' (1997) 46
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 243.
25 JHH Weiler, 'The Community System: the Dual Character of Supranationalism' (1981) 1 Yearbook
ofEuropean Law 1.
26
Treaty on European Union, signed 1992, and entered into force in 1993.
27 The TEU renamed the EEC Treaty as the EC Treaty (which would comprise the Communities and
be the first pillar) and created the three pillar structure and the European Union.
28 The focus behind the amendments in the Treaty of Amsterdam signed 1997, entered into force 1999
and the Treaty ofNice, signed 2002, entered into force 2003. See for discussion J Shaw 'The Treaty
of Nice: Legal and Constitutional Implications' (2001) 7 European Public Law 195.
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on the future of the Union29 called for a deeper and wider debate about the future of the EU,
leading to the Laeken Declaration.30
This Declaration set out the political agenda and the normative vision of the EU's Member
States for a more democratic Europe. The Declaration focused upon some general key
themes, such as bringing the institutions closer to the citizens by making them more open
and efficient, which in turn would lead to an increased democratic scrutiny of the EU's
actions. Through the simplification of instruments, clearer roles for each institution and
greater transparency in its operation, the Laeken Declaration pinpointed the way in which the
democratic credentials of the EU could be greatly increased. The Declaration culminated in
the convening of the Convention on the Future ofEurope to reflect upon the issues raised.31
After 17 months of work and discussions, the Convention proposed a Draft Treaty,
establishing a Constitution for Europe. The Draft Treaty was debated and amended at the
IGC in 2004, eventually resulting in agreement upon the Treaty establishing a Constitution
for Europe which was signed by the Member States in October 2004. The Constitutional
Treaty32 has been ratified by only 18 out of 27 Member States.33 Negative results in
referendums in France and the Netherlands have stalled progress on the Constitutional
Treaty preventing it from entering into force. This negative reaction indicates that the EU
must overcome significant obstacles if the normative vision it holds is to be accepted across
and within the Member States. The future of the Treaty is yet to be decided.
In order to have a proper understanding of the enforcement mechanism, it must be evaluated
in the light of the political context of the EU, especially those normative initiatives bound up
in the drive for greater constitutionalisation of the EU. Amongst these is the drive for good
governance, adopted by the European Commission as a talisman in the fight against the
spectre of the so-called democratic deficit. The Laeken Declaration, the Future ofEurope
29 Declaration on the future of the Union, Treaty ofNice OJ C 80 10.3.2001, Declaration 23 at p 80.
30
European Council, December 2001, the text can be found at
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/68827.pdf.
31 The Convention was charged with preparing for the 2004 IGC in a transparent and open format,
including many stakeholders into the debate, for instance, the governments of the Member States and
the candidate countries, representatives of national parliaments, representatives of the European
Parliament and the European Commission, and observers from the Committee of the Regions, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the European social partners. For a step by step
description of the work of the Convention and the debate about the future of Europe, see
http://europa.eu/scadplus/european_convention/introduction_en.htm. See generally J Shaw 'Process,
Responsibility and Inclusion in EU Constitutionalism' (2003) 9 European Law Journal 45.
32
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe OJ C 310 16.12.2004.
33 As of January 2007, see http://europa.eu/constitution/index_en.htm.
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Convention and the production of a Constitutional Treaty are relevant political factors that
structure and underpin a useful evaluation of the role ofArticle 226 in contemporary Europe.
1.1: Research motivation
The traditional characterisation and approach to Article 226 by the main stakeholders in the
enforcement mechanism presents an interesting paradox in contemporary Europe.34 As the
EC progressed from an economic to a political union, the EU has become increasingly
criticised as an organisation lacking in democratic credentials. These credentials are
important since they legitimate the transfer of economic, political and legal power over the
citizen from the state to the supranational level. The recent focus of both the institutions and
the Member States has been on increasing the legitimacy and popularity of the European
project with the citizens ofEurope, in the face of increasing disinterest and disillusionment.35
Article 226 provides a rare opportunity for the institutions of the EU to connect directly with
European citizens, as citizens can complain to the Commission about breaches of
Community law. This forum of institution-citizen interaction is a valuable conduit for
improving citizen relations with institutions that are all too often seen as distant, bureaucratic
and unapproachable.
Article 226 provides an opportunity for the citizens to hold Member States to account
through the EU institutions, by using Article 226 as a complaint forum. The Commission
could develop a citizen friendly image as the protector of European citizens' rights by
seeking legal enforcement ofMember States' obligations. It also provides an opportunity for
inter-institutional dialogue and interaction: the Parliament has a vital role to play in ensuring
the Commission carries out its role as guardian of the Treaty effectively. Furthermore, the
European Ombudsman has sought to improve the administration of the Commission when it
interacts with citizens in relation to Article 226 complaints and investigations, and has
attempted to create some form of accountability of the Commission to the citizen. Ensuring
Member States fulfil their obligations under the Treaty is crucial in terms ofprotecting and
reinforcing citizens' European rights, and is therefore of particular importance in the context
of delivering good governance:
'in a moment of serious doubt about the capability of the EU to listen to its
citizens, the ability to ensure the implementation of.. .legislation, could
34 The traditional characterisation of Article 226 will be explored later in this section particularly with
reference to other scholarly works and documents produced by the institutions.
35 See the Eurobarometer website for opinion polls on the popularity of the EU project at
http://ec.europa.eu/public opinion/index en,htm. See generally A Amull and D Wincott (eds),
Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002).
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represent a way to regain citizens' confidence that should be given the upmost
priority by EU institutions.'36
As part of the good governance agenda, the Commission recognises the importance of its
enforcement responsibilities in increasing the legitimacy of the EU, and it contends that it
will 'pursue infringements with vigour',37 and that:
'Reforming European governance implies that the Commission must refocus on
its core mission.. .and maximise the impact of the Commission's actions as
guardian of the Treaty.'38
The Commission recognises that in order to achieve greater legitimacy, the EU cannot rely
solely on policy delivery. This is no longer sufficient in order to connect Europe to its
citizens. The sole function of Article 226 therefore cannot be the delivery of effective
enforcement alone because:
'The Union is changing as well. It will no longer be judged on its ability to
remove barriers to trade or to complete an internal market; its legitimacy today
depends on involvement and participation'.39
Furthermore:
'Ultimately this.. .concerns the citizens themselves. Through information,
participation and access to justice they are to be the actors of a Community
based on the rule of law.'40
In the search for greater legitimacy, adherence to the rule of law is crucial. Respect for the
rule of law is a fundamental foundation of the EU project, and ofArticle 226 itself. It is,
after all, a mechanism for ensuring Member States respect the rule of law by fulfilling their
legally binding obligations under the Treaty. The Commission acknowledges that:
'The Union is built on the rule of law; it can draw from the Charter of
fundamental rights'41
Yet, respect for the rule of law appears to be problematic in the traditional operation of
Article 226. A lack of legal regulation of the operation of Article 226, culminating in
extensive Commission discretion, means that:
'There is a clear contradiction between the principles underlying the rule of law
and a certain practice of indulgence and negotiation engendered by the
Commission through its use ofArticle 226 EC.'42
36
Report of the European Parliament: 'Report on the Commission's 21st and 22nd Annual Reports on
monitoring the application of Community law' Committee on Legal Affairs, 24 March 2006 A6-
0089/2006 final, p 15.
37
European Governance: A White Paper COM (2001) 428 p 25.
38 Ibid p 8.
39 Ibid p 11.
40 Commission Communication 'Better Monitoring of the Application of Community Law' COM
(2002) 725 finaF4 16.5.2003, p 21.
41 Above n 37 p 7.
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There is a conflict between the good governance agenda, aimed at increasing legitimacy in
the EU, and extensive political and administrative discretion when compliance with legal
rules is the ultimate goal:
'Discretion may be a necessary evil in modern government; absolute discretion
coupled with an absolute lack of transparency, however, is fundamentally
contrary to the rule of law.'43
Juxtaposed against this search for popular approval and legitimacy, the approach of the
stakeholders toward the central mechanism of enforcement appears essentially the same as it
always was: an arena of secretive deal-making, riddled with a lack of transparency and
accountability for those actors claiming to promote legitimate European governance. If the
good governance agenda, and the process of constitutionalisation are to be taken seriously,
this situation cannot be permitted to continue. Furthermore, it need not be the case that
improving governance in the EU, and the effective operation of Article 226, are seen as
contradictory propositions. There is scope for both the delivery of effective enforcement and
the accommodation of good governance values through the recognition of the multiple
functions which Article 226 performs, and of the different roles of the multiplicity of actors
involved in the process of enforcement. This thesis will discuss the issues highlighted in the
above quotations, and evaluate the role of Article 226 in the context of good governance and
legitimacy in the EU.
1.2: The treatment ofArticle 226 in academic literature
Much of the early work on Article 226 was by legal scholars, who attempted to break down
the provision into distinct phases and analyse the meaning of each particular section of the
Treaty article.44 Various authors adopt this descriptive analytical approach, whether this
relates to the position of an institutional actor in the infringement process, or the specific
interpretation of the Treaty given by the Court. For example, some authors have chosen to
focus on what conduct constitutes a 'failure to fulfil obligations' under the Treaty.45 A
thorough analysis of the case law provides an illustration of the specific types ofMember
42 Above n 36 p 15.
43 Ibid p 17.
44 See generally A Dashwood and R White, 'Enforcement Actions under Articles 169 and 170 EEC'
(1989) 14 European Law Review 388, J Mertens de Wilmars and IM Verougstraete, 'Proceedings
against Member States for Failure to Fulfil their Obligations (1970) 7 Common Market Law Review
385.
45 A Barav, 'Failure of Member States to Fulfil their Obligations under Community Law' (1975)
Common Market Law Review 369.
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State conduct that the Commission will prosecute.46 Barav's work is typical of the early
legal scholarship on Article 226 which is generally supportive of the Article 226 procedure
and remarks that conflict ought to be resolved through negotiation, with the Commission
resorting to the Court only 'in extremis'. This is an approach that reinforces the international,
diplomatic characterisation ofArticle 226 popular in early academic pieces. This analysis is
primarily aimed at providing a detailed understanding of the application of the Treaty to
specific cases before the Court, in order that the outcome of analogous cases might be
predicted using these criteria and applying legal reasoning.
The role of the Court of Justice in Article 226 has also been documented in previous studies.
Some pieces particularly focus upon the Court's deferential approach to the Commission's
discretion under Article 226.47 Article 226 has also been explored as a paradigm of Member
State/ECJ interaction, using the outcome of cases and the reasoning applied by the Court to
extrapolate the division ofpower between the respective players (identified as the
Commission and Member States).48 By analysing the statistics generated by the
infringement process, Everling attempted to draw a picture of the way in which Member
States react to the pressure of an impending Court appearance for failing to fulfil their
responsibilities under the Treaty, and concluded that some Member States are particularly
anxious to avoid the 'stain of judgment' resulting from judicial proceedings.49
The subject of the Commission's discretion in Article 226 is a familiar topic of inquiry.50
Such discussions tend to focus upon the extent ofCommission discretion throughout the
administrative and judicial stages of the enforcement procedure, and examines the limits (or
lack thereof) that the ECJ has attempted to set. This analysis is based on examination of the
Article 226 case law from the ECJ and Opinions of Advocates General. Again the procedure
is characterised as sui generis. The Commission's duty as 'guardian of the Treaty' in Article
211 EC is considered by Evans to be a significant limiting factor upon the exercise of the
Commission's discretion under Article 226.
46
eg breach ofTreaty articles, secondary legislation, general principles of EC law, omission of state
as well as action, incorrect application.
47 See especially AC Evans, 'The Enforcement Procedure ofArticle 169 EEC: Commission
Discretion' (1979) European Law Review 442.
48 U Everling, 'The Member States of the European Community before their Court of Justice' (1984)
9 European Law Review 215.
49 Ibid p 244.
50 See Evans, above n 47.
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Similar questions have been raised in connection with the use and extent ofCommission
discretion and the operation of the revised Article 228 procedure, which now includes
financial sanctions for non-compliance with judgments under the infringement process.51 By
way of comparison and analogy with the Article 226 process, Bonnie is very critical of these
instances of discretion on the grounds that it undermines the effectiveness of the Article 228
procedure. It was not suggested in earlier work that discretion contributed to undermining
the effectiveness of the infringement proceedings, because the discussion of Article 226 and
Article 228 tended to focus upon the lack of sanctions available to compel the Member
States to act. This lack of sanctions, rather than extensive discretion, was considered as the
major barrier to effective enforcement. Despite many criticisms levelled at the penalty
process by Bonnie, the operation ofArticle 228 is subject to a great deal more transparent
structuring and confining ofCommission discretion.52 The Commission has produced several
Communications specifically explaining the method of calculation and the criteria on which
the seriousness of the infringement will be judged. In comparison with Article 226 where
there was no similar structuring of discretion, Article 228 appeared to be a far more
transparent process.53
Such a discussion of discretion exemplifies the limits of legal analysis. The way in which
the Commission behaves in relation to these two similarly worded and closely related Treaty
provisions is of great significance, but cannot be adequately explained by legal analysis of
the case law and Treaty provisions alone. Political motivations, institutional attitudes and
51 A Bonnie, 'Commission Discretion under Article 171(2) EC' (1998) 23 European Law Review 537.
52 This structuring of discretion was self-imposed by the Commission to some extent, but was also a
consequence of the ECJ's approach to the imposition of financial penalties. This will be discussed in
greater detail in Chapter IV.
53 In fact Bonnie, above n 51, attempts to differentiate the infringement process under Article 226 and
the financial sanctions in Article 228 as being entirely unrelated, despite the obvious link between
them, to explain the difference in approach by the Commission. But see MA Theodossiou, 'An
analysis of the recent response to non-compliance with the Court of Justice Judgments: Article 228(2)
EC' (2002) 27 European Law Review 25. Theodossiou argues that these Articles are clearly linked.
Both Bonnie and Theodossiou seem intent on distinguishing the conduct under each proceeding
however, since both authors object to the taking into consideration of voting capabilities in the
Council as a criterion for judging the amount ofpayment, on the grounds that this does not correlate to
ability to pay the fine (as in GDP) but to political power. However, political motivation (power) is
felt to be an acceptable criterion under Article 226 forjudging whether to proceed to the ECJ, or at all.
Both argue that as the ultima ratio for securing compliance, discretion ought to be minimal under
Article 228 as this is seen as a hindrance to effectiveness, but this was exactly the argument used in
relation to Article 226 for allowing extensive Commission discretion (Barav, Evans) in earlier
academic work.
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decision-making processes need to be explored in depth, in order to enhance our
understanding of the reasons for a difference in approach.54
The seminal work of Audretsch on Article 226 was a forerunner of a more contemporary
debate.55 This early work focused upon questions of effective supervision not common to
works of pure legal analysis, and raised questions about the overall transparency of the
process at a time when transparency was not a popular concern of other authors. The scope
of his original study was supervision of the Member States in the EC context, which
involved examining the principal supervisory sections of the Treaties (ECSC, Euratom and
EC Treaty). This study included a comparative analysis of the Treaty articles in relation to
state aid and competition.56 Additionally, the actual day-to-day work undertaken by the
Commission in this field is also analysed, using a number of different empirical materials,
including Commission papers and interviews. The analysis of the Commission's activities
adds a further dimension to Article 226 scholarship as previous to Audretsch's work little
was known about the day-to-day management of the infringement process.
In terms of the characterisation of the infringement process Audretsch notes that it differs
from the general obligation contained in the principle ofpacta sunt servanda in international
law, due to the sui generis nature of the EC legal order. Nevertheless the Article 226
mechanism retains some of the distinctive nature of international procedure such as the
'diplomatic mystique' involved in its operation, typical of interaction through negotiation,
consent and a respectful attitude toward state sovereignty. Commission supervision is
characterised as political in nature,57 since it occurs with the participation of all the interested
parties (defined as the Member State and the Commission). This is justified since it
correlated to the (then) political reality ofmore limited obligations of the Member States and
a Community not yet considering its evolution into a constitutional polity. Due to the often
competing interests of the Community and the Member States, and the absence of sanctions
available for breach, there seemed little alternative to extensive Commission discretion at
54 See the work of KC Davis, Discretionary Justice in Europe and America (University of Illinois
Press, Chicago, 1976).
55 HAH Audretsch, Supervision in European Community Law (2nd Edition, Elsevier, North Holland,
1986) hereinafter as 'Audretsch'.
56 This technique is repeated again and again in many later pieces, for example see Gil Ibanez, below
n 61.
57 Above n 55 p 451.
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this point in time.58 Negotiation was necessary precisely because there were no effective
sanctions available to compel Member State compliance.
Much of the academic discussion ofArticle 226 relates to the question of how to achieve
effective enforcement ofCommunity law. In this respect Snyder focuses upon improving
the effectiveness ofEuropean law using different 'tools and techniques'.59 He characterises
Article 226 as just one process of administrative negotiation which, in order to ensure
effective enforcement ofCommunity law, ought to be used in tandem with his two other
suggested methods of enforcement: soft law and structural reforms. Effective enforcement,
in turn, is considered necessary for smooth European integration. In this study Article 226 is
characterised primarily as a strategic bargaining device, used to 'play for rules' before the
Court, essential in order to establish general principles in the case law. In this way, Snyder
agrees with Audretsch that the role of the Commission as initiator and enforcer ofpolicy are
complementary and are both essential to the successful evolution of the EU.60 Article 226 is
conceived less in the traditional international/political terms used in the earlier, more
doctrinal pieces, and more as a bureaucratic aid to regulation ofCommunity law. The main
focus of this piece is the element of 'structural reforms' (meaning the interaction between the
Commission and national authorities in enforcement), which he contends are vital avenues of
reform in order to achieve more effective enforcement.
Increasing the efficiency of Community administration is also an aspect of better supervision
and enforcement ofCommunity law. Ibanez's study on enforcement examines the role of
the Commission in tandem with national administrations when supervising and enforcing EC
law, and questions how the two administrations interrelate and conflict, using the structural
reforms element of Snyder's three part enforcement model.61 Ultimately, this is a search for
a more efficient system of enforcement of EC law, and Article 226 data is used to establish
areas ofnon-compliance, and therefore to pinpoint areas ofpossible improvement. Article
226 is described as a tool of administrative regulation, along with other enforcement
provisions relating to state aid and competition.
58 Ibid.
59 F Snyder, 'The Effectiveness ofEuropean Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and
Techniques' (1993) 56 Modern Law Review 19.
60 In Audretsch's terms, the 'steering' function of his model of effective supervision.
61 AJ Gil Ibanez, The Administrative Supervision and Enforcement ofEC Law. Powers Procedures
and Limits (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1999). See also AJ Gil Ibanez, 'Exceptions to Article 226:
Alternative Administrative Procedures and the Pursuit ofMember States' (2000) 6 European Law
Journal 148.
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Ibanez's empirical focus is upon problems of co-ordination between the two levels of
administration which inhibit efficient enforcement. He concludes that the Commission's
enforcement powers should be developed more consistently instead of the current trend of
developing enforcement proceedings to suit the particular sector on an ad hoc basis. A
plethora of individual pieces of enforcement legislation, he argues, has led to unnecessary
confusion, favouring the increase in Commission power without leading to better
enforcement. Improving efficiency in enforcement is best achieved through the development
of clear legal rules, in concert with better co-ordination in the practical application of those
rules between the two levels of administration. Studies that move beyond pure legal analysis
(such as this one) tend to conclude that the legal framework ofArticle 226 alone is
insufficient to achieve effective and efficient enforcement. Ibanez suggests on the one hand
creating a more flexible and responsive approach to enforcement,62 but similarly pushes the
notion of further juridification of administrative procedures63 that seems, to some extent,
contradictory.
Most authors agree that one function ofArticle 226 is to enhance uniform integration by
means of coercion ofMember States to ensure they fulfil their Treaty responsibilities. It is
therefore important to consider the relative success of its operation across the Member
States: i.e. how effective is Article 226 as a mechanism of integration? This question is
addressed in the research undertaken by Siedentopf and Ziller, which examines problems of
control and monitoring ofCommunity law and evaluates the consequences of non¬
compliance for uniform integration.64 This study consists of comparative research across all
the Member States of how national administrations transpose and implement European
legislation in practice, and it is designed to highlight the problems experienced by national
administrations in the execution and administrative application ofCommunity law.65
A number of directives and regulations are used as the empirical basis of this comparison,
drawn from different policy sectors and varying in political, legal and economic significance
across the Member States. As well as horizontal comparisons across the Member States in
terms ofworking practices relating to transposition of the directives, there is also a detailed
case study of regulations. The research suggests that Article 226 cannot bear the burden of
62 Ibid p 316.
63 Ibid p 320.
64 H Siedentopf and J Ziller (eds), Making European Policies Work. The Implementing ofCommunity
Legislation in the Member States Volume I, Comparative Synthesis (Sage, London, 1988).
65 For instance by uncovering of common difficulties across the Member States' administrations or
specific problems due to local (legal or political) conditions.
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ensuring states comply with their legal obligations and that the future lies in 'decentralised
control'.66 This would mean a shift from the traditional reliance on the Article 226
mechanism and Commission enforcement, towards a greater role for the national courts
which ought to be the ultimate guardians of proper implementation and application of EU
law. As a consequence, the centralised control can become more selective and compensate
for the failures of the national control mechanisms.
Although there are numerous studies on Article 226 as a mechanism of effective
enforcement, and an equally abundant selection of research on the Commission as an
institution, few studies have combined consideration of these two questions. One exception
to this is Mendrinou's paper which focuses on the role of the Commission in European
integration through the use of its monitoring powers under Article 226.67 Using infringement
data to analyse the trends in the Commission's enforcement policy with regard to particular
states and policy areas, Mendrinou argues that the non-compliance ofMember States is a
'systemic phenomenon' not linked to a particular country or policy area. Mendrinou,
through the use of game theory, attempts to construct a theoretical model that explains the
differing tactics adopted by the Commission in its enforcement strategy. She concludes that
when pursuing infringements the Commission's own institutional self-interest has had some
influence over which infringements are prosecuted and which are not.68
The Commission's policy approach is evaluated by Mendrinou as having moved away from
a policy of 'forbearance'69 (the patient, diplomatic approach) to a more aggressive policy of
monitoring. Through its monitoring function the Commission has been able to prioritise
certain policy fields over others, emphasising integration in one policy sector through
consistent pursuit of certain types of infringements. This in turn can be linked to the
Commission's role in policy initiation and policy development. The Commission tends to
pursue those policies it remains most committed to, perhaps because it is a particular
initiative for which the Commission itself had fought for when acting as the legislator. Thus,
the Commission does not pursue each infringement with equal impartial disinterest, contrary
to the assumptions made in other academic studies, which do not consider the Commission's
66 CD Ehlermann, 'Opening Speech at the IVth Erenstein Colloquium', in H Siedentopf and J Ziller
(eds), Making European Policies Work. The Implementing ofCommunity Legislation in the Member
States Volume I, Comparative Synthesis (Sage, London, 1988) 147.
67 M Mendrinou, 'Non-compliance and the European Commission's Role in integration' (1996) 3
Journal ofEuropean Public Policy 1.
68 See also J Tallberg, European Governance and Supranational Institutions: making states comply
(Routledge, London, 2003).
69 Described by Ehlermann, above n 66 as the 'diplomatic period'.
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strategic priorities as a factor that determine how effective Article 226 can be as a
mechanism of enforcement.
The European Union presents a unique environment for the discussion of theories that try to
analyse why states behave in a certain way in the context of complying with international
obligations, because of the sui generis nature of the legal obligations incurred by the
Member States under the Treaties. Article 226 data is used to pinpoint areas of non¬
compliance, against which theories or models are constructed which seek to understand the
behaviour of states in the arena of compliance with international law. An example of such
an approach is Borzel who studies the statistical data relating to Article 226 and examines
whether in fact it is possible to assert that there is a growing compliance problem amongst
the Member States with EU law, as previous academic works had done.70 She asserts that
there is no conclusive raw data available to measure accurately the rate of non-compliance of
Member States, due to varying factors, such as of the lack of consistency of the reporting
methods of the Commission when collating the Article 226 data.
Borzel et al critique the use of the figures generated by Article 226 actions, due to the fact
that they represent only a sample of all possible breaches, as every breach is not pursued or
discovered by the Commission.71 Statistics alone cannot portray a realistic picture of non¬
compliance, let alone the underlying reasons for it. Compliance theory is then used to
provide the theoretical framework to test hypotheses against the data. This type of study is
useful as it tries to understand compliance from the perspective of studying Member State
behaviour rather than that of the Commission.
Some contemporary studies into Article 226 have begun to recognise the value of
acknowledging and examining the role of other actors in the enforcement process, besides
the Commission and Member States. In particular, the role of the complainant in the
infringement process has been commented upon. The position of the individual in the
infringement process had not been a prominent feature of the earlier academic work, perhaps
understandably so given the (then) state of integration at the European level. Timmermans
analyses the role of the complainant with reference to established case law principles and
Treaty provisions and in doing so restates the traditional approach to Article 226
70 TA Borzel, 'Non-Compliance in the European Union: pathology or statistical artefact?' (2001) 8
Journal ofEuropean Public Policy 803.
71 TA Borzel, T Hofmann and C Sprungk, 'Why Do States not Obey the Law? Lessons from the
European Union?' (EUSA Conference, Nashville, 2003).
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scholarship.72 The basic premise of the paper is that individuals have no place in the Article
226 process (beyond that of informant), and thus there is nothing amiss in the secretive,
international approach to the conduct ofArticle 226 as it currently stands. Individuals are
catered for via the preliminary rulings system under Article 234 and it is within this arena
that individuals must pursue their grievances.
In order to increase the effectiveness ofArticle 226, Timmermans proposes that supervision
of EC law should be a 'partenariat' between the Commission and the Member States, with
national courts offering better opportunities for the individual to find redress.73 Any attempt
to correlate the position of the complainant under Article 226 with that in state aid and
competition74 is totally rebuffed on the basis that the reason the complainant's role in such
proceedings differ is directly related to the type of Treaty provision under consideration.75 It
is in fact this apriori assumption made by many academic studies, that Article 226 has one
sole function (i.e. of effective enforcement to be achieved via negotiation between the
Commission and Member States) that reinforces a blinkered approach to the characterisation
and role ofArticle 226 which is now out of date in the current political context.
Consideration of the participation and impact of other actors in relation to the operation of
Article 226 is limited, although more recently there has been some discussion of the impact
of the citizen and Ombudsman.76 This study is based on the case law of the courts and
consideration of citizen complaints to the Ombudsman in relation to the extent of
Commission discretion and the lack of transparency in the infringement process. Rawlings
departs from previous studies in that his work questions the appropriateness of the traditional
characterisation ofArticle 226 as a process of'elite regulatory bargaining', i.e. one of closed
and secretive negotiation between Member States and the Commission, or that this is the sole
function of Article 226 in the European polity. The role of the complainant in enforcement
is not viewed as being restricted solely to preliminary rulings or direct actions, contrary to
72 CWA Timmermans, 'Judicial Protection against Member States: 169 and 177 revisited' in D Curtin
and T Heukels (eds), Institutional Dynamics ofEuropean Integration. Essays in Honour ofHenry G.
Schermers Volume II (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1994) 391.
73 The type of technocratic jargon used by Timmermans (such as partenariat and complementarity) is
unhelpful in the context of engaging with citizens. This is commented upon further in Chapter III.
74 Where the individual possess many more procedural rights than under Article 226, see Maselis for a
full discussion below n 75.
75 Other scholars have commented on the rights of complainants in other enforcement actions and
made the comparison between those and Article 226, see I Maselis and HM Gilliams, 'Rights of
Complainants in Community Law' (1997) 22 European Law Review 103 is one example relating to
state aid and competition.
76 R Rawlings, 'Engaged Elites: Citizen Action and Institutional Attitudes in Commission
Enforcement' (2000) 6 European Law Journal 4.
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the view of Timmermans. Instead he asserts that private actors do have a role to play in
public enforcement, and this needs to be complemented by a more effective targeting of
Commission enforcement policy.
The material presented above provides a broad overview ofprevious academic discussion of
Article 226. In summary, Article 226 has been characterised as a forum of negotiation
between the Commission and Member States, with the ECJ having a deferential attitude to
the institutional power of the Commission. Rather than a mechanism of strict legal
enforcement, the judicial phase ofArticle 226 has been characterised as a mechanism that is
resorted to only in extreme circumstances and after all other avenues have been exhausted.
The enforcement mechanism was surrounded by 'diplomatic mystique' and as such was not
open to scrutiny by outsiders. The emphasis had largely been on the examination ofjust two
actors in the enforcement mechanism; the Commission, which devises, manages and controls
the enforcement process, and the Member State which is the subject of the enforcement
action. These studies are concerned with either legal analytical questions, or with questions
of institutional behaviour, but do not necessarily identify the connection between the two.
Previous scholarship has (largely) assumed that Article 226 has one function/output in the
EU polity, usually that of achieving effective enforcement ofCommunity law. The question
of how this is best achieved in the light of a cumbersome legal provision has been explored
at length, whether through decentralised control, better coordination between national and
European administrations or a more effective enforcement policy from the Commission. It is
rarely acknowledged that Article 226 might have more than one function in the European
polity.77 Furthermore, this single function approach is analysed almost always in isolation
from the contemporary legal and political context of the Union. When contemporary legal or
political developments have been commented upon, it has been incidental to the discussion
or has not been considered ofparticular importance or explored in any significant depth.78
Similarly, the Commission's discretion and its consequences is an abundantly analysed topic
in legal doctrinal accounts of Article 226. However, work on discretion based on the
analysis of legal provisions or case law provides a necessarily limited set of questions and
answers and does not address the more in-depth conceptual and theoretical problems
77
Although see the very recent article by C Harlow and R Rawlings, 'Accountability and Law
Enforcement: The Centralised EU Infringement Procedure' (2006) 31 European Law Review 447.
78 See the recent article by A Bonnie, 'The Evolving Role of the European Commission in the
Enforcement ofCommunity Law: From Negotiating Compliance to Prosecuting Member States?'
(2006) 1 Journal ofContemporary European Research 39.
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inherent in the exercise of discretion that are tackled by other disciplines such as public
administration. This is because legal scholarship focuses upon analysing specific sections of
legal text which are broad enough to confer discretion on an actor through wide drafting of
particular phrases. This analytical approach then considers ways to limit or expand this
discretion using legal reasoning techniques, or using pre-established legal principles (for
instance, natural justice) to instil limits to discretion that are not necessarily self-evident by
reading the text itself.79 There is no investigation into the complex institutional/actor
interactions that occur within the enforcement process, or the behaviour of the actors on
whom discretion is conferred (for instance the factors which may influence the way in which
they exercise this discretion).80
1.3: The research puzzle
This study will contribute to the scholarly discussion of the role of Article 226 by starting
from the basic standpoint of questioning the function (or functions) ofArticle 226. In
contrast to the established approach to discussions on Article 226, this study begins from the
proposition that the Article 226 mechanism has many different functions or roles. These
differing functions must all be accommodated within the Article 226 process, and any
conflicts between these functions must be identified and explored before a useful evaluation
of the role of Article 226 can be undertaken. An examination of the role of Article 226
cannot be complete if only one function, say that of effective enforcement, is identified as
the only relevant consideration. Table 1 below highlights the various functions or processes
that exist under the umbrella ofArticle 226.
79 R Mastroianni, 'The Enforcement Procedure under Article 169 of the EC Treaty and the Powers of
the European Commission: Quis Custodiet Custodes?' (1995) 1 European Public Law 535.




The different functions ofArticle 226
Function ofArticle 226 Output/Example
Constitutional mechanism of enforcement, compliance and
integration.
Uniform application ofEU law.
Executive policy choice. Design/implementation and control of
policy on enforcement a Commission
prerogative.
Forum for citizen-institution interaction. Citizen-Commission, citizen
Ombudsman, citizen-Parliament.
Administrative/regulatory tool. Rule making for Member States, soft
law codes for citizen.
Institutional forum for debate, control and accountability. Commission-Member State, citizen-
Member State via Commission,
Parliament-Commission,
Ombudsman-Commission.
There are five different functions that must be accommodated within the enforcement
mechanism of Article 226. There is an obvious emphasis on compliance and effective
enforcement evident throughout the scholarly literature and the policy papers of the
Commission. Article 211 EC, which governs the Commission's responsibilities, makes clear
that as 'guardian of the Treaty' it must ensure that Member States comply with Community
obligations. Under the auspices of Article 226, during the period of infringement
investigation and management by the Commission, there is also a rare opportunity for the
European Union to connect directly with its citizenship81 by a process of complaint and
administrative interaction between the citizen and the institution. The European
Commission encourages this interaction between itself and the citizens of Europe as vital to
the process ofmonitoring Member State compliance with Community obligations, and in
doing so engages in the process of administrative rule making through the use of soft law
instruments. Article 226 also provides a forum for valuable institutional interaction and
debate in the EU, and is one of the few processes by which the actors interact to provide
control and accountability in respect of the how enforcement responsibilities under Article
226 are discharged. The European Ombudsman and the European Parliament are the
primary institutions involved in this process of debate and control with the European
Commission. Finally, Article 226 confers an executive policy choice on the Commission - it
81 There is a lively debate about the nature and extent of citizenship in the EU, and the relationship
between the citizens ofEurope and the institutions, see generally S O'Leary, The Evolving Concept of
Community Citizenship (Kluwer, The Hague,1996), J Shaw, 'European Union Citizenship: The IGC
and Beyond' (1997) 3 European Public Law 413, J Shaw 'The Many Pasts and Futures of Citizenship
in the European Union' (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 554, RW Davis 'Citizenship of the
Union...rights for all?' (2002) 27 European Law Review 121.
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alone is responsible for formulating the strategy on how it will pursue, investigate and
prosecute infringements and which areas of substantive EU policy it will concentrate its
efforts upon. This in turn effects the output of the Union, and in doing so impacts upon the
process of integration and the citizens' perception of what the EU can deliver.
This study evaluates the role of the Article 226 in light of the different functions assigned to
it, with reference to the contemporary legal and political context of the EU. This study then
questions to what extent the current understanding of the role of Article 226 fits with the
greater aspirations of good governance and legitimacy in the EU. An understanding of the
contemporary legal context of the EU is essential to the evaluation of the role of Article 226
as an enforcement mechanism. Article 226 is of course a legal provision, and one that has
been shaped by the interpretation of the courts. The EU is not a static legal environment and
the Treaties are 'living instruments', where the interpretation of text is always evolving. The
legal system of the EU has changed enormously since Article 226 was conceived, and this
includes the continuing development of administrative law and human rights principles,
along with an increasing expectation of rights protection amongst the European public.
The relationships and interactions that occur within the enforcement action are themselves
governed by legal principles that have been developed by the courts. It is also a legal
provision that accords tremendous power to the Commission in dealing with compliance in
an administrative forum. Most of the institutional decision-making under Article 226 occurs
in the administrative phase of the enforcement action, in fact around 91 per cent.82 The
importance of legally enforceable administrative rights becomes relevant, especially in the
context of creating greater accountability in respect ofEuropean institutions, and the role of
administrative law in creating a legitimate system of governance.
The political context is equally important in evaluating the role of Article 226. This study
identifies Article 226 as the central mechanism of enforcement in the constitutional
architecture (the Treaties) of the EU. Member States' compliance with the Treaties is
fundamental to the success, and even the existence of, the European project:
82
Twenty-Second Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law (2004) COM
(2005) 570 final. Out of 2146 infringements detected, only 202 were referred to the ECJ, or 9% of the
total infringements detected. All other infringements were therefore dealt with in the administrative
phase of Article 226.
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'In an enlarged EU the fact that laws are correctly and visibly implemented is
essential to give meaning to the whole European project. This is not only a
matter of legal obligation but also a question of political responsibility'.83
The uniform application ofEU legislation in all Member States underpinned the initial
primary goal of creating an economic area, where the conditions governing the internal
market are equalised across the Union, necessitating a system of uniform legal rules across
state boundaries.84 Although the goals of the European project have moved forward to a
political union, the need for Member State compliance with their Community obligations has
remained of primary importance. The drive toward political union, in combination with the
enlargement of the EU, has posed even greater challenges in terms of ensuring Member State
compliance, with a greater geographic area to monitor and ever more politically sensitive
policy domains being transferred to EU competence. With a changing political environment
come unique challenges to enforcing compliance with European obligations, although the
central mechanism for ensuring compliance remains unchanged. Against this backdrop,
Article 226 is problematic as the central enforcement mechanism of the EU because it has
not evolved in line with either the dominating legal or political aspirations of the EU.
Against this legal and political background, this study characterises Article 226 not simply as
a single faceted legal provision, but also as a unique space of interaction for a multitude of
actors. The study takes into consideration the increasingly important input of other actors
involved in the enforcement process, such as the European Ombudsman, the complainant
and the European Parliament, as well as the more traditionally discussed roles of the
Commission, Member State and the ECJ. The focus on the Commission, the European
Ombudsman and the ECJ (and where appropriate the Court ofFirst Instance) as the
institutional actors considered in detail in the study is motivated by relevance to the thesis
question, and methodological reasons. The role of the two courts is relevant as, in the
interpretation of the Treaty and development of administrative principles, they provide the
legal framework within which the enforcement mechanism is operated. The Commission is
the primary actor in Article 226, as it is charged with the responsibility ofmonitoring and
enforcing compliance, and is also responsible for the design of enforcement policy itself, and
83 Above n 36 p 11.
84 The uniform application of EC law has been achieved through a variety of mechanisms in the
Treaty as well as the developing jurisprudence of the ECJ, which developed the doctrine of direct
effect and supremacy. Elowever, ensuring compliance with all the Treaty provisions, through the use
of Article 226, is the precondition for these doctrines to be effective - they are only as effective as
Member States' compliance with them. Member States must comply with the doctrine of supremacy
and direct effect as part of its obligations under the Treaties, and this is ensured through the
Commission's guardianship through Article 226 amongst other things.
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more generally the political and policy direction of the EU. This enables a comparison to be
made between the Commission's practice in Article 226 against its overall policy ambition
of delivering good governance in the EU. The Ombudsman fulfils the role as surrogate for
the European citizen; through this actor, those issues relevant to the administrative function
ofArticle 226 will be explored, including whether the administration of Article 226
conforms to principles of good administration and good governance. The European
Parliament and Member States also play a role in Article 226, but their roles are primarily
reactive rather than proactive in nature, and accordingly the impact of these institutional
actors will not be considered in the same detail.85 Consideration of a greater number of
actors is crucial to analysing the role of Article 226. It enables all the functions of Article
226 to be taken into account when analysing the role of this mechanism in the current legal
and political context, and it allows a different set of questions to be pursued, including issues
of control, accountability and legitimacy.
The impact of these actors on the role ofArticle 226, and the extent to which they have
contributed to re-shaping the role of Article 226 by their interaction with each other, will be
discussed against a framework of analysis that has been developed on the basis of the legal
and political context identified. This will be composed of the separate but overlapping
conceptual tools of good administration, good governance and legitimacy. These concepts
are explored in further detail in Chapters II and III, which set out the intellectual framework
for the evaluation of the role of Article 226 in contemporary Europe.
1.4: Research approach
The study will consider the role of Article 226 in the context of good governance and the
quest for greater legitimacy in the EU. I have approached this question by breaking down
the main topic into a number of smaller questions. What is the contemporary legal
administrative and political context in the EU, and how has it impacted upon the operation of
the enforcement mechanism? What do we mean when we discuss concepts such as
legitimacy, good governance and good administration? What actors actively shape the
development of the enforcement mechanism, and how have they shaped it? How does the
design, management and operation of the enforcement mechanism fit with the aspirations of
greater legitimacy, against a defined benchmark of good governance and good
administration? Can we re-conceptualise the role ofArticle 226 as being able to provide
85 The extent to which the Member States and European Parliament play a proactive role discussed
throughout Chapters IV, V and the VII.
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accountability and legitimacy alongside effective enforcement? Essentially, this study seeks
to move academic discussion of the enforcement mechanism away from an entrenched
historical perspective of a negotiation forum focused on the sole function of effective
enforcement, by examining Article 226 in the light ofmore contemporary debates including
concepts such as democracy, legitimacy, good administration and good governance in the
EU. Figure 2 below sums up the research approach and puzzle.
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Figure 2
Research approach and puzzle86
Good governance and legitimacy in (he Hi: the role ofArticle 226 EE
Intellectual J
Inquiry: What are the factors that influence the role ofArticle 226?
Research aim: To identify the different functions ofArticle 226, and to establish the
relevant legal and political questions which influence the development of the role of
Article 226.
Examines the contemporary lcgrl and political oontext ofthe EU, focusingon the role
ofadministrative law and contarporary debates about legitimacy and gxxi governance
intheEU
Carriedout: Chapter I (functions and actors) Chapter II (legal context) and Chapter III
(political context)
framework
Inquiry: What is the appropriate benchmark against which the role ofArticle 226
should be evaluated?
Research aim: To create a set ofdefined criteria against which the role ofArticle 226
may be evaluated
Examines the development ofadministrative law principles and the policy initiative of
good governance in the EU




f Inquiry: Who are the relevant actors, andwhat interactions, shape the role of
Article 226?
Research cam: To identify the relationships and interactions that affect the role of
Article 226, and assess the impact ofthese actors on the enforcement mechanism
through analysis ofempirical material
Examines the ECI and CFI, the CorrmissiorL, the European Oiribudsman, complainant
and European Parliament by analysing relevant case law, policy papers, interview data,
reports and complaints
Carriedout: Chapter I (actors) Chapter II (the oourts), Chcpter IV andV (the
Commission and Pari iament), Chapter VI (theOmbudsmatVcomplainant)
Inquiry: To what extent is the role ofArticle 226 compatible with the concepts of
good governance and legitimacy in the EE?
Research aim: To identify the strengths and weaknesses ofArticle 226 as an
enforcement mechanism in a constitutionalised Europe
Examines the compatibility ofArticle 226 with the criteriaof legitimacy and gxxd
gpvemanoe, and considers the scope for re-conceptualising the role ofArticle 226 in
order to accommodate the aspirations ofgxxi governance and legitimacy
Carriedout: Chapter IVand V (the Commission/European Parliament), VI (the
QrrioudsmaiVcomp1ainant) Chapter VII (conclusions)
861 have drawn inspiration for the format of this model from D Sindbjerg Martinsen, 'European
Institutionalization ofSocial Security Rights: A Two-layered Process ofIntegration' (European
University Institute, Florence, PhD Thesis, 2004) p 13.
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1.5: Research method
The primary research method employed in this study has been examination and analysis of
primary and secondary documentary material. This has been complemented by conducting
elite interviews. The primary research material consists of a broad spectrum of documents
sourced from the actors involved in the enforcement mechanism. In order to evaluate the
appropriate legal context, I will analyse the approach of the European courts including where
appropriate specific judgments of the courts. The political context, and in particular the
normative initiative of good governance in the Union, will be analysed with particular
reference to the Commission's White Paper on Governance87 and the subsequent
Communication on Better Monitoring.88
The Commission's Communications and Annual Monitoring Reports provide useful
information on the Commission's approach to monitoring. This primary research material is
however necessarily one-sided as it presents Article 226 from the perspective of the
Commission alone. In order to uncover another perspective on the role of Article 226, the
Annual Reports and Decisions of the European Ombudsman, along with Reports from the
European Parliament have also been analysed.
In addition, elite interviews have been conducted in relation to the institutional actors
involved in the enforcement mechanism. This includes Commission officials, the European
Ombudsman and his staff as well as staff of the European Parliament. Interviews with
Commission staffwere conducted on the basis that they remain absolutely anonymous. In
order to preserve the confidentiality of those who agreed to be interviewed, where requested
by the interviewee, the generic title 'Commission Official A' etc and the date they were
interviewed is the method used to identify the source. A list of the questions and a
breakdown of all interview data can be found in Appendix 1,89
The secondary documentary material comprises scholarly works in the disciplines of law,
public administration and political science.
87 Above n 37.
88. Above n 40.
89 See Appendix 1 for full information on the elite interview methodology, including breakdown of
those interviews, questions and answers where appropriate.
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1.6: Thesis structure
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I introduced the thesis puzzle and
explained the research approach and motivation, and contextualised the study in relation to
other academic discussion of Article 226.
Chapter //begins an examination of the actors involved in Article 226 by providing an
outline of the contribution of the Court of Justice (and where appropriate the Court of First
Instance) in developing legal principles applicable to the enforcement mechanism, and
explains the role of administrative law as a part of the EU's quest for legitimacy. It
identifies the lack of legal controls on the operation of the infringement procedure as being
unacceptable within the EU as an organisation with pretensions of good governance and
constitutional legitimacy.
Chapter III explores the current debates about democracy and legitimacy in the European
Union and focuses on the examination of the Commission's conceptualisation of what
constitutes good governance in the EU, as presented in the White Paper on Governance. On
the basis of both institutional and academic debates about legitimacy, democracy and the
EU, this Chapter develops a framework of analysis using the concepts of good
administration, good governance and legitimacy as separate but overlapping lenses through
which the role and operation of the enforcement mechanism will be evaluated.
Chapter IV continues the examination of the major institutional actors that affect the
development of the enforcement mechanism, focusing on the Commission's practice,
management, and attempt at reform of the enforcement mechanism. This Chapter also
highlights the relevant interactions of the Commission and Member States, and the influence
this has had on shaping the way in which the Commission manages Article 226.
Chapter Vexamines the Commission's strategy with regard to Article 226, provided by the
Commission in its Communication on Monitoring,90 and considers to what extent the
Commission's commitment to good governance can be cross-referenced against the available
data provided by the Commission in its Annual Monitoring Reports. The choices of the
Commission are then examined against the framework model developed in Chapter III,
particularly focusing on the principles of good governance.
90 Above n 40.
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Chapter VI continues the examination of institutional actors by analysing the impact of the
European Ombudsman on the enforcement process, as both a surrogate for the citizen as well
as an institutional actor in its own right. It begins by analysing the procedural reforms
brought about by the institutional interaction of the Commission and Ombudsman, and then
considers the impact of the Ombudsman in relation to enforcing principles of good
administration in relation to infringement investigations. It identifies good administration as
the foundation of good governance, and analyses to what extent the Commission's approach
to citizen-institution interaction is consistent with principles of good administration and good
governance.
Chapter VII presents the conclusions of the research and considers to what extent it is
possible to reconceptualise the role of Article 226 in the light of good governance and
legitimacy in the EU by taking into account the different functions of the mechanism and the
multiplicity of actors involved in the process.
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Chapter II: Mind the accountability gap - administrative law
and legitimate governance
The role of administrative law is central to the legitimacy of any system of governance. In a
system of governance based on the rule of law1, those who wield public power must respect
the law and where that power is discretionary, there must be clear limits upon it to prevent
arbitrary, corrupt or unfair behaviour. Administrative law may be broadly defined as
'a branch of public law concerned with the composition, procedures, powers,
duties, rights and liabilities of various organs of government that are engaged in
administering public policies...there is no bright line demarcating constitutional
and administrative law'.2
It can be viewed as a system for controlling public power, or as a system to facilitate the
defence of an individual's rights or as a conflation of both these propositions.3
The development of administrative law and the role it plays in a system of governance is
dependent upon the context in which it develops. Thus, there is a different role and
definition applied to administrative law across the Member States of the EU.4 A typical
view ofEnglish administrative law might be that it provides a conduit for making public
actors accountable to the public through a variety ofmechanisms; accountability is a key
organising concept in providing a useful definition of the nature of administrative law.5 It
may provide certain procedural safeguards for individuals when dealing with public
authorities, or provide a mechanism for challenging the decisions taken by public authorities
that adversely affect an individual's interests. Regardless ofwhich normative approach is
taken to the characterisation of administrative law, even in the most developed democratic
systems of governance, administrative law is an essential factor in the delivery of a
legitimate system of rule.
' In this sense, that both the citizens and the institutions (and the officers of those institutions) are all
equally subject to the law. See generally J Jowell, 'The rule of law today' in J Jowell and D Oliver
(eds), The Changing Constitution (5th Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004), P Craig,
'Formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law: an analytical framework' [1997] Public Law
467, J Raz, 'The rule of law and its virtue' (1977) 93 Law Quarterly Review 195.
2 AW Bradley and KD Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (14th Edition, Pearson
Longman, Harlow, 2006), ch 27 p 657. For more detailed definitions of administrative law see P
Craig, Administrative Law (5th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2003), P Leyland and G Woods,
Textbook on Administrative Law (5th Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005), M Loughlin,
Public Law and Political Theory (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992), J Schwarze, 'Sources of European
Administrative Law' in S Martin (ed) The Construction ofEurope (Kluwer, The Netherlands, 1994)
183.
3 C Harlow and R Rawlings, Law and Administration (2nd Edition, Butterworths, London, 1997).
4 C Harlow, 'European Administrative Law and the Global Challenge' EUI Working Paper 98/23
European University Institute, Florence, http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/handle/l 814/3//browse-date. JP
Olsen, 'Citizens, public administration and the search for theoretical foundations' ARENA Working
Papers WP 20/03, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/.
5 P Cane, Administrative Law (4th Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) ch 1.
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The wide variety of administrative law traditions within the Member States6 has not been
transplanted uniformly into the European Union system of governance.7 Unlike the rich
administrative traditions of individual Member States, there has been little activity in the EU
on a horizontal and/or legislative basis to systemize the application of administrative law.
Although Member States may have legislation to govern the behaviour of discretionary
administrative decision-making, or a long-standing common law tradition of judicial review
based on principles ofnatural justice, no such tradition has been inculcated into the European
level administration.
It is more common to see a non-linear approach to administrative law in the EU, where
administrative principles and procedural guarantees are sourced from the individual Treaty
provisions or specifically granted in sector specific secondary legislation. These vary a great
deal as to their nature and extent. This has led scholars in the field of public administration
and European law to debate the appropriateness of adopting a more systematic approach to
administrative law in the EU.8 This chapter does not seek to revisit such debates, but instead
focuses upon examining the legal context within which Article 226 is operated.
Understanding the role that administrative law plays in the operation of the enforcement
mechanism is particularly important when considering whether Article 226 is compatible
with the wider legal context of the EU. The administrative element ofArticle 226 is
overwhelmingly the most dominant part of the enforcement action in terms of institutional
decision-making. For instance in 2004, 91 per cent of the cases were closed in the
administrative phase of the process.9 It is therefore of crucial importance to understand how
the administrative part ofArticle 226 is regulated by the Treaty and how the case law
6 R Seerden, and F Stroink (eds), Administrative Law of the European Union, its Member States and
the United States (Intersentia Uitgevers, Antwerpen - Groningen, 2002).
7 On the cross-fertilisation of administrative law through membership of the EU, see J Bell,
'Mechanisms for Cross-fertilisation of Administrative Law in Europe' in J Beatson, and T Tridimas
(eds), New Directions in European Public Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998) 147. See also JP
Olsen, 'Towards a European administrative space?' (2003) 10 Journal ofEuropean Public Policy 506.
8 See generally C Harlow, 'Codification ofEC Administrative Procedures. Fitting the Foot to the Shoe
or the Shoe to the Foot? (1996) 2 European Law Journal 3, P Craig, 'The Constitutionalisation of
Community Administration' Jean MonnetWorking Paper 3/03,
http://www.ieanmonnetprogram.org/papers/index.html. AJ Gil Ibaiiez, The Administrative Supervision
and Enforcement ofEC Law. Powers Procedures and Limits (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1999), AJ Gil
Ibanez 'Exceptions to Article 226: Alternative Administrative Procedures and the Pursuit ofMember
States' (2000) 6 European Law Journal 148.
9
Out of 2146 infringement cases detected, only 202 (9%) were referred to the ECJ, beginning the
judicial element of the Article 226 process, source Twenty-Second Annual Report on Monitoring the
Application of Community Law (2004) COM (2005) 570 final.
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principles are developed through judicial interpretation. To what extent has administrative
law, through the interpretation of the courts, contributed to filling in the gaps left by the
widely drafted Treaty language, in order to deliver procedural safeguards on the exercise of
public power?10
It is appropriate to examine the contribution made by the Court of Justice (ECJ) and the
Court ofFirst Instance (CFI) to the development of administrative rights across the EU legal
system in general (to identify the context) and specifically in relation to Article 226 (to
assess its impact). Judicial enforcement and development of administrative rights is of
special significance, particularly in the absence of any secondary legislation granting
administrative rights, or extensive recognition of procedural guarantees in the Treaty
provision." Before assessing the impact of administrative law principles in delivering
greater legitimacy to the operation of Article 226, it is necessary to narrow down the focus
from 'administrative law' generally to key principles or rights to be found in the EU legal
system.
The chapter will be structured as follows. Section one will outline the main sources of
administrative law in the EU legal system, in order to provide an overview of the legal
context in which the enforcement mechanism is operated. Section two then focuses upon
two key horizontal administrative principles (transparency and the obligation to provide
reasons for decisions) as principles that could contribute to the legitimisation of the use of
public power under the enforcement action, and will discuss the applicability of such
principles to Article 226. Section three considers the renewed drive to develop further
administrative rights in the EU, as the EU advances towards greater constitutionalisation,
based on the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.12 Section four will then
present a brief comparative analysis of the ECJ and CFI's approach to administrative rights
in three different enforcement actions in the Treaty. Finally, some concluding remarks are
made on the success of the courts in developing and applying administrative law principles
in order to provide control and accountability to the operation of the enforcement
mechanism.
10 This chapter does not consider any 'soft law' procedural protections and only deals with the
applicability of formal legal rights.
11
Obviously administrative law is far wider than simply the operation ofjudicial review mechanisms
or court developed remedies.
12 The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, Title V: Citizens' Rights OJ C 310
16.12.2004. hereinafter referred to as the 'Charter'.
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1.0: An introduction to administrative law in the EU
It is the role of the two European courts in the development of administrative law as it
applies to the European institutions that is most relevant when considering the impact of
administrative law on the enforcement mechanism.13 The ECJ stands at the apex of the
European judicial architecture that comprises the ECJ, the CFI and the courts and tribunals
of the Member States.14 The role of the ECJ in the development of the European legal order
is a familiar topic of discourse in European literature, generating both supporters and critics
of its self-imposed role of judicial integration.15 The ECJ's inability to cope with its ever
increasing caseload led to the creation of the CFI, initially to deal with fact intensive cases
brought by private applicants in areas such as competition law, state aid and staff cases.
Gradually the jurisdiction of the CFI has been widened, culminating in a much needed
overhaul in the Treaty ofNice.16 Broadly speaking, the ECJ retains the sole jurisdiction to
hear cases that concern an 'essential Community issue' and cases brought by privileged
applicants.17
If the ECJ remains the 'constitutional court' of the EU, the CFI is better characterised as an
administrative court, due to the original jurisdiction of hearing fact intensive cases from
individual applicants, and challenges to individual decisions of an administrative nature.
Consequently, the different courts do not always approach the issue of administrative rights
in exactly the same way. The ECJ retains sole jurisdiction over enforcement actions brought
by the Commission against the Member States under Article 226. Nonetheless, it is the CFI
that is the main arena for enforcement actions under the competition and state aid provisions
of the Treaty, and it is the CFI that has been most active in developing administrative rights
13 For the sake of clarity in discussing the development of administrative law, references are made to
either the ECJ or CFI individually where appropriate. The term 'courts' refers to both these
institutions together. There is no discussion of the role of the national courts although they are an
integral part of the European judicial system.
14 In addition, the Treaty ofNice (TN) amends the EC Treaty and allows for the creation of
specialised 'judicial panels' which also form part of the European judicial architecture, Article 225a
EC. This resulted in the creation of the Civil Service Tribunal which deals with staff cases, Council
Decision 2004/752/EC 2 November 2004 establishing the European Union Civil Service Tribunal OJ
L 333 9.11.2004 p 7.
15 See generally A Arnull, The European Union and its Court ofJustice (2nd Edition, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2006), G De Burca and JHH Weiler (eds), The European Court ofJustice
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001), HP Nehl, Principles ofAdministrative Procedure in EC Law
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998).
16 These range from the creation of the specialised judicial panels designed to perform the same role
the CFI originally performed for the ECJ, ie to cope with the ever increasing case loads, to the
inclusion of a provision in Article 225(3) which would allow the CFI jurisdiction to hear preliminary
rulings in specific areas of law.
17 The distinction between privileged and non-privileged applicants will be explained below.
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where instances of institutional decision-making have directly impinged on the interests of
individuals.
One of the most commonly recognised features of administrative law is the ability of the
courts to oversee the discretionary decision-making power of public authorities through the
function of judicial review. This review function ensures that public authorities exercise
public power in a fair and impartial manner, and it is crucial to the legitimisation of such an
authority's discretionary power. Another common feature of administrative law is the right
of access to information. Freedom of information, or transparency in a system of
governance, even has constitutional significance in some Member States. In the context of
the EU, human rights principles may also be relevant in so far as they might provide further
grounds for judicial review of administrative discretionary action. In the EU such principles
are said to be 'general principles' ofEU law and may provide the basis for the development
of abstract principles that are administrative in nature.18 In the EU, the source of the courts'
power is Article 220 EC which states that:
'The Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, each within its
jurisdiction, shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty
the law is observed.'19
The ECJ interpreted this article broadly and it became the source of the ECJ's power to
review measures not listed in the Treaty, and bodies which were not expressly subject to its
review power, and it became the basis for developing general principles of review that were
of a constitutional nature.20 The ECJ may only review acts of the institutions. These are acts
which produce 'legal effects'. This is not restricted to legislative acts, but the act must be
capable of producing a change in somebody's rights and obligations. In general, this will not
apply to recommendations or opinions21. The next sections will briefly explain the
provisions governing the process ofjudicial review and the general administrative principles
that have been developed by the courts (initially the ECJ and then later the CFI) to increase
the scope and application of administrative law principles.
18
Although human rights review may be considered as constitutional rather than administrative in
nature.
19 This article concerned the ECJ alone until it was amended by the Treaty ofNice Article 31 to
include the CFI.
20 See P Craig and G De Burca, EU Law Text Cases and Materials (3rd Edition, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2003) p 97.
21
Except where Parliament is acting alone. See TC Hartley, The Foundations ofEuropean
Community Law (5th Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) pp 337-338.
34
1.1: Judicial review of EU institutional decision-making
The segmented approach to the development of administrative law means that most
administrative rights are found in individual Treaty provisions or secondary legislation.
However, there are some common sources of administrative law to be identified in the EU.
Article 230 EC is the general provision for judicial review of the activities of the institutions.
There are two main elements to consider in any system ofjudicial review: ability to obtain
locus standi and the grounds of review. Article 230 differentiates the position ofprivileged
applicants (Member States, European Parliament, Council and Commission) and of the
semi-privileged applicants22 from that of the non-privileged (all other potential applicants,
whether natural or legal persons).
The privileged applicants may (within the two month limitation period) always bring
applications before the ECJ on the grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an
essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or any rule of law, or misuse
of powers. Individual applicants find themselves in a lesser position to challenge Union acts
since they may only do so in three circumstances: (1) if they are the addressee of the decision
(2) if the decision is addressed to another but is of direct and individual concern to them (3)
if the decision is in the form of a regulation but is of direct and individual concern to them.
The case law resulting from this Treaty article has been interpreted narrowly to mean that an
individual can only gain locus standi if he or she can fulfil the narrow definition for being
directly23 and individually concerned.24 This means it is virtually impossible to challenge a
measure not addressed to the individual, even though this was a possibility contemplated by
the Treaty itselfunder the wording of Article 230.
The issue of standing under Article 230 in the EU has generated enormous controversy
amongst EU scholars, and is roundly criticised as being too narrow, resulting in a lack of
access to justice for European citizens.25 Whilst this is not the appropriate place to rehearse
22 The Court of Auditors and the European Central Bank may only sue in defence of their
prerogatives.
23
Although the requirement of 'direct concern' is a limiting condition in itself, it is the condition of
'individual concern' that has caused most difficulty in this area of law, see J Steiner et al, EU Law
(9th Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) pp 249-266.
24 Known as the Plaumann test 'certain attributes peculiar to them.. .factors distinguishing them
individually just as in the case of the person addressed' Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co v Commission
[1963] ECR 95.
25 MP Granger, 'Towards a Liberalisation of Standing Conditions for Individuals Seeking Judicial
Review ofCommunity Acts: Jego Quere et Cie SA v Commission and P Union de Pequenos
Agricultores v Council' (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 124, P Craig, 'Standing, Rights, and the
Structure of Legal Argument' (2003) 9 European Public Law 493.
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that debate, a few points remain relevant. The ability to obtain judicial review in a system of
governance is directly linked to the ability of administrative law to deliver legitimacy to
public decision-making.26 The more restrictive access to judicial review becomes, the less
legitimacy is generated by the existence (in principle) ofjudicial review. Some systems of
administrative law have wide locus standi rules and narrow grounds of review; some instead
have narrow locus standi rules and wide grounds of review. These choices reflect the desire
to enable legitimate challenges to public decision-making, whilst simultaneously limiting the
number of cases that can proceed to court.27 However, the EU has both narrow locus standi
rules and narrow grounds for review (as interpreted by the ECJ), making individual
challenges in general to EU institutions decision-making extremely difficult to achieve.28
There are four grounds for review under Article 230: lack of competence; infringement of an
essential procedural requirement; infringement of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its
application and misuse of powers. The latter three grounds of review are often
interchangeable and the ECJ does not necessarily have a strict approach to categorisation of
rights in each ground. For instance, a breach of the right to a fair hearing may be deemed a
breach of an essential procedural requirement, or a breach of any rule of law. In order for
the court to consider conduct to be a breach of an essential procedural requirement, it is
usually a procedural requirement that is contained in the Treaty or secondary legislation
rather than one required by the court on the basis of an abstract principle. It is primarily
these two grounds of review that form the basis of challenges to administrative decisions in
individual cases, with the grounds ofmisuse ofpower and lack of competence providing
(often interchangeably) grounds for review of a more constitutional nature.29
1,2: General principles of EU law as a source of administrative law
The third ground of review, an infringement of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its
application, has been interpreted by the ECJ to include the so-called general principles of EU
law. These principles have been developed by the ECJ over a long period of time and are
26 In the case ofBosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland Application No.
45036/98 [2006] 42 EHRR 1, the European Court ofHuman Rights has recently indicated that it may
in future be willing to re-examine whether an individual's access to review by the ECJ is protected
sufficiently to satisfy the standards of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Article 6. See concurring opinions of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Traja, Botoucharova,
Zagrebelsky and Garlicki and the concurring opinion of Judge Ress.
27 See generally C Harlow and R Rawlings, Pressure Through Law (Routledge, London, 1992).
28 See generally C Harlow, 'Towards a Theory ofAccess for the European Court of Justice' (1992) 12
Yearbook ofEuropean Law 213.
29 Such as challenging a piece of legislation because it has been based on the incorrect legal base of
the Treaty, see Case C-376/98 Germany v European Parliament and Council [2000] ECR 1-8419.
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inspired by the constitutional traditions and legal systems of the Member States30; they
include, but are not limited to, human rights principles, in particular those contained in the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.31 They have not been
concretely defined and are an open ended set of ideas or principles that may guide the courts
when deciding cases. Although some of these general principles may be reflected in Treaty
articles or secondary legislation, many are not specified in such a format and have been
developed on an ad hoc basis.
There is no definitive closed list of general principles. They provide an illustration of the
evolution and nature of the EU legal order - one that is influenced by the legal systems of
the Member States and so changes with each new accession and reflects changes within the
Member States themselves. This 'cross fertilisation' has resulted in the general principles of
the EU reflecting the diverse legal traditions of the common law and civil legal systems of
the constituent members.32 The principles that are transferred into the EU arena undergo a
metamorphosis in order that they might properly interact with the other elements of the sui
generis EU system. This means that the EU general principles neither retain the same
function and definition that they once did in the original Member State, nor are they applied
in the same manner. Consequently, whilst the explanations ofwhat constitutes the 'general
principles' ofEU law differ according to which texts are consulted, there are some common
strands that are agreed upon.
The most established general principles are those that protect fundamental (human) rights33;
legal certainty, including the concept of legitimate expectations; proportionality; and equality
(non-discrimination).34 The principles of a right to a fair hearing, the right to a reasoned
decision, and transparency are also sometimes referred to as general principles.35 These
general principles are, with the exception of fundamental rights protection, largely
30 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratstellefur Getreide und
Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125.
31 Case 44/79 Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727.
32 See generally J Bell, above n 7.
33 Case 29/69 Stauder v. City ofUlm [1969] ECR 419.
34 For a discussion of the general principles of EU law, see T Tridimas, The General Principles ofEU
Law (2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), JA Usher, General Principles ofEC Law
(Longman, London, 1998) and see generally TC Hartley, The Foundations ofEuropean Community
Law (5th Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003), P Craig and G De Burca, EU Law Text
Cases andMaterials (3rd Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003), J Shaw, Law ofthe
European Union (3rd Edition, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2000).
35 TC Hartley, The Foundations ofEuropean Community Law (5th Edition, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2003) ch 5 pp 122-157.
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administrative in nature although there is considerable overlap between human rights
principles and administrative principles.
In the EU, the intensity of administrative review of institutional discretion differs a great deal
according to the particular policy sector and complainant. Part of this differential treatment
can be connected with the source of administrative principles in the general principles of EU
law. It is relatively rare to win a case on the basis of breach of a general principle in the
abstract sense, especially in relation to general legislation. There is more evidence of the
application of general principles in cases of review of individual administrative decision¬
making, and this has been a fertile area of development of the general principles ofEU law.36
Nevertheless, the applicability of such principles is heavily dependent on them being
formally protected in either the Treaty or secondary legislation, for example the granting of
specific procedural rights to a defined party. They may be general principles, but they are
not generally applicable, in the sense that they are concretely defined and consistently
applicable to all administrative discretionary action.
In relation to enforcement actions, the most important of the general principles are those of
legal certainty and the right to a fair hearing. The principle of legal certainty is well
developed and encapsulates retroactivity and the concept of legitimate expectations.37 The
concept of legitimate expectations is most easily established when practices affecting the
financial (business) interests of the complainant are altered to their detriment without
adequate notice and/or compensation.38 The right to a fair hearing is subsumed in the EU
principle of the 'rights of defence'. The right to a fair hearing differs according to the status
of the complainant and is quite dependent on the procedural rights granted by secondary
legislation being breached by the institution.39 It is therefore most commonly raised in areas
of competition law and state aids, where certain complainants have this right formally
protected.40 In the context of Article 226, the general principles ofEU law are not decisive
in the outcome of cases before the ECJ. When the Member States claim protection of the
rights of defence, these are considered to be an 'essential procedural requirement' as this is
36 In the areas of competition law and state aids.
37 See S Schonberg, Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2000).
38 There is not a sophisticated distinction between substantive and procedural legitimate expectations,
and in the EU is it is linked to strict legality rather than an abuse ofpower as in the English system
from which it originates.
39 Both legitimate expectations and the right to a fair hearing are inspired by the same principles in
English public law, and the rights of defence is an import from the French legal system.
40 Instances of individual decisions, such as those relating to staff issues, are also a common source of
this principle being raised.
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written into the Treaty text. Breach of the rights of defence therefore come under a separate
ground of review in Article 230 and are not treated as a species of the general principles of
EU law.
2.0: Two key principles of administrative law: transparency and the
obligation to give reasons
The traditional characterisation of Article 226 as a forum ofnegotiation between Member
States and the Commission had the inevitable consequence that the operation of Article 226
is surrounded in secrecy. In order to ensure compliance without any coercive or financial
penalty to force Member States to comply, confidential negotiations were seen as the only
way to ensure Member States fulfilled their obligations. Political deal making was the norm:
political rather than legal supervision predominated.41 As a result, one of the most
incongruous aspects of Article 226 in the contemporary legal context is that it is out of step
with an avowed commitment to greater transparency in the Union.
Although horizontally applicable42 principles of administrative law are not common in the
EU legal system, the EU has embraced the principle of transparency and has enacted
legislation accordingly. This action has further buttressed the obligation on the institutions
to provide reasons for their decisions (when legislating) contained in the Treaty in Article
253 EC. The drive toward greater transparency in the EU is directly related to the delivery
of legitimacy and is bound to the ambition of securing greater political and democratic
legitimacy for the EU.43
The Member States have very different approaches to the idea of freedom of information,
with the Scandinavian states leading the way with constitutional traditions of openness in
public authorities. Consequently, the idea of transparency in the EU has not been without
controversy since there are many different appreciations of what this notion really means.
Tomkins argues that transparency is an umbrella term for different ideas and may be used in
41 HAH Audretsch, Supervision in European Community Law (2nd Edition, Elsevier, North Holland,
1986).
42 This refers to principles of administrative law that are applied with the same definition by the courts
in a variety of policy sectors and cases.
43
Again, this might also be seen as an example ofMember States' legal orders influencing the
development of the EU legal system, as transparency was really embraced in the EU with the
accession of the Scandinavian countries where transparency has constitutional significance, see D
Curtin, 'The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces' (1993) 30 Common
Market Law Review 17.
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at least five different ways.44 Access to information is the least demanding aspect of
transparency and is the definition of transparency traditionally embraced at the European
level. Knowledge of who makes decisions and how these decisions are made, simplification
of the legislative process, consultation and a duty to give reasons make up the other elements
to a more rounded vision of what transparency really encompasses. Despite the numerous
opportunities both courts have encountered through developing case law on access to
documents, they have always resisted the argument by applicants that the right of access to
information is a fundamental or general principle ofEC law, on the same level as
proportionality, direct effect and supremacy.45
2.1: The evolution of transparency in the EU
The formal recognition of the principle of transparency began with Declaration 17 at
Maastricht which stated:
'The [Intergovernmental] Conference considers that transparency of the
decision-making process strengthens the democratic nature of the institutions
and the public's confidence in the administration.'46
As the search for legitimacy at the European level became an increasing concern, the term
'transparency' became a tool to be brandished in the campaign of connecting Europe to its
citizens.47 With this in mind the Council and Commission drew up a Code of Conduct
designed to establish the principles governing access to documents held by these two
institutions. Establishing the rules on a more formal basis, the Council adopted Decision
93/731/EC which governs access to Council documents 48 Starting with the principle of
'widest possible access to documents held by the Commission and Council', it goes on to list
the circumstances in which the institution may refuse to grant access, contained in Article
4(1). The institution will refuse access (the mandatory exception) if it could undermine the
protection of the public interest.49 The Council may refuse access (the discretionary
44 A Tomkins, 'Transparency and the Emergence of a European Administrative Law' (1999) 19
Yearbook ofEuropean Law 219.
45
Although some scholars list it as such, TC Hartley, The Foundations ofEuropean Community Law
(5th Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003). For general discussion on the desirability and
'inspiration' ofmaking this a fundamental right, see M O'Neill, 'The Right ofAccess to Community
Held Documentation as a General Principle of EC Law' (1998) 5 European Public Law 403.
46 Final Act, TEU.
47 See generally I Harden, 'Citizenship and Information' (2001) 7 European Public Law 165.
48 Council Decision 93/731/EC 20 December 1993 on public access to Council documents OJ L 340
31.12.1993 and Commission Decision 94/90/ECSC, EC, Euratom of 8 February 1994 on public access
to Commission documents OJ L 46, 18.2.1994.
49 Public interest is defined as public security, international relations, monetary stability, court
proceedings, inspections and investigations (the Article 226 exception); the protection of the
individual and ofprivacy; the protection of commercial or industrial secrecy; the protection of the
Community's financial interests; the protection of the confidentiality as requested by natural or legal
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exception) in order to protect the institution's own interest in the confidentiality of its
proceedings. Article 7(1) states that reasons must be provided when refusing access.
The CFI proceeded to flesh out the governing Code in various positive ways, introducing a
balancing exercise into the discretionary exception regarding each document being
requested.50 It also developed the principle that the exceptions to access should be construed
narrowly51 and extended the ambit of the Code to the comitology system.52 One of the most
important developments was the extension of the Code to cover access to information rather
than just documents. This development introduced the notion of granting partial access,53
and latterly, the CFI re-evaluated an institution's judgment as to whether access to
information would in fact harm the public interest as the institution claimed.54
In the Treaty of Amsterdam, transparency had gained more formal recognition. Article 255
states that:
'any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its
registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to European
Parliament, Council and Commission documents'
and as of December 2001, access to documents was governed by Regulation 1049/2001
relating to documents held by the Council, Commission and European Parliament.55 The
Regulation specifically links the principles of democracy and respect for fundamental rights
with transparency in the text of its preamble.55 The ambit of the Regulation extends from
that of the previous Decision to agencies set up by the institutions, and to documents
received as well as drawn up by the institution.57 Acknowledging the Court's jurisprudence,
the Regulation covers information in whatever form58 rather than just 'documents' and the
persons that supplied the information or as required by the legislation of the Member State that
supplied the information.
50 Case T-194/95 Carvel and Guardian v Council [1995] ECR 11-2765.
51 Case T-105/95 WWF UK v Commission [1997] ECR 11-313.
52 Case T-188/97 Rothmans International v Commission [1999] ECR 11-2463.
53 Case T-14/98 Hautala v Council [1999] ECR 11-2489.
54 Case T-211/00 Kuijer v Council [2002] ECR 11-1729.
55
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents
OJL 145 31.5.2001.
56 Ibid preamble para 2.
57 Ibid para 10 abolishing, at least in principle, the authorship rule. This means that documents
covered by the Code only included those actually drafted by the institution, and did not relate to
information held by the institution which it received from a third party.
58
Including information relating to the CFSP and PJCC areas, ibid para 7.
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purpose of the Regulation is stated as being to give the 'fullest possible effect to the right of
public access'.59
Article 4(1) contains the exceptions present in the original Code, and the legal test is slightly
stricter in that refusal shall only occur when disclosure would (as opposed to could)
undermine the protection of the relevant public interest. Article 4(2) contains a further list of
exceptions (commercial interests, court proceedings, investigations) which must be balanced
against what is termed an 'overriding public interest in disclosure'. The previous
discretionary exception has been elaborated in Article 4(3), which now states that documents
shall be refused if disclosure would seriously undermine the institution's decision-making
process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure. This seems to be a step
backwards from the Code, as the 'discretionary' element has been removed. Although the
institution (and the Court) still has to take into account the public interest, it would seem
easier to balance the interests (in the Code) than to have to establish an overriding public
interest in disclosure for the applicant. This seems more onerous on the applicant than under
the previously discretionary exception in the Code.
Article 5 dictates that any Member State that possesses documents which originate from the
EU cannot release them (unless it is clear that the documents shall or shall not be disclosed)
without consulting with the institution concerned.60 This clause is in fact likely to conflict
with constitutional provisions in certain Scandinavian countries,61 leaving applicants in a
disadvantaged position in comparison to that allowed under national rules.62 Although the
EU institutions have accepted the principle of transparency as a part of the EU legal order, it
would be wrong to suggest that a cultural revolution had taken place throughout the
administration in the EU institutions on this basis.
59 Ibid para 4.
60 This is a clear attempt to prevent a repeat performance of the Svenska scenario where the Swedish
authorities released 18 of 20 documents requested by the Swedish Journalists Union, and yet when
these exact same documents were requested from the Council, only two were released under the more
oppressive EU regime. See Case T-174/95 Svenska Journalistforbundet v Council [1998] ECRII-
2289.
61 Sweden and Finland in particular have constitutional rights devoted to citizens' access to public
documents, see Curtin below n 62.
62
Contrary to the assertion by Curtin, that when interpreted in the light of the principle of subsidiarity,
EU legislation on access to documents should not be allowed to supersede national guaranteed rights
'a reverse supremacy in the interests of the citizens'. See D Curtin, 'Citizens' Fundamental Right of
Access to EU Information: An Evolving Digital Passepartout?' (2000) 37 Common Market Law
Review 7 pp 15, 26.
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2.2: The obligation to give reasons for decisions
The obligation to provide a reasoned decision is a cornerstone of administrative law and is a
specific manifestation of the principle of transparency. When a public authority exercises its
decision-making power, it is essential that an explanation is provided as to why that
particular course of action was taken. Without access to this information, it becomes
difficult for anyone to challenge the decision being taken or for the court to perform an
effective judicial review. The Treaty has always made provision for the important
administrative principle ofproviding reasons in Article 253 EC. As well as the common
traditions of the Member States and the general principles of EU law, Article 253 is often
referred to by the courts as the source of a more general principle of providing reasons for
decisions. Article 253 is not a reasoning requirement in itself, but merely states in a formal
manner that legislation produced by the Community must have a preamble that takes the
form of a list of reasons.
The CFI has repeatedly stressed the importance of the institutions providing fully reasoned
decisions to explain a decision to refuse access to information.63 More generally, when the
CFI is dealing with judicial review of an administrative decision taken by the institution, the
court considers the giving reasons requirement as essential to its own ability to conduct a
proper review of the situation. If the court cannot perform its review function on the basis of
the explanations offered by the institution to the applicant, a decision may well be overturned
on this basis.
The rationale behind a duty to provide reasons for decisions, like that of transparency in
general, is strongly connected to the idea of legitimate governance. If a decision-maker must
provide reasons for a decision, in theory the decision-making process itself will be less likely
to be unfair or arbitrary in nature because the decision will have to be publicly justified.
This in turn ensures an approach to decision-making invoking the consideration of all
options and weighing the pros and cons of each alternative argument before arriving at the
best possible decision. The duty to give reasons therefore has an intrinsic benefit of
producing the best possible decision, and increases the legitimacy of that decision by virtue
of rendering the decision-making process more transparent. It allows the court to perform an
effective review of the institution's decision-making process, and on a more basic level,
allows the public access to information on how public authorities exercise their discretion.
63 Case T-124/96 Interporc Im-und Export GmbH v Commission [1998] ECR11-231, Case T-174/95
Svenska Journalistforbundet v Council [1998] ECR 11-2289.
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The duty to provide reasons for decisions varies in different constitutional traditions and
different contexts, and can be more or less effective in producing legitimacy depending on
the intensity of this obligation. One of the most demanding reasoning requirements can be
found in the Administrative Procedures Act in the US which has been characterised as a
'synoptic' reasoning requirement.64 This essentially means the duty to provide reasons has
been extended by the courts to resemble a 'record requirement'; the list of reasons provided
by the decision maker is a record of the deliberation undertaken by the administration before
the decision was reached. Such an extensive reasoning requirement enables the court to
assess whether all relevant arguments have been taken into account by the administration and
accorded proper weight. Ultimately this allows the court to substitute its own decision for
that of the administration, as it is in full possession of the facts presented to it in the record of
deliberation.65 This transforms the procedural reasons requirement into a mechanism for the
court to perform substantive review of the decision, and ensures the administration enters
into a dialogue with interested parties before reaching a decision in order that it is able to be
in possession of, and fully consider, all relevant arguments.
At the other end of the scale, there is the purely formulaic reasoning requirement of Article
253 which states only that reasons must be provided when legislating. The reasoning
requirement that has developed from this article of the Treaty varies according to context
like other general principles ofEU law. Some scholars claim that the ECJ is edging ever
closer to requiring 'good reasons' to be provided, rather than the institution being allowed to
present a formulaic response on the basis of formal legal doctrine.66 At any rate, the
reasoning requirement in the EU is not as advanced as that in the US and does not yet require
a record of the dialogue undertaken between the administration and all interested parties.
In relation to Article 226 enforcement actions the only reasoning requirement is that
guaranteed by the Treaty, which states that the Commission must provide a reasoned opinion
to the Member State that is the subject of the infringement investigation. This forms an
essential procedural requirement in the enforcement action, and is a part of the dialogue
between the Member State and the Commission in trying to avoid referral to the ECJ, as well
64 M Shapiro, 'The Giving Reasons Requirement' (1992) University ofChicago Legal Forum 179.
65 This is similar to performing review on the basis of a proportionality test.
66
Shapiro, above n 64.
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as forming the legal basis of the subsequent (possible) action in the ECJ.67 However, this
requirement is not for the purpose ofproducing a transparent and open procedure, or
engaging all parties and canvassing all possible arguments in a decision to prosecute. First,
the reasoned opinion is not a public document. Furthermore, it is more akin to a formulaic
legal document setting out the factual and legal position of the Commission in relation to the
existing infringement, and does not contain a statement of record of the Commission's
deliberation leading up to the decision to proceed to the ECJ. Decisions not to prosecute, or
even to investigate a complaint of an infringement, or to close an investigation, are not
decisions that legally require a public record of deliberation. As a consequence, the courts
are unable to perform a review of the administrative process in Article 226.
2.3: Transparency in infringement investigations
Applicants trying to obtain information relating to the Commission's investigations and
management of Article 226 infringements soon tested the new transparency regime. One of
the defining characteristics of the central enforcement mechanism had always been the
secretive nature of how it is conducted, primarily because of the 'closed shop' arrangement
of the Commission and Member State relationship. The formal Code on access to
documents provided the first window of opportunity to open up the enforcement action.
Unfortunately for the applicants, there was to be no change to the status quo, as the
Commission routinely rejected all requests for access to documents relating to Article 226
investigations on the basis of Article 4(1) (court proceedings, inspections and investigations).
The early judgments under the Code in WWF,68 Bavarian Lager69 and Petrie70 confirmed the
CFFs reluctance to second guess the Commission in the conduct of infringement
investigations, including the classification of, and access to, all information connected with
infringements.
All information held by the Commission in relation to an infringement investigation is
unavailable to the public under the exception in the Code, although the CFI did state that the
Commission must consider each request on its merits and not operate this rule as a blanket
exception for refusing access to information.71 Early applicants had concentrated on
obtaining access to the Commission's reasoned opinions, although it soon became apparent
67 U Everling, 'The Member States of the European Community before their Court of Justice' (1984)
9 European Law Review 215.
68 WWF above n 51.
69 Case T-309/97 Bavarian Lager Company v Commission [1999] ECR11-3217.
70 Case T-191/99 Petrie and Others v Commission [2001] ECR-II 3677.
71
WWF, above n 51.
45
all documents were considered as covered by the exception in Article 4(1), regardless of the
timing of the request.72 This means that even if the Commission has not brought proceedings
against the Member State and the investigation has been concluded, historical documents are
still covered by the exception under the present case law, as release of these documents is
still considered capable of'undermining the public interest'.73
Under the Regulation, access to information categorised as relating to Article 226 is even
harder to achieve.74 The Regulation states that an 'overriding public interest in disclosure'
must be demonstrated before access to such information would be granted. Without
applicants having prior knowledge of exactly what is in the file they wish to access ahead of
time (which seems unlikely in the case of Article 226 investigations), it is near impossible to
prove there would be an overriding public interest in disclosure. As there was a less strict
test to overcome in the Code and applicants still could not access information related to
infringement investigations, it seems unlikely there will be greater success under the more
stringent Regulation.
Article 5 of the Regulation seems to prevent the only other route to accessing information
under infringement investigations, which would be to obtain information from the Member
State itself. Particularly in Scandinavian administrations, this would have provided a better
opportunity to access Commission correspondence with the Member State regarding the
investigation (as it did in the Svenska case). In summary, the new drive to increase
transparency in European administration does not extend to accessing information relating to
the enforcement mechanism, and the position remains unchanged for applicants in this
respect, and may even have taken a step backwards from the original Code.
3.0: The attempt to develop new administrative rights
As well as the drive for transparency in the EU, there has been fresh impetus from the CFI in
its attempt to develop administrative rights protection after the proclamation of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights, itself a reflection of the need to increase legitimacy in the EU. This
is based on the express acknowledgement in the Charter of such rights as the right to good
72
WWF, above n 51, the CFI confirmed that even where time had elapsed after the conclusion of an
investigation, the Commission could still refuse access to those documents.
73 This seems difficult to justify. If the infringement complaint had been, say, about building a
motorway, and five years later after the motorway has been built someone wished to access the
reasoned opinion of the Commission (or even relevant surveys regarding the project), why should this
be deemed as prejudicial to the public interest? The entire incident is historical. The only purpose of
keeping this information secret is to suppress politically embarrassing information.
74 This information is categorised by the Commission and is not subject to outside review.
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administration.75 The further development of administrative rights has been led mainly by
the CFI rather than the ECJ largely due to the nature of the cases that are heard by the CFI
which in general tend to be concerned with administrative rights.76 The CFI was the first
court to acknowledge the Charter as a source of inspiration in developing legal principles.77
The ECJ is reluctant to develop jurisprudence based on the Charter and it remains to be seen
whether it will develop a strong line of cases before the Constitutional Treaty becomes a
legally binding.
In the context of the EU institutions, the principle of good administration is very much in its
fledgling stage of development, and has mainly been an invention of the European
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman campaigned extensively for the inclusion of the right to
good administration at the first European Convention which drafted the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. The explanatory notes to the Charter as amended by the second
European Convention,78 which proposed incorporation of the Charter into the Draft Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe, contain an indication as to why the right to good
administration was included:
'Article 41 is based on the existence of the Union as subject to the rule of law
and whose characteristics were developed in the case law which enshrined, inter
alia, good administration as a general principle of law.'79
This links the right to good administration directly to the legitimacy of the Union,
acknowledging the connection between the conduct of the administrations and respect for the
rule of law.
73 See the final text of the Charter as incorporated into the Treaty establishing a Constitution for
Europe Part II: The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, Title V: Citizens' Rights, Article
11-101 OJC 310 16.12.2004, p 50.
76
Particularly in cases relating to competition law and state aid.
77 This relates back to the earlier discussion regarding the different roles of the ECJ and CFI, with the
'constitutional' court of the ECJ tending to be more cautious in the development of administrative
rights.
78 The European Convention 'Updated explanations in relation to the text of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights' CONV 828/1/03 REV 1 18 July 2003.
79 For instance Case C-338/00P Volkswagen AG v Commission [2003] ECR1-9189, Case T-392/02
and Case T-392/02 R Solvay Pharmaceuticals B V v Council [2003] ECR II-1825. It has been
mentioned in several cases before both the CFI and ECJ, but the explanatory notes include references
to cases that refer in general terms to the institutions being subject to the mle of law, and as a part of
this the principle of good administration is said to exist as a general principle, such as Case C-255/90
P Louis Burban v European Parliament [1992] ECR 11-2253, Case T-167/94 DetlefNolle v Council
[1995] 11-2589. It is interesting to note that standard textbooks do not all include the right to good
administration as one of the 'general principles' of EU law.
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3.1: The principle of sound administration
The CFI has adopted the language of'sound administration' rather than good administration
in its case law, but has not yet fully defined the concept of 'sound administration'. An
explanation of the principle of good administration, from which this term derives, is
provided in the Charter as follows.80 In broad terms the right to good administration is
meant to guarantee the right to an impartial and fair decision from an institution within a
reasonable period of time.81 This right is then clarified into three composite parts. The first
part is:
'the right of every person to be heard, before any individual measure which
would affect him or her adversely is taken'.
The second part concerns the right of access of each person to their file and the third part is
the obligation for the administration to provide reasons for its decisions. Parts two and three
are reflections of the case law of the ECJ, and the explanatory notes specifically refer to the
obligation to provide reasons for decisions being based on Article 253.82 The right to a fair
hearing is potentially much wider in the Charter than the general principle referred to by the
ECJ, partly by defining the right in this way, the discretion of the court is reduced in the way
the principle is applied. The wording of 'individual measure' widens the type of decisions to
which the right to a fair hearing could apply, but as the Charter remains unenforceable the
CFI has been unable to apply this principle concretely and turn it into a legal right in its case
law. Finally, the explanatory notes to the Charter link the right to good administration to the
right to an effective remedy.83
Where the principle of sound administration does appear in the case law, it often does so as a
'catch-all' statement, much like a general principle, which sums up individual procedural
rights guaranteed to the complainant in secondary law or the Treaty. For instance, the
general principle of a right to a reasoned decision, inspired by the formulaic reasoning
requirement for legislation in Article 253 in the Treaty (and then usually in the relevant
governing Regulation or Decision) is often covered by the use of the catch-all term 'sound
administration'. Other general principles are also sometimes implied in the use of this term,
for instance access to the administration's file, objectivity in decision-making, fairness and
80 The CFI has referred to the Charter when discussing the concept of sound administration, so it is
reasonable to assume that this relates to the right to good administration in the Charter.
81 Charter above n 75.
82 The European Convention 'Updated Explanations relating to the text of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights' Rights CONV 828/1/03 REV 1 18 July 2003.
83 Ibid, 'The right to an effective remedy, which is an important aspect of this question [the right to
good administration], is guaranteed in Article 47 of this Charter', p 37.
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following the correct procedural steps in taking a decision, equal treatment and
proportionality.
As different procedural rights are guaranteed in different policy sectors and secondary
legislation, it is hard to make generalisations about the meaning of sound administration, or
whether in fact it adds anything to the scope of administrative rights protection or whether it
is just used as a form of legal shorthand by the CFI. What is clear from the case law is that
cases are, as yet, not decided on breach of this principle alone; it has not been effective as a
ground for annulment before the court, as even where the court finds a breach of sound
administration, it is not enough to set aside the contested decision. In the EU, the applicant
must have a stronger 'hook' on which to decide the case.84
3.2: The principle of diligent complaint handling
A significant element of administrative law is aimed at producing a sense of fairness and
objectivity into the way in which the institutions interact with the citizens. Since a large part
of this interaction occurs when citizens complain to the institutions themselves, or where the
institution's decision affects the individual's interests directly, enforcement actions have
provided a fertile ground in the development of administrative law protections. After the
proclamation of the Charter which contained the right to good administration, the CFI
quickly seized upon an appropriate case relating to an enforcement action to attempt to
enhance the administrative rights of complainants.
The max.mobil case was based on the Commission's decision to reject the complaint of
max.mobil in relation to an alleged breach of the law on state aid.85 The complainant alleged
that the Commission had arrived at the wrong conclusion when deciding not to open
enforcement proceedings under either the competition law enforcement procedure or the
state aid enforcement procedure in relation to one ofmax.mobil's competitors, and had
therefore breached both Articles 82 and 86(3) EC. The point of interest in the case is the
CFI's attempt to develop the complainant's administrative rights in the context of'sound
administration', and in doing so correlating the procedural rights applicable in competition
law cases as also applying to state aid cases.
84 When and if this principle does evolve, it is much likelier to be in the context of competition or state
aids, rather than the Article 226 action.
85 Case T-54/99 max.mobil Telekommunikation Service GmbH v Commission [2002] ECR 11-313.
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The CFI developed the principle that the Commission must undertake a diligent and
impartial examination of a complaint in competition law cases, and furthermore, that this
diligent and impartial examination of complaints should also apply to state aid cases:
'diligent and impartial treatment of a complaint is associated with the right to
sound administration which is one of the general principles that are observed in
a State governed by the rule of law and are common to the constitutional
traditions of the Member States...[the Charter] confirms that every person has
the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a
reasonable time by the institutions and bodies of the Union.'86
Moreover,
'the obligation to undertake a diligent and impartial examination has already
been imposed on the Commission by the case-law of the Court of First Instance
relating to Articles 81 and 82 EC on the one hand, and in the context of Article
87 and 88 EC on the other...there is no specific written provision or anything
else to support the view that the position is any different so far as concerns the
discretion enjoyed by the Commission in respect of a complaint in which it is
called to take action under Article 86(3) EC.'87
The CFI justifies this reasoning as follows:
'that the existence of an obligation to undertake a diligent and impartial
examination was justified by the general duty of supervision to which the
Commission is subject, even though the action taken by virtue of that duty is
directed under Article 86(3)88...that must apply without distinction in the
context of Articles 81, 82, 86, 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty, even though the
precise manner in which such obligations are discharged varies according to the
specific areas to which they apply and, in particular, to the procedural rights
expressly conferred by the Treaty or by secondary Community law in those
areas on the persons concerned'.89
The reasoning of the CFI was therefore based on the right to good administration in the
Charter, and the comparable situation of complainants in other areas of the Treaty. Most
importantly, it was the Commission's general duty of supervision (which also applies to
Article 226) and the nature of the Commission's extensive discretion in these areas of the
Treaty which meant that all complainants had the right to a diligent and impartial handling of
their complaints.
In this case, the CFI attempted to systematise the way in which complainants are treated
when they complain to an institution of the EU, regardless of the context of that complaint.
The CFI was not attempting to impose a particularly high standard - in fact the concept of
diligent complaint handling was very basic in itself. Since the institutions had already
proclaimed the Charter, which promised a higher standard than that being developed by the
86 max.mobil ibid para 48.
87 max.mobil ibid para 49. I have updated the numbering of the Treaty articles throughout the quotes.
88
max.mobil, ibid para 52.
89
max.mobil, ibid para 53.
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CFI, in theory the notion of diligent complaint handling ought to have been uncontroversial,
especially since it already applied to certain complainants in competition law cases.
However, the notion of administrative systematisation is yet to be embraced in the EU legal
order, and if the Commission's (and ECJ's) response is an indication of the acceptance of
administrative systematisation, there is a long way to go before this might be achieved in
enforcement actions.90
The Commission won the case in the CFI against max.mobil on the facts as the CFI
considered that the applicants' administrative rights had been respected, since the
complainant had been in a position to fully understand the Commission's reasoning in
deciding not to open an enforcement action. Despite this, the Commission still appealed the
case to the ECJ, specifically in order to overturn the reasoning of the CFI regarding the
principle of diligent complaint handling, not only because of the impact of its discretion in
the administration of state aid cases, but by analogy, its similar discretion under Article 226.
It is the argument that the Commission's general duty of supervision (i.e. as guardian of the
Treaty) that is the real source of the right to sound administration that was unacceptable to
the Commission. The Commission's submission to the ECJ in its appeal reflects the attitude
ofboth the ECJ and the Commission to the principle of sound administration91:
'the Commission expresses the view that the principle of the proper
administration of individual situations, hitherto unknown in the case-law of the
Court but on which the Court of First Instance bases its reasoning, is too general
to constitute a basis to support procedural rights for the benefit of individuals, a
fortiori as the Charter of Fundamental Rights invoked in support of that
principle is not applicable. The third indent of Article 41(2) of that Charter,
moreover, merely repeats the obligation to state reasons set out in Article 253
[190] of the Treaty'.92
The ECJ made its position clear in max.mobil that the abstract notion of diligent complaint
handling is not transferable between different articles of the Treaty on the basis that it forms
part of the concept of a sound administration. The Commission won the case. On a more
general basis, it seems clear that any principles developed in the administration of
competition law or state aids are unlikely to be applicable, by analogy, under the
administration of infringement actions by the Commission. In reality, the CFI has already
90 It is worth noting that the CFI did not attempt to introduce a basic standard for administration of
Article 226 and expressly exempted Article 226 from this reasoning, probably as a way to avoid being
overturned by the ECJ which would not have supported this reasoning.
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Case C-141/02P Commission v T-Mobile Austria GmbH, formerly max-mobil Telekommunikation
Service GmbH [2005] ECR1-1283.
921 have already argued that the obligation to provide reasons for decisions extends far beyond the
formulaic reasoning requirement of Article 253.
rejected the attempt, in previous cases, to enhance administrative rights under Article 226 by
reference to rights enjoyed in other areas of the Treaty.93
3.3/ Advancing the administrative rights of complainants
In the context of Article 226, the ECJ has been steadfast in its rejection of the development
of administrative rights, and there is nothing to suggest a different attitude will prevail even
when (if) the Charter were to become legally binding. It is interesting to note the vehemence
with which the Commission rejects the relevance of the Charter in its entirety, and especially
the development of a basic standard of complaint handling by the Commission in the context
of its discretionary exercise ofpublic power. The Ombudsman, supported by the European
Parliament, has already made it clear that in the course of his investigations into the
administration, he intends to hold all the institutions that declared the Charter as bound by its
94
contents.
In the light of greater constitutionalisation of the EU and proclamation by the Commission of
the Charter, it seems an amazing contradiction in attitude. It is difficult to defend objectively
the imposition of a (very basic) standard of diligent discharge of its duties, composed of
basic principles like impartiality, objectivity and fairness as too much of an administrative
bind for the Commission to accept. It seems even more difficult to justify why one class of
citizens can justifiably expect one standard of treatment of complaint handling (the business
community) and others cannot.95
4.0: The applicability of administrative law principles to enforcement
mechanisms
The above sections have outlined some key administrative rights that are crucial to the
delivery of legitimacy in a system of governance based on the rule of law. It is now
appropriate to consider in more detail the breadth and depth of legal administrative rights
and principles as they apply to the enforcement mechanism ofArticle 226, and to provide an
illustration of the type of administrative rights present in other enforcement actions in the
Treaty, to form a basis for comparison.96 Article 226 has been thoroughly examined and
93 Case T-182/97 Smanor SA v Commission [1998] ECR11-271.
94
Foreword, Code ofGood Administrative Behaviour, adopted by Resolution of the European
Parliament 6 September 2001 p 5, which can be found at
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/home/en/default.htm.
95 See the difference in approach considered in following section between competition law, state aids,
and individuals under Article 226.
96 This is not an exhaustive comparative analysis of enforcement actions and administrative law. For
a comprehensive discussion of other mechanisms see AJ Gil Ibanez 'Exceptions to Article 226:
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commented upon in terms of the exact meaning of the Treaty wording, the legal reasoning
and impact of the case law principles.97 As such, the 'conventional wisdom' in relation to
Article 226 is now well established. The following sections will therefore only give a brief
outline of accepted legal doctrine, in order to draw some conclusions as to the influence of
the courts on the application of administrative principles to Article 226. I will then briefly
consider the different approaches taken in the field of state aids and competition law, where
separate enforcement mechanisms exist within the Treaty, and try to draw some conclusions
as to why there is such a marked difference in approach.
4.1: The approach of the ECJ: deference and limited intervention
The impact of the ECJ on the development and role ofArticle 226 has been crucial. As the
institution tasked with interpreting the bare Treaty language, the approach of the Court has
had a great deal of influence on the way in which Article 226 is operated by the main actors
in the process. The ECJ deals with numerous infringement cases in any given year; in 2004,
202 cases were referred to the ECJ.98 Cases vary a great deal as to policy sector, Member
State, political sensitivity and the nature of the infringement under examination.
Infringement cases can vary from the prosaic to the explosive: from cases of failure to notify
measures,99 to cases that have incredible political and economic fallout attached to them.100
Many of the cases before the ECJ originate from a complaint by a citizen to the Commission,
although by the time the case reaches the ECJ, such a personal connection to an individual
citizen is almost entirely removed.101 The case before the ECJ is usually presented in an
anodyne fashion; a simple question of the facts of the infringement (the behaviour of the
Member State) applied to the legislation in question. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to
suggest the Court is entirely unaware that at some point a complainant had been involved in
Alternative Administrative Procedures and the Pursuit ofMember States' (2000) 6 European Law
Journal 148.
97
See generally A Dashwood and R White, 'Enforcement Actions under Articles 169 and 170 EEC'
(1989) 14 European Law Review 388, J Mertens de Wilmars and IM Verougstraete, 'Proceedings
against Member States for Failure to Fulfil their Obligations (1970) 7 Common Market Law Review
385.
98
Source, Twenty-Second Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law (2004)
COM (2005) 570 final.
99 This means that the Member State failed to notify the Commission of the measures it had take to
transpose a directive into national law, as required by the deadline in the directive. See for instance
Case C-385/04 Commission v UK [2005] 10 November 2005 nyr.
100 For example Case C-265/95 Commission v France [1997] ECR1-6959. Protesting farmers caused
France to be prosecuted for failing to fulfil obligations relating to free movement of goods.
101 See for example Case C-344/03 Commission v Finland [2005] ECR 1-11033 regarding the
conservation ofwild birds.
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the case - and that this somehow excuses the lack of legal supervision under Article 226 - as
the judgment of the court always comments on the pre-litigation (administrative) procedure.
This commentary includes whether the Commission's investigation began on the basis of a
complaint being made.102
In terms of analysing the case law and applicable principles that are relevant to
understanding the courts' approach to Article 226, for the purpose of this chapter, two
categories of cases can be identified - those relating to Member States' rights of defence and
those relating to third party interests. Much of the ECJ's positive activity (in terms of
'fleshing out' the Treaty framework) has been in relation to the rights of defence of the
Member State. In contrast, a more conservative attitude has been displayed in relation to
third party interests on the basis that they are exactly that - by definition these applicants are
not identified as a party to infringement proceedings in the Treaty wording itself.
The concept of 'rights of defence' encapsulates the notion of legal certainty and the
protection of essential procedural requirements that are in the Treaty. In relation to Article
226, this includes the principle of the right to a fair hearing which is formally protected in
the Treaty, through the requirements of the information exchange in the formal letter and
reasoned opinion stages in the administrative procedure. Breach of these procedural
requirements will lead to the action being declared inadmissible in the ECJ. In order to
provide legal certainty and protect the Member State's ability to defend itself properly
against an infringement action, the ECJ has stated that at the point of the reasoned opinion
the substance of the infringement is clarified, and serves to delimit the area for legal
action.103 Regardless of the circumstances, the Commission cannot subsequently introduce
further grounds for prosecution of the infringement after the reasoned opinion has been
issued104. The Commission may however make a more limited case before the court than that
contained in the reasoned opinion.105
102 But see the recent ruling in Case C-494/01 Commission v Ireland [2005] ECR1-3331 where the
Commission is asking the court to allow an alteration to the pre-litigation procedure based on the fact
that the Commission is mounting a case of 'general and persistent breach'. Such cases are based on a
series of individual complaints to the Commission, which the Commission argues can constitute an
administrative practice across the Member State, see P Wenneras, 'A New Dawn for Commission
Enforcement under Article 226 and 228 EC: General and Persistent (GAP) Infringements, Lump
Sums and Penalty Payments' (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 31.
103 Case 7/69 Commission v Italy [1970] ECR 111, Case 232/78 Commission v France [1979] ECR
2729.
104
Although see the ruling in Case C-494/01 Commission v Ireland [2005] ECR 1-3331 and
commentary on this case by Wenneras above n 102 who argues that the Court has moved from this
established position in certain Article 226 cases by stating that new evidence is allowed to be brought
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These rights of defence do not extend to preventing the Commission from pursuing an action
before the court even if the Member State has already remedied the infringement.106 The
Member State cannot claim that the right to a fair hearing has been violated by the fact that
the Commission (in its application to the ECJ) does not take account of the further facts or
defences put forward by the Member State after the reasoned opinion has been issued.107 In
contrast to the Commission, the Member State is free to bring fresh issues and new
facts/defences to light at the judicial stage that have not been previously mentioned
throughout the investigation of the infringement.
The ECJ has not attempted to impose strict time limits in an Article 226 action, even though
it could have done so on the basis of legal certainty (a general principle of EU law). The
Commission is not bound by any significant time restrictions in the sense that an action
cannot be declared inadmissible on such grounds,108 but an excessive delay in bringing a case
before the ECJ might be considered as inhibiting the Member States' rights of defence.109
Such a formulation is sufficiently elastic as to avoid placing restrictions on the Commission
in the exercise of its discretion. The Commission must give the Member State adequate time
to respond to the formal letter and reasoned opinion110 and cases will be declared
inadmissible if this essential procedural requirement has been breached, although cases of
urgency can be justified before the Court.111
The general principle of equality before the law is not considered an adequate defence for the
Member State in Article 226 actions; a Member State cannot point to other Member States'
illegal conduct (not prosecuted by the Commission) to justify their own actions in infringing
before the ECJ that was not contained in the reasoned opinion, p 40 in cases of general and persistent
breach. Whether this departs from the settled case-law is questionable as the Court also pointed out
that new evidence did not amount to new grounds in the legal action, as the subject matter of the
dispute remained the same.
105 Case C-191/95 Commission v Germany [1998] ECR 1-5449.
106 Case 7/61 Commission v Italy [1961] ECR 317, Case 240/86 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR
1835. Specifically, once the period allowed by the Commission (contained in the reasoned opinion)
has elapsed without the Member State remedying the breach, it is no defence, nor does it render the
action inadmissible, if the Member State remedies the breach before the case is heard in the ECJ.
107 Case C-3/96 Commission v Netherlands [1998] ECR 1-3931.
108 Case 7/68 Commission v Italy [1968] ECR 428.
109 Case C-96/89 Commission v Netherlands [1991] ECR 1-2461.
110 Case 293/85 Commission v Belgium [1988] ECR 305.
111 For instance where there has been a long pre-formal letter negotiation procedure with the Member
State to no avail and the Commission's position is well known on the subject, or the particular
circumstances of the case demand it, Case C-56/90 Commission v UK [1993] ECR 1-4109, Case C-
328/96 Commission v Austria [1999] ECR 1-7479.
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Community law.112 This appears to confirm that the Commission need not prosecute every
Member State for the same infringement and (in principle at least) one judgment against an
individual Member State is sufficient to cover all defaulting Member States.113 A Member
State cannot claim (as a defence to prosecution) that the measure being infringed is in fact an
illegal act itself, as all Member States have the opportunity to open an action for annulment
for illegality under Article 230 as privileged applicants.114
Third parties developed an interest in the Article 226 enforcement action mainly because
they were invited to become a part of the enforcement process by the Commission itself.
Like other enforcement actions in the Treaty, it is only with the cooperation of individuals in
informing the Commission of infringements that the Commission can perform its role as
guardian of the Treaty. In third party actions before the CFI, the court has been dogmatic in
its rejection ofmany different kinds of claims brought by individuals. The two main legal
obstacles to developing administrative rights for third parties under Article 226 are a lack of
standing for individual applicants under Article 230 to bring an action for annulment, in
combination with the fact that decisions taken by the Commission under Article 226 are not
reviewable acts within the meaning ofArticle 230.115 The Commission therefore cannot be
forced to adopt a particular position in the investigation of an infringement. Any decision
taken by the Commission under the auspices of the infringement action cannot be challenged
by any other party, be it an institution, individual, organisation or Member State.116
Conversely, the Commission cannot be challenged for failing to act via Article 232.117
Although the Treaty wording appears to mandate the Commission to issue a reasoned
opinion if the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation
under the Treaty, this cannot be enforced in reality.118 The decision not to issue a reasoned
112 Case C-146/89 Commission v UK [1991] ECR 3533. However, for a discussion of the practical
application of this principle in the Commission's conduct of infringement proceedings, see Chapter V.
113
Although see Chapter V for a discussion of the Commission's approach to this in practice.
114 Case 226/87 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 3611. Though Member States may raise this
defence in specific instances, see P Craig and G De Burca, ibid n 20 p 428.
115 Case C-87/89 Sonito v Commission [1990] ECR 1-1981, Case 48/65 Lutticke v Commission [1966]
ECR 19, Case T-182/97 Smanor SA v Commission [1998] ECR 11-271.
116 For instance, a decision to open an investigation, a decision to stop investigating an infringement, a
decision which concludes there has been an infringement or there has not been an infringement, a
decision to issue a formal letter or reasoned opinion or a decision not to prosecute the Member State
before the ECJ even where there appears to be a clear infringement established by the Commission.
These decisions do not fulfil the requirement of acts which produce 'legal effects', which is the
criterion for acts being challengeable in principle under Article 230.
117 Case 247/87 Star Fruit v Commission [1989] ECR 291.
118 AC Evans, 'The Enforcement Procedure ofArticle 169 EEC: Commission Discretion' (1979)
European Law Review 442.
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opinion has never been successfully challenged under Article 232, because such a decision is
dependent on the previous subjective judgment of the Commission as to whether or not there
has been a breach of the Treaty, which itself cannot be challenged in court."9 Finally, the
ability to access information held by the Commission under the infringement procedure by a
third party is so far non-existent, as the applicable legislation on access to documents does
not apply to Article 226-related information. At each stage in the negotiation process with
the Member State, the Commission can conclude that an infringement has been remedied
without needing to test this proposition before the ECJ.
Although Article 226 remains the central mechanism to ensure Member States comply with
their obligations under the Treaty, there exist separate and specialised mechanisms of
enforcement in the Treaty for the areas of competition law and state aids. These mechanisms
are contained (principally) in Articles 85 and 88(2) EC, and like Article 226, contain a
significant administrative element where the Commission exercises some discretion. In both
competition law and state aids, the Commission's discretion is much more limited and the
administrative process is concretely defined, with procedural protections in place which
embrace general administrative principles not found in Article 226. Such procedural
protections are mainly absent from the wording of the Treaty itself420 and are to be found in
secondary legislation such as Regulation 1/2003121 and the new Regulation on state aids122
(which essentially codifies the court developed jurisprudence on practices in state aid
investigations).123 The next two sections will only provide a brief overview of some of the
procedural rights evident under these sections of the Treaty and does not attempt an
exhaustive comparative analysis.124
119
Commentary on the nature and extent of the Commission's discretion can be found in Chapter IV.
120
Except in the case of state aids where Article 88(2) EC states that the Commission must give the
parties concerned an opportunity to submit their comments.
121 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty OJ L 1 4.1.2003.
122 Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the
application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty OJ L 83 27.3.1999.
123 L Flynn, 'Remedies in the European Court' in A Biondi, P Eeckhout and J Flynn (eds), The Law of
State Aid in the European Union (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) 283.
124 For further detailed discussion of procedures in competition and state aids enforcement see K
Lenaerts and J Vanhamme, 'Procedural Rights of Private Parties in the Community Administrative
Process' (1997) 34 Common Market Law Review 531,1 Maselis and HM Gilliams, 'Rights of
Complainants in Community Law' (1997) 22 European Law Review 103, AJ Gil Ibanez 'Exceptions
to Article 226: Alternative Administrative Procedures and the Pursuit ofMember States' (2000) 6
European Law Journal 148, A Biondi, P Eeckhout and J Flynn (eds), The Law ofState Aid in the
European Union (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004), J Venit, 'Brave NewWorld: The
Modernization and Decentralization of Enforcement Under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty'
(2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 545.
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4.2: Competition law
As one of the primary goals of the EC Treaty was the creation of an internal market,
regulation of barriers to trade had special significance. Controlling the barriers to trade, and
in particular, the way in which private undertakings operated within the internal market was
crucial to achieving a properly functioning internal market. The regulation of competition
within the Community was so important that it had separate and specialised enforcement
mechanisms in place, with the Commission acting as the Community's competition
authority, approving or declaring illegal certain practices. Enforcement of competition law
relates primarily to private economic operators rather than Member States.125
The development of administrative rights for individuals under the enforcement of
competition law has been extensive. Primarily, it is the ability to gain standing and therefore
judicial review of the exercise of administrative discretion under the competition law
enforcement action that sets it apart from Article 226. In the context of competition law
enforcement, any natural or legal person who can claim a 'legitimate interest' is entitled to
complain to the Commission of an infringement of competition law rules, and from this
position all administrative rights follow. The requirement of a legitimate interest is fairly
easily satisfied and includes competitors126 and anyone who suffers injury or loss as a result
of the suspected infringement, including relevant associations whose members are
affected.127
A decision to reject a complaint is addressed to the complainant and can therefore be
challenged under Article 230,128 or if the Commission has taken no decision on the
complaint, a complainant may compel the Commission to act through Article 232
proceedings. The complainant does not have a right to a decision on the compatibility of the
conduct (complained of in the alleged infringement) with Community law,129 unless the
complainant is the subject of a negative decision,130 but the Commission must still define its
position regarding the complaint.
125 Articles 81 and 82 EC are primarily aimed at undertakings and Regulation 1/2003 applies to both
private and public undertakings within the meaning ofArticle 81 and 82 EC, but not to states.
126 Case 26/76 Metro SB-Grofimarkte GmbH & Co KG v Commission [1977] ECR 1875, Case 142/84
and Case 156/84 BAT and Reynolds v Commission [1987] ECR 4487.
127 Case T-37/92 BEUC and NCC v Commission [1994] ECR 11-285.
128 Case 201/81 Demo-Studio Schmidt v Commission [1983] ECR 3045.
129 Case T-24/90 Automec srl. v Commission (Automec II) [1992] ECR 11-2223.
130 The Commission must then give a decision on the substance of the case, Automec II, ibid.
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In terms of opening up the administration of competition law enforcement, interested parties
are entitled to an explanation of the Commission's decision-making process. Before the
Commission can reject a complaint, the Commission must provide a fully reasoned decision
and give the complainant an opportunity to submit their views in writing. The statement of
reasons provided by the Commission cannot be general or abstract, but must address all the
allegations in the complaint.131 Although the Commission is not bound to investigate all
complaints (as the Commission is entitled to define the Community's priorities in this
area)132 the Commission cannot refer in the abstract to Tack of Community interest' in its
reasoning in order to justify not investigating a complaint. The Commission must undertake
a balancing exercise when reaching a decision on whether to prosecute an infringement. It
must consider the significance of the infringement on the functioning of the market, the
probability of being able to establish the infringement and the extent of the investigative
measures required to ensure compatibility with competition law provisions.
The complainant is allowed to pursue annulment of this decision by claiming the decision
was not adequately reasoned, which the CFI will review in some detail.133 This reasoning
requirement is not as extensive as a 'synoptic' review of the decision-making process, but it
is certainly more extensive than merely providing a formulaic response. If the Commission
agrees to prosecute the alleged infringement, but only in part, in the interests of the
administration of justice the complainant may seek annulment of that decision under Article
230.134 If the Commission decides to open an infringement procedure in competition law,
the rights of the complainant are not as extensive as those companies which are the subject
of the Commission's investigation. The complainant's rights are therefore limited to the
right to participate in the administrative procedure of the investigation, but nevertheless these
administrative rights are protected by law. The right to access the Commission's file is
limited to the subjects of the investigation, and is subject to the necessary exception of
maintaining business confidentiality.
4.3: State aid
Unlike the field of competition law where procedural practices were codified early on in the
Community's development, the procedural requirements applicable in state aid
131 Case 293/83 CICCE v Commission [1985] ECR 1105.
132 Automec II, above n 129.
133 Case T-7/92 Asia Motor France a.o. v Commission (Asia Motor II) [1993] ECR 11-669.
134
Metro, above n 126.
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investigations have only more recently been codified by the legislator135; this codification
has largely reflected the court developed jurisprudence rather than the invention of'new'
procedural guarantees.136 The rules applicable to state aid investigations are complex and
varied in nature, and depend upon the type of administrative decision being challenged and
whether the applicant has standing to challenge the measure. Consequently, it is difficult to
present a generalised picture of administrative rights under state aid provisions. However, in
broad terms, it is possible to challenge Commission decisions that approve, or refuse to
approve, state aid regardless of the stage of the administrative procedure (formal or
preliminary stage), as well as Commission decisions that reject a complaint regarding aid.137
Anyone may file a complaint in relation to state aid but not all applicants have the same
rights in the state aid infringement procedure. Concerned parties,138 like those in competition
law, enjoy different rights to other complainants and can request the Commission to adopt a
position regarding compatibility of the aid with the internal market. Where the state aid is
found to be compatible with the common market, the Commission tends to address the
decision to the Member State and sends a copy of that decision to the complainant. This
letter of information cannot be the subject of an action for annulment.139 The decision
addressed to the Member State is only considered to be of direct and individual concern, if
the applicant was the original complainant, if they had participated in the administrative
procedure and if the applicant's market position was substantially affected by the aid in
question.140
If the Commission does not act following a complaint, this in itself is a decision that can be
challenged141 (under failure to act Article 232). Only the beneficiaries of the state aid can
have standing under Article 230 for annulment of a (negative) Commission decision.
Competitors of the recipient of state aid cannot instigate an action for annulment on the basis
they are directly and individually concerned, but the Commission must give all concerned
parties notice to submit their observations in the course of the investigation. If the
135
Regulation 659/1999 OJ 1999 L 83/1.
136
Although some novel inventions such as the 'information injunctions' echo similar Commission
frustrations in the prosecution ofArticle 226 infringements. Regulation 659/99, ibid, provides for the
possibility of the Commission adopting a negative decision on the basis of incomplete information,
due to the lack of co-operation in state aid investigation by the Member States.
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Flynn, above n 123 p 290.
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Persons, companies or trade associations whose interests might be affected by the award of aid,
Case 323/82 Intermills v Commission [1984] ECR 3809.
139 Case C-189/91 William Cook v Commission [1993] ECR 1-2487.
140 Case 169/84 Cofaz v Commission [1986] ECR 391.
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Commission breaches this procedural requirement, the competitor/complainant can then
protect their procedural rights via an action for annulment.142 Simple breach of a procedural
right is insufficient in itself to annul the decision, and the applicant must show that if the
procedural right had not been breached the Commission would have reached a different
decision.143
If the Commission opens the formal enforcement procedure under Article 88(2) then it must
request the opinions of all parties concerned,144 as this is mandated by the Treaty provision.
In decisions taken in the context of the preliminary procedure, or those where the
Commission decides not to open the formal procedure, the Commission must give clear
reasons such that complainants who participated in the procedure before the adoption of a
decision are able to defend their administrative rights and courts can provide effective
judicial review of the decision.145 An extensive obligation to respond with clear reasoning to
complainants for decisions is imposed by the CFI.146 The Commission must allow the
complainant to comment before the Commission adopts a definitive decision, which
therefore protects the right to a fair hearing. All parties with a legitimate interest are able to
participate in this administrative process.
4.4: A difference in administrative protection in enforcement actions
Even from this very brief survey of the different enforcement actions in state aid and
competition law, it seems clear that there is a marked difference in approach ofboth the ECJ
and CFI in relation to administrative controls placed on the Commission's discretion, to that
exhibited in the general enforcement action of Article 226. In summary, there are more
procedural protections in place for third parties as well as those who are formal parties in the
enforcement action. This is based on who is considered to have a 'legitimate interest' in the
enforcement action. Although competition law directly concerns individual companies, state
aid is principally concerned with the actions ofMember States (granting illegal aid to
economic operators) and so is analogous to Article 226, insofar as it concerns states and not
private undertakings. Even in the context of competition law, it is not only those mentioned
as parties to the action in the Treaty that are accorded administrative rights, nor is it only
142
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143 Case 40/85 Belgium v Commission (Boch II) [1986] ECR 2321.
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those parties who are directly mentioned in a Commission decision who are deemed to have
a legitimate interest.
Once the element of a legitimate interest (or concerned party) has been established, most of
the other administrative rights flow from this basic starting point. Even where there is no
locus standi to seek annulment of the ultimate decision, the right to a fair hearing and the
opportunity to receive information about the administrative process is legally enforceable.
This is in stark contrast to Commission action under Article 226 where the lack of
administrative protection is justified by the fact that individuals are not mentioned as parties
in the Treaty text, even though they clearly have a legitimate interest in the proper
enforcement of community obligations, as they are the recipients of the benefits of
enforcement. This is especially relevant where the complainant is the source of information
of a suspected infringement and may be directly affected by the Member State's breach of
their obligations.
The difference in the position of third parties in the different enforcement actions is as a
result of the attitude and approach of the courts (and in particular the ECJ) rather than the
Community's legislator. There are several feasible explanations for this difference in
approach by the court, and in the case of competition law at least, persuasive arguments are
often put forward. The Treaty language itself is one such argument, which specifically calls
for secondary legislation to be adopted governing the procedural safeguards for those
involved in the competition law enforcement action, as well as the fact that the relevant
Treaty articles specifically concern private undertakings rather than the Member State
themselves. Neither of these circumstances exists in relation to Article 226, nor state aids.
Whether the existence of secondary legislation alone provides an adequate answer as to why
there has been a substantial increase in the protection of third party interests (beyond the
terms of the original legislation) is questionable.147 Nor does such an explanation cover the
situation of state aid law, where the Treaty language supports a narrow interpretation of the
parties concerned (i.e. the Member State and Commission) and until recently there was no
secondary legislation supporting procedural rights at all.
There are more organic explanations offered by some authors, who view the proliferation of
different types of enforcement actions as being an ad hoc response to the policy development
147
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of the EU,148 which in turn promotes a differentiated administrative approach to enforcement
actions. Others choose to concentrate on the different character of the Commission's role in
the different enforcement procedures. This approach emphasises the 'judicial' nature of the
Commission's role in the enforcement of competition law and state aid, as opposed to the
non-judicial role of the Commission in Article 226.149
It is questionable whether such a distinction is well founded. Whilst it remains the case that
the Commission's decisions in state aid and competition law are binding on the subjects of
those decisions, these can be challenged before the CFI for review under Article 230 and so
the Commission's decision is not necessarily final. In Article 226 cases, it is formally for the
ECJ to decide whether an infringement has in fact occurred, but just like competition and
state aids, the Commission must necessarily have made aprima facie finding there has been
a violation. The fact that the Commission decides whether to refer the infringement to the
ECJ, and prescribes the behaviour necessary to remedy the infringement, brings the
Commission's role close to being a judicial one. At each stage in the negotiation process
with the Member State, the Commission can conclude that an infringement has been
remedied without needing to test this proposition before the ECJ; in this way, the
Commission's ostensibly administrative role becomes judicial and final, since no other actor
can prosecute a Member State for infringement of the Treaty in this manner.150
The ECJ is in no position to re-evaluate the very complex factual evidence supplied by the
Commission in these cases, and unless the Commission has committed a procedural error
(which is unlikely given there are few procedural protections in place), the ECJ is unlikely to
come to a different conclusion than that offered by the Commission.151 The ECJ leaves the
Commission in charge of deciding how the infringement will be corrected as judgments
under Article 226 are declaratory in nature. It is rarely a case of pure legal interpretation,
especially in the complex and politically sensitive infringement cases, but of factual evidence
proving an infringement. Beneath the formalistic distinction ofjudicial/non-judicial roles of
148 AJ Gil Ibanez, 'Exceptions to Article 226: Alternative Administrative Procedures and the Pursuit
ofMember States' (2000) 6 European Law Journal 148.
149 See Hartley, above n 35, and CWA Timmermans, 'Judicial Protection against Member States: 169
and 177 revisited' in D Curtin and T Heukels (eds), Institutional Dynamics ofEuropean Integration.
Essays in Honour ofHenry G. Schermers Volume II (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1994) 391.
150 Save the other Member States under Article 227, a situation which is politically unlikely although
not entirely unprecedented.
151 In 256 cases in the period 2001-2003, the Court sided with the Commission in 240, and only found
against the Commission in 16 cases, see Chalmers, D et al European Union Law (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2006) p 350.
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the Commission, in reality there is little distinction between the enforcement actions in terms
of the Commission's ultimate power.
Overall, these enforcement actions have many factors in common. They are all
manifestations of the Commission's role as guardian of the Treaty, and all are in place to
achieve the same end of enforcing Community law. All the enforcement actions rely
significantly on the information from complainants in order to police effectively the Member
States'/economic operators' compliance with Community law. In each enforcement action
there is a widely drafted Treaty provision and a large element of administrative discretion
involved. In each enforcement action the interests of third party complainants have been
acknowledged by the Commission, but only in state aids and competition proceedings is this
interest legally protected through the development of enforceable administrative rights by the
courts or by the legislator.
Concluding remarks
The above analysis is intended to outline the legal context within which Article 226 operates.
It attempts to provide an overview of the evolution of some key administrative law principles
in the EU legal order, and to highlight the fact that administrative law protections, and the
legitimacy such protections bring to a system of governance, are heavily dependent on the
courts' efforts in the absence of legislative action. The absence of legal administrative
controls in the operation of the Article 226, particularly in terms of curtailing the
Commission's discretion and providing effective protection of legal rights for third parties, is
incompatible with the courts' activities in other enforcement actions.
The impact of the court is crucial in Article 226, especially since the main players in the
enforcement mechanism have little to gain from introducing rights for third parties. It is not
the case that such mechanisms and principles of control and accountability (such as
transparency, the right to be heard, the right to a reasoned decision, the right to good
administration) are absent from the EU legal context. Although they are arguably
underdeveloped, such principles and protections are part and parcel of the EU legal order and
have been applied by the court in other enforcement actions. The difference in approach to
the enforcement mechanisms cannot be adequately explained by the difference in the locus
standi requirements, or the characterisation of the Commission's role in the different
processes.
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The problem is simply that the court has chosen not to apply these principles to Article 226.
The lack a synoptic reasoning requirement in the EU legal order, and particularly with
reference to Article 226 the absence of a requirement of even 'good reasons', has resulted in
a complete abdication of responsibility by the ECJ in performing judicial review of the
Commission's conduct in the administrative (and most dominant) phase of this mechanism.
This is both a cause and effect of the lack of legal control of the discharge of public power.
The court continues to view Article 226 as more of a political, rather than a legal,
mechanism of control - there can be no other explanation as to why the ECJ has chosen to
'opt out' of this particular process. Even when presented with an opportunity to systematise
the way in which the Commission handles citizen complaints, the ECJ has refused to
intervene.
The lack ofjudicial review has propagated the 'special' relationship between the Member
State and Commission, and has had a knock-on effect in terms of granting access to Article
226 information under the Regulation on access to documents. Even where this information
is entirely historical, at present it is still unavailable for scrutiny. This again prevents any ex
post scrutiny of the conduct of Article 226 investigations by any other actors, something
desperately needed if the ECJ is unwilling to judicially review Commission conduct. Some
authors have argued that there is nothing wrong with this lack of control of administrative
discretion, on the basis that it is this legal and administrative flexibility (and the inevitable
'special relationship' with the Member State that this generates) that guarantees the ultimate
success of this enforcement mechanism.152
In a system of governance so reliant on generating its legitimacy through the advocation of
the rule of law and the adherence ofMember States to its novel legal system, it seems remiss
that the central mechanism of enforcement ofEU law lacks so many pivotal elements of
administrative and legal legitimacy. The ability of European citizens to enforce their
European rights in the national courts has, in the past, been central to the defence of the
transfer of power to the supranational organisation, particularly in the absence of an increase
in democratic control and accountability.153 Even in a European Community with limited
political ambitions, this placed a great strain on the legal system as a main source of
legitimacy. In a Union with greater political ambitions, the limited development of
152
Timmermans, above n 149.
153 There has been a traditional reliance on 'output legitimacy' in defending the EU as an organisation
which lacks democratic credentials, such as the delivery of protection of EU rights through the novel
legal system. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter III.
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administrative rights at the European level has further undermined the claims of a Europe
that is focused on what it can do for its citizens.154
Identifying the appropriate legal context of the operation of the enforcement mechanism is
only the beginning of a deeper understanding of the role of Article 226. In the absence of
control and accountability provided through legal mechanisms, the enforcement mechanism
becomes a forum for unbounded political decision-making. It is necessary therefore to
consider the political context of the EU in greater detail, and to outline the kind of legitimacy
that may or may not be present through political rather than legal mechanisms.
154 Even the officers of the ECJ have expressed doubts about the strength and depth of rights
protection in the EU, see the Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-50/00 P Union de Pequenos
Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR1-6677. See also Final report of the discussion circle on the Court
of Justice CONY 636/03 25 March 2003.
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Chapter III: Conceptualising democracy, legitimacy and the
development of good governance in the EU
A key feature of Article 226 is that it provides a forum for political interaction between the
institutions of the EU, and between the institutions and the citizen. This interaction occurs in
both the judicial and administrative phase of Article 226, and concerns the formulation of
policy, the administration of infringement investigations and expost control and
accountability of the discharge of public power. Due to the lack of intervention by the ECJ,
these political and administrative interactions are largely unbounded by legal restrictions.
This transfers the pressure for creating legitimacy in the operation of Article 226 from legal
controls, to the quality and nature of the political decision-making that drives Article 226.
The political environment that shapes the operation of (and political decision-making within)
Article 226 becomes a key factor in our understanding of the role it plays in a Union with
constitutional pretensions.
Questions regarding the evolution of the EU, and its expanding boundaries (both territorial
and philosophical) are inextricably bound to complex questions about the nature of the EU
project, and the extent of the legitimacy and popularity such an entity commands. The lack
of traditional democratic mechanisms and government institutions in the EU have led to
questions as to how the EU ought to be judged in terms of its political legitimacy or
democratic merit as a whole. These debates have evolved from claims as to whether there is,
or is not, a palpable 'democratic deficit' operating in the European Union, to more subtle
discussions that are less concerned with quantifying the depth of the democratic deficit but
instead consider some alternative conceptualisations of democracy which fit more neatly
with the current organisational structure and governance mechanisms of the Union. More
recently, debates have widened and are often interrelated with discussions of such nebulous
concepts as 'legitimacy' and 'good governance' when addressing the subject of the overall
credibility of the Union's organisation. Such debates are not confined to the academic arena,
but are very much at the centre stage of European Union politics, with a renewed focus on
how to improve the legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of the citizens in the context of a
constitutional project, as evidenced by such texts as the Laeken Declaration1 and the
Commission's contribution to this debate in the White Paper on Governance.2 The debate
' Declaration No 23 annexed to the Treaty ofNice. The Treaty ofNice was signed in 2002 and came
into force February 2003 and the Declaration was agreed by the European Council summit in
December 2000.
2
European Governance: A White Paper COM (2001) 428 hereinafter referred to as the WPG.
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about the nature and direction of the European polity did not begin with the Laeken
Declaration, but rather has been part of an on-going process of renewal and reform that has
gained significant momentum since the Maastricht Treaty.3
Such debates feed into every policy-making domain of the Union, including the policy
domain of enforcement of legal obligations. In order to incorporate a useful debate
regarding the political context of the EU into the evaluation of the role of Article 226, this
chapter will focus on some key questions relating to the legitimacy of the EU. It will
highlight the fact that good governance in particular has been used to bridge the divide
between traditional concepts of democracy and workable solutions to the legitimacy
question. By defining the key concepts of legitimacy and good governance, the discussion
of the role ofArticle 226 can take place with reference to a specific intellectual framework.
This chapter will be structured as follows. First, I will discuss the challenge of terminology
in academic debates on the democratic deficit, and the difficulties caused by embedded
conceptions of democracy in attempting to construct an effective discourse. The next section
will then offer a broad outline of some conceptual tools used in academic debates, in order to
help clarify the discussion of democracy and legitimacy in relation to the thesis question.
The third section introduces the concept of 'good governance', which has been embraced as
an alternative approach to increasing the EU's legitimacy, and in particular considers the
contribution of the Commission in itsWhite Paper on Governance. Finally, section four will
focus upon how these conceptual tools and contemporary institutional contributions can be
utilised in order to outline a framework of analysis for the consideration of the legal and
political context of the enforcement action, and which can ultimately be used as a benchmark
against which the role of Article 226 can be evaluated.
1.0: The challenge of terminology
The question of the democratic deficit in the European Union is as vast as it is opaque. It is,
like questions relating to the concept of legitimacy, very much dependent on one's
theoretical and ideological perspective. What there can be no doubt about is that there is a
pervasive feeling of discontent amongst the European publics with the Union project.4 In
response to this perception of discontent, politicians, bureaucrats and academics alike have
3 See below for an outline of the process of reform that has led to the current focus on the nature of the
EU as a constitutional entity, culminating in the production of the Constitutional Treaty. See also
Chapter I for an overview of the evolution of the EU as a sui generis organisation.
4.See http://ec.europa.eu/public opinion/index en.htm for a comprehensive analysis of opinion polls
about the popularity of the Union.
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tried to envision a solution to this crisis, albeit in sometimes very different guises. The
suggestions presented as a means of solving the problem of the democratic deficit are
equally problematic - there is, at the heart of these debates, no accepted definition of the
term 'democratic'. Consequently the ideas (or ideals?) are wide-ranging depending upon
which definition of'democratic' is adopted.5 This in turn depends upon one's own
normative vision for the European Union in the first place, and indeed whether you think the
Union ought to be democratic under any definition at all.6 Like so many dilemmas, this
particular chicken and egg question is difficult to resolve without an accepted benchmark as
to what is democratic or legitimate. Whilst this is certainly not inimical to the generation of
debate on the problem of legitimacy and democracy in the EU, and indeed such debate might
certainly create a more democratic environment in and of itself,7 such difficulties do present
a challenge to those charged with making concrete and readily defendable changes to the
system of governance in the EU.
1.1: The 'state model' of democracy
The term democracy is inevitably linked in the popular consciousness with the modern
western liberal conception of state level democratic rule. First, this typical benchmark of the
'state model' of democracy is, in reality, a far cry from the idealised version of democracy
against which the EU is unfavourably judged. Executive dominated parliaments, declining
voter turnouts, and the effects of globalisation on nation state politics are just a few points on
a very long list of criticisms to be levelled at modem state democracies. Secondly, there is
no single model of state democracy, even one with all these limitations. The approach to
democratic governance varies over time and territory.8 There are a myriad of different
configurations currently in operation, so it is unsurprising that, in practical terms, an
organisation made up of (now 27) very differently configured states finds it hard to agree on
what form of 'democracy' the EU ought to take - each being rather fond of its own particular
5 C Lord, 'Assessing democracy in a contested polity' (2001) 39 Journal ofCommon Market Studies
641.
6 See the commentary ofUlrich Haltem who poses the question as to whether the difficulties in
attempting to create constitutional legitimacy for the EU through a Constitutional Treaty are not
created by the very nature of the EU itself which in Haltern's terms was simply never supposed to
evolve into such an entity, see U Haltem, 'Pathos and Patina: the Failure and Promise of
Constitutionalism in the European Imagination' (2003) 9 European Law Journal 14. See also A
Moravcsik, 'What Can We Leam from the Collapse of the European Constitutional Project?' (2006)
47 Politische Viertelsjahresschrift 219.
7 C Lord and P Magnette, 'E Pluribus Unum? Creative Disagreement about the Legitimacy in the EU'
(2004) 42 Journal ofCommon Market Studies 183.
8 D Held, Models ofDemocracy (2nd Edition, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996), P Dunleavy and B
O'Leary, Theories of the State: The Politics ofLiberal Democracy (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1987).
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brand of democracy - let alone what view those who represent the EU itself should
champion.
The lack of one accepted 'pure' model of state democracy is not the only drawback to simply
transforming the EU into an organisation with a state-like structure. Even if, in
organisational term this were possible, there are some other well-rehearsed objections to this
approach to democratising the EU. Some authors point to the difficulties of democratising
the EU without a fixed, cohesive demos. In short, without a common cultural identity to
unite the peoples of Europe, it is argued that operating a nation-state model would not work.9
Majority rule would be harder to justify with such diverse and large minorities being
subordinated in this way. The problems of a lack of common European political space in
which to debate European issues, and more importantly, a common European vernacular in
which to debate issues, are cited as central obstacles to the formation of a cohesive demos.10
There are of course some alternative views on these problems, such as Held's cosmopolitan
democracy ofmultiple identities and 'thin' citizenship, based on basic human rights norms
as the validating and cohesive element of the demos.11 Such theories are criticised on the
basis that they do not adequately address the problem of how a European political space
could develop without a common vernacular whilst the impetus still remains with the nation-
state in terms of controlling the discussion and promotion of the EU.12
If the critique of state democracy is accepted, there is one of two paths to follow in
attempting to alleviate the democratic deficit problem. One approach is the better-the-devil-
you-know attitude, replicating the imperfect state system at the EU level with (or without)
some alterations. Alternatively, there is the approach of identifying of an entirely new set of
democratic criteria on which to judge the credibility of the EU. The first path has
limitations; even if it were a perfect working model of democracy, without the requisite
characteristics of a nation-state, this model may still not work in an international entity, and
9 W Kymlicka, 'Citizenship in an era of globalisation: a comment on Held' in I Shapiro and C Hacker-
Cordon (eds), Democracy's Edges (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999) 112, although it is
questionable as to what extent a common cultural identity exists at the state level either.
10 Ibid.
11 D Held, 'The transformation ofpolitical community: rethinking democracy in the context of
globalisation' in I Shapiro and C Hacker-Cordon (eds), Democracy's Edges (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1999) although see also A Peters, 'European Democracy after the 2003
Convention' (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 37.
12 On how to tackle this thorny issue see P Steinberg, 'Agencies, Co-Regulation And Comitology -
And What About Politics?' in Symposium: Mountain orMolehill? A Critical Appraisal ofthe
Commission White Paper on Governance Jean MonnetWorking Paper 6/01,
http://www.ieanmonnetprogram.org/papers/index.html.
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may even prove disastrous. Taking selected elements from across the Member States, a 'best
bits' concoction of state democracy, is not assured success. The difficulty of 'fit' between
elements that have not evolved within the same constitutional set-up is already evident in the
current organisation of the EU.13
The problem with the second path is that conceiving of entirely new democratic criteria is a
difficult theoretical task in itself and worse, novel concepts of democracy are harder to sell to
the European public at large. Yet this is arguably the most important point of reference
when defining such criteria. The quandary here is that there is no other model to replicate, to
use as a template to point to its relative success (or failure), and therefore no way to predict
the consequences of choosing one set of criteria over another. What is feasible in theoretical
terms in constructing a new model of a 'post-national democracy' in order to overcome the
democratic deficit problem, may not be feasible in the 'real world' of politics.
2.0: Conceptual tools to aid the discussion of democracy and
legitimacy
Accepting the above proposition that each approach to the question of democratic deficit is
dependent upon the normative vision of the EU, in concert with a certain definition of
democracy, it is unsurprising that the European Union is often characterised as both a lsui
generis organisation' and a 'contested polity'. These terms are often used in academic
literature because they appear to offer a degree of value-free descriptive narrative when
talking about the European Union, but in fact such terms belie the very nature of the problem
of the democratic deficit itself.
When the term 'democratic deficit' was first coined14 it was in response to the lack of
traditional direct 'inputs' into the system of governance in the EU, specifically with
reference to the (then) non-elected Assembly.15 One suggested response to resolve this
democratic deficit was to create a directly elected Parliament. Despite this eventual
occurrence, there has been no abatement of the discussions on democratic deficit, but quite
the opposite. At any rate, it proved rather insufficient at plugging the gap between those
who govern, and those being governed.
13 See generally J Ziller, ' European Models of Government: Towards a Patchwork with Missing
Pieces' (2000) 54 Parliamentary Affairs 102.
14 D Marquand, Parliamentfor Europe (Jonathan Cape, London, 1979).
15 In this sense, 'inputs' refers to the input of voter preferences through regular voting in elections.
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The discussion of the democratic deficit is often seen as interchangeable with discussions on
legitimacy and the EU, although properly conceived these are not necessarily the same
concepts at all. 'Democratic deficit' debates ought to be confined to an analysis of the
organisation of a system of governance against pre-defined criteria of what constitutes the
optimum configuration of democratic institutions and mechanisms. In this sense, it might be
reduced to a consideration of inputs and outputs that represent the best formula for achieving
democracy. In contrast, discussions of the legitimacy of the EU are normatively driven. It is
a discussion which relates to the external acceptance and support for a system of governance
by those who are governed by it. It is not about whether a system is 'democratic' per se.
Clearly, if a system is judged as democratic, then chances are that it is more likely to be
regarded as legitimate by the citizenry, since through the operation of the democratic
mechanisms in which their value choices are imposed on the governors, the demos might
incrementally mould the organisation into one that they feel is legitimate. Democracy and
legitimacy are not synonymous concepts however. It is quite feasible to suppose a non-
democratic governance system might be seen as legitimate, accepted and supported by the
demos at large. Debates on legitimacy are therefore really debates about how to generate
support for the EU in the European public at large.
Unfortunately such distinctions are not always made within the academic literature on
legitimacy and democracy in the EU, further confusing and blurring the boundaries of an
already complex issue. It is necessary therefore to clarify the terminology and normative
approach being used to define the political context of the EU in this thesis, and to define the
key concept of legitimacy which will frame the evaluation of the role of Article 226.
2.1: Focusing on the 'key pillars' of democracy
One approach to tackling the issue of democratic deficit is that ofMeny, who sums up the
problem of the democratic deficit in Europe as being a struggle to find the correct balance
between the 'popular pillar' and the 'constitutional pillar' of democracy.16 According to
Meny, most modern democracies are dependent on two particular elements; inputs, in the
form of citizens' influence through regular voting; and a constitutional framework
guaranteeing rights and the protection ofminorities from the rule of the majority.
16 Y Meny, 'De la democratic en Europe: Old concepts and new challenges' (2002) 41 Journal of
Common Market Studies 1.
In this analysis, the popular pillar comprises of direct methods of accountability of the EU
institutions to the citizens. This has fallen way behind in the EU's expansion and evolution,
perhaps unsurprisingly, given the initial focus on negative economic integration in the early
years of the Community. It is at this fledgling stage of the Community's development that
the popular pillar was created and has remained largely untouched since.17 As politics have
progressed beyond the economic project, the popular pillar has not developed in parallel
along with this new enterprise. Simultaneously the constitutional pillar, which focuses upon
guaranteeing rights and imposing duties directly on the citizenry, is overdeveloped.
Naturally therefore, there is a cleavage between the control of the EU and its institutions,
policy direction and decision-making by the citizenry (including the continued development
of the constitutional pillar), and the burgeoning impact of the EU on citizens' daily lives.
Neither the constitutional pillar nor the popular pillar is sufficient without the other in a
properly functioning democracy, and although the relative balance between these two pillars
might vary over time and space, they are seen by Meny as equally significant in combating
democratic malaise.18 Here the discussions of democratic deficit and legitimacy are
intertwined somewhat. By increasing the democratic credentials through alteration of the
institutional set-up, which in turn will increase the citizens' input, the legitimacy of the EU is
also improved. Nevertheless, this discussion is firmly placed in the 'democracy' end of the
spectrum - improving democracy is the first priority and is the pathway to achieving
legitimacy.
Meny does not suggest trying to replicate the state at the EU level, but rather the
development of a sui generis definition of democracy to go with the sui generis organisation:
to develop a concept of 'post-national democracy'. According to Meny, there is no value in
replicating the national system as there is also a 'democratic deficit' being felt at the national
level, though less acutely than at the EU level. The same problems (of a lack of popular
input and control) persist in this domain of governance also, as the influence of non-
democratic institutions and corporations expand and voter apathy grows. In national systems
however, the development of the constitutional pillar has either occurred suddenly (in a state
17 With the exception of the direct election of the European Parliament.
18 In order to improve the relative balance between these two pillars, Meny suggests that tentative and
small adjustments to the current system would begin to address some of the weaknesses in the popular
pillar, such as making the institutions of Commission, Council and European Parliament directly
accountable to the citizens; improving the 'transmission belts' of democracy (the political party
system); improving the role of national parliaments with regards to EU policy; and introducing
referenda on European issues.
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forming big bang event) or at a significant time after the popular pillar, bringing with it the
will of the people, and consequently the bigger imbalance felt at the EU level is not present.
This broader approach to the question of democratic deficit is useful as it crystallises the
main arguments ofmany other authors in the discussion of these key 'pillars'. The critique
is along similar lines to Schmitter who links the problem of the democratic deficit to the key
factor of the European project proceeding without the direct input or control of the
citizenry.19 It is clear that under Meny's analysis of the democracy crisis in the EU, the
current institutional attitudes to the problem of the democratic deficit are perhaps misguided,
since the most visible efforts at reducing the malaise of the European public are placed
squarely in the further development of the constitutional pillar. Indeed a new constitution,
complete with its own bill of rights is first and foremost on the agenda, with no equivalent
effort being aimed at the popular pillar or voter input.
2.2: A liberal democratic emphasis
A more detailed analysis of the democratic deficit is undertaken by Beetham and Lord, who
conflate the problem of democratic deficit and lack of legitimacy in the EU, and describe it
as the 'legitimacy deficit'.20 This study lays out a cogent and clear approach to the question
of legitimacy deficit in the EU. Using such terminology allows the debate to take into
account both legitimacy and democracy criteria, and also circumvents the expectations
generated by the use of the term 'democratic'. They analyse what criteria underpin
legitimate government and describe the lack of legitimacy, or democracy deficit, as:
'a gap between principles and practice, or between legitimating norms and
societies support for those norms'.21
The central argument of this contribution is that liberal democratic criteria are the
appropriate criteria forjudging the legitimacy of the EU, although they may be insufficient
on their own, and the ultimate institutional structure may differ from that of the state model
of democracy.
The concept of legitimacy used by Beetham and Lord is helpfully defined as consisting of
three distinct criteria: identifiable rules; justifications for actions (by those who govern)
19 Discussed above n 25.
20 D Beetham, and C Lord, Legitimacy and the European Union (Longman, London, 1998).
21 Ibid p 2.
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founded on beliefs; and consent and recognition by those governed by the system.22 They
define liberal democratic legitimacy as having five key features23: a constitutional rule of law
to determine legality of action; popular sovereignty as the source ofpolitical authority; rights
defence as the purpose of the government (freedom, welfare, security); consent of the demos
by electoral authorisation; and external recognition of the validity of that entity's political
arrangement.24 Clearly the EU has some features of liberal democratic legitimacy and not
others. Beetham and Lord analyse the EU's legitimacy by focusing upon specific aspects of
the liberal democratic model, particularly those which are seen as posing the greatest
problem in terms of translation to the EU level of governance: political identity; popular
authorisation/accountability; and performance.
This approach to the discussion of the democratic deficit is useful in several ways. First, it
clearly articulates its particular normative vision for the EU from the outset, by using
modified criteria of a liberal democratic state as its starting point, as well as articulating
what constitutes legitimacy which provides a clear yardstick. This first step is often
overlooked entirely in discussions on democratic deficit, leading to unclear benchmarks
against which claims of a lack of legitimacy/democracy are often made.
In analysing certain aspects of the legitimacy criteria, the discussion is also opened out to
consider alternative models for increasing the democracy and legitimacy of the EU, with
each alternative approach critiqued and dismissed in turn. The analysis considers the
problems of using the liberal democratic criteria to judge the EU against, in terms of the
costs to state legitimacy - that in some cases, strengthening one system inevitably leads to
weakness in the other and, alternatively, that such criteria might also have the positive effect
of reinforcing democracy at both levels. This brings with it another perspective on the
question of the democratic deficit and the difficulties caused when addressing certain
problems at the EU level might have a detrimental knock-on effect at the level of the
Member States.
22 Above n 20 p 4. This is the definition of legitimacy I will adopt and apply as the benchmark for
consideration of the legitimacy of the infringement process in the wider context considering the
operation of its competing functionality.
23 Liberal democratic legitimacy is usually the term used to describe western European modem state
democracies.
24 Above n 20, p 9.
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2.3: Democracy and citizen control
Schmitter's work on democracy and the European Union takes a different approach, heavily
focused on democracy as traditionally understood.25 It begins with a definition of democracy
as:
'a regime or system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their
actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition
and cooperation of their representatives'.26
Whilst this does not equate to replication of the state institutions, it is heavily based on voter
input and representation - in this sense it is liberal democratic in orientation. After
describing the three main features of a democracy as being the rulers, citizens and
representatives, Schmitter goes on to discuss how a Euro-democracy would be configured in
relation to his model which incorporates these three key elements at the centre of the
organisation. He provides a detailed critique of the current configuration of the EU with
reference to these standards, concluding each section with some suggested 'modest
proposals' for reform of the current system. These 'modest proposals' are detailed and
practical changes to the current institutional and Treaty framework rather than an elaboration
of a grand theory or new way of thinking of the democratic deficit, albeit there is clearly an
underlying normative vision underwriting it. This is a remodelling rather than a
reconceptualisation of democracy.27 Most of the proposals are geared towards strengthening
the key elements of Schmitter's model of democracy, which hark back to models of
democracy heavily based on citizen control of public actors.
Although this is not a deeply theoretical discussion on the democratic deficit, the detailed
consideration ofparticular amendments in the current practices in the EU and of the
institutions and the manner in which they work, still contributes to the debate by highlighting
how future concrete changes might affect the legitimacy and democratic credentials of the
EU. What this book focuses upon much more than other pieces is the practical realisation of
theoretical discussions on democratic deficit, as judged against the initial definition of
democracy. The top-down approach ofmost theories, which inevitably outline change and
25 PC Schmitter, How to Democratize the European Union...and Why Bother? (Rowman & Littlefield,
Oxford, 2000), PC Schmitter, 'What is there to legitimise in the European Union and how might this
be accomplished?' in Symposium: Mountain orMolehill? A Critical Appraisal of the Commission
White Paper on Governance, Jean MonnetWorking Paper 6/01,
http://www.ieanmonnetprogram.org/papers/index.html. See also Miles, L 'Editorial: The Paradox of a
Popular Europe' (2004) 42 Journal ofCommon Market Studies Annual Review 1.
26 Ibid n 25 p 3.
27 For instance, under the key element of citizenship, Schmitter proposes the insertion of referenda
into European elections; allowing citizens to vote over a much longer time period and by electronic
means; an entirely new voting system for MEPs; and granting the EU the authority to define and
protect the status of third country nationals in the EU who are permanent residents.
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democratic/legitimacy gains being elite driven through the process of Treaty amendment,
tend to obscure the underlying cause of dissatisfaction with the EU project.
Schmitter repeatedly concentrates on ways in which to directly involve the citizenry on a
level that the European public already understands, without trying to replicate the state
institutions at the European level. The recurring calls for referenda on the issue of the
direction of the EU and on certain policy initiatives is a specific example of the realisation
that legitimacy and democracy cannot be invented over night, and the achievement of
closing the emotional and intellectual gap between the elites who are invested in the EU
project, and the demos at large, will be a long and painful process.
The focus on generating the ' spark' of change in the current malaise of the European public
is usually either missing entirely or not treated in sufficient detail in other academic
discussions. In Meny's parlance, this would relate to the expansion of the 'popular pillar',
but crucially Meny does not fully connect the necessity of this expansion being 'bottom up'
i.e. coming at the behest of the citizenry. Only time, and a monumental publicity campaign,
can hope to improve the European citizens' disconnection with the EU.28 Schmitter
identifies this correctly as a risky strategy, since increasing the citizens' involvement and
awareness of the Union will not necessarily result in generating overwhelming support for
it.29
2.4: Categorisation of approaches: reconciling differences
Lord and Magnette's discussion of legitimacy is focused upon reconciling the competing
theories of legitimacy in debates about EU governance.30 The premise of this work is that
these competing visions of legitimate governance do not constitute evidence that there can
never be legitimate governance in Europe, but quite the opposite. Accordingly, it is within
these broad ideological differences of what is legitimate that a plurality of legitimating
principles can be found, and whilst some visions may compete and conflict, others
complement and reinforce each other. It is within the management and reconciliation of
these competing visions of legitimacy that the EU's claim to legitimate government can be
made, based on the common legitimating principles.
28 The EU is not blind to this and recent initiatives clearly demonstrate that this has been identified as
a key part of the strategy to increase the legitimacy of the EU, see for instance
http://euobserver.eom/9/21452/?rk=l where the Commission is keen to emphasise its commitment to
addressing citizens' concerns.
29
Though see the Commission's thoughts on this matter in the WPG, discussed below.
30 Lord and Magnette above, n 7.
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In surveying the literature on legitimacy/democracy and the EU, Lord and Magnette
categorise the different approaches taken by other authors. These are described as indirect
legitimacy, parliamentary legitimacy, technocratic legitimacy and procedural legitimacy.
This is a useful tool to aid the discussion of the broad approaches taken by other authors
when discussing legitimacy and/or the democratic deficit in the Union, and I will use this
terminology throughout the thesis to identify the different ways of conceptualising the
conflicting approaches, and to define the types of legitimacy questions applicable to
evaluating the role of Article 226. Ideologically, the categorisation used by Lord and
Magnette easily covers those discussions strictly dealing with democracy questions, and
those strictly dealing with legitimacy questions, as well as those who conflate the discussion
of both.
These categorisations reflect a commitment to a fundamental way of conceiving a more
legitimate or more democratic Europe. The indirect legitimacy approach relies heavily on
the pre-existing legitimacy of the state actors and each Member State's sovereignty when
participating in the EU on the basis of consent31 - this is also sometimes referred to as the
international model and is an approach adopted in earlier discussions of the EU's legitimacy,
and in particular the 'legitimacy' of the enforcement action.32 This particular line is
favoured by those authors who prefer the intergovernmental model of the EU to the
supranational model or those who prefer the democratic credentials to stay at the nation-state
level.
The category of 'parliamentary legitimacy' refers to those authors that support the status quo
of representation of citizens through the Council ofMinisters and government heads in the
European Council, plus the direct representation through the European Parliament, combined
in a forum of consensus and majority decision-making. This approaches favours alterations
to the current system on a smaller scale, and places emphasis on re-conceptualising the
problem of democratic deficit rather than reducing it to increasing the elements of direct
representation of the citizen.33 It can also refer to those academic contributions that wish to
31
Moravcsik, A The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Powerfrom Messina to Maastricht
(University College London Press, London, 1998).
32 In fact the word legitimacy is never used in relation to early discussions of Article 226 at all, as this
was considered irrelevant to the utility ofArticle 226 as an enforcement mechanism. Nonetheless,
consideration ofArticle 226 was always couched in terms of intergovemmentalism and Member State
sovereignty and the lack of legal control and unbounded discretion is defended on this basis.
33 An example of this approach is in Lord & Beetham above n 20.
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concentrate on improving the direct accountability of the EU institutions to the citizens of
Europe by changing the current institutional structure to offer direct input opportunity other
than that already offered by the European Parliament.34 Both those who want 'more Europe'
and, occasionally those who want less, can champion this path - ideologically this is quite a
flexible tool. Clearly, the greater the traditional nation state characteristics are replicated at
the EU level, the more it resembles a super-state that is at once more federal and more
democratic (if the major democratic criterion is voter input, though again, this is a point of
disagreement). Those who want less Europe might also wish to see the status quo largely
preserved (since it appears so unpopular, thereby denying it democratic credibility) with an
increase in the role of national parliaments keeping the democratic credentials at the national
level.35
It is the final two categorisations of Lord and Magnette, of technocratic and procedural
legitimacy, that dominate the discussion and evaluation of the role of Article 226 in this
thesis. The technocratic vision of the EU is based on an entirely different premise from the
first two categories, is largely associated with the work ofMajone,36 and will be discussed
infra. The procedural category best describes those authors who prefer the approach of
improving the current institutional framework with more commitment to certain overriding
principles in the EU's operation such as transparency, due process, legal certainty and
respect for fundamental rights. This stance is less concerned with (voter) inputs and more
concerned with increased participation and transparency more generally37; it is heavily
reliant on the legal system to provide legitimacy, when the political system is considered
deficient in certain respects.38 This standpoint is often combined with other models in
academic literature rather than a stand-alone approach to improving the legitimacy of the
EU, and is more linked to questions of legitimacy than questions of democracy.39
34
Meny above n 16.
35 C Harlow, Accountability in the European Union (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002).
36 G Majone, Regulating Europe (Routledge, London, 1996), G Majone, 'The European Community:
An Independent Fourth Branch of Government' EUI Working Paper 94/17, Florence, G Majone,
'Europe's 'Democratic Deficit': The Question of Standards' (1998) 4 European Law Journal 5. See
more recently G Majone, Dilemmas ofEuropean integration: the ambiguities andpitfalls of
integration by stealth (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005).
37 D Curtin, 'Citizens' Fundamental Right ofAccess to EU Information: An Evolving Digital
Passepartout?' (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 7, D Curtin, 'The Constitutional Structure of
the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces' (1993) 30 Common Market Law Review 17.
38 In Beetham and Lord's terms, deficient in the conventional legitimating criteria present in the
liberal democratic state. In terms of Article 226, deficient in legal administrative controls in the
operation of the enforcement mechanism.
39 See also A Heritier, 'Composite democracy in Europe: the role of transparency and access to
information' (2003) 10 Journal ofEuropean Public Policy 814.
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This categorisation of the debates on democratic deficit and legitimacy is not an attempt to
apply a particular theory to one policy field or institution (which is a popular approach in
academic contributions), but to show how the combination of various broad approaches
might eventually produce the most acceptable outcome in a new system of governance such
as the EU, and how a plurality of views promotes the idea that the EU might be defended as
a legitimate system of governance.
2.5: Technocratic governance: the non-majoritarian approach
Technocratic governance is a different approach to the legitimation of the EU and is firmly
rooted in discussions of legitimacy rather than democracy. If the EU is not envisioned as a
super state, a federal state or any other kind of state-like entity, it need not possess the
characteristics of such an entity to be legitimate. Majone's approach to the discussion of the
democratic deficit was quite different from most others, since it focused upon the necessity
ofnon-majoritarian (non-democratic) institutions in democratic governance. An example of
this type of system is the American 'fourth branch of government' of executive agencies,
which are non-elected expert bodies charged with rule making.40 Examples of this type of
governance now abound in most liberal democratic systems of government.41
The premise of this theory is that the necessity for traditional (state like) organisation of
democracy is limited at the European level, since conceptually it can be viewed as a
regulatory body on a grand scale. This government by epistemic communities requires no
democratic credentials save the governing instruments of such bodies be clearly set out;
legitimation is generated by the quality of those decisions that are being made and the
superior knowledge of those participating in the decision-making process.42 The legitimacy
credentials are therefore reliant only upon the quality of the outputs (good or bad decisions
or policies) rather than the inputs of voter/citizen values or beliefs.43 In a regulatory system,
40 M Shapiro, ' The problem of Independent Agencies in the United States and the European Union'
(1997) 4 Journal ofPublic Policy 276.
41 For instance, the Bank ofEngland is one such institution in the UK.
42 E Vos, 'Reforming the European Commission: What Role to Play for EU Agencies' (2000) 37
Common Market Law Review 1113, E Chiti, 'The emergence of a Community administration: the case
ofEuropean agencies' (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 309, R Dehousse, 'Misfits: EU law
and the Transformation of European governance' in C Joerges and R Dehousse (eds), Good
Governance in Europe's IntegratedMarket (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002).
43
Although as part ofBeetham and Lord's definition of liberal democratic legitimacy, the outputs (in
terms of the 'performance' criterion) are a part of the five key features of liberal democratic
legitimacy and the relevance of outputs is not solely associated with the non-majoritarian approach to
legitimacy.
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decisions are best insulated from politics which (should) reflect voter beliefs or preferences,
which in turn might negatively affect the quality of the decisions being taken by experts in
the field.
Doubtless this theory has some significant drawbacks. Since progression to a political union
the EU cannot accurately be described as a technical rule making body alone (if indeed it
could ever have been accurately described as such), and is it very much immersed in
normative political choices extending to the heart of value-laden judgments like human
rights and social policy. There is no 'expert body' more qualified than the representatives of
the citizens to take such normatively foundational decisions which shape the society in
which we all live. The weakness of this theory is accountability to the demos', whilst
legitimacy is based on outputs of 'good decisions', even the most technical and seemingly
non-political decision will at some point contain a value-choice. If the citizenry disagrees
with this value choice, there is no way for the citizenry to alter the system - it is completely
insulated from political influence and purposely so. Whilst 'experts' may be accountable to
each other via a species of 'network accountability',44 again this is internal accountability
rather than external. This viewpoint can be contrasted with the approach of Schmitter above
where the input from 'below' is of central importance in the debate on the democratic deficit
and is viewed as the only way forward to bridge the growing disconnection with the citizens
oftheEU.
There might be discrete areas within the EU that might more properly relate to this particular
stance on legitimacy, such as the organisation of the European agencies or the European
Central Bank. In this respect, on a functional basis, this theory has much to offer as an
explanation of legitimacy in individual non-majoritarian based institutions. Equating the EU
with the American system, as Majone does, misses the crucial point that this system of
executive agencies is deeply imbedded within the traditional organs of state democracy and
is not a stand-alone system responsible for the entire governance of the US. Nevertheless,
this particular approach to the legitimacy crisis in the EU is useful since it provides an
alternative to most other theories which posit political representation as a cornerstone of
improving the democratic deficit in the EU. It also reflects, to some extent, the focus of
institutional discussions of legitimacy in the EU.
44 C Scott, 'Accountability in the Regulatory State' (2000) 27 Journal ofLegal Studies 38, KH
Ladeur, 'Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality - The Viability of the Network Concept' (1997)
3 European Law Review 33, C Scott, 'The Governance of the European Union: The Potential for
Multi-Level Control' 8 (2002) European Law Journal 59.
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The above survey only touches upon the enormously varied discussion of the issues which
surround the questions about democratic deficit and legitimacy in the EU, but it does provide
a broad overview of some of the intellectual approaches taken, focusing on material that
specifically contributes to the underpinning the discussion of legitimacy in this thesis. If it is
a difficult task theoretically to construct an acceptable solution to the democracy/legitimacy
crisis of the EU, transferring such considerations to the infinitely less flexible and less
adaptable 'real world' of politics is exponentially harder. Nevertheless, the political world is
awake to the dissatisfaction of the European public with the EU, and must try to forge a
solution that is workable in the arena of co-operation between 27 differently configured
Member States.
3.0 The introduction of 'good governance' as a tool to redress the
legitimacy deficit
Due to the lack of a traditional state structure, based on hierarchical authority derived from
the popular consent of the demos, the notion of government as a basis for conducting the
business of the European Union has been largely sidelined. In its place, the more fluid
concept of governance, which can be constructed in various organisational formats and can
accommodate even the vagaries of the EU's operations, has replaced the idea of traditional
government as an organising concept. The governance trend is widely addressed in
academic literature in relation to the evolution of the EU,45 and has also caught the
imagination of the political/institutional arena as a way forward in addressing the legitimacy
problems of the Union. Employing the term 'governance' in debates on legitimacy in the
EU is yet another method of circumventing the difficulties associated with the democratic
deficit debates, as government seems inevitably linked with 'democracy' rather than an
alternative form of rule.
When focusing down from the generalised debates on democracy/legitimacy, the concept of
good governance provides a yardstick of legitimacy in the EU. The question then becomes,
what constitutes good governance and legitimacy in the contemporary political context of the
EU? Fortunately, the EU itself, in the form of the European Commission has outlined what
45 For instance C Carter, and A Scott 'Legitimacy and Governance Beyond the European Nation State:
Conceptualising Governance in the European Union' (1998) 4 European Law Journal 429, R Rhodes,
'The New Governance: Governing without Government' (1996) 44 Political Studies 652, J Scott, and
D Trubek, 'Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union' (2001) 8
European Law Journal 1, IJ Sand, 'Understanding the New Forms of Governance: Mutually
Independent, Reflexive, Destabilised and Competing Institutions' (1998) 4 European Law Journal
271.
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it considers to be the appropriate defining criteria of the concept of good governance, and
this will be considered in greater detail below. The Commission's vision of good
governance, together with the appropriate political and legal context will be used as the
framework of analysis for considering the role of the Article 226.
3.1: A changing political vision of Europe
The Maastricht Treaty46 was an important turning point in achieving greater political co¬
operation.47 It introduced the pillar structure and with it more nationally sensitive policy
areas into the EU domain. From this point onwards, the rate at which renewal and debate
about the nature of the European project greatly increased. The prospect of enlargement to
include states from Central and Eastern Europe focused attention on issues relating to
institutional reform, initially on a practical level of whether the existing institutions could
cope with the increased workload enlargement would bring.48 The Treaty ofNice and in
particular the Declaration on the future of the Union49 called for a deeper and wider debate
about the future of the EU, leading to the Laeken Declaration.50
This Declaration sets out the political agenda and the normative vision of the EU's Member
States for a more democratic Europe (without, conveniently, defining the term 'democratic')
The Declaration focuses upon some general key themes, such as bringing the institutions
closer to the citizens by making them more open and efficient, which in turn will lead to an
increased democratic scrutiny of the EU's actions. Citizens' expectations are explained in
the language of 'more results, better responses to practical issues, less bureaucracy' and not
the formation of a 'European super-state involved in every detail of everyday life'. It is
stated that the citizens are in complete agreement with the Union's broad aims and there is
no ambiguity in the citizens' call for a clear, open, effective and democratically controlled
Union. Through the simplification of instruments, clearer roles for each institution and
greater transparency in its operation, the Laeken Declaration pinpoints the way in which the
democratic credentials of the EU could be greatly increased. The Declaration culminated in
46
Treaty on European Union, signed 1992, and entered into force in 1993.
47 The TEU renamed the EEC Treaty to the EC Treaty (which would comprise the Communities and
be the first pillar) and created the three pillar structure and the European Union.
48
Treaty of Amsterdam signed 1997, entered into force 1999 and the Treaty ofNice, signed 2002,
entered into force 2003.
49 Declaration on the future of the Union, Treaty ofNice OJ C 80 10.3.2001, Declaration 23 at p 80.
50
European Council, December 2001, the text can be found at
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/68827.pdf.
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the convening of the Convention on the Future ofEurope51 to reflect upon the issues raised,
which eventually resulted in the production of a Draft Constitutional Treaty. The Draft
Treaty was debated and amended at the IGC in 2004, eventually resulting in the
Constitutional Treaty which was signed by the Member States in October 2004.
The Laeken Declaration marks an important step forward in the recognition that the
European project must search for better democratic credentials if it is to be sustained, not
only in response to the (then impending) enlargement process, but also to improve its
democratic standing and therefore its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. By virtue of the
fact that the Laeken Declaration is a political document from the Member States, it is light
on detail and heavy on rhetoric. However, it is feasible to speculate that in the politician's
mindset, the discussions of democracy and legitimacy are inextricably linked and often
interchangeable.52
The concentration on clarification and transparency broadly adopts the route of procedural
legitimacy in its approach to delivering greater legitimacy credentials for the EU, combined
with a focus on improving performance, or increasing the quality of the 'outputs'.53 In
Meny's parlance, this is once again a concentration on expanding and improving upon the
'constitutional pillar', and despite the mention of 'democratic control' in the Laeken
Declaration, there is not much in the way of suggestions to increase the ambit of the 'popular
pillar'. In comparison to Schmitter's model, which is completely focused on increasing the
democratic credentials of the EU, the vision espoused in the Laeken Declaration bears scant
resemblance to a blueprint for increasing citizen control. This is important to note because,
as will become clear, the incantation ofparticular phrases does not amount to the adoption or
realisation of that strategy in reality.
51 The Convention was charged with preparing for the 2004 IGC in an transparent and open format,
involving many stakeholders into the debate, for instance, the governments of the Member States and
the candidate countries, representatives of national parliaments, representatives of the European
Parliament and the European Commission, and observers from the Committee of the Regions, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the European social partners. For a step by step
description of the work of the Convention and the debate about the future of Europe, see
http://europa.eu/scadplus/european_convention/introduction_en.htm.
52 See the speech by R Prodi, President of the European Commission 'The European Union and its
citizens: a matter ofDemocracy' European Parliament Strasbourg, 4 September 2001, at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/01/365&format=HTML&aged=l
&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
53 This is a combination of technocratic legitimacy and procedural legitimacy.
84
3.2: The background to the White Paper on Governance
As a part of the process of re-conceptualising the EU in the political world, the Commission
as central policy initiator, drafted what it foresaw as a realistic vision of a better governed
Europe. This document contained clues as to the Commission's particular normative vision
for the future governance of the EU.54 The White Paper on Governance55 proved an eerily
accurate precursor of the Laeken Declaration with many of the themes espoused in the
Laeken Declaration advocated in the WPG.56 This is of course no co-incidence; the
Commission is eager to position itself as the neutral mediator between the political struggles
of the Member States, and so it should come as no surprise that in search for politically
neutral terminology, phrases from the earlier produced WPG appear replicated. It is also the
primary function of the Commission to initiate new policy so naturally, when the political,
philosophical and functional direction of the EU might be changing, the Commission was
keen to actively participate in shaping the future direction of the Union.
The stated purpose of the WPG was to engage in an intellectual exercise of debating new
governance techniques, in order to improve the governance of the EU, placed within this
changing political context. It was put forward specifically as a way to exchange ideas, in the
form of an open consultation paper, with anyone who wished to contribute to this debate. It
acknowledged the wider debate taking place on the future of Europe, and is self-conscious
that the proposals contained therein form a part of the same normative debate. From this
perspective, the WPG was an ambitious project of attempting to open up the discussion of
EU governance by and with the Commission, so often an event viewed as being exclusive
and behind closed doors by the outside world. On the whole, this process in and of itselfwas
a positive step forward in opening up policy making discussions in EU governance.
3.3: The underlying normative vision and the five principles of good
governance
The Commission set out its position on greater democracy and legitimacy in the EU. The
emphasis was placed on adopting five principles of good governance to be applied to the
conduct of the EU governance. The principles articulated by the Commission were those of
54 The Commission's White Paper has been chosen as it reflects the view of the 'neutral'
representative of Europe itself, as well as being the institution responsible for policy initiation in the
EU. More importantly, in the context of the wider thesis, the Commission is the main controller of the
infringement process, which itself is a central tool of governance.
55 Above n 2.
56
Proving once again the astute policy organisation of the Commission in getting its proposals in early
in order to influence the Laeken Declaration and the Convention.
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openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence.51 The WPG began with
the warning label ofnot being 'a magic cure for everything' and the statement that the
Commission was constrained in its suggestions by the framework of the Treaties.58 This
being acknowledged, it is correct to say that even within the parameters of its own
circumscribed proposals, there is a normative vision ofEurope being put forward by the
Commission nonetheless.59 The WPG used the terminology of 'democracy' and it is quickly
evident that much of the WPG is aimed at a particular brand of 'democracy' that is not
necessarily liberal democratic in nature60: however, it is no less democratic for this reason
alone. As we have seen, democracy is a flexible term that can be applied to many different
configurations of institutions and principles.
It is disappointing that there is no working definition of democracy within this document,
and this is a particular weak point if the WPG was to represent an intellectual (rather than
political) exercise of discussing better governance. It is hard to measure the effectiveness of
the suggestions if there is no self-set benchmark. Notwithstanding this, there is an
appreciation in the WPG, so often missing in academic contributions to the debate, that the
legitimacy of the EU can be viewed as quite separate from the democratic credentials of the
EU, and is just as important (ifnot more so), when framing the proposed solutions in the
WPG. There was an ostensibly two-prong approach to the discussion of governance:
legitimacy-based solutions and democracy-based solutions. The legitimacy-based proposals
are a species of procedural and technocratic legitimacy. The democracy-based solutions are
heavily influenced by theories that rely significantly on increasing (citizen) participation in
public affairs, although the legitimacy 'input' is not necessarily created by the elements of
liberal democracy and citizen control emphasised by Schmitter.61
57 Governance is defined in the WPG as 'rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which
powers are exercised at the European level, particularly as regards openness, participation,
accountability, effectiveness and coherence'.
58
WPG, above n 2 p 3.
59
Contrary to the thoughts of EO Erikson, 'Democratic or technocratic governance?' in Symposium:
Mountain or Molehill? A CriticalAppraisal of the Commission White Paper on Governance Jean
Monnet Working Paper 6/01. http://www.ieanmonnetprogram.org/Dapers/index.html.
60 Unlike most of the academic discussions surveyed above which, if focusing upon democracy, tend
to reference liberal democratic criteria as the benchmark.
61 It is feasible to suggest that in the early drafting of the WPG, the Commission may well have
originally been influenced by the theoretical approach of civic republicanism, which is less reliant on
the traditional emphasis of liberal democratic systems of voter input and control that the EU does not
presently contain. See the governance website of the Commission for some of the early contributions
to the debate, http://ec.europa.eu/govemance/index en.htm. See also
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/areas/preparatorv work en.pdf. A useful elaboration of civic
republicanism can be found in P Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory ofFreedom and Government
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997).
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The principle of openness
The proclaimed objective of the WPG proposals was to 'promote greater openness,
accountability and responsibility'62 in European governance. These terms are defined in a
way that underlines the emphasis placed by the Commission on procedural and technocratic
legitimacy. The principle of openness is defined as the:
'institutions working in a more open manner...actively communicating about
what the EU does.'63
In choosing the principle of'openness', the Commission was responding to the criticism that
the EU is a complex organisation not easily understood by the citizens of Europe.
Embracing greater openness, meaning in this case greater transparency in the way in which
the Union operates, will ensure that citizens feel less suspicious of the 'bureaucracy in
Brussels'. Secretive dealings behind closed doors do not inspire claims of legitimacy, and
without a doubt the Commission has pinpointed one aspect of citizen dissatisfaction about
the EU as a whole.64
The Commission concentrated on openness in relation to one very specific issue with the
EU, relating it only to the complex methods of decision-making.65 Here, openness equates to
clarity within and between the institutions, which can loosely be defined as a type of
procedural legitimacy. Arguably, greater openness relies not only on open deliberations of
the legislator and clarity in the legislating process, but also easy access to information. The
often quoted shining light of progress in this particular field is woefully inadequate and has
proved insufficient at quelling calls for a more open Europe.66 The Commission itself is
often a target of citizen complaints under this very legislation; it is disappointing therefore,
that this rather central aspect of 'openness' was sidestepped in discussion of this governance
principle.
Interestingly, despite 'transparency' being the buzz-word of the new governance trend, it
was not adopted as a principle of good governance. Transparency and, perhaps, even the
more limited version of openness adopted by the Commission, requires much more than
active communication about the ways in which decisions are taken, but also (at the very
62 WPG above n 2 p 3.
63 WPG above n2p 10.
64 The Commission does not connect this problem to the operation of the enforcement mechanism.
65
Though this is a very basic requirement of any system of legitimate legislation.
66
Regulation 1049/2001 OJ 2001 L145/43, discussed in greater detail in Chapter II.
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least) an ability to discover information for oneself rather than a one-way stream of
educative information from the EU 'downward'.67 This might be seen as a missed
opportunity to improve the legitimacy of the EU, especially considering the Commission
would not have had to compromise on its particular normative vision of procedural and
technocratic legitimacy, in order to improve both the transparency credentials of the Union
and its own beleaguered image in this respect.
The principle of participation
The principle ofparticipation was defined with reference to the underlying Commission
vision of technocratic legitimacy; in this sense, active participation is important in European
governance because there is 'a greater need for quality, relevance and effectiveness'.68 This
version ofparticipation is output driven: with greater participation from appropriate parties,
including citizens in the form of organised interest groups, policies will be of better quality,
more relevant (and therefore more popular) and more effective. This approach to
participation might be seen as a lost opportunity. Arguably, one is tempted to think of
participation in very different terminology than 'quality, relevance and effectiveness' when
the self-proclaimed task at hand is aimed at establishing democratic governance and
reconnecting Europe to its citizens.69
This was perhaps one of the most crucial miscalculations on the Commission's part in the
WPG, revealing the essentially political (rather than intellectual) aspect of the WPG
exercise. Correctly identifying the lack of citizen connection with the EU in several
passages in the WPG nevertheless resulted in an extremely weak attempt to engage with the
citizenry under the principle of participation, focusing on the task of engaging with already
integrated elite actors, and failing to mention political parties in any fashion.70 It seems the
principle ofparticipation is not focused on engaging with the citizenry, but rather on
improving the quality of the policy output. On closer inspection, this initiative is more to do
with (technocratic) policy management techniques and therefore does not contribute to
democracy-based solutions. This is not to suggest good policies are not an admirable goal in
67 M O'Neill, 'The Right of Access to Community Held Documentation as a General Principle of EC
Law' (1998) 5 European Public Law 403, A Tomkins, 'Transparency and the Emergence of a
European Administrative Law' (1999) 19 Yearbook ofEuropean Law 219.
68
WPGaboven2p 10.
69 See generally F Bignami, 'Three Generations of Participation Rights in European Administrative
Proceedings' Jean Monnet Working Paper 11/03,
http://www.ieanmonnetDrogram.org/paners/index.html.
70
Steinberg above n 12.
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any governance reform programme, only that this was the least suitable principle to assign to
this task.
Putting aside the reasoning behind the definition of this principle, the Commission has
attempted to be more inclusive in its policy making by arranging to include the organisations
of civil society, with the Commission choosing which organisations will qualify as proper
representatives of the citizens.71 The principle of participation, on further elaboration by the
Commission72 actually really equates to some form of consultation, which has very different
democratic (and legitimacy) connotations than that ofparticipation. It is certainly less
catchy as a headline principle of good governance, and ultimately less meaningful in
practical terms as a way of actively engaging with the citizenry.
The principle of consultation does fit entirely with the Commission's emphasis on
procedural and technocratic solutions, and should have replaced the term 'participation' so as
not to give a false impression. On further elaboration of this principle in the Commission's
more detailed Communication, even as consultation properly conceived, it still remains
rather restricted as a principle of good governance. As a form of consultation, it resembles
the natural justice end of the consultation spectrum: an opportunity to air views, rather than a
way to truly assert influence in the policy making process.73 This then reduces the WPG
focus from a two-pronged approach of democracy and legitimacy-based solutions, to being
focused only on legitimacy.
The principle of accountability
The term accountability is famously elastic and, rather like the term democracy, it can mean
whatever one would like it to mean, depending on one's perspective.74 In the WPG, the
Commission adopts the principle of accountability as one of its good governance principles
and defines it as a combination ofparticipation (meaning consultation) and openness. This
view of accountability again reflects the underlying normative bias of the WPG towards
71 There is no duty to consult other than that which already exists (with reference to the 'social
partners') and no clear commitment to when and on what issues the Commission will consult. On the
problem of agency capture and self selection of civil society and the value of this approach see O De
Schutter, 'Europe in Search of its Civil Society' (2002) 8 European Law Journal 198, LSE response
paper to the governance consultation 'Taking Governance Seriously'
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/index en .htm.
72 Commission Communication 'Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and Dialogue' COM
(2002) 277 final 5.6.2002.
73 S Arnstein, 'A Ladder ofParticipation' (1969) Journal ofthe American Institute ofPlanners 216.
74 R Mulgan, 'Accountability: An Ever Expanding Concept?' (2000) 78 Public Administration 555.
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procedural and technocratic legitimacy-based solutions. Accountability is not, despite the
conflicting rhetoric, about direct accountability of the European Union towards the citizens
ofEurope and therefore is not a species of democracy-based solutions.
Accountability is defined as comprising of two elements. The first is democratic
accountability as traditionally understood in the liberal democratic model as the
representatives of citizens.75 This is the status quo, a rehearsal of the current arrangement
and contains no new initiative. To complement this, the second aspect of accountability
suggested by the Commission is in the form of technocratic and procedural accountability. It
is within the clarification of the decision-making rules that procedural legitimacy is assured
(i.e. openness in decision-making). Technocratic accountability relates specifically to the
introduction of the new type of European agencies. This is a measure which is meant to
increase accountability by the use of clear governing legislation to frame their operation,
increased monitoring by the Commission and the ability to easily identify those institutions
charged with the decision-making task in a particular field.76 There is an indication that this
principle might also refer to internal accountability of the institutions through path
dependence and networks,77 partnership and monitoring practices,78 although this is not
explored in any depth in the WPG.
This illustrates the weakness of the technocratic approach to governance; it is a rather
technical, obscure and jargon based approach to legitimacy and therefore not easily 'sold' as
a concept to the public at large. This is a problem with all new 'post national' concepts of
democracy/legitimacy and, as identified by Schmitter, has some serious drawbacks in terms
of connecting the citizens to the institutions of the EU.79 It is unfortunate that this approach
is adopted when dealing with one of the central concerns of the European public, i.e. that of
accountability of the EU to the citizens.
It is true that the Commission was restricted in its options on accountability if it were to
propose solutions within the framework of the current Treaties, but there are alternative ways
75
Already provided for through the direct election ofMEPs and the election of national MPs who then
sit in the Council ofMinisters and the European Council.
76 As opposed to the previous system of comitology, often pilloried for blurring the lines of
responsibility and being impossible for the citizens to understand.
77 Above n 44.
78 For instance as already practised through the structural funds, see J Scott, 'Law, Legitimacy and EC
Governance: Prospects for Partnership' (1998) 36 Journal ofCommon Market Studies 175. For an
alternative view, see MW Bauer, 'The EU Partnership Principle: Still a Sustainable Governance
Device across Multiple Administrative Arenas?' (2002) 80 Public Administration 769.
79 Above n 25.
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of dealing with accountability as a governance principle within the current framework which
would also have the advantage ofnot using technocratic jargon. Surprisingly, and given the
negative publicity generated by the resignation of the Santer Commission, there was no
discussion of the Commission's own reform programme relating to internal accountability,
which would have been an excellent opportunity to demonstrate that citizens' concerns were
being taken seriously.80 There was no attempt to define accountability as either
'responsibility', or in terms of accountability through audit (the actual root meaning of the
term81) which would have fitted in perfectly with the Commission's own technocratic and
procedural normative vision. This approach would have been explainable in terms of
legitimacy and democracy in easily understandable language, with the emphasis being
placed on a more fastidious approach toward quantifying how public money was being spent
- a real and tangible concern ofmost citizens.
Without the ability to hold to account (remove, sack, publicly shame, command explanation
from) the decision maker for decisions that go badly wrong, it is hard to convince the
European public that there can be real accountability. The fact that decision-making is
interdependent, majority, consensus, collegiate, outsourced, obscure and ultimately never the
responsibility ofjust one actor or body is no consolation - this excuse, often played out time
and again, could be said of any state in the European Union. Yet, in these imperfect
examples of governance, accountability (however flawed) is still believed to be present
(sometimes) in some form. This is a missed opportunity to connect with the citizenry of the
EU.
There are yet other alternative ways to discuss and define accountability. One such way
would have been to promote the adoption of the Code ofGood Administrative Behaviour82
as a Regulation, already adopted by some institutions within the EU as Decisions (such as
the European Agencies and the European Parliament). The Commission however has an
amended soft law version 83 which it uses as a kind ofNew Public Management technique in
dealing with the European public. Again, this in no way threatens or undermines the
Commission's normative vision, as it is a species of procedural legitimacy. This might have
80 See the Code ofConduct for Commissioners, European Commission, SEC 1487/2 at
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/code_of_conduct/code_conduct_en.pdf.
81
Mulgan above n 74.
82 Code ofGood Administrative Behaviour, adopted by Resolution of the European Parliament 6
September 2001, can be found at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/home/en/default.htm.
83 See the Commission's version at http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/code/index_en.htm.
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struck a chord with the European public without at all compromising the Commission's
position, or necessitating a 'ballot box' approach to accountability.
The principles of effectiveness and coherence
The final two principles of effectiveness and coherence fit most comfortably with the WPG
approach to increasing the legitimacy credentials of the EU based on procedural and
technocratic solutions. By definition, these governance principles are not concerned with
democracyper se. Historically, the EU has derived much of its legitimacy through the
delivery of specific policies, such as the achievement of the common market. The principles
of effectiveness and coherence are not 'normative' criteria; it is an inbuilt assumption that
the policies adopted are the right policies and have been arrived at in the correct fashion.84
Effectiveness is defined with reference to policy outputs, meaning good policy management
techniques resulting in effective implementation and achieving the maximum results from
each policy initiative. Similarly, coherence is concerned with clarity and simplicity in policy
delivery, maximising the efficiency of the institutions responsible for co-ordinating and
delivering the policies on the ground.85
Most of the concrete proposals outlined in the WPG could easily be placed under the banner
of one of these two principles; intellectually, these would have been sufficient to underpin
the WPG's entire approach to better governance. For example, the policy initiative of
tripartite target based contracts86 could conceptually be placed under increasing multi-level
governance in the EU (taking decisions as close to the citizen as possible), but actually
relates to the efficient and effective policy making goal. The commitment to the
'reinvigorated Community method'87 might suggest a commitment to openness and clarity,
but again, the emphasis is placed on the efficiency gains of this method of decision¬
making.88 A great deal of the strain of creating a legitimate or more democratic European
system of governance is placed on these two principles of good governance, and it is
questionable as to whether these principles in isolation can deliver the vision of good
84 It is the function of other democracy or legitimacy principles/mechanisms that are responsible for
ensuring the 'right' policies are adopted, such as voter inputs and accountability in the liberal
democratic model, or the correct procedures in the procedural model.
85 WPG above n 2 pp 10, 13, 18.
86 See Commission Communication 'A Framework for Target-Based Tripartite Contracts' COM
(2002) 709 final.
87 WPG above n 2 p 34.
88 Not to mention the unambiguous commitment to increasing the Commission's power and control of
the legislating process in the EU.
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governance based on procedural and technocratic legitimacy as defined by the Commission
in the WPG.
3.4: The WPG and its five principles: is this 'good governance'?
The WPG has been the subject of intense debate and criticism89 relating to two broad
aspects; the normative vision underpinning the document as a whole, and more specifically,
as a missed opportunity for the main policy initiator of the EU to achieve the self-set task of
re-connecting with the citizens of Europe. The Commission identifies the lack of interest
and confidence of the European public in the EU system of governance, urging that the
institutions 'can and must try to connect Europe with its citizens'. Crucially, however, this
particular cry for action ends with the sentiment 'This is the starting condition for more
effective and relevant policies'.90 And thus, the WPG normative vision is born. What might
have begun as a genuine desire to engage in a meaningful debate on the future governance of
Europe, descended into an unambiguous statement of institutional ambition by the
Commission, with the constant message of increasing the Commission's power and control
in the EU.
There is no ambiguity or confusion in recognising citizen distrust and disconnection with the
EU, but there is an inability to identify and correctly analyse the reasons for this
disconnection: the proposals put forward therefore do not alleviate these concerns. The
democratic challenge, properly conceived, is not addressed at all, and what could have been
a shining light in this area (under the principle ofparticipation) performed an entirely
different function. Efficiency, and not legitimacy or improving the democratic credentials of
the EU, is a key goal. Under the heading of 'Why Reform European Governance?'91 this
dilemma is in evidence. The first half of the page is geared toward the democratic challenge
- talk ofpolitical objectives, political institutions, the rejection of the EU by its citizens and
89 See generally JHH Weiler, 'The Commission as Euro-Skeptic: A Task Oriented Commission for a
Project-Based Union, A Comment on the First Version of the White Paper' in Symposium: Mountain
orMolehill? A Critical Appraisal ofthe Commission White Paper on Governance Jean Monnet
Working Paper 6/01, N Walker, 'The White Paper in Constitutional Context' in Symposium:
Mountain orMolehill? A Critical Appraisal of the Commission White Paper on Governance Jean
Monnet Working Paper 6/01, M Wind, 'The CommissionWhite Paper: Bridging The Gap Between
The Governed And The Governing?' in Symposium: Mountain orMolehill? A Critical Appraisal of
the Commission White Paper on Governance Jean MonnetWorking Paper 6/01 all available at
http://www.ieanmonnetprogram.org/papers/index.html D Wincott, 'Looking Forward or Harking
Back? The Commission and the Reform ofGovernance in the European Union' (2001) 39 Journal of
Common Market Studies 897.
90 WPG above n 2 p 3.
91 WPG above n 2 p 7.
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the problem of citizens feeling isolated.92 The second half of this section goes on to identify
the reasons for this isolation being fourfold: a lack of effectiveness of the EU; the ignorance
of the public of the achievements of the EU; Member States failing to communicate well
with their citizens about the EU; and finally the citizens' ignorance of the institutions.93
Whilst this checklist of cause and effect might neatly fit the broadly technocratic and
procedural solutions offered by the WPG, it lacks saleability to the European public. It
seems, after lengthy analysis, it is largely the citizens' fault that things are not working in the
EU. This does not appear to be a prudent way forward if the goal is reconnection with the
citizens. It is an approach that never comes to terms with issues raised in academic
discussions that explain and identify the cause of the legitimacy crisis and democratic deficit
in the EU.
The strength of the WPG lies in the principles of effectiveness and coherence. All legitimate
governance structures ought to pursue the aims of effectiveness and coherence in policy
making and delivery - since these are bureaucratic/management driven proposals, the
Commission's institutional expertise is put to best use here. The principles of good
governance, as selected by the Commission, are not objectionable per se regardless as to
which particular normative vision one might subscribe, but the definition assigned to these
terms is rightly subject to some criticism, particularly in the light of the WPG's proclaimed
task.
3.5; The WPG and the enforcement action
The WPG is a fairly detailed policy paper and, as well as explaining the concept of good
governance, it introduces in great detail some novel policy initiatives that the Commission
views as necessary improvements to the EU system of governance. A great deal of space is
dedicated to the Commission's role as policy initiator and legislator in the EU, with a
detailed exposition of how the Commission might better perform its role in this regard.94 As
a central tool of governance in the EU, and as a tool of governance central to the discharge of
the Commission's own institutional responsibilities in the EU, the enforcement mechanism
of Article 226 is given surprisingly little mention. Nonetheless, the WPG does provide a
limited overview of the enforcement mechanism and is a useful starting point when
considering how the Commission views the role of Article 226 within the context of
improving governance in the EU.
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Specifically focusing on the rejection in the referendum in Ireland on the Treaty ofNice.
93 WPG above n 2 p 7.
94 This is in respect of the 're-invigorated Community method' of legislating, amongst other things.
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The WPG specifically acknowledges the enforcement mechanism as being a central tool of
governance in the EU. The Commission discusses Article 226 under the heading of 'Better
policies, regulation and delivery', clearly characterising Article 226 as having a singular
function: delivering effective compliance. The Commission harks back in some respects to
the traditional approach described in earlier academic pieces on Article 226, where the
broader political context and the policy direction of the EU were considered as having little
relevance to the role ofArticle 226 or its effectiveness as an enforcement action.
In relation to improving the application ofEU law at the national level, the Commission
promotes various solutions, such as the 'twinning arrangements' of national
administrations,95 and better training for legal professionals in the Member States.
Interestingly, and in contrast to the traditional approach of the Commission, the European
Ombudsman and the Petitions' Committee of the European Parliament were also mentioned
in the context of the enforcement action. This is unusual in the sense that the Commission
does not usually acknowledge the role of other actors in relation to Article 226 besides itself
and the Member States. The Commission's suggestion is that the European Ombudsman's
role of dealing with citizen complaints (in relation to suspected infringements of the Treaty)
ought to be:
'complemented by creating networks of similar bodies in the Member States,
capable of dealing with disputes involving citizens and EU issues'.
This was not elaborated in any further detail, but it seems to suggest a body for dispensing
information - a sort ofEuropean version of the Citizens' Advice Bureaux, to be based in the
Member States to encourage better awareness of citizens' rights and ensure better application
ofEU norms in the Member States, through citizens' invocation of their EU rights in
national courts.96
In terms of the role of the Commission in the enforcement action, the WPG reinforced the
Commission's intention of 'pursuing] infringements with vigour', noting the importance of
individual complainants within this process, and reiterating its commitment to speeding up
the processing of such complaints by highlighting the published Communication which
95 WPG above n 2 p 25. Twinning arrangements essentially means co-operation between national
administrations to swap best practices, and co-ordination units set up within central government in
order to have increased control over the application of EU law. This is a suggestion of Gil Ibanez,
discussed in Chapter II in AJ Gil Ibanez, The Administrative Supervision and Enforcement ofEC Law.
Powers Procedures and Limits (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1999).
96 For further discussion of this and the role of the Ombudsman in enforcement actions see Chapter
VI.
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details the position of the complainant in relation to the Commission's investigation of
infringements.97 The Commission is unequivocal in stating that Article 226 is not the forum
for complainants to seek legal satisfaction as:
'a lengthy legal action against a Member State is not always the most practical
solution. The main aim of an infringement action is to oblige the offending
Member State to remedy its breach of Community law'.98
The Commission committed itself to establishing criteria that will identify how it prioritises
the infringement cases it will pursue under the enforcement action.99 Generally, the main
cases to be handled within the formal infringement process are as follows: incorrect
transposition of directives; compatibility cases of national law and EC law; cases that
seriously affect the Community interest; cases where specific EC legislation created repeated
implementation problems in a Member State; cases that involve Community financing. The
WPG ends the very brief discussion of enforcement with the continued commitment to
pursuing an 'active dialogue' with Member States, since this can often:
'lead to a faster resolution of a potential infringement than a full court case and
therefore offer a quicker solution to the person at the origin of a complaint.'100
The WPG did not propose any changes to the enforcement action or administration of the
infringement process. In this way, the WPG restated the long established position of the
Commission in relation to Article 226, namely that it is a bi-polar forum ofnegotiation with
the Member States and not an avenue of grievance satisfaction for individual
complainants.101 Despite the commitment to 'pursue infringements with vigour', it is made
equally clear that active dialogue is as much a part of the Commission's strategy as court
proceedings, and is considered far more effective in resolving disputes. It seems that from
the standpoint of the Commission, the quest to improve governance in the EU does not
extend to the alteration of one of the Commission's own central governance tools.
Presumably this indicates that in the assessment of the Commission, the enforcement
mechanism as it currently stands already fits squarely within the Commission's normative
vision of a more legitimate and better governed EU.
97 Commission Communication on 'Relations with the Complainant in Respect of Infringements of
Community Law' COM (2002) 141.
98 WPG above n 2 p 25.
99 Commission Communication 'Better Monitoring of the Application of Community Law' COM
(2002) 725 final 16.5.2003, which is analysed in Chapter V.
100 WPG above n 2 p 25.
101 As detailed in past academic discussions of the infringement process outlined in Chapter II.
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4.0: A framework for evaluating policy and practice in Article 226
It is important that one of the central tools of governance in the constitutional architecture of
the EU conforms to some limited standards of legitimacy, particularly in light of the
dominating policy initiatives of achieving good governance across the EU as a method of
bridging the 'legitimacy deficit'. In order to try and evaluate the role ofArticle 226 in the
contemporary legal and political context which drives the operation of the enforcement
mechanism, it is necessary to identify some organising concepts that will be used as a
framework of reference in the following chapters. Rather than engaging in a vague or
generalised debate about 'legitimacy' and 'good governance', this chapter has sought to
identify and define these concepts in a clear and precise manner, and draw out some relevant
debates that constitute the appropriate frame of reference.
The framework of analysis for the evaluation of the role of Article 226 will be composed of
three separate but overlapping organising concepts, or lenses. These concepts have been
chosen on the basis of their relevance to the current legal and political context of the EU, and
in particular the operation of the enforcement mechanism itself. The three key organising
concepts, or lenses, are those of good administration, good governance and legitimacy.
Figure 3 below gives a diagrammatic representation of this framework. Each lens in the












Good Administration Good Governance Legitimacy
Note: The arrow denotes the correctprogression through the different criteria which constitute the
concept of legitimacy.
Different colours are used to show the correlation between each stage in the model. The
principles of good administrative behaviour form the basis of the principles of good
governance, and these are inspired by the current legal principles that exist in the system of
administrative law of the EU,102 in conjunction with the European Ombudsman's Code of
Good Administrative Behaviour which is the relevant code ofpractice for European
institutions. The principles of good governance as selected by the Commission and
discussed in this chapter correspond to the broader academic definition of legitimacy
identified by Beetham and Lord. Effectiveness and coherence correlate to the need for
identifiable rules in a legitimate policy; openness and participation provide the opportunity
for clear justifications; and the principle of accountability relates directly to the acceptance
of those being governed. Due to the multi-faceted nature ofArticle 226, different organising
concepts in the framework will be used according to the particular function/actor under
consideration, as opposed to applying all three stages in each of the following chapters.
Each of these conceptual tools feed into each other and overlap.
102 As identified in Chapter II.
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Thefirst organising concept is that of good administration. These standards are the basis of
a deeper understanding of the concept of good governance and are relevant to the
enforcement mechanism particularly, since it has a significant administrative dimension.
The requirement of good administrative conduct is therefore a crucial legitimating criterion
in evaluating the role of Article 226, and whether it conforms to the standards of legitimacy
and good governance. In order to provide an objective set of administrative standards, I will
adopt the European Ombudsman's model of good administrative behaviour, as is elucidated
in the Code ofGood Administrative Behaviour, in conjunction with some common legal
administrative principles identified in Chapter II. This is particularly important as the
standards of good administrative behaviour have been developed with specific reference to
the European institutions and so there ought not to be a problem of 'fit' between adopting
principles of good administrative behaviour that have been developed with specific reference
to another (say, the state) model of governance.
Table 2 below provides an indication of how the principles of good administrative practice
feed into the broader framework of analysis. The concept of good administration will be
relevant to the enforcement mechanism in three ways: in relation to the legal framework and
legal principles which govern the operation of the enforcement mechanism; in relation to the
Commission's conduct in the management of infringement investigations; and in relation to
the contribution of the Ombudsman to the enforcement mechanism, both as a surrogate for

















Notes: B&L = Beetham and Lord's model oflegitimacy.
WPG = Principles ofgood governancefrom the White Paper on Governance.
CGAB = Principles ofgood administration from the Ombudsman's Code ofGood
Administrative Behaviour.
The second organising concept through which Article 226 will be considered is that of good
governance. This study will use the Commission's own principles of good governance of
openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence.103 It is important to use
the Commission's principles of good governance as part of the framework of analysis for
two reasons. First, the Commission is the main player in the Article 226 procedure, and
controls, designs and operates the enforcement mechanism. Secondly, as policy initiator and
'engine' of the EU, the Commission has committed to the application of these principles of
good governance across the Union, contending that these principles amount to a species of
good governance, and identifies these principles as the appropriate mechanism for delivering
greater legitimacy in the EU.104 The governance principles, as has already been discussed
103 It is outside the ambit of this thesis to construct a model of good governance for the EU. Using the
Commission's principles serves both methodological and normative purposes - it provides a ready
made framework of analysis from the principal policy maker of the EU, and main actor in the
enforcement mechanism. This is also in normative terms as neutral as possible, as by using this
framework, rather than one of the author's invention, the evaluation of Article 226 relates to the self-
set benchmark rather than an idealised version of legitimate governance.
104 Since the Article 226 process is one of the Commission's main tools of governance, logically these
principles of 'good governance' ought to apply not only across the board of EU governance to frame
policy proposals, but also to the operation of specific governance tools.









































above, are legitimacy-based principles, and so fit neatly within the framework of analysis
that seeks to evaluate the role of Article 226 in the current political context.
The different governance principles might have a particular resonance with one function of
Article 226 over another, but together the principles of good governance adequately
encapsulate all the modalities ofArticle 226, as set out in Chapter I.105 The principles of
good governance used throughout the thesis will not necessarily be applied with the exact
definition as adopted by the Commission in the WPG. These will be re-moulded to
accommodate some of the criticisms outlined above and to incorporate the standards of good
administrative behaviour, whilst still adhering to the Commission's overall vision of good
governance based on procedural and technocratic legitimacy solutions.
The third organising concept will be that of legitimacy defined by Beetham and Lord. This
broad definition of legitimacy is broken down into its three basic component parts of:
identifiable rules; justifications for actions (by those who govern) founded on beliefs; and
consent and recognition by those governed by the system. Although Beetham and Lord use
this as a test for the legitimacy of a system of rule in an entire community, it will be used at a
micro level as a part of the test for the legitimacy of the enforcement action as a tool of
governance appropriate in contemporary Europe. This definition of legitimacy takes the
format of a 'building blocks' definition, meaning that the first criterion of identifiable rules
forms the necessary foundation for the next criterion ofjustifications. This in turn forms the
foundation for the third criterion of consent. The 'building blocks' definition therefore
requires all three criteria to be adequately met before claiming that the test for legitimacy has
been fulfilled.
Concluding remarks
There are considerable difficulties associated with discussing the concept of legitimacy in
the EU which stem from embedded conceptions of democracy associated with state level
government. Due to the sui generis nature of the EU, with its distinct organisational and
decision-making structure, traditional notions of what constitutes a legitimate or democratic
system of decision-making have to be modified or re-invented. The momentum towards re-
105 For example, the principles of effectiveness and coherence will be appropriate to analyse Article
226 as a compliance mechanism and as an executive function of the Commission, in relation to the
formulation and control of the enforcement policy. The principles of openness, accountability and
participation will be appropriate when discussing Article 226's competing roles as a formal process
where institutions and citizens interact, a forum for institutional dialogue and control, and as a tool of
administrative regulation.
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conceptualising debates about democracy and legitimacy is evident in both academic and
political discourse, as is the changing political context of the EU.
One way of structuring the debate about legitimacy in the EU is through the adoption of the
more flexible terminology of good governance, which enables notions of legitimacy to be cut
free from the ties of voter inputs. This traditional reference point of legitimate rule in
democracy debates is not useful in the current legal and political organisation of the EU.
Nonetheless, the use of the rhetoric of democracy has not lessened in political discourse
about increasing the legitimacy of the EU, although this brand of democracy is not
democracy as the European citizen might understand it. In the absence of the recognisable
inputs of legitimacy, and in a constitutional era where the traditional reliance on output
legitimacy is no longer sufficient, it is essential that the commitment to deliver good
governance is taken seriously by the institutions who proffer it as the solution to the
legitimacy crisis. Focusing down from wider discussions of legitimacy at the macro
organisational level of the EU, to the micro level of policy and practice in Article 226,
requires a specific framework of analysis. This enables an examination of the political
context of the EU and how this context impacts upon the political motivations of the
actors/institutions involved in moulding the role of Article 226.
The traditional characterisation of Article 226 as a forum for political bargaining, unbounded
by legal restrictions, is incongruous with the current legal developments and political
discourse taking place in the EU. It is essential therefore that in the absence of legal
controls, political legitimacy through the adoption of good governance techniques, fills the
void left by the lack ofjudicial review of conduct in Article 226. The Commission's
definition of its principles of good governance is open to criticism, not least because the
normative foundations of some of the concepts have been buried in an overt political
scrabble for power and influence in a constitutionalised EU. The Commission remains
focused on technocratic and procedural legitimacy as the answer to improving governance in
the Union. In terms of the approach to enforcement, the emphasis placed on Article 226 as a
single-function mechanism of effective enforcement is totally misguided with reference to
increasing the legitimacy of the EU. If the main aim of the enforcement mechanism is to
oblige Member States to remedy the infringement, for the benefit of the complainant, it is
dubious whether the correct method of achieving this outcome is that of 'active dialogue'
with Member States; not just in terms of legitimacy, but also in terms of effectiveness.
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In order to concretise these wider issues into a useful set of criteria for the evaluation of the
role ofArticle 226, it is necessary to focus down from generalised debates about legitimacy
and good governance, to produce a defined framework of analysis. The related and
overlapping concepts of good administration, good governance and legitimacy will frame the
analysis of the practice and policy within Article 226, and the impact of the major actors on
the mechanism. This will begin with a consideration of the role played by the Commission.
As the dominant actor in the enforcement mechanism, the Commission plays a pivotal role in
both the operation ofArticle 226, and as the promoter of the policy of good governance in
the EU.
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Chapter IV: The management game - political enforcement,
neutral guardianship and legal uniformity
The European Commission is the dominant actor within Article 226. It occupies a unique
position in relation to ensuring the compliance ofMember States with their obligations under
the Treaty, by acting as investigator, primary judge of the Member States' conduct, and
ultimate arbiter ofwhat will constitute the appropriate conduct in order for Member States to
have complied with the Treaty.1 The Commission's stated view of the enforcement
mechanism is that:
'The main aim of an infringement action is to oblige the offending Member
State to remedy its breach ofCommunity law' ,2
This characterisation of Article 226 suggests that the Commission views Article 226, in the
main, as a compliance mechanism, and as such the Commission's role under Article 226 is
largely that of the enforcer of compliance. This is a rather simplistic explanation of the
Commission's position. If the main aim of the infringement action is to oblige the Member
State to remedy its breach of Community law, this implies that there might be other aims or
roles that the enforcement action might perform; nonetheless the Commission continues to
discuss Article 226 in terms of a singular enforcement function. It must necessarily be true
that first and foremost, Article 226 remains an executive policy choice - the Commission
chooses its strategy on enforcement and is in complete control of the design, management
and operation of the Article 226. Only then can the Commission carry out its role of
enforcer (or in the Commission's terms, guardian of the Treaties).
The factors that influence and drive the behaviour of the Commission in relation to the
practice and policy of Article 226 ultimately help to shape the role of Article 226 within the
constitutional architecture of the EU. It is important therefore to consider how the
Commission actually manages the enforcement action on a day to day basis, and to consider
to what extent the Commission has tried to improve or alter Article 226. Does the
Commission's practice complement the ideals set forth in the WPG in terms of a coherent
and effective approach to enforcement under Article 226? To what extent does the
Commission's simplistic characterisation of its own role underpin and perpetuate the narrow
definition of the role or functions of Article 226, and thus undermine the conception of
1 The judgments of the ECJ are declaratory as to whether there has been a breach but do not shed light
on what is required to for Member States to fulfil their obligations under the Treaties. The Court
merely states that there has or has not been a breach. It is the Commission that prescribes the conduct
that will be satisfactory in order to either avoid referral to the Court in the first instance, or satisfy the
Court's judgment so as to avoid being referred again under Article 228 and neither of these opinions
can be challenged in the ECJ.
2
European Governance: A White Paper COM (2001) 428 page 25.
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Article 226 as a mechanism that is well matched to the aspirations of good governance and
legitimacy in the EU?
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section will provide a brief overview of the
organisation and make up of the Commission, and explain the Commission's central role in
Article 226, as defined by the Treaty language and the case law principles. Section two will
then consider in detail the recent evolution of the Commission's approach to the operation of
Article 226. I will discuss the reforms implemented in relation to the internal management
of infringement investigations and the attempts to amend the Treaty provision. Section three
then identifies the different roles of the Commission within Article 226, and explores how
these discrete functionalities may conflict. Finally, I will conclude with some observations
regarding the Commission's conflicting roles and divergent priorities under the enforcement
mechanism, and question how this approach to enforcement ultimately affects the role of
Article 226.
1.0: The European Commission: an introduction
The organisation and characteristics of the Commission3 is a field of study in itself.4 The
Commission is a notoriously labyrinthine organisation and practically impossible to navigate
by outsiders, however for the purposes of this chapter the organisation of the Commission
can be discussed in very broad terms. The Commission may be broken down into two
distinct parts: the individual Commissioners and the Directorates General. The individual
Commissioners are the political head of their respective departments and provide the
initiative in policy direction and political leadership, or 'face', of a policy sector. The
Directorates General (DGs) are the administrative body of the Commission which carry out
the broad spectrum of tasks assigned to the Commission as a whole.
The Commissioners periodically sit as a 'College of Commissioners' in order to take certain
decisions, including taking decisions in relation to infringement cases. Individual
Commissioners must act independently in their duties as a Commissioner and only in the
general interest of the Community. In this way, the Commission is seen as the 'neutral'
31 will use the term 'the Commission' when referring to the body as a whole and where necessary I
will differentiate between the political head (the Commissioners) and the administrative body (the
DGs).
4 See generally P Craig and G De Burca, EULaw Text Cases andMaterials (3rd Edition, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2003), ch 2, M Cini, The European Commission: leadership, organisation
and culture in the EU administration (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1996), N Nugent,
The European Commission (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001), L Hooghe, The European Commission and
the integration ofEurope: images ofgovernance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001).
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heart of the European project untainted by national politics and allegiance. This core
element of the Commission is then supported by the 'service' DGs which comprise of
horizontal service staff such as the legal service, the translation service and the Secretariat
General.5
The current Commission is made up of 27 individual Commissioners, each ofwhom have
been nominated by one Member State and appointed by the Commission President. The
President of the Commission is proposed by the European Council, and must be formally
approved by the European Parliament by a majority vote. The Commission President, who
provides the political leadership for the Commission as a whole, then determines which
Commissioner receives which portfolio, or policy field/department (after much political
lobbying by the Member States). Each Commissioner has his own personal cabinet, or staff,
and heads up a Directorate General.
The formal tasks of the Commission are laid down in Article 211 EC and can be broken
down into four distinct responsibilities: (1) ensuring compliance with the Treaty and
subsequent laws; (2) to formulate recommendations and deliver opinions on matters within
the Treaty; (3) to have its own power of decision and participate in legislating; (4) to
exercise rule making powers as conferred by the Council. Cini characterises the
Commission as having six distinct roles within the EU6: the right to initiate policy and
legislation; the ability to execute detailed legislation; the duty to ensure Member States fulfil
their obligations; the power to provide the external representation of the Community; the
capacity to act as a mediator between different factions (Member States and interest groups);
and the role of acting as the 'conscience' ofEurope or promoter of the 'general interest'.
The Commission has been discussed and analysed at length, leading to various
characterisations of the Commission. These range from descriptions which characterise the
Commission as acting principally as a technocracy or regulatory body to the Community's
executive authority, a politicised bureaucracy or network organisation.7 Cini describes the
5 For a basic description see the Commission's website at
http://ec.europa.eu.int/comm/atwork/basicfacts/index en.htm.
6 Cini above n 4.
7 See generally T Christiansen, 'Tensions of European governance: politicised bureaucracy and
multiple accountability in the European Commission' (1997) 4 Journal ofEuropean Public Policy 73,
V Mehde, 'Responsibility and Accountability in the European Commission' (2003) 40 Common
Market Law Review 423, L Metcalfe, 'Reforming the Commission: Will Organisational Efficiency
Produce Effective Governance?' (2000) 38 Journal ofCommon Market Studies 817, P Craig, 'The
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Commission as a hybrid body, part executor and part administration.8 Tallberg characterises
the Commission as both agent and supervisor of the Member States.9
1.1: The formal Treaty process and Commission discretion
The original wording of Article 226 reveals two main historical points. First, the drafters
envisaged a two-party relationship between the Commission and the Member States.
Secondly, as an effective enforcement mechanism, it was never meant to pack a significant
punch, as it lacked any type of coercive penalty or means to enforce a judgment of the ECJ.10
The provision was meant to be a forum for negotiation; this is revealed by the lengthy,
cumbersome procedure and ultimately the lack of sanctions in this or any other Treaty article
for general non-compliance. The Treaty ofRome did not follow the blue print of the ECSC
Treaty, its precursor. This perhaps belies the intentions of the original members to submit in
principle to the jurisdiction of an outside authority (the ECJ) but to ensure no consequences
would follow from non-compliance (and consequently no reduction in sovereignty).
The Treaty wording refers to two stages in the pre-litigation (or administrative) procedure.
This begins with the formal letter and ends with referral to the ECJ. In practice, this process
has been much lengthened by the Commission in a political climate that was very concerned
with emphasising negotiation and protecting state sovereignty." The negotiation process
involved long investigations and information exchange between the permanent
representatives of the Member States and Brussels, both before and after the formal letter
and reasoned opinion had been issued. In the spirit of co-operation that predominated the
early years ofArticle 226,12 it was common practice for the Commission to engage in
negotiations with Member State officials in the hope of securing compliance throughout the
administrative process. Referrals to the ECJ were to be avoided at almost all cost.13
Fall and Renewal of the Commission: Accountability, Contract and Administrative Organisation'
(2000) 6 European Law Journal 98.
8 Cini above n 4.
9 J Tallberg, European Governance and Supranational Institutions: making states comply (Routledge,
London, 2003). These different characterisations depend upon which particular aspect of the
Commission's activities are the focus of inquiry, the part of the Commission being analysed, the
disciplinary background of the commentator, and the overall normative vision of the EU.
10 See U Everling, 'The Member States of the European Community before their Court of Justice'
(1984) 9 European Law Review 215. Until the Maastricht Treaty, see below.
11 HAH Audretsch, Supervision in European Community Law (2nd Edition, Elsevier, North Holland,
1986) hereinafter as 'Audretsch'.
12 This was in the period up until the Jenkins Commission reforms of the management of
infringements, see Audretsch, ibid.
13
Everling above n 10.
107
The conventional wisdom in relation to Article 226 is that the Commission formally
possesses two areas of discretion sourced from the Treaty wording, as indicated in italics
below:
'If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an
obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter
after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations.
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid
down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of
Justice.'14
Within the administrative phase of the enforcement procedure there exists substantial
administrative discretion on the part of the Commission. The first point of discretion relates
to the Commission's 'consideration' as to whether or not there is, prima facie, an
infringement on the part of the Member State. Whilst this is often referred to as discretion in
legal literature, it is more properly conceived as an exercise of subjective judgment since the
term 'discretion' means a choice between limited but clearly proscribed options,15 and
subjective judgment means an unlimited choice on the part of the Commission. Whatever
term is assigned to it, it is clear that the Commission exercises public power that is not
subject to outside review, or circumscribed by the Treaty. This directly impinges on the
whether or not a reasoned opinion must be issued. Even though the Treaty language appears
to mandate this step, giving no discretion to the Commission, the Commission must still
'consider' that an infringement exists. At any time the Commission can change its position
and decide that the infringement no longer exists, removing the necessity to issue a reasoned
opinion.
After an initial investigation by the Commission has taken place it may seem more
convenient to avoid coming to the conclusion that there has been an infringement (whether
there has been one or not), as once this conclusion has been reached, the Treaty then
mandates the Commission to deliver a reasoned opinion. Historically, this proved quite a
controversial move as issuing a reasoned opinion was not a common practice.16 There are
multiple reasons for why the Commission might choose to drop an investigation before the
reasoned opinion stage. Particularly in cases where there has been an individual
misapplication of the rules on the ground due to negligence or bad faith, the Commission
might consider it a waste of resources to attempt to remedy a 'one off infringement through
14 Article 226, Treaty establishing the European Community, my emphasis.
15 KC Davis, Discretionary Justice in Europe and America (University of Illinois Press, Chicago,
1976), J Jowell, 'Legal Control ofAdministrative Discretion' (1973) Public Law 178.
16 See Audretsch above nil.
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its Article 226 powers. Instead, it may advise the complainant to seek a remedy in the
national courts.
It may be politically inconvenient to pursue an obvious infringement and this is the ideal
opportunity in the Article 226 process to put the suspected infringement on the back burner.17
The Commission may also consider that a case is not worth pursuing if there are reasonable
grounds to suspect that there is no way to prove the infringement has occurred. Through the
course of informal contact with the Member State in question, the Commission may also find
it expedient to arrive at a political trade-off whereby the Member State promises to abide by
the rules in future and to discontinue the conduct that has given rise to the infraction. The
first formal point of discretion in the Treaty flows from this area of subjective judgment.
Since this cannot be challenged, the prescription of 'shall issue a reasoned opinion' in reality
is transformed into 'may issue a reasoned opinion'.
The second formal point of discretion within the Treaty wording is that, after the reasoned
opinion has been delivered, if there is further non-compliance, the Commission may or may
not bring the case to the Court of Justice. This is problematic if Article 226 is to be
characterised as a compliance mechanism; surely if the object of the Treaty article is to
obtain compliance, is it not logical for automatic referral to the Court of Justice to occur after
non-compliance has been established by the Commission? It seems in essence that the
wording of the article itself does not entirely censure non-compliance. Two opportunities to
drop the case before the reasoned opinion seems both unnecessary and inefficient.
It is the very nature of the wording of this Treaty article that has been the source ofmuch
consternation in relation to legal enforcement of Member State obligations, but despite this
obvious flaw, this part of the Treaty has never been revised. The issuing of the reasoned
opinion may well be enough to spur the Member State into action in any case, and statistics
produced by the Commission may be interpreted as supporting this assertion.18 The standard
reasoning of the Commission is that negotiations between the Commission and the Member
17 For instance, if the country suspected ofnon-compliance happens to be holding the Presidency of
the EU, Interview, Commission Official C (25 October 2005), Interview, Commission Official D (25
October 2005), Interview Commission Official G (26 October 2005), Interview, Commission Official
H (26 October 2005).
18 See Chapter V.
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State produce quicker results than referring a case to the ECJ,19 and cases are often
withdrawn from the Court following corrective action by the Member States who are anxious
to avoid prosecution.20
The Commission's administrative and political discretion under Article 226 is therefore
fairly extensive. To summarise, the Commission determines whether an infringement has
occurred, defines the extent and nature of the infringement, determines the course of action
to be undertaken by the Member State to remedy that infringement,21 and decides all the
relevant time-limits imposed on the Member State (and itself) throughout the investigation
and administrative process. It also decides whether or not to refer the case to the ECJ (and
subsequently to refer the case under Article 228 and request a financial penalty). To
compound this unchecked power, all of these acts or decisions are not able to be challenged
before the courts and are not subject to the legislation on transparency.22
1.2: Buttressing the enforcement mechanism - financial penalties under
Article 228 EC
The only complementary enforcement mechanism to aid the Commission in discharging its
enforcement responsibilities is that contained in Article 228. In its original format Article
228 was simply an opportunity for the Commission to re-prosecute those Member States that
had not complied with the Court's judgment under Article 226. In formal terms, this
mechanism did not provide another occasion for the Commission to obtain the same
judgment of non-compliance with Community obligations, but was an attempt to obtain
judgment against a Member State for failing to abide by the Court's previous judgment. Its
purpose was to provide the Commission with an opportunity to publicly denounce those
Member States who were disregarding the authority of the Court.
19 See for example European Governance: A White Paper COM (2001) 428, p 25 and Commission
Communication 'Better Monitoring of the Application of Community Law' COM (2002) 725 final/4
16.5.2003 p 14.
20 See Everling above n 10 p 244.
21
Recently, this discretion has been extended further by the ruling in Case C-494/01 Commission v
Ireland [2005] ECR1-3331 where the possibility of the Commission mounting an infringement case
on the basis of a 'general and persistent breach' has been established, for discussion of the this
concept see P Wenneras, 'A New Dawn for Commission Enforcement under Article 226 and 228 EC:
General and Persistent (GAP) Infringements, Lump Sums and Penalty Payments' (2006) 43 Common
Market Law Review 31.
22 See Chapter II for the application of Regulation 1049/2001 OJ 2001 LI 45/43 on Access to
Documents to the infringement process.
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Article 228, in its original format, was not a particularly effective punishment for Member
States who failed to comply with an Article 226 judgment.23 There seemed to be little
incentive for the Commission to engage in another lengthy legal battle, to obtain another
judgment from the Court, when the original judgment had been ignored. Furthermore,
obtaining this declaration involved another lengthy process of investigation and back-and-
forth communication between the Commission and Member State, resulting in even further
delays in correcting the original infraction. The lack of penalties available to the
Commission to force Member States to comply with their obligations helped to entrench the
environment ofnegotiation between the Commission and the non-complying state. This
emphasis on negotiation with Member States was seen by the Commission as the only way
to achieve compliance - the Commission was in the business of persuading and cajoling
compliance, rather than enforcing it as a matter of law.
Eventually, it was accepted by the Member States and Commission that these two Articles
were an insufficient deterrent, particularly in an organisation whose entire existence was
predicated on the rule of law and uniformity within the legal system.24 Accordingly, after
repeated attempts at reform, the necessity of changing this article finally found some
momentum at Maastricht. The revised Article 228 now reads as follows:
'If the Court of Justice finds that a Member State has failed to fulfil an
obligation under this Treaty, the State shall be required to take the necessary
measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice.
If the Commission considers that the Member State concerned has not taken
such measures it shall, after giving the State the opportunity to submit its
observations, issue a reasoned opinion specifying the points on which the
Member State concerned has not complied with the judgment of the Court of
Justice.
If the Member State concerned fails to take the necessary measures to comply
with the Court's judgement within the time-limit laid down by the Commission,
the latter may bring the case before the Court of Justice. In doing so it shall
specify the amount of the lump sum or penalty payment to be paid by the
Member State concerned which it considers appropriate in the circumstances.
If the Court of Justice finds that the Member State concerned has not complied
with its judgment it may impose a lump sum or penalty payment on it.'25(my
emphasis)
23 See generally Audretsch above n 11 and Everling above n 10. See also A Bonnie, 'Commission
Discretion under Article 171(2) EC' (1998) 23 European Law Review 537 p 358 and MA
Theodossiou, 'An analysis of the recent response to non-compliance with the Court of Justice
Judgments: Article 228(2) EC' (2002) 27 European Law Review 25, pp 25-27.
24 It also prompted similar observations in the legal literature, Theodossiou above n 23 and Bonnie
above n 23.
25 Article 228 EC, Consolidated Treaty Establishing the European Community.
Ill
The lengthy administrative and judicial procedure from Article 226 is still in place in the
revised Article 228. This arguably reduces the effectiveness of this mechanism as a
compliance tool. It also now allows the Commission to pursue a financial penalty against
the Member State if it has not complied with the Court's judgment under Article 226. This
in turn strengthens the authority and impact of a judgment under Article 226. The
imposition of a financial penalty was originally understood to have been a choice between
one of two options, reflecting the actual wording ofArticle 228, with either the Commission
requesting a lump sum payment or a periodic penalty payment. Initially the Commission
favoured the periodic penalty payment to encourage the Member State to correct the
infraction as quickly as possible, and to remove the temptation for the Member State to
simply pay a large fine and reap the potentially greater financial rewards of its illegal
conduct.26 This choice reflects the Commission's approach to achieving compliance - that it
is the neutral enforcer, trying only to bring the Member State into line as quickly as possible.
The request for a financial penalty to be imposed for non-compliance is again a matter
falling within the discretion of the Commission, although the actual amount of the penalty is
ultimately decided by the ECJ. This was a source of controversy between the Commission
and Court, with the Commission claiming that it ought to have responsibility for setting the
payment amount as indicated by the Treaty wording.27 In answer to calls from Member
States for more clarity with regard to the calculation of the financial penalty, the
Commission devised a formula and published its guidelines in a Communication, thereby to
a certain degree taking control of how expensive infractions would become.28 Whilst the
Court bases the final penalty on the recommendations of the Commission, it stated in the
first Article 228 judgment which imposed a financial sanction that it alone bears the
responsibility of deciding the penalty amount.29 Initially the Commission was fairly hesitant
to use the new sanction of a financial penalty under Article 228, but since the first judgment
in 2000, the number of cases of Article 228 referrals has increased steadily.30
26 For an explanation of the calculation of the financial penalty and the policy behind its application in
Article 228 cases see the latest of the Commission's Communications on the subject in Commission
Communication 'Application ofArticle 228 of the EC Treaty' SEC (2005) 1658.
27 Case C-387/97 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR1-5047.
28 The formula is also explained in the Commission Communication, above n 26.
29 Commission v Greece above n 27.
30 Commission data only provides information as to how many cases have been referred to the court
under Article 228, rather than specifically which of these cases include a request for a financial
penalty. In the period 1998-2004, Article 228 referrals increased by 87%. In the period 2000-2004
referrals increased by 128% source Sixteenth Annul Report on Monitoring the Application of
Community Law (1998) COM (1999) 301 final, Seventeenth Annual Report on Monitoring the
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The way in which financial penalties are being imposed has changed however, suggesting a
more proactive approach by the ECJ to Article 228 than it has ever adopted in relation to
Article 226. In Commission v France,31 for the first time the court imposed both a lump sum
penalty of €20 million and a periodic penalty of €58.7 million every six months until the
infraction is rectified. This clearly contradicts the Treaty wording which suggests an
either/or choice between a penalty payment or lump sum. Nevertheless, the ECJ seems to
have stepped in where the Commission had been outmanoeuvred by the Member State,
making certain that the weapon of financial sanction, which was not being utilised to its
potential, is as effective as possible.32 Member States had routinely taken up the practice of
settling the infringement a matter of days before final judgment under Article 228 was
delivered by the ECJ,33 thereby circumventing the imposition of the penalty payment which
would only be applicable after the date of the final judgment.34
The further buttressing of the enforcement powers of the Commission, through the revision
of Article 228, has occurred in place ofmaking changes to the main enforcement provision
of Article 226. The Commission has adopted a different approach under the financial
penalty provision to that of Article 226, and furthermore, so has the Court of Justice. The
Commission has provided several explanatory Communications on the subject of how it
exercises its discretion under Article 228, not only in relation to calculating the penalty but
also its policy choices, namely in which cases it will request a fine and why. The Court of
Justice has been proactive in its interpretation of the Treaty by reading the text of the Treaty
Application of Community Law (1999) COM (2000) 92 final, Eighteenth Annual Report on
Monitoring the Application of Community Law (2000) COM (2001) 309 final, Nineteenth Annual
Report on Monitoring the Application ofCommunity Law (2001) COM (2002) 324 final, Twentieth
Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law (2002) COM (2003) 669 final,
Twenty-First Annual Report on Monitoring the Application ofCommunity Law (2003) COM (2004)
839 final, Twenty-Second Annual Report on Monitoring the Application ofCommunity Law (2004)
COM (2005) 570 final.
31 Case C-304/02 Commission v France [2005] 12 July 2005 nyr.
32 This radical reinterpretation ofArticle 228 was proposed first by Advocate General Geelhold
(Opinion of AG Geelhold 29 April 2004). Since this had not been proposed by the Commission nor
discussed by the parties in the original proceedings, the Court re-opened the oral procedure to enable
the parties to put their views forward. AG Geelhold then delivered a second Opinion on 11 November
2004 which re-stated his original position that the Court was entitled to impose both a lump sum and
periodic payment on France given the particular circumstances of the case.
33
Communication, above n 26 p 3.
34
Although see http://euobserver.com/?aid=21024&rk=l where France is refusing to pay the penalty
imposed by the Court, and is attempting to challenge the judgment of the Commission under Article
228. The Commission has concluded France has yet to alter its conduct sufficiently in order to
comply with the Court's findings in Article 226 and therefore has not remedied the infringement.
France contests this assessment in the application for annulment pending before the Court in Case T-
139/06. Meanwhile the fine continues to accumulate.
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in contravention of the clear language to achieve a particular policy result, and in doing so,
has stepped in to ensure the effectiveness of the provision in the light ofMember State
conduct, when the Commission has been unable to maximise the potential of this provision.
2.0: Operational problems with the infringement mechanism
The historical evolution of Article 226 has presented the Commission, as the main actor in
the process, with three major problems. The first of these relates to scale. There are too
many Community rules to police over a vast geographical area combined with the fact that
the different Member States have different arrangements for implementing Community rules.
This makes it difficult for the Commission to be able to monitor Community legislation
single-handedly. Secondly, and compounding the first problem, the Commission has
insufficient resources to effectively police the EU. The problem of insufficient resources
relates not only to the amount ofmoney earmarked for enforcement, but also insufficient
staff and ultimately, insufficient time. The Commission is not a single-task enforcement
body and ensuring compliance is not its number one priority at all times, even if it views the
sole function ofArticle 226 as compliance. Thirdly, the Commission is faced with an
inadequate compliance mechanism drafted in the original Treaty. It compounds inefficiency,
consumes resources by its nature and relies too much on the consent of the Member States to
be truly effective. The Commission has therefore tried to circumvent these limitations using
technocratic methods with which it is most familiar, and has been successful in some
respects, and in others less so. The next subsections consider each of these problems in
detail and identify the methods adopted by the Commission to deal with them.
2.1: Scale
In relation to the first problem of a vast geographical area and sheer volume of rules to
monitor, the Commission has been inventive in the way in which it initially dealt with
detection of infringements. The Commission chose the path of outsourcing to combat
management and resource problems. Rather than relying on self-detection, the primary
source of information has long been citizen complaints,35 where citizens contact the
Commission directly and report suspected infringements. This source of information is
crucial to the Commission's resource efficient policing of the Community legal system and
35 Twentieth Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law (2002) COM (2003)
669 final.
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fulfilling its role as guardian of the Treaties.36 The Commission has facilitated direct contact
with citizens through a number of initiatives, utilising advances in technology to streamline
the information gathering process. The Commission has encouraged the use of a specific
complaint form available on its infringement website,37 but has also developed complaint
forums, such as those relating to the internal market38 and competition cases.39 It also relies
on citizen questions or petitions made to the European Parliament, which are then referred
back to the Commission by the Petitions Committee for further investigation.
Internal detection of infringements by the Commission is an alternative method of
monitoring. This occurs by surveying national press or through the Commission undertaking
its own investigations into specific pieces of legislation. It has been especially proactive with
regard to the enforcement of directives, which statistically account for a large proportion of
infringement cases.
2.2; Reform of administrative procedures
The Commission's second problem of insufficient resources, particularly in relation to staff
administration of the infringement cases, has led to a programme of internal reform in order
to eradicate internal inefficiencies.40 Throughout the 1990s, it became apparent that after the
big push to complete the internal market, the enforcement mechanism was unable to cope
with the increased urgent workload. In the mid 1990s internal reforms were put in place but
were slow to gain any real administrative momentum.41 These reforms were further reviewed
in 1998 culminating in yet more initiatives to streamline the infringement investigation
36 The Commission relies on citizens enforcing their community rights in national courts of course,
although this type of rights assertion policing is not counted as a way of detecting infringements for





j9 For instance, for consumer concerns see
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/competition policy and the citizen/consumer li
aison.
40 The first wave of these reforms occurred early in the 1970's under the influence of Ehlermann -
these reforms are detailed in the original work by Audretsch into Article 226, above nil. These
reforms occurred in a very different political context to the more recent changes, and hence I have not
detailed these in my discussion.
41 These can be viewed at OJ C 332 3.11.1997 p 9.
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process.42 The main priorities of the Commission's reform were threefold: faster handling of
cases, greater transparency43 and better relations with the complainant44
The amount of time that the Commission took in handling cases was the source of a great
deal of frustration, both for complainants and the Commission itself. The established
decision-making procedure in Article 226 consisted of the compilation of four periodic
reports by the Secretariat General (March, June, October, December) that detailed all the
infringement cases and stages of investigation. These reports were then discussed at the
quarterly infringement meetings of the Commissioners, who sit as a College to take
decisions on infringement cases.
This report-based approach was meant to deliver consistent handling of the infringement
cases across different sectors, DGs and Member States, (demonstrating a coherent approach
to enforcement), but could lead to considerable delay in reaching decisions whilst cases
waited for the production of the report before being discussed.45 A decision whether or not
to proceed to the next stage of the Article 226 procedure, whether this was to issue a formal
letter or reasoned opinion, or to abandon the investigation altogether, could potentially have
to wait three months until the next quarterly meeting, and then another three months for the
next meeting and so on.
The 1996 reform package contained the innovation of handling state aid infringement cases
(the focus of the Commission's infringement policy at that time) in a different format. This
meant that state aid cases were decided every fortnight in the regular Commissioner
meetings. The emphasis was on 'cases ripe for a decision' 6 so that these could proceed
more quickly without having to wait for the quarterly infringement meeting of the College.
In 1998 the Commission decided to modify, in certain cases, the established decision-making
procedure. The fortnightly decisions had been widened to encompass more cases of
infringements and nearly 400 cases had been dealt with in this manner, compared with only
42 Sixteenth Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law (1998) COM (1999)
301 final, hereinafter 'Sixteenth Annual Monitoring Report'.
43 The push for greater transparency was already in place at this time and consisted solely of the
production of press releases that outlined the Commission's decision to give a reasoned opinion or
refer a case to the Court of Justice.
44 Better relations with the complainant relates to the work of the Ombudsman and is discussed in
detail in Chapter VI.
45
Interview, Commission Official G (26 October 2005).
46 Sixteenth Annual Monitoring Report above n 42, p 6.
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70 in the previous year.47 The impact of faster internal decision-making has the inevitable
consequence of speeding up Member State compliance with Community law (either through
negotiation or legal proceedings) and a more efficient Commission administration, with a
reduction in the time between the opening and closing of a case.
The increased automatic use of the formal letter meant that time devoted to pre-procedure,
behind the scenes negotiation declined dramatically. Additionally, the Commission
promised more rigorous adherence to specified time limits in the formal letter with the
promise to initiate the reasoned opinion stage as soon as the specified time had elapsed. This
had not always been the case in the past with quite significant time gaps between the expiry
date in the formal letter and the reasoned opinion stage of infringement proceedings. The
Commission also promised to significantly decrease the time passing between a decision
being reached by the Commissioners, and the notification of that decision to the Member
State by the responsible DG. This had previously been 'measured in months'48 for no other
reason than administrative inefficiency, but the Commission undertook to complete this task
in the same week. Such administrative reforms resulted in an 18 per cent increase in the
amount of cases that were opened and reached the reasoned opinion stage within the same
49
year.
The Annual Report for 2000 was the first to be produced after the Commission was
substantially reorganised under the Santer presidency.50 In relation to infringement
investigations, it was clear there was still considerable work that could be done to improve
efficient case handling by the time of the Prodi presidency. Despite earlier promises in the
1998 Annual Report to reduce the time delay between the Commission reaching a decision
on an infringement (at the initial investigation and the reasoned opinion stages), and the
communication of that decision to the Member State from a matter ofmonths to one week, in
2000 there was still an average time lapse of 29 days. The failure to eradicate such a time
gap between decision and communication seems unfathomable, since it is completely within
the control of the Commission and not subject to the influence of other actors. The
Commission once again promised to reduce this unacceptable time delay.
47 Sixteenth Annual Monitoring Report above n 42.
48 Sixteenth Annual Monitoring Report above n 42 p 6.
49 Sixteenth Annual Monitoring Report above n 42.
50
Eighteenth Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law (2000) COM (2001)
309 final.
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The detection of infringements in relation to directives, always a high priority for the
Commission, had been made far more systematic and efficient by the development of a
special internal database.51 This database enabled the issuing of formal letters to be
automated, thereby avoiding the politicisation of what were indisputable and straightforward
infringements. Member States are judged to have automatically committed an infringement
in relation to the implementation of directives if they do not follow the instruction within the
directive to notify the Commission when they have implemented national legislation to
transpose the directive.52 Whether they have or have not transposed the directive is
irrelevant, as failure to adhere to this notification is sufficient in itself to trigger the
infringement process. The Commission's database records all deadlines for directive
transposal and Member State notification. This process of notification is not a question of
political judgment but administrative certainty as the Commission either has, or has not, been
notified ofmeasures adopted by Member States.53
The standard formal letter and reasoned opinions have reduced the administrative delays
within the DG and between the DG's internal legal department and the legal service
associated with drafting work. These database advances are combined with a sustained
effort to increase the amount of information available to the public on the internet, including
decisions taken to issue formal letters and an on-line database containing information for the
public on deadlines for specific directives.54
Increasing the efficiency of infringement investigations and reform of internal procedures
had thus far focused upon three common themes. First, reducing time delays by sticking to
internal deadlines and streamlining administrative procedure. Secondly, increasing the use
of technology to better utilise resources and create systematic, impartial monitoring of the
transposition of directives. Thirdly, increasing the information available to the public by
establishing an infringement website.
51 Asmodee II Database, see Eighteenth Annual Monitoring Report ibid p 10.
52 The so-called non-notification cases.
53 This still needs the 'rubber stamp' of the College of Commissioners, but this can be obtained in the
weekly meetings without controversy, Interview, Commission Official A (25 October 2005),
Interview, Commission Official B, (25 October 2005), Interview, Commission Official C (25 October
2005) Interview, Commission Official D (25 October 2005) Interview Commission Official E (24
October 2005), Interview, Commission Official G (26 October 2005).
54
Previously this had been restricted to publicity relating only to issuing reasoned opinions, Sixteenth
Annual Monitoring Report above n 42.
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By 2001, there was a notable change of approach by the Commission in its Annual Report.55
The Commission had achieved the promised reduction in administrative delays between
arriving at a decision on an infringement case and communication of this decision to the
Member State, eliminating the delay from a massive 29 days, to communication within 24
hours. Having achieved this momentous turnaround in its internal efficiency, including
making further improvements to the directive database, the Commission turned its attention
to those delays which were outside its direct control.
The Member States have always played a significant part in the inefficiency of the Article
226 process and have been aided both by the case law of the ECJ in this regard, and the
Commission's internal inefficiencies.55 The efficiency of the enforcement mechanism
always depended on a significant degree of cooperation from the Member State under
investigation, because it often required the Member State to hand over the proof of its own
non-compliance, without which the Commission found it difficult to bring proceedings.57 It
has been the practice of some Member States to simply string out the investigation process
by a number ofmethods. They often deny the Commission information for as long as
possible, or alternatively simply refuse to cooperate at all, or they promise to correct
behaviour and then fail to deliver on this promise. Against this conduct, the Commission has
been more or less impotent. Without an exchange of information there can be no negotiation
with the Member State. When the Commission is unable to establish the facts there can be
no prosecution before the ECJ, and without this there can be no judgment, and no financial
penalty under Article 228.58
The Commission has always belaboured the point of needing close cooperation with the
Member State for this reason.59 In the 2001 Annual Report the Commission introduced the
strategy ofprosecuting Member States for their non-cooperation in infringement
55 Nineteenth Annual Report onMonitoring the Application ofCommunity Law (2001) COM (2002)
324 final.
56 See Chapter II for an explanation of the applicable case law. In particular, the Court's refusal to
enforce specific deadlines in the administrative procedure.
57 This is not necessarily true across the broad range ofpolicy sectors, in particular, common policies
such as fisheries have their own inspection teams and are not so reliant on Member State co-operation.
58 This depends on the type of infringement under investigation - a straightforward conflict in the
wording of the legislation (or no transposition ofmeasures) is fairly easy to discover for the
Commission without the cooperation of the Member State, but cases ofmisinterpretation or
misapplication require intensive fact finding on the part of the Commission.
59 See the approach in the WPG, above n 2 pp 25-26 where the Commission reaffirms its commitment
to 'active dialogue' with the Member States, discussed in Chapter III.
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investigations.60 An action for non-cooperation would be based on Article 226, i.e. non-
fulfilment ofCommunity obligations, and the specific obligation is that contained within
Article 10 EC (interpreted as a duty of close cooperation). This had been hinted at in the
Commission's White Paper on Governance,61 produced in the same year, by statements that
focused upon closer co-operation with Member States in order to fulfil the task of effective
monitoring. However, specific statements relating to coercion through the application of
Articles 10 and 226 were not mentioned.
In 2000, the Commission had already resorted to the use of Article 10 before the Court of
Justice in relation to infringement investigations seven times (without announcing this
strategy in the previous Annual Report), but by 2001, this had increased notably to 20
separate cases. The Commission's increasing frustration with the 'information asymmetry'62
inherent in the Article 226 process was beginning to materialise in the diverse approaches it
was taking to right this problem.63 However, the Commission was still hesitant to make
recourse to these prosecutions routine. Prosecution would only be resorted to where
Member States persistently refused all cooperation rather than simply took excessive time to
answer the Commission's inquiries.
The 2002 Annual Report did not mention recourse to prosecution for breach of Article 10 at
all, but instead emphasised the implementation of various preventative strategies to decrease
the incidence of infringements.64 Again the Commission's position moved from a tougher
'prosecution' approach back to encouraging negotiation with Member States. These new
operational measures were to be explained in more detail in the 2003 Annual Report, but
60 Ibid n 55 p 6.
61 WPG above n 2 pp 25-26.
62
Tallberg above n 9. Tallberg uses the term 'information asymmetry' when discussing how effective
the Commission is when acting as supervisor of the Member States. This role is hampered
considerably by the fact the Member State is in possession of all the information the Commission
needs to mount a case before the Court, but the Commission cannot obtain much of this information
independently.
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At the Convention on the Future ofEurope, the Commission proposed a different strategy to
achieve the same end (of reducing the opportunity for Member States to delay infringement
proceedings) by suggesting that if the Member States objected to the reasoned opinion of the
Commission, the Member State could take the case to the Court of Justice, rather than wait to be
referred to the ECJ by the Commission. In reality this turns the reasoned opinion into a legally
binding instrument, with the Member State appealing the Commission's decision before the Court.
This also suggests a change in the burden ofproofwhereby the onus would be on the Member State
rather than the Commission to prove their case. In fact this proposal was rejected, as it had been time
and again at other IGCs when the Commission had proposed similar amendments to Article 226,
albeit using different terminology.
64 Twentieth Annual Monitoring Report above n 35.
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instead mysteriously slipped off the agenda and are not mentioned at all.65 The reasons
behind the Commission's sudden reluctance to pursue the Article 10 strategy in 2002 are
unclear. It might be related to a hostile reaction from the Member States or simply a lack of
coherence from the Commission in the reporting of its activities under Article 226.
Nevertheless the current position remained reasonably clear - the Commission felt that it had
eradicated its internal inefficiencies in relation to the decision-making process under Article
226 as well as it could, and was now beginning to look for other ways to streamline the
procedure, including forcing Member States to be more cooperative in its investigations.
2.3: Attempts to reform the Treaty language
The third main problem of the Commission is that the Commission has often been frustrated
by an enforcement procedure that is undeniably weighted in favour of the Member States it
tries to supervise. The Treaty wording itself, compounded by the interpretations laid down
by the Court of Justice, has created a slow and cumbersome enforcement mechanism. There
is no doubt that when the pressure has been on to achieve maximum compliance, and in
particular to meet the deadline to create the internal market by 1992, both the Commission
and certain Member States' attention focused on how best to remedy this situation.
From the Commission's perspective the main problems with Article 226 are related to the
wording of the Treaty. It is the lengthened process which allows the Member States to delay
compliance, and so the focus on improving Article 226 would naturally begin with reform of
the Treaty itself. This is one area where the Commission often finds itself in an
uncomfortable position. The clamour for amendment ofArticle 226 is seen by the Member
States as an overt attempt to boost the supranational element of the Union by increasing the
Commission's powers, and is instinctively resisted on this very basis alone. The
Commission has not helped matters as it has not always 'played the IGC game' as well as it
ought to have over recent decades, and consequently has not been as effective as might have
been hoped for.66 Particularly through the 1970s and 1980s there were calls for greater
central enforcement powers from the institutions ofEurope, and comparisons were often
drawn with those enforcement provisions of the ECSC Treaty which were more extensive
and far more efficient from the Commission's perspective. Despite serious efforts at two
65
Twenty-First Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law (2003) COM
(2004) 839 final, possibly because the Commission has changed its method of reporting, see Chapter
V on this point.
66 See especially Cini above n 4 and Tallberg above n 9 in this regard.
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separate IGCs the Commission has never managed to exert enough pressure on the Member
States to amend the wording of this provision.67
At the 1990 IGC there was a substantial emphasis placed on the task of completing the
internal market, and consequently on enforcement of EC law. Even so, the language of
Article 226 remained immovable. The Commission presented four alternative suggestions to
the current enforcement powers in Article 226, but only the first of these proposals suggested
amendments to the wording ofArticle 226 itself. This proposal, which was to replicate the
ECSC Treaty provision on enforcement, was immediately dismissed. This amendment
would have granted the Commission the power to find an infringement by decision on appeal
to the Court of Justice, but it had quickly become apparent that there was no appetite
amongst the Member States for this initiative.68 Two of the other suggestions circumvented
the Article 226 provision altogether by focusing on developing a state liability principle,69 or
alternatively an extension of ECJ's powers to annul national laws. Unsurprisingly, such
extensions to the ECJ's powers were also seen as supranationalist and unpopular.
The only proposal that was really under discussion was the UK Government's suggestion
that Article 228 could be amended to include a financial penalty for those Member States
that refused to comply with an ECJ judgment under Article 226. The Commission had
expressed reservations about this method of ensuring enforcement during negotiations but
ultimately this proposal was accepted, resulting in the current Treaty wording ofArticle
228.70 The Commission's reservations concerned the practicality of obtaining the penalty
payment from the Member States, an issue that underpinned the Commission's eagerness to
replicate the ECSC Treaty which provided for the Commission to withhold monies owed to
Member States in order to recoup financial penalties. This scepticism proved well grounded
when it took Greece some years to pay the financial penalty imposed on it under Article 228.
At the next IGC in 1996 the same themes from the Commission arose. Replacing the
reasoned opinion stage ofArticle 226 with a reasoned decision (similar to the ECSC Treaty)
was still the preferred option and again this was unsuccessful. The Commission also
proposed amending the new Article 228, so that Article 226 and 228 proceedings were




69 Which the Court of Justice would eventually develop through its own case law principles anyway,
despite the Member States' firm opposition.
70
Tallberg above n 9.
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attached. This would reduce the time delays in the Article 228 procedure, but this proposal
was unsuccessful despite the backing of some Member States.71
The one advantage the Commission has in the Treaty revision process is that it can more
successfully play the long game, whereas Member States' priorities and attentions can
fluctuate dramatically depending on the overall political picture. In the Convention on the
Future of Europe, the Commission finally had some success in its reform quest. This can be
attributed to two factors; first, other more pressing constitutional matters consumed the
agenda of the Member States, and secondly, the Member States finally had something to
gain from increasing the Commission's enforcement powers. The enlargement of the EU
and fears that the new Member States would not fulfil their responsibilities weighed heavily.
For once, the 'them versus us' mentality of the IGC negotiations that the Commission had
been forced to battle against in previous IGCs worked in its favour, with the prospective
accession states being on the wrong side of the 'them and us' fence.
Suggested alternatives to the current enforcement provisions again bore resemblance to those
from the 1990 and 1996 IGC negotiations. The three main proposals involved abolishing
either one or both of the pre-litigation stages in Article 228, pursuing Article 228 penalties
simultaneously with Article 226 proceedings, or granting the Commission the right to
declare an infringement by decision, which would be challengeable in the ECJ.72 In the final
version of the Constitutional Treaty, Article 226 (Article III-360) again remains largely
unchanged in its wording in terms of the applicable procedure.73 However, it should be
noted that Article III-360 refers to failure to fulfil obligations in the Constitution, rather than
only the EC Treaty, so the range of 'obligations' covered by the mechanism is greatly
expanded.
In contrast, Article 228 (Article III-362) is to be amended in three ways.74 First, the
requirement of a reasoned opinion under the Article 228 action would be removed so that
only a formal letter is required before the Commission can refer the case to the ECJ. This
makes the procedure faster and leaves less room for procrastination by the Member State.
71
Tallberg above n 9 states that one reason this was unsuccessful was that the Commission had yet to
initiate any proceedings under Article 228 requesting a financial penalty, so the newly amended
system had not even been tested before the Commission was attempting to amend the Treaty provision
again.
72 Final report of the discussion circle on the Court of Justice CONV 636/03 25 March 2003.
73
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe OJ C 310 16 December 2004 p 158.
74 Ibid p 159.
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The reasoned opinion is no longer necessary as it is clear by this stage exactly what the
Member State should have done to remedy the non-compliance with the Article 226
judgment. Secondly, Article 228 would be amended to include a final paragraph as follows:
'When the Commission brings a case before the Court of Justice of the
European Union pursuant to Article III-360 [226] on the grounds that the
Member State concerned has failed to fulfil its obligation to notify measures
transposing a European framework law [a directive], it may, when it deems
appropriate, specify the amount of the lump sum or penalty payment to be paid
by the Member State concerned which it considers appropriate in the
circumstances.
If the Court finds that there is an infringement it may impose a lump sum or
penalty payment on the Member State concerned not exceeding the amount
specified by the Commission. The payment obligation shall take effect on the
date set by the Court in its judgment.'
This would mean that when Article 226 proceedings are brought for non-notification cases,
the Commission may request that a financial penalty be imposed in the course of these
proceedings instead of having to wait for a separate case to be brought under Article 228.
Although this step does not fully achieve what the Commission had wanted in terms of
attaching all Article 226 and 228 proceedings to reduce time delays, it does address the
central preoccupation of the Commission in achieving greater compliance with directives, in
particular the non-notification cases. Last, the final paragraph has been altered at the IGC by
the Member States, as this was not included in the text of the Draft Constitutional Treaty
submitted by the Convention.75 This final paragraph attempts to place control over the
amount of the fine for non-notification cases in the hands of the Commission, as opposed to
the Court. In ordinary Article 228 cases it is the ECJ that has the final say on the amount of
penalty payment imposed on the Member State.
The amendments contained in the Constitutional Treaty are of course only indications of the
enforcement strategy that the Member States and Commission can currently agree upon.
Given the rejections of the Constitutional Treaty in two Member States' referendums, it
might be some considerable time before these changes become binding Treaty text, if ever.
Nevertheless, this analysis does provide an insight into the Commission's strategy for
external reform and long term goals for Articles 226 and 228 as a joint enforcement
mechanism. It reveals that the Commission may eventually succeed in its aim of increasing
its enforcement powers by seizing the opportunity presented by political challenges within
75 See for comparison The European Convention 'Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe'
CONV 850/03 18 July 2003 pp 187-188, Articles III-265-267.
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the EU (such as that of enlargement), so that it can champion the cause of increased
compliance as something that the Member States can benefit from.
2.4: One size fits all: a horizontal policy with vertical challenges
In principle, the Commission operates an enforcement policy under Article 226 that appears
to apply equally across the DGs. Although the internal procedures of the Commission
remain a secretive business,76 there are several standard procedures that all DGs follow, in
respect of internal management of infringement investigations. These are (1) processing of
complaints from citizens77 and (2) all decisions to pursue infringements must be verified by
the College ofCommissioners at each stage. Despite concerns over internal efficiency, the
management of the enforcement action is nonetheless still a political and time-consuming
affair and the influence of the Commissioners has not diminished in recent years.
In principle, the Commissioners still meet on a quarterly basis to specifically discuss on¬
going infringement cases, along with the Secretariat General and Legal Service. These
meetings are based around the collation of data regarding all infringements across all DGs,
contained in an internal quarterly report. The quarterly meetings are split into two 'A
Meetings' and two 'B Meetings' in order to discuss infringement cases that are more or less
controversial.78 The internal reforms of 1998 have not altered this procedure as the standard
procedure.
Each decision taken during an investigation of a possible infringement must be authorised by
the College of Commissioners. The issuing of a formal letter, reasoned opinion, referral to
the ECJ and each subsequent step in the Article 228 procedure all require this political stamp
of approval. This has been the procedure within the Commission since time immemorial,
reflecting the historical position that infringement decisions are not a case of 'crime and
punishment', but a more of a political affair riddled with negotiation and trade-offs. All
Commissioners must agree to a decision for the case to move forward. The rigidity of the
76 Note the refusal to supply the European Parliament with the internal manual, amongst other things,
discussed in Chapter V.
77
Discussed in Chapter VI.
78
Interview, Commission Official A (25 October 2005), Interview, Commission Official B, (25
October 2005), Interview, Commission Official C (25 October 2005) Interview, Commission Official
D (25 October 2005) Interview Commission Official E (24 October 2005), Interview, Commission
Official F (24 October 2005), Interview, Commission Official G (26 October 2005), Interview,
Commission Official L (24 October 2005).
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decision-making process seems to be a problem for some (but not all) DGs, depending on the
policy sector and the type of infringement case that each DG encounters.79
Flexibility in the procedure can exist in some cases, particularly where the infringements are
not especially politically sensitive (such as non-notification cases) or where interim measures
are required.80 An example of a quick decision-making procedure is in relation to a transport
case against Austria. This case was initiated by DG Transport on the basis of internal
monitoring of compliance with a directive; this is a case ofnon-implementation rather than
non-notification. On 25 June 2003 a formal letter was set to the Member State. On 9 July a
reasoned opinion was sent to the Member State, and by 24 July the case had been listed by
the ECJ. The first judgment, an order for interim measures against Austria for breach of its
obligations, was made on 30 July 2003.81 The entire decision-making process of the College
ofCommissioners took a matter of weeks. The Member State claimed that the case should
be dismissed due to the short time period in which they had to respond to the Commission's
allegations. Nonetheless, the Commission was judged not to have breached the Member
State's rights of defence even though the case had proceeded at a brisk pace.
Contrast this approach with the recent case against Finland regarding the conservation of
wild birds.82 The Commission had received numerous complaints between 1995 and 1996
about Finland's failure to comply with a directive. In February 1998 the Commission sent a
letter of formal notice. In April 1998 the Commission sent a reasoned opinion to Finland.
Inexplicably, nothing then happened for another three years, until July 2001 when the
Commission sent a supplementary reasoned opinion. This is totally unnecessary in Article
226 proceedings, and this step is not required by the Treaty provision or the case law of the
ECJ.83 Another two years passed before the case was finally referred to the ECJ in August
2003, resulting in a judgment in December 2005. In contrast with the case against Austria,
this no doubt seems like a protracted timescale for bringing Member States into line with
79
Interview, Commission Official A (25 October 2005), Interview, Commission Official B, (25
October 2005), Interview, Commission Official C (25 October 2005) Interview, Commission Official
D (25 October 2005) Interview Commission Official E (24 October 2005), Interview, Commission
Official G (26 October 2005).
80 See for instance Case C-320/03 R Commission v Austria [2005] ECR1-9871.
81 Ibid Commission v Austria. The full infringement hearing took place two years later, with the court
delivering judgment against the Member State on 15 November 2005. This delay was the same
experienced by most cases before being heard in the Court of Justice and is not peculiar to Article 226
cases, or the Commission's management of them.
82 Case C-344/03 Commission v Finland [2005] ECR 1-11033.
83 If the Commission wishes to advance different arguments to those in the original reasoned opinion,
it must issue a new reasoned opinion. This appears to be different from a 'supplementary' reasoned
opinion.
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their obligations under Community law, but it must be pointed out that this case probably
proceeded faster than many other cases. The more political the case, and the more severe the
sanctions, the longer Commission decisions seem to take. The recent case against France,
regarding France's failure to comply with technical conservation measures relating to the
fishing of Hake, is illustrative of this point.84 Even though an infringement was established
by the ECJ in 1991 (for an infringement beginning in 1984) France has yet to correct its
conduct and, according to the Commission, is still in breach of its obligations under
Community law.85 The Commission took 11 years to refer the case to the ECJ under the
Article 228 procedure.86
The actual practice ofmanaging the Commission's enforcement responsibilities across and
within individual DGs belies the apparent uniform formal procedure. In fact, there are vast
differences between the DGs in terms of how they discharge their enforcement
responsibilities.87 These differences are sometimes directly related to the peculiarities of the
policy sector, but sometimes are affected by more nebulous issues. Each DG has its own
internal organisation, not necessarily consistent with any other DG - some DGs have a
specific unit devoted to the management of infringements,88 and others spread this
responsibility across the DG.89 Some DGs have internal horizontal co-ordination units
specifically devoted to infringements.90 Some have no specific arrangements for
infringements at all.91 Many DGs subsume the management of infringements within a legal
unit of the DG whose central taskmight be drafting legislation rather than enforcement of
it.92 None of the DGs have a specific unit whose sole task is to manage complaints from
• • 93
citizens.
Due to the different organisation of infringement handling across the Commission, no two
DGs operate the enforcement mechanism in the same way. The internal organisation of each
84 This case also concerns France's failure to adopt the concurrent measures relating to this
conservation of fish stocks, including ensuring fisherman used the correct mesh size, and the
minimum size of fish allowed to be sold.
85 Case C-64/88 Commission v France [1991] ECR1-272.
86 Case C-304/02 Commission v France [2005] 12 July 2005 nyr.
87
Christiansen, ibid, note 7 discusses the issue of DGs operating in very different ways in general, but
not in relation to Article 226.
88 See eg DG Transport and Energy.
89 In a specialised unit for the diverse legislative areas contained within one DG, for instance see DG
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities.
90 For instance, DG Internal Market.
91 DG Justice Freedom and Security.
92 DG Environment.
93 See Appendix 2 for the details of the organisation of a selection ofDGs.
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DG can be related to the type ofpolicy and legislation it develops, or simply an historical
artefact. Those DGs with higher infringement rates tend to be departments that deal mainly
with first pillar policy sectors, or where the majority of legislation is produced in the form of
directives.94 As a consequence the internal organisation of that DG has evolved to
compensate for this higher instance of infringement.95
In terms of the method adopted for infringement detection, again there are vast differences
across the Commission. Some departments are inundated by citizen complaints,
overwhelming the resources available within the DG for dealing with such complaints.96 In
contrast, certain DGs have comparatively limited citizen complaints and rely far more on
their own internal monitoring ofMember State legislation to detect infringements.97 This is
related to the policy sector at hand and the attitude ofMember State compliance to that
particular sector. The environmental sector is a case in point. There is a reluctant attitude
amongst Member States to compliance for a variety of reasons, including the complex nature
of the legislation, the form of the legislation and the cost of compliance. At the same time
there is a large number of complaints98 because it is an area ofNGO lobbying, and a difficult
area for citizens to enforce their rights directly before a national court.99 As a consequence a
complaint to the Commission is the best hope of affecting compliance from a bottom up
perspective. Whether a policy sector is one of shared competence or EU competence also
makes a significant difference. Certain aspects of the fisheries sector are an exclusive
competence of the EU; the nature of the sector has resulted in fewer citizen complaints, and
detection is achieved via the EU Inspectors. In comparison, internal market or employment
issues may be infringements that are of a more individual nature. Without a similar
inspection team, the DG is left with the task ofmonitoring. In instances of individual
misapplication of the rules it is much easier to monitor infringements on the basis of citizen
complaints.100
94 Which generate by far the highest number of infringement cases, see Figure 7, Chapter V.
95
Interview, Commission Official A (25 October 2005), Interview, Commission Official E (24
October 2005).
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Interview, Commission Official A (25 October 2005), Interview, Commission Official B, (25
October 2005), Interview Commission Official E (24 October 2005).
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Interview, Commission Official C (25 October 2005), Interview, Commission Official G (26
October 2005), Interview, Commission Official H (24 October 2005).
98 For instance, in 2004, 33% of all infringement complaints to the Commission related to
environmental legislation, Twenty-Second Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of
Community Law (2004) Com (2005) 570 final.
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Due to issues of a lack of standing in relation to 'diffuse rights', see Chapter II for a discussion of
these issues.
100
Interview, Commission Official H (26 October 2005), Interview, Commission Official G (26
October 2005), Interview, Commission Official E (24 October 2005).
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There are other factors influencing the way in which a particular DG operates infringement
investigations which are harder to quantify. Certainly, the attitude of the Commissioner in
charge of the policy sector is of vital importance.101 The significance of compliance on
his/her particular agenda has a definite influence on the effectiveness of that DGs
enforcement ofMember States' obligations.102 It is also influenced by that Commissioner's
success in political terms in the context ofputting forward an infringement case that the
entire College will agree to proceed with.103 Similarly, the attitude, commitment and
political skill of the Director General within a DG is equally important.104 The Director
General is the ultimate bridge between an infringement case proceeding from the hands of
the investigating Commission official and the Commissioner's Chefde Cabinet,105 It is the
Chefde Cabinet who communicates downwards whether it is politically possible to proceed
with the case. Once the infringement file has navigated all these hurdles successfully, it
must then come before the College for a decision.106
As a consequence, it is difficult to make sweeping comments about the way in which 'the
Commission' actually practises its enforcement responsibilities. There are, however, some
common themes that emerge for all the DGs. Resources are a perennial problem across the
Commission in the discharge of all of its duties, including those relating to enforcement.107
The enlargement of the Union has created a situation of enormous consequence in terms of
ensuring Member State compliance, the impact ofwhich will not be fully understood for a
101
Interview, Commission Official A (25 October 2005), Interview, Commission Official B, (25
October 2005), Interview, Commission Official C (25 October 2005) Interview, Commission Official
D (25 October 2005) Interview Commission Official E (24 October 2005), Interview, Commission
Official F (24 October 2005), Interview, Commission Official G (26 October 2005), Interview,
Commission Official H (26 October 2005), Interview, Commission Official I (6 April 2005)
Interview, Commission Official L (24 October 2005).
102 Ibid.
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Interview, Commission Official C (25 October 2005), Interview, Commission Official G (26
October 2005).
104 In organisation terms, the Director General is the most senior Commission official of the DG and is
the last tier ofmanagement before the Commissioner.
105 Each Commissioner has his own personal, Cabinet, or personal staff of advisors and administrators
and the Chefde Cabinet is the head of this department. This is not a department within the DG, but an
adjunct to the Commissioner, Interview Interview, Commission Official C (25 October 2005),
Interview, Commission Official G (26 October 2005).
106 Ibid.
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Interview, Commission Official A (25 October 2005), Interview, Commission Official B, (25
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D (25 October 2005) Interview Commission Official E (24 October 2005), Interview, Commission
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number of years to come. This is an issue of language as well as volume. Within the
Commission DGs, those staff that deal with enforcement generally have proficiency in a
variety of languages between them which covered most, ifnot all, of the 15 'old' Member
States.108 Staff therefore were able to translate the relevant Member State legislation to
check compliance, without having to submit pieces to the translation service which has long
suffered from severe backlogs.109 The situation is not the same for new Member States,
resulting, in some cases, in a complete inability to check compliance through monitoring of
the transposal measures notified to the Commission, or complaints from citizens. This
means it will be difficult to monitor compliance effectively in the new Member States for the
immediate future.110
A complicating factor is the insistence by the Commission that all States are investigated
simultaneously for the same infringement, i.e. if there seems to be a problem in a particular
Member State, a survey is conducted to see if this problem is unique to that Member State, or
in fact uniform across the Union.111 This is not required in the case law of the Court, but is a
manifestation of the equal treatment principle in the practice of the Commission.
Unfortunately, this practice will now hinder the Commission, since it lacks the linguistic
ability to pursue recent accession Member States to the same degree as the 'old 15' Member
States. Whilst there is an interim transitional period for compliance in some sectors for the
new Member States as part of the accession agreement, enabling the Commission to justify
taking a 'two tier' approach to enforcement, this reprieve will not last indefinitely.112
3.0: Conflicting roles of the Commission within Article 226
The Commission's continuing efforts at reform, both of its internal management of
infringement cases and Treaty revision, are compromised by the Commission's attempts to
accommodate the competing roles and priorities that are inherent in its management of the
enforcement action. The Commission engages in different, and sometimes competing roles,
when it executes the separate tasks assigned to it under the Treaties. In general, it may be
said to act as an executive body when it initiates and steers policy development, or single-
108




Interview, Commission Official G (26 October 2005), Interview, Commission Official C (25
October 2005).
112 This means that some DGs within the Commission will develop the strategy ofprosecuting
infringements in two blocks - one block of cases against the old 15 Member States and a second block
at a later date against the new 12 Member States, Interview, Commission Official G (26 October
2005).
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handedly executes implementing legislation, and acts as a bureaucracy or administration
when engaging in monitoring activities and contracting various bodies to carry out the
implementation of Community policies. These functions rarely operate in a completely
discrete fashion, and to complicate matters, such functions are not always complementary to
one another. In the field of enforcement actions undertaken in Article 226, these tensions are
especially evident. Within this one Treaty provision the Commission must act as guardian of
the Treaties, an efficient and fair administration, and balance its executive function. The
following subsections identify the Commission's different roles under Article 226 and
explore how each of these discrete functions conflict, and how the conflicts work to shape
the role of Article 226.
3.1: The guardian of the Treaties - enforcement and compliance
The first role or function of the Commission is that of enforcement and compliance. The
Commission's role in ensuring compliance with Community law through the use of Article
226 is exclusive. Its role as the 'guardian of the Treaties' is contained within Article 211
which states that the Commission must ensure that the Treaty provisions and pursuant
legislation are applied by the Member States. The objective of this duty is spelled out in the
Treaty in no uncertain terms: compliance. The Commission's duty as the guardian of the
Treaties is arguably more important than any other power or responsibility it possesses, since
the very existence of the Community depends upon the unique legal system which has
evolved under the Treaty. The value of Article 226 as a compliance mechanism in terms of
its effectiveness, i.e. the achievement of complete uniform application in the arena of
international legal obligations, is outside the scope of this study.113 The main focus of this
section is the Commission's use ofArticle 226 through the function of 'guardian of the
Treaties'. This is the role identified by the Commission as central to its activities under the
enforcement action.
The Commission is keen to promote its role of guardian of the Treaties as that of a neutral
monitoring agency. The Communications and Annual Reports it produces in connection
with this role are all described as 'monitoring' reports, rather than compliance or
enforcement reports. The moniker of 'guardian' evokes an image of an equitable overseer of
113
Though others have canvassed the issue of compliance, see especially H Siedentopf, and J Ziller,
(eds), Making European Policies Work. The Implementing ofCommunity Legislation in the Member
States Volume I, Comparative Synthesis (Sage, London, 1988), TA Borzel, 'Non-Compliance in the
European Union: pathology or statistical artefact?' (2001) 8 Journal ofEuropean Public Policy 803,
Borzel, TA, T Hofmann and C Spmngk 'Why Do States not Obey the Law? Lessons from the
European Union?' (EUSA Conference, Nashville, 2003), Tallberg above n 9.
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the Treaty, a neutral even-handed defender of the legal order. The guardian ofTreaties
ought therefore to pursue uniform application of the laws across all Member States without
regard to other (conflicting) priorities. In this sense, the process of guarding the Treaties
ought to be as automated and mechanical as possible, apolitical and without regard to other
issues that have no connection with ensuring uniform application of the law. The
Commission embraces this characterisation in its technocratic methods of detection and
reform, and when it focuses upon the function of compliance and integration.
This role of neutral guardian is undermined by the reality in which the Commission must
operate to ensure compliance with the Treaty. It is not simply a mechanical application of
transparent (or even secret) rules which govern the duty of compliance assigned to the
Commission. Enforcement ofCommunity responsibilities is not an aseptic, neutral or
valueless monitoring task. The Commission's management has promoted an atmosphere of
negotiation and mediation with the Member States. The internal decision-making
procedures relating to Article 226 have also been slow and highly politicised
(notwithstanding the advances made in relation to directives), in direct contrast with the
fictional mechanical application of rules that the role of 'guardian' might promote. To
compound this problem, inadequate resources have ensured that all infringements cannot be
pursued with equal vigour. This, in turn, has seen the neutral compliance mechanism
transformed into an executive policy choice; a policy field of enforcement implies political
choices and is the antithesis of a neutral rule driven compliance tool.
3.2: An efficient administration - complaint handling and case investigation
The second role or function is that of an efficient administration, concerned with handling
complaints from citizens relating to suspected infringements and conducting investigations.
The DGs are at the centre of the administration in relation to the handling of infringement
cases. Not only do DGs detect infringements through their own investigations, they also act
as a contact point for European citizens who wish to complain about alleged infringements.
The Commission has developed an administrative code of conduct in relation to its dealings
with complainants in an effort to standardise treatment of complaints and improve relations
with the European public.114 Additionally, there is an internal code of conduct informing DG
staff how to proceed when investigating suspected infringements. The code consists of
114 See Chapter VI for a discussion on the Ombudsman's contribution and the Code.
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administrative protocols and deadlines for actions.115 Indeed when publishing reports or
communications on the infringement process, the Commission tends to characterise the task
of ensuring enforcement of Community law as primarily a monitoring exercise, a type of
administrative review of the conduct of Member States.116
The Commission has devoted a lot of resources to developing administrative (or
technocratic) strategies such as database management systems which automatically monitor
the transposal of directives. This is an efficient administrative mechanism to enable
centralised policing of the transposal of directives, but is limited to a specific type of
infringement. It does not account for misapplication or misinterpretation of the rules once
formal transposition has occurred. The more automated a task becomes, the less discretion
or value choice is attached to it and the more neutral and administrative it becomes. The
DGs are also responsible for collating statistics, and in cooperation with the Secretariat
General, produce reports which are then analysed to gather information on implementation
trends across sectors and Member States. In all these tasks, the DGs are acting as a large
administration, in principle pursuing correction of infringements in a regimented and
bureaucratic manner.
This dry and formalistic picture of the Commission acting as a tightly bound rule driven
administration is compromised in several respects. The first problem with this
characterisation is the actual composition of the Commission, with the two distinct sections
of the political head and the administrative body. Decisions on infringement cases have to
travel between the level of the DG and the Commissioners, causing both administrative
delay and a possible (political) change of direction. The DG case handlers are only
responsible for unearthing the facts relating to any particular case and taking decisions at a
fairly basic level. Pursuing the case to the next stage, say the delivery of a formal letter or
reasoned opinion, involves not only the input of the legal service but also takes on a far more
political and discretionary dimension; pursuing cases to the Court of Justice even more so,
and invoking Article 228 penalties increases the political element even further.
The enforcement policy decided at the level ofCommissioners and overall the Commission
President then becomes far more instrumental than the (theoretically) neutral, aseptic
115 Not available to the public.
116 For instance, see Sixteenth Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law
(1998) COM (1999) 301 fmal, Twentieth Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of
Community Law (2002) COM (2003) 669 final, Commission Communication 'Better Monitoring of
the Application ofCommunity Law' COM (2002) 725 final/4 16.5.2003.
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approach of the rule driven administration.117 The Secretariat General (SG) is also involved
in decisions to pursue or drop a case, and is responsible for co-ordinating the overall
enforcement policy across the different DGs to ensure consistency. Where cases involve
more than one Directorate General, the input of the SG becomes particularly crucial. The
result of the political guidance from more senior officials means that infringement
investigations cannot be even-handed, rule driven administrative affairs alone. This conflict
can manifest itself (internally at least) when it seems clear from the facts of a case that an
infringement has occurred, yet for other undisclosed reasons, after the case is referred up the
chain of command it is not pursued.
Recent statements that individual case handlers will be given more authority in infringement
investigations is an attempt to increase the efficiency of the system of decision-making, and
to try and decrease the number of cases referred to the ECJ by encouraging resolution of
cases much earlier during the investigation phase.118 If this is the case it might suggest that
the 'political' decision-making is simply moving down the hierarchy rather than being
removed. To counteract these developments, the freedom of the administration is
compromised by the scrutiny of the European Ombudsman who has been keen to police the
administrative protocol of infringement investigations in response to citizen complaints.119
3.3: An executive power- policy development and control
The third function or role of the Commission within the enforcement mechanism is that of
the 'executive' of the EU, responsible for designing, managing and controlling the
enforcement policy. The Commission occupies a unique position in the Community's
legislative function as it may play a part in each and every stage of the formation of the
legislation, from its executive prerogative of initial policy proposal to the formal legislating
procedure with Council and Parliament, to the execution of detailed rule making powers
within the legislation conferred by the Council. Whilst the Council can claim similar
(though not quite as extensive powers) in formal legislating, only the Commission possesses
the power to pursue implementation of the legislation once it is passed down to the Member
States.
117 This is evidenced by the apparent difference in approach to some infringement cases between the
administration and the Commissioners themselves. Interview, Commission Official I (6 April 2005),
Interview Commission Official E (24 October 2005), Interview, Commission Official G (26 October
2005).
118 Commission Communication 'Better Monitoring of the Application of Community Law' COM
(2002) 725 final/4 16.5.2003 p 17.
119 See Chapter VI for a full analysis of the Ombudsman's contribution.
134
The Commission's executive power relating to policy initiation is extended to arguably the
most important stage of all - that of implementation and uniform application. The
Commission itself makes the explicit link between its right of initiative and its role as
defender of legal order:
'So that it can play its role as guardian of the Treaties and defender of the
general interest, the Commission has been given a right of initiative in the
legislative process, proposing the legislation on which the European Parliament
and the Council decide'.120
The Commission has sole control over the policy of enforcement. In having the exclusive
power to select which legislation it will focus on to ensure compliance, the Commission has
the power to control selectively the Community's output. The consequences of this are
twofold. If a piece of legislation is considered less important to the Commission's overall
political agenda, it may choose to pursue a 'soft' enforcement policy by diverting its
resources to concentrate on other types of infringement.121 Without a consistent approach of
equitable and unbiased enforcement, uniformly applied across all policy sectors (and it is
clear that Commission is selective in its choice of enforcement policy), some sectors may
become ineffective, especially if by definition such sectors rely on uniform application
across the Member States. Conversely, those areas that the Commission concentrates its
enforcement efforts on may appear disproportionately important in the output of the Union
when one considers the bare statistics.122
The Commission may choose a different enforcement policy to achieve different aims,
whether to achieve a specific focused goal like the completion of the internal market, or in
order to emphasise the importance of a particular sector. It may seek to correct a particularly
recalcitrant Member State by targeting it specifically in its investigations, or in seeking to
scale down the importance of a sector or a point of particular political controversy, it may
choose to do nothing at all. It is not only the positive steps taken by the Commission under
Article 226 that count; equally, the choice of inaction is significant.
When determining its enforcement policy, the Commission has been motivated by various
internal and external factors, but the two most important variables have often been those of
120
http://ec.europa.eu.int/comm/atwork/basicfacts/index en.htm.
121 See M Mendrinou, 'Non-compliance and the European Commission's Role in integration' (1996) 3
Journal ofEuropean Public Policy 1 for a more detailed exposition of the Commission's use of the
Article 226 to fulfil its institutional self-interest and to make strategic gains in the bigger picture of
Community politics.
122 See Chapter V, Figure 4 in relation to the environment sector.
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prioritisation and timing - neither ofwhich reinforce an image ofmechanical neutral
guardianship, and these relate directly to its executive function. Internally, the influence of
the personality of the incumbent Commission, and particularly the Commission President is
important, because this determines to a large extent the prioritisation given to the policy of
enforcement.123 Externally, the shaping of the policy of enforcement depends on the current
political climate, the political objectives of the Union and the more general prevailing
atmosphere regarding the popularity of the Community project as a whole.
In times of crisis or stagnation, enforcement as a policy sector has taken a back seat, whether
to avoid rocking the boat by engaging in high profile legal attacks on the Member States, or
because there have simply been more pressing policy objectives to pursue. The completion
of the internal market saw the compliance with Community norms return to the forefront of
the political (and Commission) agenda, and a concerted effort was undertaken by the
Commission when policing the Member States. The enforcement policy became a priority
due to the particular characteristics of the single dominating policy objective being pursued.
The completion of the internal market depended on the uniform application of a vast amount
of legislation, perhaps significantly more than other policy objective by its very definition.
It seems crucial to be able to tie the policy of enforcement to a 'greater good' in order for it
to command significant political/executive attention and compete with other policy fields.
More recent discussions regarding enlargement and the functioning of the Community with a
much larger membership brought the issue of compliance again to the fore, but this time with
less success than might have been hoped for, particularly since the focus on new Member
States adopting the acquis before membership removed the impetus from discussion of
compliance. Nevertheless, the Commission's recent Communication explicitly ties the need
for new policy initiatives to the enlargement of the Community.124
The executive function ofArticle 226, and the Commission's role, is compromised by a
number of factors. First, when acting as guardian of the Treaties the Commission's focus
ought to appear to be uniform application of Community law, which (in principle) limits to
some degree just how selective it can be in pursuing its own self interest or political agenda.
Secondly, control of the enforcement policy generated at the political head of the
Commission, requires a great deal of bottom up administrative cooperation and information
123 See the current Commission's approach at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/programmes/index en.htm.
124 Discussed in Chapter V.
136
flow. The political head is not necessarily master of all information in this respect and may
find itself having to operate in a less self interested manner as a result of other institutional
controls on its executive function. The European Parliament is charged with the task of
monitoring the Commission's discretionary activities under the infringement proceedings.125
The production of the Annual Reports which are presented to Parliament for scrutiny is one
aspect of this external control,126 but this also includes questions from MEPs and petitions
from citizens through Parliament about these activities.127
Concluding remarks
This chapter has attempted to identify and analyse the Commission's practice in Article 226,
and to identify what factors have moulded the enforcement action into its current format.
The emphasis placed on achieving compliance through negotiation with the Member States
is motivated by both practical and political factors. The lack of regulation of the
Commission's discretion in Article 226 ensures that executive (political) power remains
protected, but this comes at a cost. The emphasis placed on negotiation and cooperation with
Member States means that the administration of infringements becomes a frustrating task;
the Commission can be stonewalled by the Member States themselves, ultimately reducing
the effectiveness of Article 226 and the ability of the Commission to ensure legal obligations
are complied with. This resulted in a brief threat to become more combative by prosecuting
Member States for breach of Article 10, but the Commission quickly returned to a more
conciliatory approach.
The Commission defends the use of protracted negotiation as the most effective way to
ensure compliance because of (1) the cumbersome nature of Article 226 and (2) the
information asymmetry inherent in Commission prosecutions. Evidence suggests however
that in some cases, no negotiation and swift progression to the court can see a judgment
given in as little as five weeks. The vast difference in the timescales spent bringing a case
before the ECJ can, in part, be explained by the difference in the complexity of the cases, but
125 The role of the European Parliament will be explored in more detail in Chapter V, from the
perspective of the accountability of the Commission in the discharge of its duties as guardian of the
Treaties.
126 As a result of a Resolution by the European Parliament, Resolution 9 February 1983,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/search/motion/perform.do?query=Resolution+1983&language=EN.
127 This report is subject to some delay. The most recent report (at July 2006) was made available on
24 March 2006 and this report covered the Commission's Annual Reports of 2003 and 2004. Report
of the European Parliament: 'Report on the Commission's 21st and 22nd Annual Reports on
monitoring the application ofCommunity law' Committee on Legal Affairs, 24 March 2006 A6-
0089/2006 final.
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this is not the only factor, or even the most significant. The political nature of the decision¬
making procedure, still unchanged since inception of the Communities, is hugely important
and arguably no longer appropriate, especially ifwe adopt the Commission's vision of
Article 226 as a single function effective and efficient compliance mechanism.
Internal reforms to the administration of the Article 226 process are technocratic in nature
(database management) but this efficiency drive ends at the administrative divisions of the
Commission. They have no impact on the political bargaining at the level of the
Commissioners themselves. Where reform of the Treaty language has been (provisionally)
agreed, this relates only to the prosecution of infringements of directives, and could only be
agreed as an amendment to Article 228. There is nothing in the practice of the Commission
to suggest a solution to the problems of scale or scarce resources. The problems related to
enlargement and enforcement appear to be swept away to be dealt with at a later date,
although this is not all the fault of the Commission, there seems to be little publicity being
given to what is surely about to become an immensely serious situation in terms of legal
uniformity across the EU.
The three conflicting roles of the Commission of guardian, administration and executive
exist within one single Treaty article. These conflicting roles cause tension and inefficiency
within Article 226 and undermine the agenda of efficiency and effectiveness. The
Commission must therefore face the difficult task of formulating an enforcement policy,
which recognises and accommodates the competing functions of Article 226, and the
divergent priorities of the Commission, whilst still being faithful to its promise to deliver
good governance throughout the Union. The next Chapter will examine the Commission's
policy on enforcement under Article 226 as developed in the context of the WPG and the
subsequent Communication, and what this policy contributes to further defining the role of
Article 226.
138
Chapter V: The policy on enforcement in an era of good
governance
The Commission's view ofArticle 226 (what its function is, and how it will be operated) is
explained in the Communication produced in the context of improving governance
throughout the Union.1 The Commission committed to a better explanation of policies in
order that the citizens might better understand the workings of the Union. This has not
traditionally been a strategy embraced by the Commission in relation to Article 226, where
even basic policy statements or guidelines in respect of the operation of the enforcement
mechanism have been avoided. The problem that the Commission has encountered is that its
own definition of good governance (openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness
and coherence) does not fit comfortably with the way in which it historically operated
Article 226. Explaining the enforcement policy in good governance language therefore
ought to suggest a palpable change in the way in which the Commission discharges its
enforcement responsibilities. This should alter the enforcement mechanism in two ways.
First, the Commission's policy ought to recognise the role of other actors in the enforcement
process. Second, the explanation of Article 226 in good governance language should include
the recognition of the various functions Article 226 performs, rather than being solely
focused on achieving enforcement through secretive negotiation. At the very least, the
commitment to producing a policy statement ought to provide greater insight, and therefore
openness and clarity, into the executive choices of the Commission in carrying out its
enforcement responsibilities.
This chapter will be structured as follows. The first section analyses the Commission's
Communication on its policy on enforcement under Article 226, and attempts to establish to
what extent it is possible to compare the Commission's policy to its actual practice. The
next section analyses how, and to what extent, this policy reflects a change in approach by
the Commission which is consonant with the Commission's vision of good governance. The
third section comments upon how the Commission might have improved its policy on the
use ofArticle 226 in ways which complement its commitment to good governance as the
pathway to legitimacy in the EU. Finally, some concluding remarks are made as to the
success of the Commission in explaining the way it will operate Article 226 in light of its
commitment to good governance.
' Commission Communication 'Better Monitoring of the Application of Community Law' COM
(2002) 725 final/4 16.5.2003, hereinafter 'Communication'.
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1.0: The two tier approach to enforcement: prevention and correction
The Commission's Communication entitled 'Better Monitoring of the Application of
Community Law'2 elaborates the Commission's approach to Article 226 against the wider
backdrop of improving governance in the EU. The Communication describes the function of
enforcement in Article 226 as being 'essential to the interests of European citizens'3 and so
identifies the need for this policy to be better understood by the public. Both the
administrative procedure and the prosecution ofMember States before the Court of Justice
(ECJ) are considered as non-exclusive parts of the same objective of enforcing Community
law.
The Commission notes that due to lack of detailed guidance in the Treaty, it is the
responsibility of the Commission to:
'continually adapt...to carry out its mission effectively, and where necessary,
make innovations designed to improve the application ofCommunity law.'4
There is an acknowledgement that the Commission controls the process and shapes the role
ofArticle 226. It is clear that the Commission realises it must adapt the operation of the
enforcement mechanism in a changing Community environment. However, it is the
enlargement of the Community that is identified as the key factor in the need to further
innovate and redesign the process of enforcement in order for it to remain effective, rather
than a need to alter practices in light of a commitment to good governance. The enforcement
policy is split into several stages by the Commission, but for the purpose of this analysis it
can be broadly divided into proposals aimed at prevention of infringements and proposals
aimed at correction of infringements.
1.1: Prevention of infringements
The Commission has developed a number of strategies aimed at preventing an infringement
from occurring, in order to decrease the instances where the Commission would need to
resort to initiating Article 226. This strategy is considered as necessary and inevitable since
the Commission does not have enough resources to pursue every infringement through the
Article 226 mechanism. In the WPG and several subsequent detailed Communications,5 the
Commission has identified the need for both clearer legislation (in terms of better drafting)
2 Communication above n 1.
3 Ibid p 3.
4 Ibid p 3.
5 For example Commission Communication 'Towards a Reinforced Culture ofConsultation and
Dialogue' COM (2002) 277 final 5.6.2002, Commission Communication 'A Framework for Target-
Based Tripartite Contracts COM (2002) 709 final.
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and the choice of the right instrument for the policy proposal - a key feature of the 'better
regulation' section of the WPG was the emphasis on 'less is more'. Less legislation was
proposed by the Commission on the understanding that the legislation produced was of a
better quality, meaning that fewer infringements would occur because of bad drafting, and of
course there would be less legislation to monitor. Such initiatives will prevent unintended
infringements, which might occur through a simple misunderstanding of the language of the
legislation. To further aid prevention of these types of infringements, the Commission also
proposed greater use of interpretative Communications, produced by Commission
departments, to explain in clear terms what outcomes are expected from transposal of a
directive.6 The increased use of specialised committees to help oversee drafting and
implementation ofparticular pieces of legislation (like those relating to workers or equality)
has also been part of the Commission's strategy for improving the quality of the legislation,
particularly since the increased role of such groups was a core part of the Commission's
approach to increasing participation in the WPG.7
The strategy of 'name and shame' has been a long-term weapon in the Commission's arsenal
ofpreventative measures. These measures consist of the Internal Market Scoreboard,8
reports on the implementation of particular directives across the Member States and the
production of the Annual Monitoring Reports. This strategy has also been developed by the
online publication of deadlines for each directive. These are not just instruments for the use
of the Member States to police each other, but also for attracting the attention of interest
groups which may then litigate on a particular infringement, thereby reducing the
administrative burden on the Commission. It has also concentrated on finding the best
means to inform the 'target public'.9 The Commission also pays particular attention to so-
called 'national projects'. Such projects, attracting large-scale investment, are likely to be a
source of infringement (for instance of state aid or public procurement rules) and these often
generate substantial publicity in the national press, assisting centralised proactive monitoring
by the Commission.
6 The use of soft law as a mechanism or weapon of the executive to circumvent the proper paths of
legislating is a tactic of the Commission that is used in many areas of EU law, see Cini, M 'The soft
law approach: Commission rule-making in the EU's state aid regime' (2001) 8 Journal ofEuropean
Public Policy 192, Snyder, F 'Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community' in S
Martin(ed), The Construction ofEurope (Kluwer, The Netherlands, 1994) 197.
7 See generally Commission Communication 'Towards a Reinforced Culture ofConsultation and
Dialogue' COM (2002) 277 final 5.6.2002.
8 http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal market/score/index en.htm#score
9
Presumably this means the particular NGO/lobby group/industry/region most affected by the
legislation so that such groups can create pressure on the Member States to comply.
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In the case of directives in particular, the Commission views the close co-operation of the
Member States at an earlier stage in the transposal process as crucial to the prevention of
many infringements. The Commission now dispatches automatic reminders two months
before the transposal deadlines to the Member State. A more efficient use of the transposal
period is also proposed by the Commission, by transforming the purpose of 'package
meetings'10 to be used to prevent infringements in the transposal periods. The established
practice was to use such meetings to correct an infringement after it has already occurred.
The Communication also suggests that the Member States could contribute to better
enforcement by setting up clear 'horizontal co-ordination points' within governments. This
would provide Commission officials with a specific reference for all infringements. A
horizontal contact point would have the responsibility for co-ordinating activities across the
levels of a national administration to ensure that infringements are corrected. A core part of
preventing infringement actions for non-transposed directives is the smooth operation of the
notification process itself. Previously, the process of notifying the Commission was not
specifically defined. The Commission proposed this should be remedied and the process of
transposal should be defined and restated systematically in each directive, including the
obligation to establish a 'concordance table', so there can be no confusion on the part of the
Member State.
1.2: Correction of infringements - developing a strategy ofprioritisation
The correction of infringements is the main focus of the Communication as this is the central
task of Article 226: after all, this is not, and was never designed as, a preventative
mechanism. In order to clarify the Commission's policy on its use of the enforcement
action, the Commission has produced 'priority criteria'. These criteria are meant to define
what types of infringements will take priority in the use of Article 226 over others, and as an
alternative to commencing an Article 226 action, what other corrective measures will be
used to remedy the infringement. The stated purpose of the priority criteria is to 'produce
effective andfair use of the infringement procedure by the Commission' (my emphasis)."
The formation of the priority criteria is an executive policy choice. The Commission links
the choice of the priority criteria to the seriousness of the infringement which it goes on to
define. Some infringements, and therefore some policy sectors or pieces of legislation, are
considered more important to the Commission than others. The priority criteria are defined
10 The package meeting is a forum for Commission officials and bureaucrats from the Member State
to meet and resolve potential conflicts in transposing and implementing legislation. Historically, this
was the main arena for negotiating secret diplomatic solutions to infringement cases in order to
prevent the disclosure of the details of an infringement.
11 Communication, above n 1 p 11.
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by reference to policy sectors or particular principles. The Commission goes on to identify
and explain three categories or priority areas that will result in the suspected infringement
being pursued under the enforcement action.
The types of infringements that are identified as the most serious, which I will refer to as
priority one infringements, are those that 'undermine the foundations of the rule of law'.12
This is explained as any breach of the primacy or uniform application principle, i.e. the
application of the preliminary reference mechanism or judicial subverting of the primacy
principle. It also refers to 'systematic infringements that provide for no redress in national
law'.13 Failure to refer cases under the preliminary reference procedure in the past has led to
the development of strict rules relating to the application of the preliminary reference
mechanism, and the national judiciary are increasingly scrutinised in relation to the proper
application ofEC law by the Court of Justice.14 This is consistent with the emphasis placed
on the supremacy of the EU legal order throughout the EU's evolution. Infringements that
cannot be redressed by asserting rights in the national court have not received the same in-
depth treatment by the courts and Commission.15 The lack of redress in national law for
certain breaches of EC law has been exacerbated by the legal fiction that citizens can always
find redress for breach ofCommunity law rights in national courts - which is obviously not
the case, or the Commission would not have acknowledged this in its priority criteria.
The Commission also highlights under the priority one category any violations of human
rights principles enshrined in Community law, along with threats to human health and
damage to the environment with implications for human health.16 Although the
Commission's approach to enforcement in the environment sector as a whole can be
examined by analysing information produced in the Annual Reports, it cannot be stated that
this correlates exactly to the category of 'damage to the environment with implications for
human health'. The statistics relating to the environment sector as a whole encompass all
violations of environmental legislation, and not only those that have implications for human
12 Communication above n 1, p 11.
13 Ibid.
14 To the point where damages are now obtainable against a national supreme court in an instance of
incorrect interpretation of the EU law by the national court, especially as regards the duty to refer
questions to the ECJ under Article 234, see Case C-224/01 Kobler v Austria [2003] ECR1-10239.
15
See the discussion in Chapter II about the availability of standing for individuals, and the extensive
criticism this has provoked especially the Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-50/00 P Union de
Pequenos Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR 1-6677. See also Final report of the discussion circle on
the Court of Justice CONV 636/03 25 March 2003.
16 Last but not least in the priority one category are cases which involve damage to the Community's
financial interests.
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health. The statistics relating to the environment sector underline the fact that the
Commission pursues environmental cases through different stages ofArticle 226 more than
any other type of infringement. Figure 4 below shows that in 2004 more cases in the
environmental sector were under examination by the ECJ for an Article 226 violation than
any other sector by a significant margin.
Figure 4
Article 226 cases under examination by ECJ, by sector (2004)
Source: AnnualMonitoring Report 200417 (French version). Top six sectors.
Figure 5 below shows that the trend of concentrating resources on prosecution of
environmental cases is not a new strategy of the Commission. There is no concrete evidence
that this strategy has any connection to refining the operation ofArticle 226 in the light of
the Commission's commitment to good governance or the definition of its priority criteria.
In fact, in the period from 1998-2004, the resources devoted to prosecuting environmental
infringements have begun to far outweigh the next most significant sector (the internal
market). This does not end with Article 226 prosecutions but extends to actions under
Article 228.18
17
Twenty-Second Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law (2004) COM
(2005) 570 final, hereinafter referred to as the 'Annual Monitoring Report 2004'.
18 This also shows that environmental infringements may be less likely to be remedied by the Member
State after an Article 226 judgment, due to the often immense costs involved in adhering to
environmental legislation, it may be cheaper in the long run to 'buy off the illegality and simply pay
the penalty imposed by the ECJ.
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Figure 5
Article 228 cases referred to ECJ-top two sectors (1998-2004)
1998 1999 2000 2001
■ Environment ■ Internal Market




The environment sector is exceptional, in the sense that it is the only 'priority criterion' that
can be readily compared, however inaccurately, to the Commission's data in the Annual
Monitoring Reports. The Commission produces data on a sectoral basis in the Annual
Monitoring Reports, and so it is impossible to easily compare priority criteria which refers
to, say, infringements that breach the primacy principle to anything in the Annual
Monitoring Reports. The Annual Monitoring Reports contain the only data on infringements
that can be used as an indicator of the Commission's practice vis a vis its policy statement.
As a consequence, it is difficult to know how to judge the Commission's practice as a whole
in light of its statement on what it considers to be the most serious types of infringements.
What can be drawn out of the above statistics is that, despite the fact that the environment
sector does not produce the largest volume of legislation, it seems nevertheless to occupy a
disproportionate amount of space/resources in the Commission's enforcement activities.
Commenting on the other priority one criterion is more difficult. Suspected infringements
that relate to health matters are detailed as a priority one infringement, but the health sector
ranks only tenth in terms of the actual number of cases referred to the ECJ under Article 226.
It is the seventh significant sector under Article 228 referrals, and eighth significant sector in
terms ofCommission detection of infringements.19 Of course, it could well be the case that
all the health cases were unfounded or quickly remedied by the Member State concerned,
and so do not appear in significant numbers in the final statistics produced by the
Commission. The category of financial affairs is too vague to be useful in terms of using
statistics from the Annual Reports because this category cuts across many different sectors
19
Source, Annual Monitoring Report 2004 above n 17. The Monitoring Reports categorise health and
consumer complaints as one sector.
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(customs, tax, Community financial affairs) and could encapsulate many different types of
violations. In effect, out of the list of those infringements considered the most serious in the
Commission's enforcement policy, it is only possible to conclude that the environmental
sector is reflected in the Commission's actual practice of prosecuting Member States as a
priority. This has been the case for a significant number of years, and does not reflect a
palpable change in approach due to a new enforcement policy which embraces good
governance.
Priority two infringements are those 'that undermine the smooth functioning of the
Community legal system' ,20 This relates to Member States who legislate illegally in an area
of exclusive Community competence, Member States that repeatedly commit the same
infringements in relation to a specific piece ofCommunity legislation, and cross border
infringements where it is more difficult (ifnot impossible) for citizens to assert their rights
directly in a national court. This category also includes those cases where Member States
fail to comply with ECJ judgments under Article 228. Repeated infringements of the same
legislation are correctly placed in this category of infringements; such breaches might be less
serious than breaching the primacy principle, yet more serious than non-notification of
transposal measures. They are also likely to generate a significant number of citizen
complaints. With the exception of Article 228 prosecutions, the other Commission priorities
cannot be compared with the data compiled in the Annual Reports.
It is surprising that infringement ofArticle 228 was not placed in the priority one category of
infringements. It fits in the priority one category by definition, since failure to respect ECJ
judgments surely amounts to an undermining of the rule of law. Categorising this type of
infringement as less serious than subverting the primacy principle is a contradiction - non¬
compliance with a court judgment must surely be the very essence of undermining the rule of
law. How can non-compliance with Article 226 (and then Article 228) be considered of
secondary importance under that self-same article? If the Commission does not consider
failure to comply with Article 226 proceedings as the very pinnacle of their enforcement
responsibilities - let alone compounded by repeated failure to adhere to an Article 228
judgment - then why should the Member States take infringement proceedings seriously?
Not only that, but there can be no doubt about the intent of the Member State when it does
20 Communication above n 1 p 11.
146
not comply with an ECJ judgment relating to a clear instruction to pay a financial penalty
levied as a consequence of a state's misconduct.21
Figure 6 below illustrates the Commission's approach to the use ofArticle 228. There has
been an 87 per cent increase in the number of cases referred for judgment under this
provision since 1998, which at first glance, seems to suggest a committed approach to the
financial penalty system by the Commission.
Figure 6
Article 228 cases referred to ECJ (1998-2004)
80
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: AnnualMonitoring Reports 1998-2004.
Despite this dramatic increase in referrals, the reality is that there have been only four fines
imposed on the Member States to date under Article 228. The first case was against Greece
in 2000.22 The second case was against Spain, but the fine imposed by the Court has been
waived by the Commission, despite the fact that the infringement has still not been
remedied.23 The third fine was imposed on France, which now refuses to pay it despite not
yet remedying the infringement.24 The latest fine to be imposed was also against France,
although in this case was not contested.25
21 It is reasonable to assume that the Member State's 'intent' goes to determining the seriousness of an
infringement. Intent is a factor in determining 'seriousness' in relation to calculating the amount of
the financial penalty a state is made to pay by the ECJ under Article 228, see Commission
Communication 'Application ofArticle 228 of the EC Treaty' SEC (2005) 1658.
22 Case C-387/97 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR1-5047.
23 Case C-278/01 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR 1-14141, see the commentary by the European
Parliament in the latest report on the Commission's enforcement activities, where the Parliament is
extremely critical of the Commission dropping the fine even though it has been imposed by the Court
and Spain has not corrected the infringement, Report of the European Parliament: 'Report on the
Commission's 21st and 22nd Annual Reports on monitoring the application of Community law'
Committee on Legal Affairs, 24 March 2006 A6-0089/2006 final.
24 Case C-304/02 Commission v France [2005] 12 July 2005 nyr, see the commentary on this case in
Chapter IV.
25 Case C-177/04 Commission v France [2006] 14 March 2006 nyr.
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Priority three infringements are defined as the incorrect transposal of, or failure to transpose,
directives. It is questionable as to exactly why the Commission chose to place transposal of
directives in its lowest priority category. The proper enforcement of directives has
historically been the area of compliance that has received the majority of the Commission's
attention due to the quantity of infringements that occur from incorrect transposal. Figure 7
below illustrates that this trend is by no means on the decline (despite these devoted
resources) with the main source of all infringements consistently being directives.
Figure 7
Directives as a main source of infringements (1998-2004)
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■ Directives m T/R/D
Note: T/R/D stands for Treaty provision, Regulations andDecisions combined.
Source: AnnualMonitoring Reports 1998-2004.
Figure 8 below details the types of infringements of directives that can occur. Failure to
notify still accounts for the majority of the infringements, and the categories of inaccurate
application and non-conformity remain consistent, despite the considerable resources
devoted to these areas of the Commission's enforcement strategy in the past.
Figure 8
Types of infringements of directives (1998-2004)
Notes: FN = Failure to Notify, NC = Non Conformity of transposal measures, 1A = Inaccurate
Application ofthe transposal measures.
These figures are taken from those cases that are referred to the ECJ under Article 226.
Source: AnnualMonitoring Reports 1998-2004.
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The Commission's proposals in relation to the correction of infringements of directives are
twofold: faster notification of infractions, and measures to address the more complicated
problem of incorrect application or non-conformity of national transposal measures. The
perennial problem of speeding up the notification of infractions has resulted in the
Commission suggesting DG officials (together with the President) dispatch formal letters
automatically when Member States have not notified the Commission that transposal has
taken place. This is tracked through an internal database (the Asmodee II database). The
Commission is now prepared to extend this new system to the dispatch of reasoned opinions
once the deadline specified in the formal letter has expired. This fast-track process enables
referral to the Court of Justice to be possible (in theory) within six months of the initial
formal letter. It is not explained how this strategy works in respect of the College of
Commissioners' quarterly infringement meetings, or indeed how this transfer of decision¬
making downwards fits with the traditional standpoint of the Commission. The College of
Commissioners alone has the authority to take decisions on infringement cases, and this
responsibility cannot be delegated downwards to a Commission official.26
The problems relating to incorrect application of directives or non-conformity of transposal
measures is more difficult for the Commission to deal with, as such cases cannot be dealt
with by automated (technocratic) solutions. The Commission produces implementation
reports for certain directives where there might either be political resistance to
implementation within the Member States or problems arising from the complex nature of
the proposals.27 However, such infractions are more likely to be detected by citizen
complaints or the Commission's own ex ante investigations into specific pieces of
legislation. The Commission's usual emphasis on technocratic or management focused
solutions is incompatible with these types of infringements, but there is no suggestion in the
policy paper as to how these types of infringements might be better tackled by the
Commission.
The Communication explains that when an infringement meets one of these three priority
categories, Article 226 proceedings will be:
26 This is one reason why such a lengthy and cumbersome decision-making process evolved in the
first place.
27 The Commission states it will consider further legislative initiative where persistent problems arise
with specific directives.
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'commenced immediately, unless the situation can be remedied more rapidly by
other means'.28
This statement from the Commission undermines the attempt to provide any clarity in
relation to the enforcement policy and underlines its 'one function' approach to Article 226.
It seems hard to imagine any infringement situation that cannot be solved more rapidly than
invoking the full Article 226 procedure all the way to the Court of Justice, especially in light
of the way in which the Commission operates the procedure without the imposition of any
rigid deadlines. Cases that go to the ECJ have sometimes taken in excess of ten years to get
to the stage of a judgment (and even longer to get the actual infringement corrected). The
recent case against France took 21 years from initial detection in 1984 to final judgment
under Article 228 in 2005.29 Despite this, the Commission insists that:
'The rapid turnover of cases in hand is reflected in the short handling time of
procedures.'30
The Communication states that infringement cases of a lower priority (so those not defined
in categories one to three above) will be dealt with by 'complementary mechanisms'. This
approach is said to meet the concern for efficiency whilst ensuring that Member States (and
those who have identified the infringement) receive equal treatment in the application of
these mechanisms by the Commission. The complementary mechanisms highlighted in the
Commission paper are as follows. First, negotiation with Member States is given priority,
because when there are repetitive and numerous violations ofCommunity law, this often
proves more effective than opening full proceedings. Secondly, the Commission highlights
the SOLVITproblem solving network which it hopes will offer a speedier resolution of
problems submitted to this internal market forum, in principle within a ten week deadline.31
Thirdly, the 'package meetings' continue to be an important mechanism of enforcement.
The fourth complementary mechanism is specifically for cases of non-compliance with
directives that require case by case handling; these are distinguished from cases of failure to
notify. In the case of infringements that relate to inaccurate application of transposed
measures, ad hoc contacts often provide an effective solution to resolving non-compliance.
These ad hoc contacts are those groups who are actually in charge of implementation of the
directive on the ground, thereby bypassing the more cumbersome political channels and
28 Communication above n 1, p 12.
29 Commission v France above n 24.
30 Communication above n 1 p 4 entitled 'an efficient procedure'.
31 An internal market problem solving mechanism where centres are set up in each Member State and
offer an out of court resolution of problems relating to implementation of the internal market rules.
This is also complemented by an on-line database which allows information exchange across the
Member States SOLVIT centres.
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getting straight to the root of the problem and how to best solve it. Lastly, the establishment
of independent and specialised national bodies who deal with a specific area of law can
facilitate the Commission in its enforcement task, such as those bodies that relate to
competition or public procurement contracts. These complementary mechanisms dovetail
with the proposals for preventing infringements from occurring as discussed in Section 1.1.
1.3: Enhancing the co-operation of Member States
The Communication not only deals with strategies for prevention and correction of
infringements, but also clarifies the Commission's position in other areas of potential
conflict under the enforcement action, such as the Member States' proclivity for delaying the
investigations of the Commission. The Communication explains that the Commission may
bring proceedings under Article 226 against the Member State for failure to co-operate with
the Commission in an infringement investigation, on the basis of the duty to cooperate
contained within Article 10 EC.32 The Commission had previously warned that such
prosecutions for failure to cooperate would be resorted to only in exceptional cases,33 but the
Communication states that this mechanism will be used in a more systematic and targeted
basis.
The strategy of instigating these actions before the ECJ is aimed at combating the ability of
the Member States to frustrate the Commission's efforts at investigation and prosecution of
infringements. The Commission states in its Communication that cases of:
'manifest and persistent unwillingness to cooperate on the part of the Member
State would make infringement proceedings for breach of Article 10
inevitable.'34
The infringement proceedings in relation to Article 10 will be accelerated - which is a novel
improvement on the previous Article 10 strategy - lasting no more than four months from
the formal letter stage to referral to the court.35 The secondary aspect to the tactic of
32 Communication above n 1 p 14. It is already established case law that the Commission cannot rely
on a presumption of a breach where the Member State fails to provide the Commission with
information in Article 226 investigations, Case 96/81 Commission v Netherlands [1982] ECR 1791.
As was noted in the previous chapter, the 2001 Annual Report had included information on the actions
taken by the Commission in this respect; however this strategy had never been fully explained and had
mysteriously fallen out of favour by the 2002 Annual Report.
33 Past cases on Article 10 include Case C-35/88 Commission v Greece [1990] ECR 1-3125, Case C-
48/89 Commission v Italy [1990] ECR 1-2425, Case C-374/89 Commission v Belgium [1991] ECR-I
367.
34 Communication above n 1 p 14.
35 This strategy will not (presumably) follow the three monthly infringement meeting route, as
prosecution could not be achieved within six months otherwise. This is not explained in the
Communication.
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instigating Article 226 prosecutions for breach ofArticle 10 is to 'name and shame' the
recalcitrant Member State.
It will be interesting to see if the Commission itself can actually stick to this self imposed
fast-track strategy, since it has not been blameless in the past in causing delays due to the
rather loose fashion in which it takes decisions and conducts investigations. Indeed, as has
already been seen, the more political a decision is the longer the Commission takes to make
it. Proceedings under Article 226 for breach of Article 10 might be considered as even more
political than regular infringement proceedings, since it is a kind of guilt by default, and
decisions to prosecute for breach of the obligation to cooperate will be taken at the very top
of the Commission organisation. When the Commission is using the Article 10 strategy it is
doing so because it lacks the information to prove an actual infringement of substantive
legislation has occurred.
Ultimately, the effectiveness of this weapon must then be questioned, since prosecution will
not result in a correction of the infringement itself. The Member State may eventually be
penalised through a judgment under Article 226 for breach of the obligation to cooperate.
However, without a provable case of an infringement of legislation (and only proof of non-
cooperation) it is unlikely the suspected non-compliance with Community legislation will be
remedied or punished by a financial penalty through further recourse to Article 228.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the Commission's inability to change the wording ofArticle 226
in order to reduce the opportunity for delaying tactics by the Member State has forced some
creative thinking, and demonstrates the Commission's frustration with the enforcement
action. This strategy is likely to prove an unwelcome addition to the Commission's
enforcement arsenal in the view of the Member States, as past attempts by the Commission
to reduce the Member States' control of the infringement process have been stonewalled.
1.4: The citizen as enforcer
The Commission is keen to emphasise the role of the individual citizen in the enforcement of
Community law, beyond acting as informant to the Commission. In particular, the citizens'
assertion of their Community law rights in their national courts is ofprimary importance.
This approach to enforcement makes sense for the Commission and the citizen, for it is a far
more efficient use of resources in achieving detection of infractions, and offers a speedier
resolution for the citizen. However the blind assertion that invocation of a citizen's rights
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within the arena of the national court as being an entirely sufficient (or only) mechanism for
citizen redress is no longer tenable.
Cases that eventually come to the Commission's attention via complaints often do so
precisely because the citizen is prevented from obtaining a remedy for infringement in the
national courts.36 There are many reasons why citizens cannot directly assert their rights in
national courts. The financial burden of bringing a case to court is often punitive; to
compound this, the inability to claim direct effect of directives in certain circumstances
means that, when Member States do not transpose legislation, this often acts as a bar to
claimants asserting their rights in national courts.37 There are instances where there are
insufficient remedies in the national legal system, particularly when diffuse rights are at
stake and there is no locus standi for any complainants (such as environmental cases).
Where a decision is taken and claimants cannot pass the stringent test for being individually
and directly concerned by the decision,38 they are prevented from attacking legislation head
on in the ECJ or CFI.
These cases are as much of a problem for the Commission as the individual because the
Commission is so heavily reliant on citizen enforcement. This is reflected by the
Commission's inclusion of such cases in the most serious category of infringements. In an
attempt to alleviate the need for individuals to turn to the Commission because of no locus
standi, the Commission has proposed two new pieces of legislation that aim to enhance
access to justice in cases of cross border disputes.39 Such disputes create particularly
complex jurisdictional issues in national courts, and can also affect the ability of litigants to
claim financial aid. Accordingly, these measuresalso deal with the issue of granting legal
36 In fact, the Commission has argued that individuals can protect their rights through other
mechanisms and therefore there is no need to offer further protection under the Article 226 action.
However, when Member States raise this exact defence in Article 226 cases (that the provision is
directly effective or individuals can assert rights without transposition) the Commission and Court
asserts that this is no defence for breach ofCommunity obligations Case 29/84 Commission v
Germany [1985] ECR 1661, Case 102/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 1473.
37
Craig P and De Burca, G EU Law Text Cases andMaterials (3rd Edition, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2003) ch 7.
38 See Chapter II for an explanation of standing requirements for the ECJ and CFI.
39 This initiative is a part of transposing the Arhus Convention into binding EU law. In particular, the
Commission has proposed two directives which aim to increase the access ofNGO groups to court by
widening locus standi, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
access to justice in environmental matters COM (2003) 624 final, and for the Arhus Convention to
apply to the institutions of the EU, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the application of the provisions of the Arhus Convention on Access to Information,
Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to EC
institutions and bodies COM (2003) 622 final.
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aid to complainants. The creation of standing for non-governmental organisations to
facilitate environmental litigation is a possible answer to the problem of diffuse rights. The
different procedural conditions regulating locus standi across the Member States hinder the
uniformity of protection at the national level, but interfering in national judicial procedures is
not popular with the Member States. These measures remain only proposals at present.
For the first time, the Commission is beginning to rely less and less on the complainant as its
primary source of information ofpotential infringements, primarily due to the development
of the automated system of detection for incorrect transposal and non-notification of
transposal of directives.40 Figure 9 below illustrates that in 2003, the Commission
outstripped the complainant as the primary source of information regarding possible
infringements.
Figure 9
Method of detection of all suspected infringements (1998-2004)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
■ Complaints ■ Commission
Source: AnnualMonitoring Reports, 1998-2004.
This is encouraging for the Commission since internal detection of infringements leaves the
Commission with more room to manoeuvre under the infringement process; it does not have
to spend resources on dealing with inquiries and correspondence with complainants.
The Communication breaks down the issues of enforcement into four distinct themes.
Strategies for prevention of infringements do not really contribute to a better understanding
of the role ofArticle 226, because these strategies are simply alternative enforcement
mechanisms to Article 226 itself, much like those in other areas of the Treaty. They do not
add to our understanding of the role ofArticle 226, although they do highlight the fact that
40 Incorrect transposal is not the same as incorrect application. Incorrect transposal refers to instances
where the Member State has transposed the directive, has notified the Commission in the correct
manner and by the deadline, but has not transposed the entire directive but only parts of it, Interview,
Commission Official G (26 October 2005).
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the Commission does not consider Article 226 the most efficient method of ensuring
compliance. Strategies aimed at correction of infringements are more important to the
evaluation of Article 226 - the production of the priority criteria is an essential step for a
better understanding of what the main actor in Article 226 sees as the central role of the
enforcement mechanism, although it seems this is not the aim of the Communication from
the Commission's perspective. The sections on the complainant and Member State contain
the tacit acknowledgment of the role both these actors play in the enforcement mechanism.
It is equally significant that neither the European Ombudsman nor the European Parliament
are not mentioned at all, despite the fact both these actors impact upon the Commission's
role as guardian of the Treaties under the enforcement mechanism.
2.0: Enforcement policy and good governance principles: the cleavage
between theory and practice
The Communication provides the first opportunity of an insight into how the Commission, as
the main actor in Article 226, views the enforcement mechanism in the context of improving
governance in the EU. The following sections analyse the Commission's policy in light of
its own principles of good governance, and considers to what extent the Commission has
changed its approach to the operation of the enforcement mechanism in order to
acknowledge the various functions Article 226 now performs, and how to accommodate
these functions in the light of good governance.
2.1: Coherence
The production of the priority criteria is supposed to facilitate a coherent approach to the
way in which the policy of enforcement is operated across the Commission as a whole,
although how effective this is in practice remains to be seen.41 In terms of creating
coherence in theory at least (if not actual practice), these criteria can be criticised on a
number of levels. First and foremost, the priority criteria are defined in a loose and vague
manner; such vagueness not only compromises coherence, but can have the opposite effect,
with each DG claiming a different interpretation of the policy. A good example of this
incoherence is the Commission's approach to the enforcement of directives. In its discussion
of the priority criteria the Commission states that the infringement of directives (non¬
conformity and misapplication) is considered a priority three type of infringement.42 In a
41
As already discussed in Chapter IV, each DG operates the enforcement policy in very different
ways.
42 Communication above n 1 p 12 under heading 'Failure to transpose, or incorrect transposal of
directives'.
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later section,43 the Commission contradicts this by stating that these types of infringements
will in fact be considered as priority one (not three), i.e. such infringements violate the
principles of primacy and uniform application. The Commission then goes on to state these
types of infringements might be dealt with by the complementary mechanism of ad hoc
contacts. Such blatant contradictions conflict with a coherent policy approach to
enforcement.
The Communication promotes a policy of diversification in combating infringements,
through the use of preventative measures, corrective measures and complementary
mechanisms. The reason for such diversification is clear - limited resources demand the
Commission alleviates the burden on actions before the ECJ. Unfortunately, diversification
in policy approach rarely promotes a coherent application of rules across the myriad of DGs
and the diverse cases of infringements that are investigated. The Commission pledges to use
the complementary mechanisms impartially and with equality, but this seems incompatible
with the parallel promise to increase individual case officers' responsibilities in taking
decisions on infringement cases. The need for coherence and effectiveness is compromised
by the need for efficient processing of suspected infringements.
When assessing the statistical information produced by the Commission, it must be
acknowledged that there does seem to be a coherent output of the enforcement policy,
although not one that necessarily matches the stated priority criteria. Whatever the stated
approach to the enforcement policy, the result appears to guarantee that the environment
sector always produces the greatest number of investigations and referrals to the ECJ. This
sector is followed by cases on the internal market although internal market cases are not
mentioned in the priority criteria at all.44 This of course may not be a result of the policy on
enforcement, but rather the particular organisation of the Commission and the way in which
each DG mobilises its resources to combat infringements. For instance, DG Environment is
one of the few DGs that specifically has a department that is responsible for dealing with
infringements, as opposed to (say) DG Justice Freedom and Security which has no such
department and generates very few infringement cases.45 It may be that the type of
legislation produced by DG Environment (predominantly directives) is particularly prone to
43 Communication above n 1 p 18, under heading 'Speeding up the process ofbringing implementing
legislation into line'.
44 See Figure 5 above.
45 See Appendix 2 for organisation charts of these DGs. Despite the name, this DG is also concerned
with some first pillar citizenship rights and so this cannot be explained by the fact it only deals with
third pillar measures.
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generating infractions (which appears to be confirmed by the Commission's Annual
Reports), or it may be that the subject matter is particularly unpopular with Member States.
It could be that DG Environment is particularly focused upon enforcement more than other
DGs.
There are many variables that might relate to the particular vagaries of the DG, but none of
these explanations is consistent with the (supposed) horizontal enforcement policy adopted
by the Commission. If the statistics can be explained by the varied set-up of each DG and
the peculiarities of the policy sector, it becomes untenable to assert a horizontal enforcement
policy actually exists. It would be better to acknowledge that each sector pursues an entirely
different policy from another, rather than trying to accommodate all sectors under one
'umbrella' enforcement policy. Abandoning the idea of explaining a coherent approach that
is applied consistently across the Commission may be the better option, as it would at least
allow a coherent approach to be developed (and explained) for each DG without
contradiction.
2.2: Effectiveness
The good governance principle of effectiveness is of paramount concern in the
Commission's operation ofArticle 226, because an effective enforcement mechanism is how
the Commission characterises Article 226. In both the WPG and the Communication, the
Commission equates the principle of effectiveness with that of efficiency.46 An effective
enforcement policy is therefore one that is administrated in the most efficient manner, and
(thus) results in compliance with Community law in the fastest possible way. It does not
seem to equate to a policy that results in the maximum compliance which would be the most
straightforward interpretation of effectiveness. In relation to Article 226, efficiency is
concerned both with allocation of resources and the imposition of stricter (internal and
external) time limits.
The Treaty process itself promotes a 'sifting' mechanism, so that most
complaints/investigations are settled before it is necessary to refer the case to the ECJ.
Scaling down the number of infringements the Commission actually pursues is vital to the
ambition ofmanaging a vast area of possible infringements with limited resources. Figure
10 below shows the decrease in numbers of cases handled by the Commission through each
stage of the process.
46 See Chapter III for a breakdown of the good governance principles.
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Figure 10
Number of cases by stage of infringement process (1998-2004)
Notes: Total detected = total number of infringements identified, Letter = Letter offormal notice, RO
= Reasoned Opinion, ECJ = Referral to ECJ under Article 226, 228 = Referral to ECJ under Article
228.
Source: AnnualMonitoring Reports 1998-2004.
Efficient detection of infringements has been of paramount concern. This has led to the
proliferation of techniques, both preventive and corrective in nature, to improve this element
of the enforcement policy. The development of automated databases is one such mechanism
that is utilised for both prevention and correction. Reliance on complaints from citizens as
an information source remains problematic in terms of the effectiveness (efficiency) criteria.
Complainants offer the most diverse (and cheap) policing mechanism, in terms of the
coverage of Member States, types of legislation and sectors. They also provide the main
source of information on misapplication of the law, or bad implementation on the ground
that otherwise might be undetectable by Commission staff. Complainants are not as resource
friendly as they used to be, since procedures have been put in place which now require the
Commission to proceed in its handling of complainants in a certain administrative manner.
This new procedure requires the Commission to spend more time on complaints it previously
cast aside after a cursory reading. The current stated policy is to register every complaint to
the Commission47 regarding Article 226 irrespective of the veracity of the complaint being
made.48 This is not resource efficient for the Commission in the same way that an automated
database is. There is a balance to be struck here. The Commission must be prepared to trade
47
Interviews, Commission Official I (6 April 2005).
48
Although this is the stated procedure, it may not necessarily be the actual case in practice. See
Report of the European Parliament: 'Report on the Commission's 21st and 22nd Annual Reports on
monitoring the application of Community law' Committee on Legal Affairs, 24 March 2006 A6-
0089/2006 final p 7 which reminds the Commission of its obligation to register complaints without
selection, and the impending Ombudsman investigation into a number of complaints about non¬
registration.
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off the administrative burden of dealing with complainants for the efficiency gains made in
increased detection of infringements.
The Commission also views increasing informal contacts with the Member States as an
efficiency gain. This inevitably increases the presence ofnegotiation in the enforcement
policy, which in turn compromises both the coherent application of the policy rules and the
openness of investigations. The notable emphasis placed on closer co-operation with the
Member States reveals that the Commission is not moving forward in its policy on
enforcement in the context of good governance, as this reinforces the long time practice of
negotiation and extensive time limits for co-operation. The European Parliament comments
that:
'the Commission [must] re-evaluate cooperation with the Member States...in
light of the fact that most Member States are not ready to do much to improve
the implementation of EU law as was confirmed during the negotiations on the
last Better Regulation Inter-institutional Agreement in 2003.'49
The attitude of the Commission toward the Article 228 mechanism might be judged as
misplaced if the aim is to create more effective enforcement. Making routine referrals to the
ECJ without seeing the action through to its conclusion (infringement remedied and fine
collected) undermines the commitment to effective enforcement. The financial penalty
should no longer be operated as a threat, but as a crime and punishment mechanism. The
ECJ has now introduced the notion that Member States are not only fined to end an
infringement but also, in the form of the lump sum, as a punishment for the time the
infringement has been in progress. The Commission's generous attitude toward Member
States in this regard has not gone unnoticed as the European Parliament:
'Points out that...many cases of incorrect implementation...reflect Member
States' deliberate attempts to undermine Community legislation for political,
administrative and economic reasons; in this connection notes that the
Commission is in the habit of accepting late intervention by the Member States
in order to close infringement proceedings; calls on the Commission to ask
Member States to guarantee retroactive application of Community provisions
which have been infringed.. .with immediate recourse to Article 228 in event of
persistent failure to comply.'50
Moreover, effective enforcement requires less dialogue and more discipline:
'tighter discipline is necessary...in order to avoid excessive delays and
persistent differences in the quality of national transposition'.
49
Report of the European Parliament: 'Report on the Commission's 21st and 22nd Annual Reports on
monitoring the application of Community law' Committee on Legal Affairs, 24 March 2006 A6-
0089/2006 final p 5.
50 Ibid p 6.
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Not only does the Commission's attitude seem to reflect traditional practices, but it is exactly
this relationship with the Member States that most hinders its approach to delivering good
governance under Article 226.
2.3: Openness
In the WPG, the Commission defined openness as meaning clarity in decision-making
procedures. Not even this limited version of openness can be said to apply to Article 226 in
the enforcement policy as stated in the Communication. The internal decision-making
processes are anything but clear to those outside the Commission, and the Communication
has added nothing to change this established approach. The Commission notes that it has
responsibility:
'for adopting the necessary internal organisation measures to allow it to carry
out its task effectively and impartially.'51 (my emphasis)
Crucially though, this was not tackled by the Commission in the Communication. No
Commission document ever specifies who exactly, within the Commission, develops the
policy on enforcement in the first place. This is one policy for which it seems no-one wishes
to be singled out as having overall responsibility; there is no 'enforcement department' as
such, although there is a department within the Secretariat General that has responsibility for
'coordination' of the enforcement policy across the DGs of the Commission. The legal
service reviews the viability of all cases that may be considered for referral to the ECJ.
Beyond this, the veil of'collegiate decision-making' takes over.
This approach clearly lacks a commitment to clarity in decision-making procedures. The top
down approach of the Commission in enforcement (the Commissioners being the ultimate
decision makers) further downgrades the commitment to openness. The Commissioners take
political and not legalistic decisions in relation to pursing infringements. This might mean
that whichever Member State holds the Presidency of the EU experiences some degree of
immunity from prosecution for the duration of their Presidency. This would delay (if not
51 See Chapter IV for a discussion of these internal reforms. It is important to point out that the way in
which the Commission administrates infringement investigations and proceedings is not dealt with in
this Communication so 'internal organisation measures' does not in fact refer to the internal
organisation of investigations. The focus of the Commission's reform effort has clearly moved on
from its own administrative procedures, indicating that in the main such procedures now operate
effectively.
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entirely prevent) prosecution of an infringement, regardless of the priority criteria, the
veracity of the case or any stated policy approach.52
The Communication begins by stating that the Commission is complying:
'with its duty of education and openness in a complex area of exclusive
responsibility of the Commission'.53
by producing the statement on its enforcement policy. The attitude to openness however is
still the same as that in the era before good governance was embraced as a policy initiative.
The information that is available to the public is nonetheless trumpeted as achieving a great
step forward in transparency but the information made publicly available is exactly the same
as before. The statistics and commentary produced for the European Parliament is at least
two years old by the time it reaches the public domain, and so there is a significant
development time between what has been reported and what is actually happening. The
accuracy of the information in the Annual Reports is compromised by the fact that the
Commission has altered the way it collates and categorises information from year to year,
making accurate historical comparisons of the data problematic. Despite the fact that the
Secretariat General is responsible for coordination of the enforcement activities of the DG,
and for organising the production of the Annual Monitoring Reports, consistency in
reporting is not yet a reality for the Commission in its enforcement activities.
Since enlargement, the Commission had some delays in translating the Annual Reports from
French into any of the other official languages of the Community. This is a serious barrier to
free access to information, and was not the previous practice of the Commission which
previously translated each report into all the official Community languages simultaneously.
There was a significant time delay in producing the full report covering 2004,54 but the
Commission did release an eight page statement that provides an overview of the 'overall
position' in all other Community languages.55 This is a significant downsizing from the
previous Annual Reports, which were around 300 pages long and provided more detailed
sectoral commentary about the actions of each DG. Internally, the DGs still have to provide
this information to the Secretariat General (even though it is no longer available to the
52
Although this is already an unacceptable position, the current Presidency of the EU lasts only six
months. If the planned reforms in the Constitutional Treaty were to come to fruition, the position
would be much more serious with the Presidency lasting for two and a half years.
53 Communication above n 1 p 4.
54
By August 2006 this was still only available in French, but as of January 2007, the Commission has
now managed to produce the 2004 and 2005 Annual Monitoring Reports in all Community languages.
55
Report from the Commission on Monitoring the Application of Community Law (2003), Overall
Position, Twenty-First Annual Report SEC (2003) 1638 COM (2004) 839 final 30.12.2004.
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public), so this cannot be explained in terms of reducing the workload of the DG to increase
efficient use of resources.56 The Commission's ever changing style of reporting, and
timetable for production of these reports, is a serious obstacle to accessing and analysing
infringement data.
The Commission committed to an assessment of the effectiveness and practicality of the
priority criteria which was to be discussed in the Annual Reports, but was not actually
undertaken without any explanation as to why. The Parliament comments that:
'the Commission has not presented any structured, detailed follow up to some
of the commitments announced in the [Communication], such as 'the
application of the priority criteria will be assessed annually when the report on
the monitoring of the application of Community law is discussed.'57
If there was no attempt to engineer a meaningful comparison between the stated policy and
the actual data generated by the Commission as a result of its actions under Article 226, then
the policy statement fails to provide any clarity at all. If no independent assessment can be
made of the stated approach and actual action, this policy falls short of the Commission's
own limited definition of openness and good governance.
The advances in Internet access to information are again minimal; the press release system
contains only the bare minimum of facts.58 The formal letter and reasoned opinions are still
not accessible by the public. This seems to be a misguided approach by the Commission and
one that does not serve the Commission's strategy of shifting the burden to prosecute onto
other actors in order to adopt a more resource efficient enforcement strategy. Nor does it
help to create an image of an administration working to eradicate Member States' failure to
fulfil their obligations. The European Parliament commented that:
'It is very important that the Commission decides to go public on these issues
and to accelerate both the checking process and the reaction towards Member
States who do not fulfil their obligations...conformity questions are difficult to
track, some remain mysteriously hidden in the offices of the Commission before
a 'complaint' of a citizen obliges the Commission to act.'59
56
Interview, Commission Official J (13 February 2004), Interview, Commission Official K (13
February 2004), Interview Commission Official H (26 October 2004), Interview, Commission Official
E (24 October 2004).
57 Above n 49 p 5.
58
Consisting of naming the Member State being prosecuted, the legislation (or norm) being infringed
and the stage of the procedure.
59 Above n 49 p 15.
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2.4: Participation
The principle of participation is defined by the Commission as 'quality, relevance and
effectiveness' and, as I have argued in Chapter III, this definition ofparticipation is
inadequate in terms of generating good governance in the EU. The enforcement policy does
address the need for greater participation for certain privileged actors, where the
Commission ties this greater participation in the enforcement process to achieving greater
compliance. Greater participation in enforcement is linked to greater effectiveness
(efficiency) rather than being an end in itself. The Commission is eager to concentrate on
encouraging more participation by the Member States through the generation of contacts,
and in particular, placing emphasis on the 'package meetings' as a mechanism to achieve
greater compliance.
All participation initiatives are linked to the complementary mechanisms, rather than a
change in operation ofArticle 226. These participatory mechanisms are designed to enhance
the Commission's ability to prevent infringements or to achieve compliance without
engaging Article 226 itself. The Communication focuses on further integrating those elite
actors who are already influential in the policy making process in order to produce better
legislation. The SOLVIT initiative is industry focused, as is the further integration of
specialised national bodies, such as competition authorities in the Member States. The other
complementary mechanisms are also elite actor driven, where the focus is on secretive
negotiations with the Commission in order to achieve more compliance. This does not seem
to represent a change in practice of the operation of Article 226, but a re-deployment of the
traditional approach (of secretive negotiation) to other initiatives aimed at achieving more
compliance. It does not increase participation in Article 226.
The principle of participation does not extend to the corrective element of the
Communication. From the Commission's perspective, only the Member State and itself still
participate in this process. The structured relationship with the complainant, which has
largely been forced upon the Commission by the Ombudsman (dealt with in Chapter VI), is
not elaborated in the Communication. In the WPG, the principle of participation at best
amounted to a weak species of consultation, in the sense of an opportunity for outside
privileged parties to air their views (i.e. stakeholders and deliverers of the policy), rather than
being considered as an equal or important player in the enforcement policy. The
Communication simply reinforces this approach.
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Increasing the participation of stakeholders in drafting legislation is merely a distraction in
terms of the true orientation of the Commission's approach to improving the operation of the
enforcement mechanism in an era of good governance. First, this does not increase the
involvement of outside (privileged) actors in the enforcement process, because this
'initiative' is about drafting legislation, and not the operation ofArticle 226. The novel
strategies contained in the 'preventative' section of the paper only relate to ways in which
the Commission can alleviate the pressure on itself as the guardian of the Treaties by seeking
to avoid infringements occurring and therefore do not strictly relate to how the Commission
deals with infringements when they have occurred. This is not to downplay the importance
of developing strategies to prevent infringements in the sense of improving governance
throughout the Union. This is surely an example of good governance in action, but adds
nothing in terms of how the operation of the enforcement mechanism is being modernised in
accordance with standards of good governance, or increasing the accountability of the
Commission.
2.5: Accountability
The Commission's definition of accountability in the WPG is in essence 'participation plus
openness equals accountability'. Using this formula to equate to accountability is
problematic in and of itself, but especially in relation to the enforcement policy of Article
226, it is deficient in a number of respects. As highlighted above, the Commission's
approach to openness and participation in the policy on enforcement is flawed in many
respects, and therefore does not provide a solid foundation to establish accountability even
within the Commission's own limited terms of reference.
The principle of accountability should be the very essence of Article 226. It is, above all
other things, a mechanism of accountability wielded by the Commission over the Member
States to ensure they remain committed to the obligations they have assented to under the
Treaties. It is flawed as a tool of accountability generally because of the cumbersome nature
of the process,60 and the fact that the Commission relies on the Member States' cooperation
in order to police them. The Commission has found some ways to corroborate information
supplied to it by using complainants and its own minimal resources, but can nevertheless be
stonewalled by the Member States in some instances. In terms of changes specific to the
way in which the Commission operates the enforcement mechanism itself, the only 'new'
60 An average of 54 months between the registration of a complaint and a judgment under Article 226,
Source, European Parliament Report above note 49 p 4.
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addition was the strategy of prosecuting Member States for non-co-operation.61 In terms of
the Commission's good governance agenda, this strategy is supposed to be focused on
making Article 226 actions more effective (though certainly not more efficient and this is at
the heart of the Commission's effectiveness definition).62
There is a lack of recognition in the policy paper that Article 226 offers much more than this
one-way avenue of accountability (Member State to the Commission), especially in the
context of increasing good governance in the EU. Article 226 is multi-faceted when it
comes to the principle of accountability. There are considerations of internal accountability
within the Commission in the administration of its investigations into infringements that the
Commission chose not to comment upon.63 The external accountability of the Commission to
the citizens (through the Ombudsman) was not given appropriate weight in the
Communication. Similarly, the Commission's accountability to the European Parliament
was never mentioned. The Commission refused to supply information of its internal
procedures to the European Parliament, which has the ultimate role of reviewing the
Commission's discharge of its guardian function. The Parliament has:
'Call[ed] on the Commission to provide specific data on respect for deadlines as
set out in its Internal Manual of Operational Procedures which could only be
obtained informally.'64
Furthermore:
'The Committee's rapporteur has specifically asked for information and data on
the resources allocated for the implementation policy...it is difficult to
understand why this prevented the rapporteur from obtaining data on the
CURRENT situation.'65
The absence of any mention of the European Parliament from the Communication speaks
volumes about the Commission's perception ofwhich actors have an appropriate stake in
Article 226.
61 As discussed in Chapter IV, this strategy was not entirely new and had been mentioned in previous
Annual Reports.
62 It seems that this strategy really vents the Commission's frustration with the Member State, but
whether it has any tangible effect on the Member State's conduct is questionable, Interview,
Commission Official C (25 October 2004).
63 See Chapter VI and the discussion of the Parga complaint, but also the resignation of the Santer
Commission, not a high point in the Commission organisation see P Craig, 'The Fall and Renewal of
the Commission: Accountability, Contract and Administrative Organisation' (2000) 6 European Law
Journal 98, L Cram, 'Whither the Commission? Reform, renewal and the issue-attention cycle'
(2001) 8 Journal ofEuropean Public Policy 770.
64 Above n 49, p 8.
65 Above n 49, p 20.
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The Commission's policy on enforcement is clearly couched in terms of technocratic
legitimacy alone, and has nothing to offer in procedural legitimacy terms other than
consultation with already integrated elite actors. The various strategies devised by the
Commission to improve the efficiency of the enforcement action are all species of
technocratic management initiatives. The concentration on improving the Commission's
administrative abilities to keep track ofMember States' compliance is not new - database
development is a consistent theme throughout the recent decades of the Commission's
internal management reform agenda, along with greater publicity for those Member States
who break the rules. Making greater use of the transposal period of directives is couched in
the same terms - closer monitoring through internal databases, and more active 'policing' of
Member States in the package meetings are all similar types ofmanagement initiatives.
These strategies are output driven, with the concentration on generating legitimacy, or good
governance through an improved output, i.e. better monitoring of infringements and a more
effective enforcement policy. This somewhat undermines the statement that:
'Ultimately this...concerns the citizens themselves. Through information,
participation and access to justice they are to be the actors of a Community
based on the rule of law.'66
3.0: Getting the basics right: increasing legitimacy in the enforcement
policy
The Commission's attempt to discuss its policy on enforcement in the context of good
governance highlights one of the key problems in the Commission's management, design
and operation of Article 226. According to Beetham and Lord, a legitimacy gap appears
when there is:
'a gap between principles and practice, or between legitimating norms and
society's support for those norms'67.
It is difficult to judge whether the stated policy and Article 226 data correlate: if it was not
designed to correlate with the Annual Monitoring Reports, how could this add to clarity in
the Commission's policy? In short, in what way is it possible to check for the gap between
principles and practice?
The Commission's characterisation of Article 226 as having only one function is not a useful
starting point. The emphasis on technocratic legitimacy (without the element ofprocedural
legitimacy included in the WPG proposals) further undermines the policy on enforcement in
good governance terms. The following sections will comment on the appropriateness of the
66 Communication above n 1 p 21.
67 D Beetham, and C Lord, Legitimacy and the European Union (Longman, London, 1998) p 2.
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emphasis on technocratic solutions alone in the context ofBeetham and Lord's basic criteria
of legitimacy, and suggest where the Commission might have taken a more rounded
approach to explaining the enforcement policy in terms which emphasise good governance
and legitimacy.
3.1: The need for identifiable rules
In order for the enforcement policy to be considered as generating some elements of
legitimacy, it is first necessary to establish the existence of any identifiable rules in the
enforcement policy. The Treaty language itself, along with the ECJ's interpretation and case
law principles provide a sketchy outline of the basic legal requirements, but these do not
structure the way in which the mechanism is managed by the Commission on a daily basis.
This executive policy choice is not structured either by detailed Treaty provisions or
concurrent legislation and there are no binding policy guidelines issued by the Parliament or
the Council. The enforcement ofCommunity obligations is a 'one man band' policy
domain, unlike most areas of the Treaties where there is a requirement for rules/legislation to
be produced in concert with other institutional actors. The lack of identifiable rules to
structure and guide the Commission's behaviour under Article 226 has in itself been a
springboard for many complaints, leading to accusations of arbitrary action on the part of the
Commission. As a result, the Commission has endeavoured to provide identifiable rules in
relation to the infringement process in its recent statement, concerning both the
administrative role played by the Commission in the management of Article 226 and the
executive role played by the Commission in respect of the development of specific policy
choices.
In terms of the administrative function, the main source of identifiable rules is the
Commission's published guidelines on what rights complainants can expect to enjoy when
they complain to the Commission regarding a suspected infringement. There is an easily
accessible complaint form that clearly states the Commission's administrative
responsibilities under this process. This has been achieved only after years of campaigning
by the Ombudsman, whose interference in the administration of Article 226 was heavily
resisted by the Commission. The administrative process does therefore have some
identifiable rules (the quality ofwhich is discussed in Chapter VI), but only regarding a tiny
element of the administration ofArticle 226.
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The rest of the administration and investigation of suspected infringements remains rather
mysterious. The existence of secret internal rules that cannot be examined or substantiated is
insufficient to satisfy the criterion of identifiable rules. These must be available for public
scrutiny and it is especially important that the European Parliament is able to scrutinise such
rules. This is one area where the policy paper might have expanded its explanation in terms
of (say) a reporting line or management structure for dealing with infringement
investigations.68
Defining the executive policy choices of the Commission is clearly the focus of the
Communication, and perhaps, rightly so. The method adopted by the Commission in this
respect was the development of the 'priority criteria'. It is unfortunate that the Commission
does not elucidate its policy in much detail (or with convincing coherence), presumably
because it does not want to be held accountable to it. This undermines the commitment to
good governance and legitimacy in policy making. Whilst there is certainly some progress
in the production of the priority criteria, the terminology remains vague enough to resist any
kind of ex ante challenge; for instance, as to why a particular infringement was not pursued
when it seemed to fit into the priority one criteria. There is plenty of room for manoeuvre
available, and certainly sufficient room to enable any Commission official to justify one
choice over another. The priority criteria are therefore not tight enough to promote fairness
and equality in the treatment of the Member States (contrary to the claim made in the
Communication), and are too loose to create legitimate expectations on the part of the
complainant.
The need for identifiable rules amounts to more than simply creating a coherent and effective
policy on enforcement. The point of identifiable rules is twofold: such rules help prevent
allegations of fraud, corruption and mismanagementand allow debate and challenge to take
place if such rules appear to inadequate or arbitrary in nature. The Commission continually
- on purpose or otherwise - misses this point in relation to the management of the
enforcement action, and this undermines the entire policy statement. Instead of producing
vague and conflicting priority criteria it would create more legitimacy to state, for example,
which sectors it will pursue above all others (and why), and what concrete instances of
infringements it will prosecute. This stated approach could then be checked against the
statistics generated in the Commission's Annual Reports. An exhaustive list may be
68 Of course, as highlighted in Chapter IV, this would require a singular approach by all DGs to the
infringement management process which does not (apparently) exist as yet.
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impractical, but a middle ground somewhere between too vague to matter and too
prescriptive to be useful ought to be achievable. Even ifmore detailed guidance is
considered prescriptive - what is wrong with this approach? The enforcement policy is in
the sole control of the Commission, and therefore it could change its prescriptive list as often
as it wishes. The problem from the Commission's perspective is that it may be expected to
follow its own stated approach, but this seems an indefensible reason for perpetuating a
policy without identifiable rules attached to it.
3.2: Justifications for decisions
The second criterion of justifications is based around, but is more encompassing than, the
Commission's good governance principles of openness and accountability. The reason that
justifications for decisions are so important as a criterion for underpinning the concept of
legitimacy, is that without adequate explanation, no amount ofwell defined and identifiable
rules will be enough to combat allegations of arbitrary action.69 Accordingly, the
Commission must embrace the concept of openly justifying its choices in terms ofboth its
policy overall, and the decisions taken in individual cases.
The choice of the priority criteria is not defended or explained in the Communication, apart
from a rather vague reference to 'being built on experience built up over the years'.70 The
Commission may be basing its choice of priority criteria on (say) detailed sectoral analysis
of implementation trends across the Community, but there is no outright statement from the
Commission that indicates this might be the reason behind its approach. Why these
particular criteria are chosen over another equally logical arrangement is never explained.
Conclusions can be drawn as to why the Commission pursues one type of infringement
instead of another, but why should this be reduced to a guessing game? The end result of a
lack of justifications is that the close observer is left in wonderment as to why, subjectively,
the Commission considers one type of infringement more serious than the next, and in what
specific circumstances the use of complementary mechanisms will take over from the
traditional enforcement action.
The attempt at justifications at the institutional level is also relevant. The external
accountability of the Commission to the European Parliament certainly exists in principle,
and has resulted in the production of the Annual Monitoring Reports. The European
69 See Chapter II on the importance of institutions providing reasons for their decisions.
70 Communication above n 1 p 4.
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Parliament exercises its political control over the Commission's performance of its duties,
using the Monitoring Reports as a way to scrutinise the Commission's activities as guardian
of the Treaties. As with most aspects of the enforcement action, this process of
accountability consists of a one-way information flow from the Commission to the
Parliament. In terms of real accountability, this seems to be lacking in the corner stone of all
good systems of accountability: namely independence and the ability to coerce a change in
behaviour. In theory, the Parliament could produce its own independent report into the
Commission's activities through the Committee system, and this might produce a more
effective tool of accountability, although resources for such a momentous task are lacking.
At present, the Parliament's ability to monitor the Commission effectively under this
mechanism is blighted by the problem of information asymmetry (so often a problem of the
Commission in relation to the Member States), and the Annual Reports produced by the
Commission are actually more useful for allowing the Parliament to monitor the Member
States rather than the Commission's discharge of its guardian function. The Parliament does
produce a Report71 on the Annual Monitoring Reports of the Commission wherein the
Parliament makes a resolution and calls for certain changes to made in the way in which the
Commission operates and manages the enforcement mechanism.72 These recommendations
are not binding, or apparently even persuasive on the Commission, and more often than not
fall on deaf ears.73
3.3: Consent and recognition
The third criterion comprising consent and recognition in the context of the enforcement
policy means the consent and recognition of those governed by the system of enforcement.
This relates to the good governance principles ofparticipation and openness and concerns
the Member State and the citizen; both these actors are affected by, and involved in, the
Article 226 procedure and therefore legitimacy comes from both parties' consent and
recognition. Unless the enforcement policy meets the conditions of consent and recognition,
71
Previously the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market, now the Committee on Legal
Affairs.
72 See for instance Report of the European Parliament: 'Report on the Commission's 18th and 19th
Annual Reports on monitoring the application of Community law 30 April 2003' Committee on Legal
Affairs and Internal Market, A5-0147/2003 final, and the latest available report, above n 49. These
reports will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter VII.
73 The European Parliament has been consistently requesting for some time that the Commission
provides a section within the Annual Reports dedicated to Petitions, in order that the Parliament can
track the progress of citizen complaints referred by the Petitions Committee to the Commission. The
Commission has not done so until Twenty-Third Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of
Community Law (2005) COM (2006) 416 final.
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there can be no adequate acceptance of it, which decreases the effectiveness of the policy
itself. On a basic level the Member States do consent to the Commission's role as enforcer
and monitor of the application of Community law. The Treaties identify this role for the
Commission and the Member States have signed up to this agreement. Without this
mechanism in the Treaties, the uniformity of the rights available to European citizens is
jeopardised:
'In an enlarged EU the fact that laws are correctly and visibly implemented is
essential to give meaning to the whole European project. This is not only a
matter of legal obligation but also a question of political responsibility.'74
However, the relationship between the Commission and the Member States over this
provision is nonetheless fraught with power struggles. The Member States actively solicit
better enforcement (against other Member States) on the occasions when it appears to be in
their interest, and then oppose strict enforcement when it harms their economic or political
goals. They have steadfastly refused to countenance any change to the enforcement provision
in the Treaty on numerous occasions; so whilst a limited species of consent is identifiable on
the part of the Member States, it is not without difficulties, evidenced by the Commission's
initiative to prosecute Member States for non-cooperation. In relation to the citizen, there is
no opportunity for consentper se, and only a circumscribed opportunity for 'participation'.
Concluding remarks
The Commission Communication on bettermonitoring is interesting in many respects. It
contains the tacit acknowledgment that, first and foremost, the Commission ought to explain
its executive policy choices in relation to the discharge of its duty to ensure compliance with
Community law. This is important because in the past, the Commission has steadfastly
refused to explain its conduct in relation to any aspect of the operation of Article 226. It
must be acknowledged however, that the attempt to provide some guidance as to which cases
of infringements will be pursued by the Commission as a priority does not stand up to close
scrutiny, either from the perspective of increasing good governance or from developing a
legitimate policy approach to enforcement.
An explanation of the enforcement policy that is consistent with good governance and
legitimacy does not require an entirely new policy by the Commission by any means. Such a
policy could easily fit within the overall strategy of technocratic and procedural legitimacy
promoted by the Commission in the WPG, but it requires a broader overview of all the actors
and processes involved in the enforcement policy, and more focus on how to improve the
74 Above n 49 p 11.
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enforcement mechanism itself, rather than on ways to avoid infringements in the first place.
Although the Commission correctly identifies proper enforcement as being essential to the
interests of the European citizen, it does not recognise this as an opportunity for the
Commission to deliver greater accountability by offering an avenue for citizens to ensure
their rights are protected. Whilst such infringements are recognised in the priority criteria,
there are no concrete suggestions as to how the Commission will actively pursue these
infringements, or how the Commission's activities can be tracked in relation to citizens'
concerns, for instance, via a separate section in the Annual Monitoring Reports. This is
further exacerbated by the lack of proposals to tackle those infringements that most often
result in a citizen complaint - misapplication ofEU rules (rather than say, non-transposition
of directives). The delay in the production of the Annual Reports, and the lack of fit between
the priority criteria and available data, weakens the Commission's approach to greater
efficiency and decentralisation ofmonitoring, and greater openness.
The Commission pinpoints the enlargement of the Community as being the most important
driving factor in a 'new' approach to enforcement, rather than as a response to developing
policies that reflect its approach to good governance. In light of enlargement, once again the
Commission turns to increased cooperation with Member States as the avenue to a more
effective policy. There is no appreciation of the inherent contradiction in the indulgence of
Member States and greater effectiveness in enforcement.
The approach of the Commission to the management, design and operation of the
enforcement mechanism is lacking in some foundational criteria of legitimacy, the most
serious of which is that ofjustifications for decisions. The participation of complainant,
Ombudsman and Parliament in the enforcement process contributes to the generation of
procedural legitimacy by increasing accountability within the operation of the enforcement
mechanism. Procedural legitimacy was a central part of the Commission's approach to good
governance in the WPG, and some mention of procedural legitimacy ought to have been
included in the Communication, and could have easily been incorporated into the paper by
explaining the role of the complainant and Parliament in these terms. Beyond this, the policy
paper is designed to explain the long-standing status quo, rather than develop the
enforcement process into a policy that is consistent with good governance principles.
The Commission does not act in total isolation in the management of infringement
investigations, and therefore there are other processes by which the enforcement mechanism
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might be improved in terms of good governance and legitimacy. The European Ombudsman
has attempted to make some inroads to increase the procedural legitimacy, lacking from the
Commission's own proposals, in the administration of infringement investigations. The
attitude of the Commission to these attempts to instil a culture of good administration and
good governance in the enforcement policy is instructive, and reveals some serious
limitations to the Commission's commitment to good governance and legitimacy as a way to
connect with the citizens ofEurope. Whilst the Commission's vision of good governance is
based on technocratic and procedural legitimacy, the Commission focuses the majority of its
attention on developing technocratic solutions, increasing procedural legitimacy appears to
have been left almost entirely to the Ombudsman. The next chapter will examine the role of
the Ombudsman in improving the Commission's administrative procedures in respect of
infringement complaints, and will identify the main reforms brought about by the interaction
of the Commission and Ombudsman.
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Chapter VI: The impact of the European Ombudsman:
breaking down barriers to procedural legitimacy
The impact of the European Ombudsman1 on the role of Article 226 is important in relation
to three of its functions: its function as a forum for citizen-institution interaction; its function
as an administrative and regulatory tool; and its function as a forum of debate, control and
accountability in which other institutional actors may attempt to control the discharge of
public power by the Commission when it exercises its guardian function. These aspects of
Article 226 are left largely unexplored by the Commission's policy statement, but are
nonetheless crucial if the role of Article 226 can be explained with reference to principles of
good governance and legitimacy.
Although the Commission has always encouraged citizens to play watchdog over Member
States' compliance with Community law, until the intervention of the Ombudsman, there
was relatively little structure to the way in which the Commission dealt with citizen
complaints. The administrative interaction with citizens was largely unrecognised as an area
that required any regulation. In the light of the Commission's approach to good governance
and legitimacy in the WPG (based on technocratic and procedural legitimacy), it is important
to consider, to what extent procedural legitimacy has in fact been realised within the
operation ofArticle 226, since the Commission's own proposals seem to focus upon
technocratic legitimacy and the executive/enforcement function ofArticle 226.2
As an institution that promotes good administration within the EU, the Ombudsman has
focused upon engendering a culture of good administration in Commission practices under
Article 226, by developing some concrete principles that the Commission has agreed to
apply in the handling of infringement complaints. The Ombudsman's Code of Good
Administrative Behaviour provides a detailed explanation of the concept of good
administration.3 The Code provides the template for the appropriate standard of conduct in
order to create procedural legitimacy in the interaction of institutions and citizens. The
impact of the Ombudsman within the administrative process of Article 226 has been
' Hereinafter I will use the terms Ombudsman and European Ombudsman interchangeably.
2
Proposals contained in the Annual Reports detailed in Chapter IV and the Communication analysed
in Chapter V.
3 The European Ombudsman Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, adopted by Resolution of the
European Parliament 6 September 2001, the text ofwhich can be found at
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/home/en/default.htm hereinafter referred to as the CGAB or the
Code.
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important on two distinct levels: first, as a conduit for the redress of citizen grievances and
increasing the procedural legitimacy of the administrative function of Article 226; and
secondly, in providing an insight into the actual practice of the Commission in respect of
infringement investigations outside that of the Commission's statements in the Annual
Monitoring Reports and Communication.
This chapter will be structured as follows. Section one outlines in brief the mandate and
functions of the Ombudsman. Section two examines and analyses what the Ombudsman has
managed to achieve in the context ofmaking improvements to the Commission's
administration of infringement investigations, by considering a number of significant
complaints and inquiries relating to Article 226. Section three presents a detailed case study
of a complaint to the Ombudsman regarding the administration of an infringement
complaint, in order to provide a deeper examination of the Commission's handling of citizen
complaints and highlight the type of problems that result from a lack of procedural
protections for citizens. Section four provides an overview of the results of the
Ombudsman's intervention in the Article 226 process by examining the latest soft law code
developed by the Commission in response to the Ombudsman's criticisms. Section five
considers the administrative function ofArticle 226 in the light of the Commission's
commitment to good governance and legitimacy in the EU.
1.0: An introduction to the Office of the European Ombudsman
The Office of the European Ombudsman, which became operational in 1995, was created by
the Treaty ofMaastricht and is governed by Articles 22 and 195 EC. The evolution of the
Ombudsman idea at the European Union level began in the 1970s, initially generating
support from the European Parliament which first debated the idea. It was not until the Inter-
Governmental Conference on European Political Union in 1990 that the idea of an
Ombudsman was back on the agenda, this time championed by the Spanish and Danish
governments, albeit with very different ideas of the role that the Ombudsman ought to play.
The Spanish proposal leaned more towards regulating the conduct ofMember States with a
particular focus on human rights (unsurprisingly given the role the Spanish Ombudsman
plays) and the Danish model focused upon regulating the activities of the EC institutions.
Ultimately this latter model was the basis on which the present day Office of the European
Ombudsman was formed.4
4
Heede, K European Ombudsman: redress and control at Union level (Kluwer Law International,
The Netherlands, 2000).
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According to Article 195 EC, any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person
residing in the Union can complain to the Ombudsman regarding instances of
maladministration in the activities of the Community's institutions or bodies (except the
Court of Justice and Court of First Instance acting in their judicial roles). The Ombudsman
has two methods of administrative reform at his disposal; he may either conduct inquiries in
response to complaints received or investigate institutions on his own initiative.5 The
Ombudsman has had considerable scope to define his mandate by controlling the definition
of what constitutes maladministration and designing the Office's implementing provisions.
Maladministration was originally defined by Jacob Soderman, the first European
Ombudsman, as:
'occur[ing] when a public body fails to act in accordance with a rule or
principle which is binding upon it.'6
Both the European Parliament and Commission accepted this definition, although the
Ombudsman considers the definition a flexible one rather than a strictly binding precedent.7
1.1: Powers and process
The primary focus of the Ombudsman is complaint handling, and once a decision to
investigate a complaint has been made there are several possible outcomes. The
Ombudsman may find that no maladministration has occurred; this either totally exonerates
the institution's conduct by finding no maladministration or contains a further remark, which
identifies an opportunity for the institution to improve its administration in the future. If the
Ombudsman finds that maladministration has occurred, he may attempt to negotiate a
friendly solution between the parties, or the institution may decide to settle the issue with the
complainant directly. If such a solution is not possible, then the Ombudsman issues either a
critical remark or a draft recommendation to the institution concerned. The critical remark
indicates that the complainant was justified in making a complaint and that the institution
acted wrongly, but it is no longer possible to remedy the maladministration. In this case the
instance of maladministration has no general implications for the institution and requires no
further action. The draft recommendation is issued when the Ombudsman feels that the
institution can rectify the instance ofmaladministration, and it is a particularly serious
instance ofmaladministration or has general implications for the administration of the
5 Article 195 EC.
6 The European Ombudsman Annual Report 1997, the text of all the Annual Reports can be found at
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/home/en/default.htm.
7
Interview, Mr. Olivier Verheecke, Principal Legal Advisor, Office of European Ombudsman (5
April 2005).
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institution. The institution must respond to the Ombudsman within a period of three months.
If the institution does not respond satisfactorily, the Ombudsman may send a special report
to the European Parliament, including recommendations for the institution to rectify its
administrative procedures. The matter is then in the hands of the European Parliament and
the Ombudsman has no further powers available to him.
Ultimately the Ombudsman has no formal power to compel an institution to change its
behaviour in line with his recommendations.8 The Ombudsman does have the power to
inspect files and call on the staff of the institutions for questioning and has done so regarding
infringement complaints.9 The practice of inspecting files and interviewing staff is not an
automatic action in every complaint investigation. Usually, this is only resorted to if the
usual dialogue between the Commission and Ombudsman has not proved sufficient to
answer the Ombudsman's inquiries.
The process by which the Ombudsman handles complaints can be characterised as one of
mediation and information exchange. Once the Ombudsman has received a complaint it is
automatically registered. It is then necessary to decide whether or not it is within the
Ombudsman's mandate before a further investigation can proceed.10 The Ombudsman then
corresponds with the complainant to determine all the relevant facts and identify what kind
ofmaladministration (if any) has occurred, and the Ombudsman is limited in his
investigation to the complainant's specific allegations. As a part of the investigative process,
the Ombudsman instigates a full disclosure procedure; the correspondence of each party is
submitted to the other, along with the Ombudsman's own comments and questions. This is a
very important aspect of the Ombudsman's work, since many complaints can be remedied
once a full and complete disclosure of events has taken place. Many misunderstandings
occur due to a lack of information or simple oversight, which can culminate in allegations of
maladministration. In these cases it may be possible to resolve the case quickly and achieve
a friendly solution.
8
Although this is not particularly unusual in terms of the design of national ombudsmen, it has been
the source of some criticism regarding the Ombudsman's ability to actively police the institutions.
9 Decision of European Ombudsman on Complaint 995/98/OV. Details of all Decisions and Own
Intiative Inquiries can be found at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/home/en/default.htm.
10 The complaint must fall within the Treaty language of 'concerning a Community institution', and
this has been subsequently widened to include executive agencies and third pillar bodies. However,
the Ombudsman still receives a significant number of complaints that concern the national
administration of the Member States, over which he has no authority. The Ombudsman has however
cultivated a network of national Ombudsmen to which such complaints are referred.
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The institution and the complainant are given deadlines to respond to the Ombudsman's
questions. In complex and disputed cases of serious maladministration, this back-and-forth
process can be extremely time consuming as it may take repeated information exchanges by
both sides before the Ombudsman receives a full picture of events. Once the Ombudsman is
satisfied that all the available information has been presented to him - and this may include
inspection of the institution's files - and both sides have had the opportunity to respond to
the allegations of the other, the Ombudsman makes his findings clear to both parties and
concludes the investigation with a further remark, critical remark or draft recommendation as
appropriate.
In addition to complaint handling, the Ombudsman has the ability to conduct inquiries on his
own initiative. The own initiative inquiry has been utilised by the Ombudsman in several
circumstances. If there are procedural bars to the Ombudsman investigating a specific
complaint due to the fact the complaint is outside the Ombudsman's mandate,1' but the
Ombudsman nevertheless considers that the issues raised in the complaint warrant further
investigation, the own initiative inquiry can provide the basis for an investigation. The
Ombudsman has tended to use this broader tool of investigation where there seems to be a
recurring problem within a particular area of administrative practice, established by the
receipt of a large number of complaints from citizens about the same type of practice within
an institution.
The advantage of using the own initiative inquiry is that the Ombudsman is free to determine
the remit of the inquiry rather than being bound by a specific complaint. This broader tool of
investigation can therefore prove useful in attempting to introduce an entire new procedure at
once, rather than by increments, as and when a complaint occurs. The own initiative inquiry
also has advantages in terms of the way in which the Ombudsman deals with the institution.
The situation is less combative because there is no specific allegation ofmaladministration
being investigated, and so the institution is likely to react in a more conciliatory manner than
the generally defensive approach taken to allegations made by complainants. In an own
initiative inquiry, the Ombudsman can work directly with the institution behind the scenes to
establish an agreement with the management and policy foimulators within an institution,
rather than dealing with specific case handlers on a 'one-off basis. This allows the
Ombudsman to formulate recommendations on the basis of both parties wishing to arrive at
11 For an illustration of this use of the own initiative inquiry, see European Ombudsman Own
Initiative Inquiry 01/4/2003ADB.
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the best compromise, rather than as a reaction to public criticism or negative allegations
against specific staff. At the end of an own initiative inquiry, the Ombudsman publishes the
result of the inquiry in the Annual Report and on his website.12
7.2; Overview of numbers of complaints for non-fulfilment of Article 226
obligations received by the Ombudsman
The Ombudsman is appointed by, and is politically accountable to, the European Parliament
in the performance of his duties. The Ombudsman presents an Annual Report to the
European Parliament that outlines the activities of the Ombudsman in combating
maladministration throughout Community institutions.13 Each report contains a detailed
explanation of the Ombudsman's work across the board, as well as a section on statistics that
provides an analysis of the types of complaints dealt with by the Ombudsman. An outline of
the progress of any own initiative inquiries that have been undertaken is also provided. The
percentage of the total number of complaints that the Ombudsman dealt with (i.e. that were
within his mandate14) which related to Article 226 is detailed in Figure 1 lbelow.
12 http://www.ombudsman.eiiropa.eu/home/en/default.htm.
13 In accordance with Article 195(1) EC Treaty and Decision of the European Parliament
2002/262/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 14 March 2002 amending Decision 94/262/ECSC, EC, Euratom on
the regulations and general conditions governing the performance of the Ombudsman's duties OJ L 92
9.4.2002.
14 Defined as complaints that are made in relation to Community institutions or bodies (but not the
ECJ or CFI acting in their judicial roles), made by an authorized person, and relate to
maladministration. The Ombudsman receives many complaints each year that are outside his
mandate, especially complaints which relate to the conduct of Member State institutions, eg 69% of
complaints in 2005 were outside his mandate, with 94% of those not against a Community institution
or body. See The European Ombudsman Annual Report 2005, p 181.
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Figure 11 shows that the Ombudsman was initially dealing with a large proportion of Article
226 related complaints, a fact that prompted his decision to open an own initiative inquiry
into the matter in 1997. After the Ombudsman's negotiations with the Commission, the
number of complaints declined rapidly by the next year. By 2001 the Ombudsman's
statistics show complaints relating to Article 226 at an all time low of only 1 per cent of the
total number of complaints being investigated. Since then, there has been a reversal of that
trend and the numbers of Article 226 complaints seem to be on the increase.
There are several ways to interpret the data in Figure 11. It could suggest that the
Ombudsman had tremendous success with his initial foray into the Commission's
administration of complaints, achieving satisfaction for European citizens. This would
indicate that an improving administrative process had resulted in a successive reduction in
the number of complaints to the Ombudsman to 2001. If this is the case, there is no obvious
explanation as to why the number of complaints thereafter began to rise, especially as in
2002 the Commission published a Communication containing further improvements,
extending and clarifying the complainant's 'rights'. It is just as likely that this data could be
interpreted to mean exactly the opposite. It is possible that complainants realised quite early
on that there was a limited amount the Ombudsman was able to achieve, and so
complainants stopped looking to the Ombudsman for a solution. Initially, complainants may
have focused on areas that the Court of Justice had refused to police; such as the amount of
15
Percentage of total complaints received within the mandate. This is how the Ombudsman
categorises complaints which refer to the Commission's handling of a complaint made in relation to
the Commission's guardian function of pursing infringements under Article 226. This should not be
confused with complaints about Member States not fulfilling their obligations under Article 226,
which is of course at the root of any complaint being made to the Commission in the first instance.
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information released by the Commission in relation to its on-going investigations, or the
extent of the Commission's discretion in relation to taking action under the infringement
procedure. When it became clear that the Ombudsman was unable to change this situation
(in terms of not being able to force the Commission to adopt a position) perhaps they simply
ceased to complain. Similarly, the publication of the codicil containing clarified 'rights' in
the form of soft law promises, may have produced a 'second wind' of complaining by
citizens.
Perhaps though, neither explanation is really sophisticated enough to account for the sudden
drop in the percentage of complaints being dealt with under this category. On closer
examination of the actual complaints and the Ombudsman's system of classification of the
types ofmaladministration, another explanation presents itself. In fact, the categorisation of
Article 226 'complaints' is not straightforward. It could refer only to those instances where
the complainant has alleged that the Commission has failed to prosecute Member States for
alleged infringements, either because the Commission has decided there is no infringement
and the complainant disagrees, or because despite the fact that an infringement has been
found, the Commission chose not to pursue the case to the ECJ preferring instead to pursue
the alleged infringement by other means, such as a complementary mechanism.16
It is difficult to prove there has been an overwhelming success in legitimising the
infringement process by viewing the statistics, or that examining the bare data in isolation
will provide an accurate picture. On reading a selection of complaints in the Annual Reports
produced by the Ombudsman, there appear to be a number of cases relating to Article 226
that are classified as other types ofmaladministration (such as lack of transparency, abuse of
power, unfairness, failure to give reasons, avoidable delay etc).17 This, quite correctly, is the
type of maladministration being alleged, but the fact remains that it often occurs under the
auspices of the infringement process. Due to the way in which the Ombudsman compiles the
statistics, there is no way to tell (without reviewing each and every complaint that has ever
been registered) exactly what percentage of the complaints actually relates to some element
of the Commission's administration of Article 226. Like the Commission's reporting of
Article 226 data, the Ombudsman has refined his classification system since inception of the
office.
16 See Chapter V.
17 For instance see Decision ofEuropean Ombudsman on Complaint 2333/03/99 which is categorised
as 'avoidable delay' although this avoidable delay occurs in relation to an infringement issue.
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2.0: Re-moulding the process through inquiries and complaint handling
The Ombudsman has influenced the development of the administration of the infringement
process primarily through his handling of complaints from citizens. The initial focus of the
Ombudsman on Article 226 complaints is partly explained by the large number of
complaints received,18 but this is only part of the story. Equally important in this initial
focus was the type of complaints that the Ombudsman received where it became apparent
that there was no consistent administrative practice directing Commission staff on how to
interact properly with the citizens who were complaining.19 The Ombudsman's mechanism
for solving disputes between citizens and institutions of the Union creates a unique
environment for information exchange and this helps the creation of good working
relationships with the other institutions that the Ombudsman must police. It is through these
information exchanges that the Ombudsman's style of incremental adjustment and standard
setting has induced a change in practice. The following sub-sections analyse some specific
complaints from citizens about the handling of the infringement process by the Commission.
The Ombudsman's rulings in these particular cases have formed the backbone of the
administrative changes implemented by the Commission.
2.1: The quest for full and frank reasoning
The Newbury Bypass complaint is one of the early examples of the Ombudsman making
inroads into the infringement process.20 The complainants alleged that the Commission was
guilty ofmaladministration in deciding not to open up infringement proceedings against the
UK government in relation to the building of the Newbury Bypass, because there had been
no Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) carried out (as required by Community law)
before consent had been given for the project. Although there are a number of different legal
points of contestation, the core of the complaint was the Commission's discretion in deciding
not to open up infringement proceedings where it seemed apparent that there had been a
clear infringement on the complainants' reading of the facts.
The complainants suspected that the reason for the lack ofprosecution was a political
bargain struck between the Member State and Commission.21 The source of the
18 36% of complaints received within the mandate referred to Article 226.
19 Interview, Mr. Olivier Verheecke, Principal Legal Advisor, Office of European Ombudsman (5
April 2005).
20 There were 27 separate complaints in all, Decision ofEuropean Ombudsman on Complaint
206/27.10.95/HS/UK.
21 The allegations of political reasons/bargaining/motivation are often a part of a complaint to the
Ombudsman under the Commission's handling of this particular type of complaint.
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disagreement lay in the lack of transitional provisions in the EIA Directive22 concerning
projects that had been started, but not completed, by the time the Directive came into force.
According to the complainant there was no conclusive court ruling on the issue of 'pipeline'
cases, the ECJ specifically leaving open the question as to whether the Directive applied to
cases already in the process of obtaining consent in the planning application procedure.23
The Newbury Bypass case was one of the so called 'pipeline cases'. In its response to the
complaint, the Commission chose not to explain its conclusion that there had been no
infringement. This conduct in itself prolonged what proceeded to be a lengthy battle for the
complainants in obtaining satisfactory answers in relation to their complaint. The reasons
for the Commission's conclusion that there was no infringement were far from obvious,
especially in the light of non-conclusive precedent, leading to the inevitable accusation of
'political motivations' for not pursuing the case. The Commission's response was simply to
reiterate the Court's case law relating to Article 22624: that the Commission retained
complete discretion in determining whether or not to initiate infringement proceedings.
Whilst the Ombudsman was bound by the case law, he did assert that the Commission was
obliged to issue a reasoned opinion if it considered that there had been an infringement.25
This gave the Ombudsman the opportunity to decide whether there had been
maladministration in reaching the conclusion that there was no infringement. This in itself is
significant progress under the administrative arm ofArticle 226 as it amounts to second-
guessing the original decision (that there had been no infringement and therefore no need to
issue a reason opinion). It limits (in theory) the Commission's ability to arbitrarily close
cases which is a serious concern when evaluating the way in which the enforcement
mechanism is operated in an era of good governance and legitimacy. The Ombudsman was
prevented from actually stating the decision was legally wrong as this is outside his powers,
but he nonetheless stated that the way in which the Commission had acted amounted to
maladministration due to deficient reasoning.
22 Council Directive 85/337/EEC 27 June 1985 on Environmental Impact Assessment OJ L 175
27.6.1985 p 40.
23 Case C-431/92 Commission v Germany [1995] ECR1-2189 para 28.
24 Case 48/65 Lutticke v Commission [1966] ECR 19, Case 247/87 Star Fruit v Commission [1989]
ECR 291, Case C-87/89 Sonito v Commission [1990] ECR 1-1981.
25
Although as I have already observed in Chapter IV, the term 'shall' in reality is turned into a 'may'
as the Commission must first consider that there is an infringement. This is a jealously guarded area
of institutional power of the Commission and the Ombudsman was therefore in controversial territory
in the view of the Commission.
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This forces the Commission to pay closer attention to the way in which investigations are
conducted and justified in relation to Article 226 violations. The Ombudsman's input is felt
beyond the interaction between the complainant and Commission, as it also affects the way
in which the Commission fulfils its role as guardian of the Treaties in prosecuting Member
State violations. After an analysis of the Commission's legal reasoning which led it to reach
the conclusion that there was no infringement, the Ombudsman considered that the
Commission was 'probably correct' and that the complainants had offered no evidence to
support their claims of 'political motivations', although it seems difficult to imagine how
evidence of such political dealing is to be obtained by the complainant. It was clear that the
Ombudsman considered the threadbare reasoning provided by the Commission for its
decision to be totally inadequate, preventing both the Ombudsman and the complainant from
understanding the Commission's motivations. In three separate paragraphs of his decision,
the Ombudsman criticises the explanations offered by the Commission as 'very brief, and
possibly incomplete...' and '...lacking clear explanation'.26
The Ombudsman concluded that at the very least the Commission ought to have informed
the complainants personally of its decision before announcing it to the media, instead of
three months after issuing a press release on the subject; such administrative practices simply
lack basic courtesy. The outcome of this case was a further remark, which announced that,
given the number of complaints received by the Office in relation to the infringement
process, the Ombudsman would conduct an own initiative inquiry.27 The Ombudsman noted
that citizens viewed the Commission's approach to the discharge of its Article 226 duties as
'arrogant and high-handed' and that the process:
'appeared not to promote the degree of transparency which European citizens
increasingly expect'.28
2.2: The own initiative inquiry: concentration on basic procedural guarantees
After the Newbury Bypass case in 1996, the Ombudsman decided to open an own initiative
inquiry into the Commission's administrative procedures for handling infringement
complaints that was published in the 1997 Annual Report. The further remark in the
Newbury Bypass case had announced the intention of the Ombudsman to investigate the
Commission's administrative procedures in relation to Article 226 complaints, and began the
26 Decision of European Ombudsman on Complaint 206/27.10.95/HS/UK.
27 Detailed at length in The European Ombudsman Annual Report 1997, European Ombudsman Own
Initiative Inquiry 303/97/PD.
28 The European Ombudsman Annual Report 1996 p 65.
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process of starting a constructive dialogue between the Ombudsman and the Commission.29
The inquiry reveals the methodology the Ombudsman would adopt in his own initiative
investigations. This is one ofmoulding the areas the Ombudsman perceived he could (and
ought to) pursue. The Commission has an incentive to co-operate with the Ombudsman
because during this private process of negotiation the Commission is not forced to adopt any
particular position. In contrast when the Commission must respond to the Ombudsman's
draft recommendations or answer to Parliament after a special report, the situation becomes
more combative and the Commission is forced to defend its position publicly.
The opening section of the own initiative report states that:
'the object of these [Article 226] complaints was not the discretionary power of
the Commission to bring legal proceedings against a Member State'.30
This could be viewed as a rather naive interpretation of what complainants are trying to
achieve since many of the complaints are aimed at exactly that, including the Newbury
Bypass complaint which sparked off the own initiative inquiry in the first place. It is the
discretionary element of the Commission's duty to enforce compliance under Article 226
that often provokes the allegations of 'political motivations' by complainants. However, the
Ombudsman was keen to foster a good working relationship with Community institutions
and decided initially not to push the boundaries of the Court of Justice's entrenched case
law, which steadfastly protects the Commission's discretion in this regard.
The Ombudsman began his first real foray into this sensitive administrative process by
attempting to establish very basic procedural 'guarantees', in the form of a soft law
commitment.31 These are easier and more flexible instruments for the institutions to work
with, and as procedural 'promises' such instruments might have a positive impact insofar as
they tend to yield relatively quick results for the complainant. Unfortunately, such
instruments do not give rise to substantive legal rights that can be asserted in a court of law.
Beginning with the very basic procedure of registering a complaint (which was not routinely
practiced by the Commission), the Ombudsman tackled the lack of basic administrative
organisation of infringement investigations. It is hard to believe that a process that had been
operating for many decades did not include this first step.
29 This process can take place by correspondence or meetings between the Ombudsman and the
relevant institution.
30 The European Ombudsman Annual Report 1997 p 271.
31 For detailed discussion of the importance of the Ombudsman in relation to 'soft law' see especially
PG Bonner, 'The European Ombudsman: a novel source of soft law in the European Union' (2000) 25
European Law Review 39.
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There had been numerous complaints to the Ombudsman that referred to the lack of an
acknowledgement by the Commission on receipt of a complaint, and this was something the
Ombudsman felt could not be refused by the Commission as a matter of good administrative
practice. Additionally, keeping a complainant informed as to the action being taken in
response to the complaint was seen as a matter of good practice by the Ombudsman, and was
the first step in bringing the complainant firmly into the infringement proceedings. Some of
the procedural guarantees agreed bordered on basic courtesy, but ensuring the complainant is
kept informed is tantamount to acknowledging the citizen plays an important role in policing
Member State activity and not merely one of simple information provider.32 The next
procedural guarantee that the Ombudsman and Commission agreed upon is that the
Commission must provide the complainant with the reasons for rejecting the complaint and
closing the file. This sticking point will be returned to below in the examination of the case
study. The Commission also agreed to inform the complainant as to the outcome of the
investigation into the complaint, and to establish a maximum time limit of one year before a
file is closed (except in special circumstances). Furthermore, in the course of these
negotiations, the Ombudsman and the Commission agreed that the Commission will allow
the complainant time to respond to the Commission's provisional decision to close the case
file, allowing a possibility of rebuttal of the Commission's reasoning by the complainant.
Again, this acknowledges that the complainant is considered as having a valid stake in
infringement investigations and should not be simply ignored once they have alerted the
Commission to a possible infraction.
These narrowly defined procedural guarantees leave no opportunity for redress of the
majority of complaints however, which are rooted in the suspicion that the Commission is
finding no infringement for 'political reasons' but refuses to admit it, rather than reaching a
decision based on an objective judgement of the facts of the case. This is of course perfectly
acceptable within the framework of the Court's case law, which is exactly why complainants
ultimately turn to the Ombudsman: they have nowhere else to turn. The Ombudsman's
failure to ensure that the Commission adheres to its commitment to provide full and frank
reasoning in the explanation of its decisions was to be a recurring problem in later
complaints, both in terms of dealing with a complainant's initial inquiry, and in the
subsequent investigations by the Ombudsman. Nevertheless the Ombudsman's first
32 Interview, Mr. Olivier Verheecke, Principal Legal Advisor, Office ofEuropean Ombudsman (5
April 2005).
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substantial intervention into the administration of Article 226 managed to achieve agreement
with the Commission on some basic organisational changes.33
2.3: A genuine opportunity to respond
Even after the own initiative inquiry and subsequent Ombudsman report, many complaints
were to contain the same recurring themes throughout the Ombudsman's investigations.
Analysis of later Annual Reports detailing the substance of complaints relating to Article 226
reveals that the repeated attempts made by the Ombudsman to infuse better procedural
practices has had a limited impact on the attitude of the Commission towards the Article 226
process, regardless ofwhat had actually been agreed with the Ombudsman. The Macedonian
Metro case is a good illustration of this point.34 In brief, the initial complaint to the
Commission concerned the way in which the Greek authorities had handled the award of a
public procurement contract, a familiar area of complaint to the Commission under the
enforcement action.35 The complainant, whose company had tendered for the contract and
had been unsuccessful, turned to the Commission alleging unlawful action of the Greek
authorities in the procurement procedure. The eventual decision of the Commission was to
close the file and take no further action, despite considerable evidence of an infringement.
A detailed reading of the complaint reveals that it is the suspicion of 'political motivations',
combined with a lack of communication by the Commission, which infuriated the
complainant. Initially, it was clear that the Commission thought there had in fact been a
violation ofCommunity law, and the Commission sent the Greek authorities a letter of
formal notice under the Article 226 procedure. The relevant DG wrote a letter to the
complainant informing them of this decision, together with reasons for concluding there had
in fact been a violation. When the case later came before the College ofCommissioners
there was a 'radical and unexplained change of position',36 ending in the decision to take no
further action and close the file.37
33 'Failure by a Member State to comply with Community law: standard form for complaints to be
submitted to the European Commission' OJ 1999 CI 19/5.
34 Decision of European Ombudsman on Complaint 995/98/OV, detailed in The European
Ombudsman Annual Report 2001.
35
Possibly due to the rather inadequate levels of redress available for breach ofpublic procurement
rules on awarding contracts in EC law.
36 Above n 34.
37 There are numerous reasons for a 'radical and unexplained change of position'. As detailed in
Chapter IV, the essentially political nature of whether to pursue an infringement can depend on many
and various considerations, such as the personal political expertise of the Commissioner (of the DG
investigating the complaint) in persuading the College to proceed, whether the Member State holds
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The Ombudsman conducted a detailed investigation, involving the inspection of Commission
files and taking oral evidence from Commission staff. The Ombudsman found
maladministration in several respects. First, the Commission's letter informing the
complainant of the decision to close the file was to be understood as meaning the
Commission did not at that time consider there to be any infringement of Community law.
The Ombudsman found that this was not the case, and that the Commission had decided to
make a discretionary decision to close the file, despite the evidence of a possible
infringement. The reasoning was therefore inadequate and misleading. The Commission
had allowed only eight days for the complainant to respond (in peak Greek holiday season)
before closing the file on the complaint conclusively, despite earlier agreements with the
Ombudsman in the context of the own initiative inquiry to allow rebuttal by the complainant.
This was not considered a genuine opportunity to respond and, along with inadequate
reasoning, constituted maladministration.
In his further remark on the case, the Ombudsman stated that if the decision by the
Commission to close the file on the complaint were considered as a decision addressed to the
complainant under Article 230 EC, the actions of the Commission in the case would be
grounds for annulment in a court of law. The Commission's response to this criticism was to
point out the new rules of procedure in place for complainants38 - although these were not
adhered to and were in fact the basis of this complaint - and that a further re-working of this
procedure was already underway.39
Even at the end of the Ombudsman's investigation there was no honest answer as to why the
Commission had had such a 'radical and unexplained change of position', leaving the
complainant's suspicions firmly in place. The case was closed without any tangible
conclusion, as the complainant could not prove their suspicions of unscrupulous behaviour
and the Ombudsman could take the inquiry no further. The Macedonia Metro case is not a
one-off situation. More recent cases reveal similar complaints of a lack of clear reasoning in
the Presidency, whether a significant political scandal might be caused by openly condemning the
actions of one Member State through an infringement action etc.
38 Above n 33.
39
Resulting in the production of the latest guidelines: Commission Communication on Relations with
the Complainant in Respect of Infringements of Community Law' COM (2002) 141.
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the Commission's decision to close a case, even after the Ombudsman requests a further
explanation from the Commission, leading to similar conclusions by the Ombudsman.40
2.4: Proper consideration of all the relevant factors
There has been slow and incremental advancement in some later cases that attempt to make
further inroads into the administration of Article 226 beyond what the Commission had
agreed to in the context of the own initiative investigation. In the Motor Racing Track case
the complainants alleged that the UK authorities had not adhered to the Directive containing
the obligation to conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), when they granted
planning permission for a motor racing circuit to be built in Wales.41 This time the
complaint concerned the Commission's interpretation of the Directive when it concluded that
the EIA was not necessarily required for every project, and that it was at the discretion of the
authority granting planning permission as to whether an EIA was necessary. There had
already been a lengthy report made by the Local Government Ombudsman for Wales into
complaints about the building of the motor racing track. The Commission had failed to take
this report into account when it reached the conclusion that there had been no infringement
and closed the fde, despite the fact that the complainants had brought the report to the
Commission's attention.
The Ombudsman concluded that the Commission had committed an act of
maladministration, since good administrative behaviour requires that an administration take
into account all the relevant factors, giving each factor its proper weight, as well as
disregarding any irrelevant factors before reaching a final decision. The report from the
Ombudsman for Wales was considered a relevant factor that the Commission did not
evaluate. In this case, the Ombudsman conducted a re-examination of the way in which the
Commission reached its decision on whether there had been an infringement, by introducing
an elastic rationality test,42 on the basis of principles contained in the Code of Good
Administrative Behaviour (CGAB).43
40 See Decision of European Ombudsman on Complaint 39/2002/OV, and more recently Decision of
European Ombudsman on Complaint 1273/2004/GG and Decision ofEuropean Ombudsman on
Complaint 2229/2003/MHZ.
41 Decision of European Ombudsman on Complaint 39/2002/OV.
42 Similar to that used in English administrative law, in terms ofwhether objectively (i.e. in the
judgment of the court) the decision maker took into account all the relevant considerations or based
their decision on irrelevant considerations. Such factors could render the decision illegal, or ultra
vires, in English administrative law.
43 Above n 3 in particular Article 9, 'Objectivity'.
189
The Ombudsman used his Code to further widen and deepen the opportunities to re-evaluate
the Commission's original decision as to whether or not an infringement had taken place.
The notion of relevant or irrelevant considerations had not been mentioned in previous cases
as a ground on which the Ombudsman could interfere. This could be partly due to the fact
that previous cases had not presented the opportunity to follow this line of reasoning, and
partly because the CGAB had not existed as reference point for this standard of behaviour.
This highlights the disadvantage of the Ombudsman's focus on complaint handling because
he requires the right kind of complaint to come along, with just the right factual
circumstances, in order to make further improvements in an administrative process.44 There
have been other cases45 (Newbury Bypass is just one example) where the complainants'
allegations of 'political motivations' are aimed at the Commission not giving proper weight
to all relevant factors before deciding to close the file, in essence challenging what the
Commission considers a relevant factor.
3.0: A detailed case study: the Parga complaint
It is useful to present an in-depth case study of a complaint to the Ombudsman in order to
fully appreciate the extent of the problems that exist in the administrative element of the
infringement action. Due to the complex nature of infringement complaints it is difficult to
gain a genuine understanding of the problems faced by complainants, and the Ombudsman
without analysing complaints in great detail. This section will analyse a particular complaint
to the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman's investigation into that complaint, and comment on the
quality of the Commission-complainant interaction. This will highlight the way in which the
Commission conducts infringement investigations as a whole, as opposed to just examining
the Commission-complainant interaction.46 Crucially, examining a complaint in great detail
provides a different insight into the administration of the Commission other than that
outlined in the Annual Monitoring Reports and policy papers provided by the Commission.
The Parga case reflects some inherent organisational problems within the operation of the
Commission's administration and investigation of infringement complaints.47 It
44
Interview, Mr. Olivier Verheecke, Principal Legal Advisor, Office of European Ombudsman (5
April 2005).
45 Decision of European Ombudsman on Complaint 39/2002/OV, Decision of European Ombudsman
on Complaint 1273/2004/GG,Decision ofEuropean Ombudsman on Complaint 2229/2003/MHZ,
Decision ofEuropean Ombudsman on Complaint 1288/99/OV are just a few examples.
46
Although case studies, by their nature, are anecdotal and selective, they are nonetheless useful in
respect of revealing Commission behaviour in response to infringement complaints, as these practices
cannot be discovered without examining Ombudsman investigations into specific complaints.
47 Decision of European Ombudsman on Complaint 1288/99/OV, hereinafter 'Parga complaint'.
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demonstrates that the value and extent of the Ombudsman's investigation is not necessarily
restricted to simply examining whether the Commission has followed certain administrative
steps. An investigation by the Ombudsman allows an outsider into the enforcement process,
and as a result, enables another institution to question the Commission's conduct in the
discharge of its guardian function. Through the insight provided by the Ombudsman, the
Parliament can more effectively hold the Commission to account as the information
asymmetry is lessened. This inter-institutional interaction is crucial to the creation of
procedural legitimacy and good governance. As is typical with Article 226 complaints to the
Ombudsman, the Parga case was a particularly complex and long running disagreement
between the Commission and the complainant that spirals in several different directions. Not
only does this case raise questions about the professional conduct of the Commission in the
administrative interaction with the complainant, it also questions the Commission's
performance of its role as guardian of the Treaties.
3.1: The facts according to the complainant
The facts as the complainant presented them are as follows. The complainant wrote to the
Commission alleging that the Greek government had breached Directive 85/337/EEC48, in
particular the provision which stipulates the carrying out of an Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) for the planned building of a biological waste treatment plant in Parga,
Preveza (Greece). This building project was to be funded by the European Community. The
complainant made her initial complaint for breach of Community law to DG Environment in
July 1995 stating that during the EIA, the municipality of Parga used misleading information
in order to avoid a genuine assessment of the environmental consequences of the project, and
the EIA was therefore inadequate.
The complaint was acknowledged by the Commission only after the complainant pursued the
case by telephone on several occasions. Despite sending new information to the
Commission, the complainant received no response, resulting in the complainant petitioning
the European Parliament in October 1996 to find out how the complaint was progressing.
The response from Parliament was to question the Commission and communicate the
Commission's response to the complainant. The Commission had decided that the complaint
would be attached to Article 226 proceedings already underway against Greece for breach of
48 Council Directive 85/337/EEC 27 June 1985 on Environmental Impact Assessment OJ L 175
27.6.1985 p 40.
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Directive 85/337/EEC, and that Community funding for the project would be suspended in
light of this action.
During repeated phone calls from the complainant to the Commission, the complainant
alleged that DG Environment consistently informed her that they would only correspond
with Member States and not with citizens in relation to investigations under Article 226. In
October 1998, the complainant obtained minutes (from the Greek Government) of a meeting
between the Greek Foreign Ministry and Commission representatives which stated that the
Commission had closed consideration of the complaint in May 1998, and had decided to
fund the project on the basis that:
'the shortcomings which had appeared in the project at an earlier stage had been
5 49
overcome .
On receiving this information, the complainant immediately wrote to the Commission,
stating that the Commission's decision to fund the project and close the complaint was
erroneous because it was based on misleading information obtained from the Greek
authorities.
The Commission responded in December 1998 stating that the issue was still under
consideration. The Committee on Petitions informed the complainant in late December 1998
of the Commission's further answer of 19 March 1998. Here, it appeared that the
Commission had confirmed to Parliament that there had been a violation of the Directive and
the Commission had decided to suspend Community funding; on this basis the Committee on
Petitions had terminated its own examination of the situation.
In December 1998 the complainant again sent further detailed information to the
Commission to support the conclusion that the Directive had been breached. The
Commission replied in January 1999 saying that Commission officials would be visiting
Parga in March 1999 to conduct a site visit. Finally, in April 1999 the Commission wrote to
the complainant stating its intention to close the file. This was based on new information
obtained from the Greek authorities; namely that the planning consent for the project was
approved by Decision 667 of the Prefect of Preveza, 28 February 1986. This decision relates
to the commencement of a study of a sewerage system at Parga, and included a map of the
affected area. The Commission therefore concluded that this project fell outside the scope of
the Directive since the Directive did not come into force until after this date.
49
Parga complaint, above n 47.
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Table 3 below provides a summary of the facts as they are confirmed by the Ombudsman's
investigation.
Table 3
Summary of relevant facts as they appear after Ombudsman's investigation
Date Action
July 1995 Initial complaint to Commission.
October 1996 EP communicates Commission position - will prosecute for violation, funding
suspended.
March 1998 EP confirms Commission position - will prosecute for violation, funding
suspended.
May 1998 Commission confirms to Greek Government no prosecution and will fund
project.
May 1998 Commission notes that relevant date for consent is 28 February 1995.
July 1998 Funding approved for project under Cohesion Fund.
December 1998 EP again confirms Commission position - violation, no funding resulting in EP
closing file.
December 1998 Commission informs complainant it is still deciding on her complaint.
January 1999 Commission states it will make a site visit to Parga.
April 1999 Commission closes file stating no violation of Community law as relevant date
for consent is 28 February 1986.
3.2: The complaint to the Ombudsman
The complainant turned to the Ombudsman for assistance in October 1999. Over the next
two and half years, the Ombudsman doggedly pursued the Commission requesting
information and clarification of events, dates and facts. The Ombudsman sent this
correspondence to the complainant for her views and received additional information from
both sides. In total, the Ombudsman had to contact the Commission on seven separate
occasions. By March 2000 the Ombudsman was still unsatisfied with the Commission's
response and decided to undertake further inquiries. Still unconvinced of the veracity of the
information he received from the Commission, the Ombudsman requested inspection of the
Commission's file in July 2001, which eventually took place in September 2001.
During the course of the information exchange between both sides, facts emerged that cast
further doubt on the Commission's original version of events, including the suspicion of
professional misconduct of the Commission official in charge of the complaint. After the
Ombudsman's extensive inquiries the substance of the complaint was summed up as follows:
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■ That from 7 July 1995 until December 1998, the complainant did not receive any letters
from the Commission informing her about the development of her case and therefore
the complainant was unable to properly defend her position. The complainant also
alleged that the Commission had not informed her that it had decided, by its decision
E(98)2297 of 28 July 1998 to fund the project under the Cohesion Fund, but on the
contrary had sent letters (such as the one of 9 December 1998) which indicated that the
issue was still under consideration.
■ The Commission's decision to close the case was wrong in law and the Commission
had manipulated the situation; it tried to find means to close the case as shown in its
final decision of 20 April 1999. It took the Commission four years to come to the
conclusion that the project predated the entry into force of the Directive. However,
earlier in March 1997 and March 1998 the Commission proposed including the case in
the horizontal Article 226 action against Greece for failing to comply with the
Directive.
■ A lack of impartiality in the handling of the complaint due to the fact that the official in
the Commission held a position in a Greek political party which supported the
construction of the project. This is incompatible with his duty to verify the project is
carried out lawfully. Additionally, the written expression of thanks from the Greek
Foreign Ministry to the Commission for delaying the processing of complaints
indicated that certain officials within DG Environment set themselves the task of
avoiding the proper implementation of Community law, and instead to ensure the
project received Community funding.
3.3: The inquiry
The Ombudsman's investigation took a total of two years and eight months to complete. In
September 2000 the Ombudsman requested a response to four specific questions/allegations,
but the Commission in November 2000 only responded to two of these requests, ignoring the
other two completely which, in combination with the complainant's response, prompted the
request to inspect the file in July 2001. The Ombudsman made renewed inquiries in the
same month regarding the allegations of professional misconduct that the complainant had
alleged and the Commission had ignored. The Commission eventually responded in late
November 2001 (one month later than the deadline submitted by the Ombudsman). The
Commission stated that it had initially felt the allegations were not relevant to the complaint
and so no response was necessary. After the Ombudsman's renewed pressure, the
Commission had given the official in question the opportunity to present his views in a
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hearing in October 2001, a report ofwhich was sent to the Ombudsman on the condition it
was not disclosed to the complainant. This breached a fundamental practice of Ombudsman
investigations that all parties are able to access information submitted by both sides in the
course of an inquiry. On two separate occasions in January and February 2002, the
Ombudsman again requested the disclosure of this report to the complainant, or in the
alternative, asked the Commission to provide a summary of the report. Only after a rejoinder
by the complainant, providing damning evidence that the official was in fact compromised50
and the Commission's insistence that there had been no misconduct was placed in serious
doubt, did the Commission relent and provide a summary of the report in March 2002.
Throughout the investigation by the Ombudsman, the Commission consistently avoided,
delayed and refused to answer the very serious allegations being put to it. It revealed the
practice of not adhering to its own internal procedures, including its own Staff Regulations
concerning the suitability of Commission staff engaging in political office whilst serving as a
Commission official. When questioned about this directly, the Commission attempted to
defend its position through silence or misdirection. In the course of the own initiative
inquiry launched by the Ombudsman in 1997, the Commission had undertaken to register
and acknowledge complaints by letter, and to keep complainants informed of progress in the
investigation and of a decision to close the file. This practice was not adhered to in the Parga
case, but nevertheless was defended by the Commission, since the complainant had been
able to gamer information from the European Parliament with the Commission's own
commitment to honour this procedure seemingly irrelevant.
The Commission's failure to inform the complainant of the decision to fund the project
under the Cohesion Fund seemed a deliberate attempt to keep the apparent U-tum in policy a
secret, and the Ombudsman also noted that:
'the Commission kept this important information concealed equally from the
Ombudsman'
during the course of his investigation.51 This information was discovered only after
inspection of the file. The Commission also failed to provide an acceptable explanation as to
why it informed the complainant in December 1998 that it would take into consideration new
elements transmitted by her, and in April 1999 that it was preparing to close the case, when it
had in fact effectively already closed the case in July 1998 when it approved funding. The
50 Due to the complainant submitting a number of newspaper articles where the Commission official
in question visited Parga and delivered a speech on environmental matters, not as party political
advisor in Greece, but as a Commission official.
51
Parga complaint above n 47 p 19 para 1.6.
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Ombudsman noted further that when faced with these allegations the Commission simply
asserts the CFI's case law relating to the independence of the Community funding procedure
under the Cohesion Fund from the infringement procedure under Article 226.52 This case
law however relates only to the independence of the administrative procedures (i.e. those of
Article 226 and those of the Cohesion Fund), and does not question the principle that
Community funding ought to be allocated only to projects that fully comply with
Community law.53
3.4: The final decision
The Ombudsman issued both a critical and a further remark in this case. He concluded that
after thorough investigation, it became clear that during the period March 1998 to December
1998 the Commission's position with regard to the complaint had changed and:
'the Commission had failed to provide adequate information, because the
Commission had concealed from the complainant a crucial element in the case,
namely that by Decision E(98)2297 of 28 July 1998 the Commission had
decided to fund the project under the Cohesion Fund. This left the complainant
believing that the complaint was still being investigated and this constituted an
instance ofmaladministration.'54
Crucially, and this was the main added-value element of this decision, the Ombudsman
contradicted the Commission's interpretation of the applicability of the Directive to the
project. In previous cases the Ombudsman had hinted that the Commission may have
misjudged the applicable case law or factual circumstances, but had not gone so far as to
state the original Commission decision was wrong. Using the ECJ's case law on what
actually constitutes the relevant date for application for consent, the Ombudsman concluded
that the relevant date was in fact 28 February 1995, which was after the Directive entered
into force by some eight years and not 28 February 1986 as the Commission alleged. Not
only is this the date [28 February 1986] that the relevant Greek authorities considered as the
applicable date at the time of granting consent,55 this was in fact recognised as the relevant
date by the Commission (in May 1998) in the course of its own investigation.56 This
incidentally is the exact same time that the Commission suddenly decided that it would fund
the project after all, due to the alleged inapplicability of the Directives.57 This supported the
52 Ibid p 11 para 3.
53 Ibid p 20 para 1.8.
54 Ibid p 25 para 2 (conclusion).
55 Ibid p 21 para 2.8-2.11.
56 Ibid para 2.13.
57 This is the same month that the Commission publicly states, due to the consideration of the new
element of the Decision 667 28 February 1986 of the Prefecture of Preveza constituting the formal
application for consent, that the Directive does not apply. This despite the fact (as later discovered by
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complainant's assertion that the Commission was, ex post, trying to justify its decision to
close the file to disguise the real motivation. This constituted an instance of
maladministration.
Finally the Ombudsman tackled the difficult issue ofmisconduct by a Commission official,
stating that:
'there appear to be sufficient reasons to mistrust the impartial and proper
handling of the case, and to question that the official in question did not conduct
himself solely with the interest of the Communities in mind. In fact, it would be
difficult for any citizen in any Member State not to doubt the impartiality of the
Commission's actions as Guardian of the Treaty if a Commission official, who
is deeply involved with an infringement case, also holds a post in a political
party in the very Member State that case concerns and acts publicly in that
capacity at a time when the case is being dealt with. In the eyes of European
citizens, this kind of incident may put at risk the reputation of the Commission
as guardian of the Treaty, responsible for promoting the rule of law...this
constitutes an instance ofmaladministration.' (my emphasis)
This aspect of the case reveals that the way in which infringement complaints are dealt with
by Commission officials means that the possibility of abuse of power by individual
Commission officials is left completely unchecked. On detailed reading of the case and the
carefully chosen words of the Ombudsman, there seemed to be no safeguards to ensure that
an official, directly involved in ensuring the correct application ofCommunity law, was not
also being paid to act as an advisor to those who were set on ensuring the project went ahead.
The Commission's conduct throughout the initial complaint and again throughout the course
of the Ombudsman's inquires, completely undermined any serious commitment to good
governance or good administrative behaviour. Not only did the Commission fail to adhere to
some of the basic procedural steps already agreed to in the course of the 1997 own initiative
inquiry (such as acknowledgment of receipt of a complaint, keeping the complainant
informed of the progress of the complaint), they willingly concealed crucial information,
firstly from the complainant and subsequently from the Ombudsman himself.
Although the Parga case is a particularly shocking example ofmaladministration, including
the alleged misconduct of an official, this is not the crucial aspect of the case in terms of
good administration in infringement investigations. One official's misconduct can easily be
explained away as one-off situation, and there is no evidence to suggest such unbelievable
behaviour occurs as a matter of general practice. More important, in terms of taking an
the Ombudsman) that this sudden 'discovery' was in reality pointed out by the complainant to the
Commission in her initial complaint in July 1995, and was therefore not a new element at all.
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overview of Commission practice in infringement investigations, is the persistent disregard
of procedural steps that have already been agreed to by the Commission as a result of the
Ombudsman's intervention.
The consequences of this flagrant disregard of procedure are a complete undermining of the
Commission as an institution committed to good administration and good governance. This
can and will have detrimental effects on how citizens perceive the Commission, undermining
its legitimacy as well as that of the enforcement procedure. In some cases, such as Parga, the
complete disregard of basic procedure can help to conceal unethical conduct: this reinforces
why administrative procedure is crucial to the legitimation of a system of governance. The
only hope of increasing procedural legitimacy in the administration of the infringement
investigations is through adopting (and actually carrying out) basic procedural steps that
serve to some extent to structure Commission behaviour under the enforcement process, and
provide an appropriate context within which citizen-Commission interaction can be
constructive.
4.0: The results of the Ombudsman's intervention
The Ombudsman's intervention in the Commission's investigation of infringement
complaints has certainly been significant in terms of achieving some measure of satisfaction
for individual complainants. As a result of these cumulative individual complaints and
Ombudsman-Commission interaction, there has been some success in obtaining a
commitment to overhaul the Commission administration of infringement investigations.
This culminated in the production of a complaint form and set of 'guarantees' by the
Commission. The following subsections outline the latest administrative measures that the
Commission has undertaken to comply with in relation to handling complaints under Article
226, and examines to what extent these administrative measures represent a significant
breakthrough for the treatment of complainants in relation to Article 226 complaints.
4.1: The Commission Communication: a complaint form for citizens
In 2002, and as a result of the Macedonia Metro case and associated criticisms from the
Ombudsman, the Commission decided to publish a standardised complaint form and
codicil58 of:
58 Commission Communication on Relations with the Complainant in Respect of Infringements of
Community Law' COM (2002) 141, my emphasis, hereinafter 'Communication'.
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'administrative measures for the benefit of the complainant with which it [the
Commission] undertakes to comply when handling his/her complaint and
assessing the infringement in question '.59 (my emphasis)
The list ofmeasures broadly corresponds to the issues tackled by the Ombudsman in the
course of his investigations into individual complaints and in particular, to those measures
agreed with the Commission in the course of the own initiative inquiry. Thus, firstly the
Commission undertakes the general commitment to record all genuine complaints in a
central registry held by the Secretariat General of the Commission, and to formally
acknowledge receipt of all correspondence within fifteen days of receipt. Within one month
of this first formal acknowledgment, the Commission undertakes to send a further
acknowledgment with a formal case number. If the Commission decides not to register the
complaint, it must notify the complainant of this decision by writing, setting out the reasons
for this decision, and informing the complainant of any alternative avenues of redress. To
facilitate the process of complaints, the Commission has designed a complaint form,
accessible on the internet, although complainants may simply submit a complaint in writing
without using this. This basic administrative organisation of complaint handling is where the
Ombudsman's initial efforts at altering the Commission's behaviour began and was most
successful.
The Communication then moves on to more controversial ground. The Commission
undertakes to contact complainants and inform them in writing after each decision has been
taken in response to their complaint. This would be carried out by the relevant DG
investigating the complaint rather than the Secretariat General. The Commission goes on to
state that:
'at any point during the procedure complainants may ask to explain or clarify to
the Commission officials...the grounds for their complaint.'60
Even interpreting this clause narrowly to mean that all the complainant can expect is to be
informed as each decision is taken, this is still exactly what did not happen in relation to the
Parga complaint. Decisions were taken, and the complainant was not informed, with or
without explanation. The choice ofwording is instructive - the complainant may ask to
explain, but is not entitled to a hearing to give an explanation.
The Communication contains a clause on time-limits, and this is something that the




Commission undertakes to keep all investigations to one year, after which time the
Commission must decide to close a case or begin the infringement process by issuing a
formal notice (unless there are exceptional circumstances). In reality, it is in the
Commission's own interest to keep to this (generous) time-limit. If there is an infringement,
it should want to prosecute as quickly as possible, and the only hindrance to that is obtaining
information from the Member State. The complainant is likely to prove a valuable source of
information anyway, making it much easier to pin down the facts of the Member State's
conduct. The get-out clause of 'exceptional circumstances' provides an easy justification if
this time-limit is not met. However, the imposition of a time limit was an achievement in
itself, especially since the Court of Justice had never imposed a formal time limit to restrict
the Commission's discretion.
The Communication also addresses the thorny issue of the outcome of infringement
investigations, which is the root cause of the most serious complaints to the Ombudsman
regarding the Commission's handling of their complaint. The Communication is carefully
worded to leave the complainant (and the Ombudsman) in no uncertainty as to the
Commission's view:
'After investigating a complaint, Commission officials may ask the College of
Commissioners either to issue a formal notice...or to close the case definitively.
The Commission will decide on the matter at its discretion. This discretion
shall cover not only the desirability of opening or terminating an infringement
procedure but also the choice of complaint. Complainants will be informed in
writing of the decision taken...and any subsequent decisions taken on the
matter.'61 (my emphasis)
This makes clear that even where an infringement has been uncovered by the Commission
officials, they are under no obligation to inform the College anyway. So the discretion
enjoyed under the infringement procedure does not only extend to the political decision¬
making of the College, but also to individual officials with the DG. This is further clarified
in the section entitled 'simplified procedure for closing cases'. The Communication states
that where there has not been a formal letter dispatched (i.e. the case has never been referred
to the College), the case may be closed by a procedure that does not include any notification
to the College at all.
This procedure may be applied in cases where complaints are considered:
61 Communication above n 58 clause 9.
200
'groundless or irrelevant; or that there is no evidence, or insufficient evidence,
to substantiate the complaint. The procedure may also be applied where the
complainant shows no further interest in prosecution of the complaint.'62
This clause is interesting because the Commission has made it quite clear, repeatedly and in
the beginning of this very Communication, that firstly, Article 226 does not represent an
avenue that is to be utilised for citizens to defend their legal interests, and secondly, that
complainants do not have to demonstrate an interest in order to complain. So citizens do not
have to have an interest (legal or otherwise) to complain, but they must have an interest for
the Commission to continue to investigate the complaint! The Commission's duty to
investigate relates to their duty as guardian of the Treaties, and not because a citizen
demonstrates continuing interest in the suspected infringement: regardless of whether the
citizen cares, the Commission ought to.
The closure of cases was something that the Ombudsman specifically raised in the
Macedonia Metro case. The Communication states that the Commission will henceforth
notify the complainant when it is proposing to close a case, in order to give the complainant
the opportunity to respond to this decision, before the case is finally closed. The letter will
set out the grounds on which the Commission is basing its decision to close the case, and
will invite the complainant to submit comments within a period of four weeks. Where the
complainant does not respond, or where the complainant cannot be contacted for reasons for
which he/she is responsible, or where the complainant's observations do not persuade the
Commission to change its decision, the case will be closed. The four week period is an
obvious improvement to the eight days allowed by the Commission in the Macedonia Metro
case, but this entire process is still conducted by formal letter i.e. through the regular mail.
In order to allow the complainant an adequate response time, the Commission might have
committed to more up-to-date and speedier methods of correspondence, such as email.
Finally, the Commission states that it will publish a list of formal notices and reasoned
decisions sent to Member States on its infringement website. This does not contain any
details of the complaint or conduct, but is simply a list of legislation infringed and stage of
the infringement process. At the end of the Communication, the Commission reiterates that
it handles all requests for information in accordance with the Regulation on Access to
62 Communication ibid clause 11.
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Documents 1049/200163, but as I have already noted in Chapter II, this in fact does not
enable access to documents connected with infringement investigations.
4.2: Consequences of the code
The measures adopted in the code are not legally binding on the Commission. The language
used by the Commission in its drafting of the code is particularly instructive, in that it only
'undertakes to comply' with these measures, and does not at any point refer to these as
administrative rules, or measures that generate any kind of rights for the complainant. The
measures in the code are by no means a true reflection of all the achievements of the
Ombudsman in individual cases. Although these broad measures are now 'horizontal'
commitments of the Commission, in individual cases the Ombudsman is often able to
achieve far greater results for the complainant.
The Code lacks the basic commitment to full and frank reasoning. At no point does the
Commission use the language of'reasoned decisions' and instead only commits to
'informing' the complainant as to decisions being taken. Although the Commission
undertakes 'to set out the grounds' for a decision, this is not the same as providing a fully
reasoned decision; in fact the phrase 'reasons for decisions' never appears in the text of the
code at all. This is not to suggest that the Ombudsman has not succeeded in deducing the
reasons for some complaints being closed as a result of detailed investigation, inspection of
files and back and forth correspondence with the Commission, but this is evidently still not
accepted by the Commission as the appropriate way to conduct infringement investigations.
The Communication is also used as an opportunity to re-entrench a specific sticking point
between the Commission and the Ombudsman in relation to the proper extent of the
Ombudsman's interference in Article 226 administration. The Commission's view is that the
proper remit of the Ombudsman is strictly within the area of the organisation of the
administration of investigations - registering complaints, acknowledgment, notification,
time-limits etc. Re-examining the reasoning of the Commission for dismissing a complaint
is outside the remit of the Ombudsman according to this viewpoint. The Commission alone
is sole judge of whetherprima facie there may have been an infringement of the Treaty, and
that no other institution can objectively assess the facts of a complaint and make a different
determination. Clearly, the Ombudsman has reached a different conclusion to the
63
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents OJ L 145
31.5.2001.
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Commission as to whether there has been a prima facie infringement in a number of cases,
including the Parga complaint. The Ombudsman has stated that the Commission must
adequately reason its decisions in order to demonstrate that it has carried out its duty as
guardian of the Treaties, and therefore the Ombudsman has the right to review whether this
reasoning is sound or not.
The clause relating to the outcome of investigations is interesting. The Commission expands
its already vast discretion further by stating that it need not refer cases to the College.
According to the Treaty and the Commission's (and ECJ's) interpretation ofArticle 226, it is
the College of Commissioners that is ultimately responsible for deciding whether or not to
prosecute an infringement of the Treaty. The Commission defends the cumbersome
procedure and lack of efficiency within the provision on the basis that decisions cannot be
taken by officials (which would be more efficient) for this very reason. In the
Communication, this no longer seems to be the case, and some (negative) decisions are
indeed taken by officials although the case law and Treaty provisions have remained the
same.
4.3:The Ombudsman's principles in the administration of infringements
The Ombudsman's original definition of maladministration was a flexible and open-ended
guide, but it was not particularly useful to the institutions since it (purposely) did not identify
the type of behaviour that would lead to a finding ofmaladministration by the Ombudsman.
This definition was based on the case law of the ECJ and the common principles of
administrative practice to be found in the Member States, leading to some commentators to
criticise the definition as being too narrow and legalistic.64 A further explanation of this
concept is provided by the Ombudsman in the CGAB. This states that overall, good
64 See R Rawlings, 'Engaged Elites: Citizen Action and Institutional Attitudes in Commission
Enforcement' (2000) 6 European Law Journal 4. Compare the Ombudsman's rather vague definition
to an approach adopted in English administrative law known as the 'Crossman Catalogue'. This list
included principles such as 'bias, neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude, perversity,
turpitude, arbitrariness and so on'. More recently, this was updated by the UK Ombudsman as
including: rudeness; unwilling to treat the complainant as a person with rights; refusal to answer
reasonable questions; neglecting to inform the complainant of his/her rights or entitlement; knowingly
giving misleading or inadequate advice; ignoring valid advice or overruling considerations which
would produce an uncomfortable result for the decision maker; offering no redress; showing bias;
omission to notify those who thereby lose a right of appeal; refusal to inform adequately of the right to
appeal; faulty procedures; failure by management to monitor compliance with adequate procedures;
cavalier disregard of guidance intended to produce equitable treatment of service users; partiality;
failure to mitigate the effects of rigid adherence to the letter of the law where that produces manifestly
inequitable treatment. P Leyland and G Woods, Textbook on Administrative Law (5th Edition, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2005) p 146.
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administrative behaviour is concerned with 'promoting the rule of law and showing respect
for European citizens '(my emphasis),65 and therefore maladministration was the opposite of
the principles contained in the Code. The idea of good administration goes beyond mere
legality and extends to something more nebulous.
The soft law Code is the only reference point for the proper conduct of European
administration. The principles contained in the Code are not particularly adventurous or far-
reaching. They are fairly classic and basic administrative principles that ought not to be
considered as placing too much of an administrative burden on the institutions, and they have
been developed by a European institution with the context of the European Union in mind.
The classic balance to be maintained between respecting the rights of citizens, and not
fettering the discretion of the public body, is not undermined by adhering to the
Ombudsman's Code and in reality the conservative approach of the Code protects
administrative discretion to a great extent.
The principles contained in the Code are set out in Table 4 below. Table 4 illustrates the
relationship between the broad concepts of good administration, good governance and
legitimacy. The top row of the table sets out the three criteria that constitute Beetham and
Lord's concept of legitimacy. The second row contains the Commission's five principles of
good governance, which further elaborates these key criteria of legitimacy, and positions the
principles as they relate to the overarching criteria of legitimacy. The third level of the table
contains the principles of good administrative behaviour identified in the CGAB, and
illustrates how these interrelate and feed into the wider concepts of good governance and
legitimacy. The highlighted sections of the table indicate which principles of good
administration have been adopted by the Commission in its handling of infringement
complaints and investigations in the Communication.
65 Above n 3 foreword.
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Table 4
Interlocking concepts of good administration, good governance and legitimacy
B&L Rules Justifications Consent







































Notes: B&L = Beetham and Lord's model oflegitimacy.
WPG = Principles ofgood governancefrom the White Paper on Governance.
CGAB = Principles ofgood administration from the Ombudsman's Code ofGood
Administrative Behaviour.
Out of some 20 substantive provisions in the CGAB, only six of the principles of good
administration are mentioned in the Communication which lists the administrative
'guarantees' that the Commission undertakes to comply with in relation to its dealings with
complaints under Article 226.83 Only five of these principles are in practice adhered to, with
the principle of giving reasoned decisions still being resisted by the Commission, particularly
in its rejection of a complaint, or refusal to prosecute, an alleged infringement. Although the
66 Above n 3 Article 10.
67 Ibid Article 17.
68 Ibid Article 18.
69 Ibid Article 16.
70 Ibid Article 8.
71 Ibid Article 17.
72 Ibid Article 7.
73 Ibid Article 12.
74 Ibid Article 9.
75 Ibid Article 4.
76 Ibid Article 13.
77 Ibid Article 8.
78 Ibid Article 21.
79 Ibid Article 11.
80 Ibid Article 6.
81 Ibid Article 14.
82 Ibid Article 5.
83 Communication above n 39.
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duty to state the grounds for decisions is listed in the Communication, it has hardly been
practiced with conviction by the Commission, as evidenced in the numerous complaints on
this very problem to the Ombudsman. Five out of 20 is not a particularly convincing
approach to good administration in the administration of Article 226 complaints.
There are some very basic principles that were not adopted by the Commission in regard to
its handling of infringement complaints that might have been. For instance, one technique is
to provide the name of the official that the complainant is corresponding with, or who is
dealing with complaint within the relevant DG. This is simply about providing a face to the
otherwise impersonal, intimidating and faceless public bureaucracy; it is a cheap, yet
effective, mechanism of good administrative behaviour. This is especially relevant to an
institution such as the Commission which is the institution that most citizens complain
about,84 and yet the practice in regard to infringement investigations is to sign each letter in
the name of the Unit Head of a DG, rather than the actual official dealing with the
oc
investigation.
Basic professional conduct, such as signing one's own correspondence and courteousness
could have been incorporated into the Communication as standards of good administration,
but were not. Such standards of behaviour, including apologising for mistakes and providing
contact details for individual officials, help combat the allegations that Commission officials
are arrogant and highhanded in the discharge of their Article 226 duties. It is not clear
whether the Ombudsman has pushed for such standards of behaviour to be included
specifically in the Communication; these are not areas the Ombudsman has pursued in
respect of individual infringement complaints, which seems odd as he specifically referred to
the 'high handed and arrogant' conduct of Commission officials when he undertook his own
initiative inquiry.
Another interesting omission from the Communication is the term 'efficiency' which in
general is a key watchword of the Commission's overall commitment to technocratic
governance, especially in relation to its policy on effective enforcement. Above all things,
the Commission accepts that efficient governance is good governance. Efficiency is also a
part of good administration, although it is not adopted as such in respect of the handling
complaints and investigations. Although the Ombudsman managed to obtain a half-hearted
84 In 2004 69% of inquiries concerned the Commission, source The European Ombudsman Annual
Report 2004.
85 Interview, Commission Official G (26 October 2005).
206
commitment to close a file or open proceedings within one year (except in special
circumstances), there is no other mention of dealing with complaints in an efficient or timely
manner: the term 'efficiency' is entirely absent from the Communication.
The CGAB has not been an unqualified success in changing the administrative culture of
institutions. This is demonstrated first and foremost by the refusal of the Commission to
either adopt the CGAB in its entirety as the relevant guideline for the staff of the
Commission in dealing with citizens, or to take the initiative to turn the CGAB into a binding
piece of legislation, as called for by the European Parliament and Ombudsman. However the
Parliament and other institutions have adopted the CGAB, and in particular, the European
agencies apply the code as originally drafted by the Ombudsman as the appropriate standard
of interaction with citizens. The next section will evaluate why some of the principles of
good administration have been more problematic than others for the Ombudsman, in terms
of inducing a change in behaviour in the routine administration of complaint handling and
infringement investigation.
5.0: Good administration and good governance in infringement
investigations
The vast majority of the principles in the Ombudsman's Code ought to be applicable in the
Commission's management of infringement investigations and its dealings with
complainants. The Ombudsman's principles all fit broadly within the Commission's own
vision of good governance in the EU, and thus, should be embraced by the Commission
since they can help to create legitimacy in the eyes of the European citizen. In broad terms,
the management of infringement investigations is weakest under the good governance
principles of coherence and effectiveness. Generally this is where the Commission scores
highest in terms of its overall policy and management of the enforcement mechanism. The
'strongest' area (although this is relative) is that ofparticipation which is generally the
weakest area for the Commission in general in terms of its overall management of the
enforcement mechanism. The following subsections will analyse which of the principles of
good administration have been inculcated into the codicil on relations with complainants and
how these interrelate to the Commission's own principles of good governance, and which
principles are notably absent, reducing the level of procedural legitimacy.
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5.1: Coherence and effectiveness
The principles of good administration that underpin the broader good governance principle
of coherence are a particular weak area of the administrative handling of complaints and
investigations by the Commission. Dealing with complaints in an independent, objective,
and fair manner with impartiality and respecting the legitimate expectations of complainants
is simply not accepted by the Commission as the correct approach to infringement
complaints and investigations. Furthermore, the Commission does not feel compelled to
defend this approach, and in fact, resents the inference that its power in respect of the
enforcement action should be confined in this way. This is endemic in the process of dealing
with alleged infringements of the Treaty, but is also related to institutional practices that are
out of date for an EU desperate to create an impression of legitimacy.
The blurred line between political and administrative decision-making undermines any
claims (although few are made) about the impartial or objective treatment of complaints and
investigations. Examination of complaints to the Ombudsman, such as Parga, reveals that
even at the 'administrative' level of the DG, an infringement investigation does not always
amount to an objective, fair and impartial view of the factual evidence. This damages the
credibility of the Commission in the discharge of its guardian function under Article 226.
The neutral guardian approach is undermined by the rejection of an impartial and objective
approach to complaint handling and infringement investigations.
Many complaints to the Ombudsman centre around the suspicion that the Commission is
acting on 'political motivations'. This phrase, or something similar, occurs repeatedly in
allegations made by complainants. The lack of objectivity, impartiality or fairness is exactly
what these types of complaints are pointing to although the Commission resolutely refuses to
address these claims. The Commission has the legal right to act unfairly, arbitrarily and with
partisanship in the discharge of its guardian function and operation of the enforcement
action. However, the Commission refuses to explain its partisan, unfair and arbitrary
conduct, and this infuriates complainants and prolongs Ombudsman investigations
unnecessarily. This attitude has been criticised by the Parliament which has recently
emphasised the Commission's duty to register all complaints which denounce a real
violation ofCommunity law without selection.86
86
Report of the European Parliament: 'Report on the Commission's 21st and 22nd Annual Reports on
monitoring the application of Community law' Committee on Legal Affairs, 24 March 2006 A6-
0089/2006 final p 7.
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There might be many valid reasons why the Commission may choose not to pursue a
suspected infringement pointed out by a complainant. There might be a lack of evidence, or
the Commission might reasonably conclude from its experience that the factual
circumstances of the complaint might make a case impossible to prove. The complaint
might represent a 'one off instance of corruption or misconduct by a national official that
the Commission perceives is best dealt with through informal channels or a complementary
mechanism.87 It might be an infraction in an area of law the Commission does not view as a
priority as part of its own political strategy. All of the above explanations would constitute
acceptable reasons, if clearly articulated to the complainant, for not pursuing the case. It
might even be defended as good administration to prioritise complaints (and therefore not
treat all complaints equally), but this requires an explanation or justification to be made to
the complainant along those lines, rather than simply rejecting the complaint without
explanation, or with formulaic reasoning that further undermines the Commission's
credibility. Instead the Commission asserts there is no infringement.
Although the Communication might create a legitimate expectation as to how a complainant
might be treated, in reality, there is no way (judicially or otherwise) to enforce that legitimate
expectation. If the Commission does not register a complaint, does not give reasons for a
decision, does not provide an opportunity to respond to notification of closure of a
complaint, the complainant can do nothing except complain to the Ombudsman. The
Commission accepts the necessity for treating Member States equally, impartially and fairly
once the case is pursued to the ECJ (because Member States can defend these rights in the
ECJ) but the same cannot be said of the complainant. There is no adequate defence of this
behaviour, except to state that the Court of Justice's case law does not prevent the
Commission acting unfairly, arbitrarily and in breach of legitimate expectations. It may be
legal, but it is surely not good administration.
The production of the Communication is aimed, to a certain degree, at creating a uniform
process ofhandling complaints across the Commission, so that complainants are treated
fairly and without discrimination. The absence of these terms in the Communication itself
reveals one of the key tensions between the Ombudsman and the Commission. Although the
Commission might be committed to certain administrative organisational steps which would
be applied across the range of complaints, it is not committed to fairness and non-
87 See Chapter V.
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discrimination in the investigation and subsequent decision-making in relation to the
substance of the complaint.
5.2: Openness and accountability
Good administrative behaviour promotes an open and accountable administration. In the
absence of openness and accountability, users of the administration become suspicious of
decisions that appear objectively or factually incorrect, and particularly where there is no
right of appeal, such behaviour undermines the legitimacy of the institution. In infringement
investigations, even the very basic expectation of being provided with reasons for a decision
is denied by the Commission. It is of course a classic and legalistic administrative technique
being deployed by the Commission, designed for damage limitation - the less a decision is
explained, the less easily it can be challenged. Such a limited and realistic goal as obtaining
a fully reasoned decision (and a truthful one) does not however affect the Commission's
unlimited and absolute discretion on whether to prosecute a Member State in connection
with a possible infringement. It might, at most, result in more reasoned opinions being
issued to Member States as, after full and frank reasoning, if it is clear the Commission
perceives there is an infringement, the Commission is mandated to move to this next step by
the Treaty.
The time is long past where the issuing of reasoned opinions is a rare and politically
sensitive event.88 In fact it gives absolutely no more legal rights to the complainant in terms
of forcing action before the court, so the defensive approach to answering these complaints
only hinders the Commission's relationship with the European citizen (not to mention the
Ombudsman) for absolutely no gain in institutional power. It also compromises the utility of
the procedure, as the Commission's time is taken up again and again with requests for
greater clarity, which in turn undermines the Commission's own agenda of increasing
efficiency in the administration of infringement investigations. This is not to suggest the
complainant is not entitled to a reasoned explanation from the Commission because this
somehow places an unacceptable fetter on the institution's discretion, but rather that the
Commission's time would be better utilised if it provided this explanation in the first
instance.
88
Timmermans, CWA 'Judicial Protection against Member States: 169 and 177 revisited' in D Curtin
and T Heukels (eds), Institutional Dynamics ofEuropean Integration. Essays in Honour ofHenry G.
Schermers Volume II (Martinus Nijhoff. Dordrecht, 1994) 391.
210
It could be argued that the case-by-case approach of the Ombudsman does not achieve a
transformation in the attitude of the Commission towards the Article 226 complainants,
because such an approach concentrates on achieving individual satisfaction - these efforts
remain seemingly unconnected in the Commission mindset.89 Once the Ombudsman pushes
for a clear explanation of the Commission's reasoning he may obtain it in the particular case,
but this does not necessarily transform the behaviour of the Commission in the next case the
Commission handles. So it becomes a routine of one step forward, two steps back. By the
end of the Ombudsman's exhaustive inquiry into a complaint, the complainant may achieve
a fairly detailed explanation of the Commission's reasoning process, although not every
complainant receives this in-depth treatment. Though the ultimate decision is not reversed,
and as with the Parga case the whole point of the initial complaint to the Commission has
become moot, the complainant might claim some vindication in revealing the misconduct of
the Commission. This is a classic situation where the redress model90 of the Ombudsman
only proves effective for that one complainant who is tenacious enough to pursue a claim for
years through the Ombudsman before any explanation is received.
The Commission has overtly acknowledged the complainants' right to appeal to the
Ombudsman in its Communication.91 This right of appeal is supposed to relate to how the
Commission has handled the original complaint, rather than an appeal of the Commission's
decision to commence infringement proceedings (i.e. the substance of the complaint). There
is no right of appeal on the substance in any forum at all due to the courts' case law.92 In
practice however, the Ombudsman has begun to wear away at such fine distinctions and, as
was seen in the Parga complaint, occasionally the Ombudsman reinvestigates the original
complaint from scratch. Notwithstanding this, the Commission remains the final decision
maker under Article 226 as the Ombudsman can only review and criticise ex post.
The lack of appeal to any institution has compounded the Commission's behaviour in the
administration of infringement investigations. Without legally enforceable administrative
rights, the Commission remains at liberty to conduct its affairs as it sees fit. With no other
body able to judge the lawfulness of this conduct, it is not surprising that the administration
89 This might in fact be exactly the reason the Ombudsman chooses this approach, as it appears easier
in the short term to achieve effective results almost by stealth. An all out assault would in fact cause
the Commission to sit up and take notice and may inspire a more combative attitude on their part.
90
Heede, K European Ombudsman: redress and control at Union level (Kluwer Law International,
The Netherlands, 2000).
91 Communication above n 39 para 14.
92 Case T-191/99 Petrie and Others v Commission [2001] ECR-II 3677.
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of infringement investigations has progressed into a regulatory black hole without adequate
checks and balances on institutional power. This places even greater emphasis on the correct
decision-making process being followed in the first instance since there is no appeal to
review or correct that decision.
The area of good administration that has been most disappointing in terms of the
Ombudsman's impact on legitimating the administration of infringements is that of access to
information. The Ombudsman has yet to make inroads in this regard, despite complaints
from citizens. A recent complaint, detailed in the 2003 Annual Report shows that the
Ombudsman has not given up hope of prising open this area of Article 226, but is perhaps
dependent on the right complaint coming along.93 The recent complaint related to the public
access to the letter of formal notice sent to the offending Member State.94 This is an issue
that has been tried in the courts already without success, and indeed the Ombudsman found
there was no maladministration in refusing access to the letter of formal notice. However, it
is notable that he chose to emphasise the fact that if in future a complainant could establish
an overriding public interest in disclosure of such documents, this might amount to an
instance to maladministration. Although this is the same test as that in the applicable
legislation, there is probably more hope of establishing this overriding public interest in the
mind of the Ombudsman, because of the process of information exchange in Ombudsman
investigations, than in the Court where the complainant's access to the information (which
would prove an overriding public interest) would probably be unavailable. Nonetheless this
is still disappointing as this is the same standard that the Court applies.
The particular investigative tools of the Ombudsman, of requesting an inspection of the fdes
and interviewing individual Commission staff, have been invaluable. But these tools have
not been without controversy - behind every request for information from the Ombudsman is
the possibility that eventually, information provided by the Commission could be double
checked by an outsider. In the Macedonia Metro case the Ombudsman chose to interview
Commission staff, who he found were unable to speak on their own behalf due to the
relevant regulations, and could only divulge information that had been authorised by their
line manager. This has been amended slightly to allow a more independent stance to be
taken, but certainly not to the extent to which the Ombudsman and Parliament had
93 Interview, Mr. Olivier Verheecke, Principal Legal Advisor, Office of European Ombudsman (5
April 2005).
94 Decision of European Ombudsman on Complaint 1437/2002/IJH.
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requested.95 The Commission resisted the attempt by the Ombudsman and European
Parliament to change the words from 'shall continue to be bound by their duty of
professional secrecy' to 'shall give complete and truthful information', though they did
accept the removal of the words 'on behalfof and in accordance with instructions from their
administrations'. There is no guarantee that this is the end of the matter for the Ombudsman,
who may well return to this battle at some point in the future.96 It is vital that Commission
staff are compelled to give truthful answers to the Ombudsman,97 as this is the only conduit
by which citizens can access information. Not only is the key principle of openness
underdeveloped in the administration ofArticle 226 in the first place, it is important that the
Commission accepts that full and frank reasoning of decisions is the time efficient option
and the correct good governance approach to take in Article 226.
The Communication contains no reference to the principle of proportionality, a well
established administrative principle in the EU system. This is interesting as, from the
Commission's perspective, the proportionality principle could be a useful method of
distinguishing the complaints it will pursue from those it dismisses. Proportionality in this
sense is defined widely to mean taking the appropriate action necessary in all the
circumstances. Decisions to pursue or not to pursue a complaint might be defended on
'reasonableness' grounds according to particular circumstances of each case. Applying a
proportionality test would however necessitate a clearer explanation of the decision-making
process of the Commission, but would also help to legitimise how the Commission
prioritises the cases it pursues.
The figures produced by the Ombudsman do not quantify how many of all of the
infringement complaints (received over the past nine years) have ended in a friendly solution
as opposed to a critical or further remark. An examination of the complaints that are
selectively detailed in the Annual Reports produced by the Ombudsman reveals that no
infringement complaints were in fact settled by a friendly solution, and only five complaints
(out of eight Annual Reports) were stated to have been satisfactorily settled by the
95 Commission Opinion on amendments to the regulations and general conditions governing the
performance of the Ombudsman's duties 6.3.2002 COM (2002) 133 final.
96
Interview, Mr. Olivier Verheecke, Principal Legal Advisor, Office of European Ombudsman (5
April 2005).
91 The Ombudsman himself is still restricted from passing on information that is regarded as
confidential by the Commission so this does not impinge on the obligation to safeguard personal data
or business information.
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Commission.98 Falling numbers of citizen complaints in relation to Article 226 can be
interpreted in several different ways, and may or may not support the assertion that citizens
are more satisfied and have more acceptance of the way in which infringement complaints
are handled by the Commission.
Acceptance is important in identifying whether a process has legitimacy99; if citizens feel a
process offers some accountability of public actors to private citizens, it is feasible to
speculate that the public would be more accepting of the process. The Ombudsman's
principles in the CGAB of giving reasons, lawfulness, a right to appeal, objectivity and non¬
discrimination are crucial to the legitimisation of Article 226 since the citizen can find no
place in court for any of these types of accountability. These are the concrete standards that
build citizen acceptance. The Ombudsman has had some success in this area by obtaining a
formal commitment to provide reasons, and by reinforcing the notion that operating within
the strict limits of the law does not amount to a carte blanche on how infringement
investigations are conducted.100
5.3: Participation
The Ombudsman has managed to achieve the most for complainants under the general
heading of participation, which is otherwise one of the weakest areas of Commission
management of the enforcement action. The Ombudsman has managed to establish that
complainants can expect to present their views (and evidence) to the Commission, and
expect a right to respond to the decision to close a case, effectively establishing a process of
interaction with the Commission which had been previously lacking in the Commission's
handling of infringement complaints. This element of good administrative behaviour could
be improved further with an increased commitment to administrative techniques at no
additional cost (in terms of resources or discretion) to the Commission at all. The
Commission's relationship with the complainant is explained in the Communication
produced by the Commission.101 The Commission states that it:
'conducts its relations with complainants in accordance with its code on good
administrative conduct, under which complainants are entitled to receive a reply
in line with their expectations, even if these exceed the Commission's
prerogatives.. .The obligation to reply under the code of good conduct should be
98 The European Ombudsman Annual Report 1996-2004.
99 This is the second criterion in Beetham and Lord's model of legitimacy, see Chapter III.
11)0 Decision of European Ombudsman on Complaint 995/98/0V.
101 Commission Communication 'Better Monitoring of the Application of Community Law' COM
(2002) 725 final/4. 16.5.2003
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applied in such a way that citizens are given careful and reasoned replies...the
Commission must ensure it remains neutral and objective in its replies.'
Despite these remarks, it does not seem in practice that the Commission has revolutionised
its approach to dealing with citizens' complaints. Nonetheless, the Ombudsman's
intervention has been useful in other ways. The most important aspect of increasing
participation is arguably the participation of the Ombudsman himself. This inter-
institutional interaction provides a window into the administration of Commission
enforcement, as well as an avenue of grievance satisfaction for citizens who feel they have
been unfairly treated.
Concluding remarks
If the enforcement mechanism as a whole is based on a vision of technocratic and procedural
good governance, and the executive policy has focused on increasing legitimacy through
technocratic measures, the administrative function ofArticle 226 has lacked the same
development. The administrative element of Article 226 remains vulnerable to criticism of a
lack of good administrative behaviour on the part of the Commission, and therefore of
procedural legitimacy. Procedural legitimacy means simply that an administration will
follow a legitimate set of procedural rules when exercising discretionary decision-making
powers.102 This is especially important when the administration is in direct contact with
citizens, and the decisions being taken affect the interests of the citizen. Furthermore, it is
also necessary that the set of procedural rules being followed appears to legitimise the
decisions being taken, and therefore the quality of these procedural rules is paramount: it is
insufficient that a set of 'rules' simply exists. It is also necessary to consider exactly what
these procedural rules are applicable to: is it administrative organisation or substantive
decision-making?
The Ombudsman has concentrated his efforts on improving the Commission's administration
of infringement investigations by focusing on four basic administrative principles. First, by
insisting on basic organisational changes to complaint handling procedures such as
registering a complaint, acknowledging a complaint, and obtaining a general commitment to
timeliness in handling complaints. Secondly, the Ombudsman has attempted to instil the
automatic practice of full and frank reasoning in the Commission's correspondence with
complainants, especially in regard to reasons why they will/will not prosecute the Member
State under Article 226. Thirdly, the general administrative principle of a right to a fair
102 This correlates to the legitimacy criteria of'rules' in Beetham and Lord's model of legitimacy, see
Chapter III.
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hearing underscores the ability of a complainant to have a proper opportunity to respond to
the Commission's decision-making. Finally, but with most far reaching effects, is the
Ombudsman's decision to ensure that the Commission takes 'reasonable' decisions in
relation to infringement investigations, by stating that the Ombudsman will re-evaluate the
Commission's decision-making process according to standards contained in the CGAB. The
Ombudsman's achievements are not a sufficient substitute for effective judicial review of the
Commission's administration however, as the Ombudsman cannot render the Commission's
decisions null and void, nor can he provide a remedy for the complainant.
It should be emphasised that the purpose of changing the Commission's approach to its
interaction with complainants does not correlate to changing Article 226 into a mechanism of
individual grievance satisfaction. No doubt citizens may still feel aggrieved if the result of
an investigation does not favour their own objectives. Ensuring equitable procedures exist
for handling complaints is an end in itself, something to be achieved for the intrinsic benefits
that good processes bring, in terms of generating accountability and control of the discharge
ofpublic power. The Parga complaint illustrates what can go wrong in an infringement
investigation without the requisite administrative procedures being followed.
One of the most important aspects of the Ombudsman's intervention in Article 226 is that it
provides another source of information about the Commission's discharge of its guardian
function. This reduces the information asymmetry which undermines Parliament's ability to
properly monitor the Commission's conduct when it is carrying out its role as guardian of the
Treaties. The Commission may object to the imposition of administrative controls on its
discretion under Article 226, but these (very limited controls) serve several purposes. The
creation of good administrative culture fosters both internal and external accountability, and
creates efficiency and fairness in the treatment ofMember States and complainants.
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Chapter VII: Conclusions
1.1: Summary of findings
This study has attempted to analyse the role of Article 226, by examining it from the
perspective that it is a multi-functional mechanism in the Treaty that is influenced and
moulded by a multitude of actors. It has attempted to show that it is only through the
recognition of the different, but equally important functions, of Article 226 and the
contribution made by, and interaction of, all the actors involved, that a proper understanding
of the role ofArticle 226 can be gained. In trying to understand the role ofArticle 226 in the
Union, it is insufficient and misleading to analyse Article 226 only in terms of its ability to
deliver effective enforcement, or equally, only in terms of the influence and role of one
actor. Moreover, due to a lack of legal control on the discharge of executive power in
Article 226, it is only through examination of all the actors' behaviour and motivations that a
genuine analysis of Article 226 can be undertaken. These institutional/actor motivations can
only be appropriately analysed when placed against the wider legal and political
development of the Union; this illustrates to what extent the changing environment of the
Union (and therefore the motivations of the actors involved) has affected the static legal text
of Article 226. This requires a framework of analysis that can adequately capture the
different modalities of Article 226, the actors involved and the political context of the Union.
When examining the legal context, and in particular the impact of the ECJ, it is insufficient
to recite the judgments applicable only to Article 226. It is necessary to consider the Court's
approach in other enforcement actions, and across the EU more generally, with regard to the
availability ofjudicial review of the institutional discharge of public power, and its approach
to the protection of third parties. It is the interplay (or lack thereof) between the general
principles (i.e. the administrative protections in the EU system) and Article 226 that
illustrates the ECJ's abdication of responsibility under this mechanism. The reinforcement
of untrammelled Commission power has had negative knock-on effects in other areas of the
Treaty,' as evidenced by the approach to the CFI's judgment in max mobil.2 The ECJ's
approach to Article 226 prevented the evolution of case law in other areas of the Treaty from
becoming aligned with the political aspirations of good administration and transparency (as
contained in the proclaimed Charter of Fundamental Rights) by refusing to allow 'diligent
complaint handling' to be recognised as a minimum legal standard, in order to preserve the
' In relation to all the enforcement mechanisms in the Treaty and transparency.
2 Discussed in Chapter II, Case C-141/02P Commission v T-Mobile Austria GmbH, formerly max-
mobil Telekommunikation Service GmbH [2005] ECR1-1283.
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status quo in Article 226. This has robbed Article 226 of legal administrative protections,
and of the opportunity to instil a practice of synoptic reasoning or enhance the opportunity to
develop judicial review of discretionary power. It is crucial to understand the interplay of
this case law and the practice and policy of the Commission under Article 226, including the
'special relationship' between the Member State and Commission, which is buttressed by the
stranglehold on information in relation to what amounts to fulfdment of legal obligations.
This is both promoted by, and is a consequence of, the ECJ's case law on Article 226.
In the absence of legal controls on the discharge of public power under Article 226, it
becomes important to evaluate the extent and impact of the political controls in the
enforcement process. In evaluating the existence and quality of political controls, it is
necessary to construct a framework of analysis that is relevant to Article 226, the political
context of the Union which influences actor behaviour, and encapsulates the various actors
involved in moulding the role of Article 226.3 The policy of good governance is one way in
which the institutions and Member States have sought to increase greater legitimacy in EU
policy making - in the White Paper on Governance4 the Commission concentrates its good
governance agenda on increasing technocratic and procedural legitimacy in policy making
and delivery. This thesis considers whether there has been any impact upon Article 226 as a
result of the adoption of good governance techniques - is this able to fill the void (in control
and accountability) left by the lack ofjudicial review of conduct in Article 226? Adopting a
framework of analysis comprising good administration, good governance and legitimacy
flows directly from the consideration ofArticle 226 as a multi-functional mechanism
involving a number of different actors.5
When examining the impact of the different actors in Article 226, it has been necessary to
delve beneath the surface of documentary evidence, such as that in the Annual Monitoring
Reports or Communications of the Commission, Ombudsman and Parliament, or the case
law of the Court, in order to analyse to what extent practice in Article 226 resonates with the
stated policy (and how this can be measured, if it can be measured), and to what extent the
approach of the actors reflects a vision ofArticle 226 as a multi-functional mechanism.
3 See Chapter III for an analysis of the political context and especially pp 94-98, and Figure 2 for a
diagrammatic representation of the framework of analysis adopted in this thesis.
4
European Governance: A White Paper COM (2001) 428 hereinafter referred to as the WPG.
5 If only one function of Article 226 is considered, say effective enforcement, then the framework of
analysis would be different, concentrating on output legitimacy (number of infringements that are
remedied by the Commission) perhaps combined with consideration of efficiency gains. There would
be no need to consider a legitimate policy approach, procedural legitimacy or the role of other actors
(besides the complainant as information provider) in any detail.
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Particularly with regard to the Commission, this requires access to a wide range of
information, including information not contained in published documentation, which may
highlight the motivations behind institutional practices. Published documentation reveals
little about the inner workings of Commission departments, or the challenges faced by the
Commission in accommodating its competing roles and priorities within the enforcement
process. In order to understand these challenges, it was necessary to gather information by
conducting elite interviews with a wide range of Commission officials from different levels
and different DGs.6 In order to trace the approach of the Commission over time, it was
important to look at Annual Reports produced before and after the good governance agenda
became politically significant, and to analyse to what extent there had been either a change
in approach to Article 226, or whether 'good governance' policy statements on Article 226
are reflected in the Annual Monitoring Reports where the Commission reports the outcome
of its activities as guardian of the Treaties.
The lack of legal regulation of the Commission's discretion in Article 226 ensures that
executive (political) power remains protected, but this comes at a cost. The emphasis placed
on negotiation and cooperation with Member States means that the administration of
infringements has become a frustrating task, ultimately reducing the effectiveness of Article
226 and wasting precious Commission resources, by preventing decentralisation of
enforcement. Although this frustration resulted in a brief threat to become more combative
by prosecuting Member States for breach ofArticle 10, it would be a mistake to see this as a
fundamental change in practice, as the Commission quickly returned to a more conciliatory
approach; nor was this a new or novel tactic as analysis of previous Commission reports has
revealed.
The Commission's approach to Article 226 is reflected in its approach to Article 228, which
is similarly no more combative than before the good governance agenda, although its
practice with regard to transparency continues to be entirely different to its approach under
Article 226. This is due to the interplay between the Court and the Commission - it is the
ECJ that has taken a more proactive stance on financial penalties. Wresting control from the
Commission in its first judgment imposing a financial penalty, the ECJ prompted the
Commission to counter-manoeuvre by producing Communications on how the financial
penalties were to be imposed in future, re-emphasising its prerogative power and limiting the
Court's power to decide the amount of penalty imposed. The side effect of this power play
6 See Appendix 1 for collation of the data.
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was to make the imposition of financial penalties, including the way in which the
Commission would choose infringement cases and calculate the amount of penalty, a far
more transparent process than the investigation and prosecution ofArticle 226 cases.
Ultimately, it is the Court that has (in contravention of clear Treaty wording and the
Commission's Communications) reinterpreted the provision of Article 228 to make financial
penalties even more effective as a punishment for Member State infringements by enabling a
double penalty to be imposed.7 Even so, the Commission still has the ultimate role in
securing payment of those penalties, and has been less than convincing in this regard,
allowing Member States to evade financial penalties imposed by the Court, and facing
challenges from Member States who refuse to pay at all.
The political nature of the decision-making procedure, still unchanged since the inception of
the Communities, is a major obstacle to good governance in Article 226 and arguably no
longer appropriate, even ifwe adopt the Commission's vision of Article 226 as a single
function compliance mechanism. This affects both the internal efficiency of the
administration of Article 226 and the influence of politics on whether a Member State is
complying with its legal obligations. The vast differences in time elapsed before cases are
brought before the ECJ can, in part, be explained by the difference in the complexity of the
cases, but this is not the only factor or even the most significant. The practice of compliance
by negotiation is adopted not because this is either the most efficient or only solution to
enforcement under Article 226, but because it protects the Commission's executive power,
which in turn can be partly explained by the conflicting roles and divergent priorities of the
Commission in Article 226. However, this is self-defeating - it protects the Commission
from ex post control and accountability, but it also protects the Member States from having
to comply with their obligations by ensuring there is no opportunity for review of decision¬
making within Article 226.
The Commission' policy, outlined in the Communication8 following the WPG, is an attempt
to provide some guidance as to which cases of infringements will be pursued in the light of
its commitment to good governance. This was an opportunity for the Commission to
reinvent the enforcement mechanism in light of the great challenges it is to face after
enlargement of the Union, particularly in relation to the problems it already encounters
7 A Lump sum and a periodic penalty payment, see especially Chapter IV for the discussion of Article
228 and the implications of Case C-304/02 Commission v France [2005] 12 July 2005 nyr.
8 Discussed in Chapter V, Commission Communication 'Better Monitoring of the Application of
Community Law' COM (2002) 725 final/4 16.5.2003.
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regarding the scale of the task of enforcing conformity, and the scarcity of resources
available to the Commission for monitoring purposes. It was also a valuable opportunity to
address the important role played by other actors in enforcement, and to explore the rights
and obligations of the various actors involved. However, the Commission chose to
considerably narrow the scope of the Communication, with the vast majority of proposals
being aimed at prevention of infringements (rather than at Article 226 itself). To the extent
that Article 226 was focused upon, it was in the production of the priority criteria. This was
a disappointing attempt at producing greater clarity, because it did not provide policy
guidelines which were able to stand up to close scrutiny, either from the perspective of
increasing good governance or from developing a legitimate policy approach to enforcement.
It is only when this policy is examined against a framework of analysis relevant to Article
226, with the political and legal context in mind, and is analysed against the past practices of
the Commission, that a meaningful conclusion can be made as to whether there has been a
significant change in approach by the Commission in the light of good governance.
An explanation of the enforcement policy that is consistent with good governance and
legitimacy does not require an entirely new policy by the Commission by any means. Such a
policy could easily fit within the overall strategy of technocratic and procedural legitimacy
promoted by the Commission in the WPG, but it requires a broader overview of all the actors
and processes involved in the enforcement policy, and more focus on how to improve the
enforcement mechanism itself, rather than on ways to avoid infringements in the first place.
It requires the Commission to strike a balance between the exploration of technocratic
initiatives relating to transposition and non-notification of directives, and infractions that
leave citizens without a remedy due to misapplication of the rules within a Member State.
The Commission could have increased the element of procedural legitimacy by explaining
the important role that the European Parliament and Ombudsman could play in auditing the
Commission's performance as the guardian of the Treaties. Although the Commission
correctly identifies proper enforcement as being essential to the interests of the European
citizen, it does not recognise this as an opportunity for the Commission to deliver greater
accountability by offering an avenue for citizens to ensure their rights are protected.
It is important to consider the role of the Ombudsman in Article 226 as the interaction
between the citizen and Commission is revealed, as well as the function ofArticle 226 as an
administrative and regulatory tool, and its function as a forum of debate, control and
accountability. The Ombudsman has attempted to encourage reform of the administrative
221
phase ofArticle 226, by investigating specific complaints relating to the administrative
organisation of complaint handling by the Commission. This aspect ofArticle 226 can only
be explored through the complaints made to the Ombudsman, and subsequent reports made
by the Ombudsman, as the Commission does not release information relating to the
administrative function of Article 226. It provides an insight into how control and
accountability might be exercised over the Commission's extensive administrative
discretion, and to some extent, reveals precisely the reasons such control and accountability
are necessary in order to create some procedural legitimacy in the Commission's handling of
Article 226.
Despite a commitment to procedural legitimacy in the WPG, the administrative phase of
Article 226 has not been a focus of the Commission's policy proposals, even though this is
where the majority of Article 226 decision-making takes place. Consideration of the
Ombudsman's investigations into citizen complaints about the administration ofArticle 226
reveals the impact of the Court's case law regarding the position of citizens vis a vis
Commission discretion. In the lacunae created by a lack ofjudicial review, inappropriate
administrative practices have been allowed to flourish, and it is questionable to what extent
the Ombudsman, without powers of coercion or sanction, has been sufficiently able to
improve procedures. Appraisal of the Commission's approach to good administration
enables a meaningful review of the extent of procedural legitimacy in the Commission's
practices in Article 226; procedural legitimacy in the form of good administration dovetails
neatly with the Commission's principles of good governance, suggesting that there ought to
be little resistance to the standards of behaviour the Ombudsman has tried to introduce. The
Commission has accepted in principle a limited number of organisational reforms in the
handling of citizen complaints as a result of the Ombudsman's investigations, although the
extent to which this has filtered through all of the DGs into a consistent practice is
questionable. This can be traced back to the fractured practices across the DGs in relation to
handling infringements generally, as a result of internal culture, policy area, organisation and
commitment to pursuing infringements in a regimented bureaucratic fashion.
1.2: Re-conceptualising the role ofArticle 226
There is, at present, a discernable gap between the way in which the Article 226 mechanism
is operated and the prevailing agenda of the key policy makers in the EU. It is clear that the
traditional conception ofArticle 226, primarily fulfilling the function of an institutional
power base for the Commission, and an arena for secretive deal making with the Member
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States, contradicts the pervading agenda of good governance in the EU. The current
operation of Article 226 fails to meet the needs of the citizens as evidenced by the consistent
complaints to the Ombudsman, nor does it satisfy the needs of the Commission, which finds
itself increasingly frustrated by the Member States' ability to delay compliance. Both the
Commission and Member States' ambition to popularise the EU, through furtherance of the
good governance agenda, is not serviced by this outdated approach. It is possible for Article
226 to becomeprimarily a mechanism of accountability, which has the potential to (in part)
connect the citizens to the EU, but this possibility is being overshadowed by outdated
conceptions of this central mechanism. Notions of legitimacy and good governance need not
be contradictory to the operation of Article 226, but fulfilment of the potential of Article 226
requires a major re-conceptualisation of the key role of Article 226 by the main stakeholders
who have the ability to change it.
The traditional focus of the Commission has been on achieving enforcement in a close knit
diplomatic community, with the primary method of achieving enforcement being that of
secretive negotiation. Whilst this was possible in a group of six Member States with
relatively few pieces of legislation, it became increasingly unrealistic in a club with 15
Members, and is arguably a total impossibility in an expanded (and expanding) Union of
currently 27 members. Nor is this just a question of numbers - ofmembers or legislation - it
is also a question of political context. The preservation of the so-called 'special relationship'
between the Commission and Member States (the cause and effect of secretive negotiations)
can no longer be thepriority underlining the design, management and operation ofArticle
226. As the European Parliament has pointed out, this 'special relationship' is at best a one¬
sided affair that does not significantly benefit the Commission in carrying out its duty as
guardian of the Treaties. The Parliament urges the Commission to:
'reassess the cooperation with Member States in light of the fact that most
Member States are not willing to do much to improve the implementation of EU
law'.9
This 'special relationship' is the shield for many practices within Article 226 that are
incongruous with the aspirations of good governance and legitimacy. Primarily, this creates
a lack of openness or transparency in all aspects of the Commission's enforcement of alleged
infringements, from decisions to open a case (or not), all the way to decisions to inflict or
9
Report of the European Parliament: 'Report on the Commission's 21st and 22nd Annual Reports on
monitoring the application of Community law' Committee on Legal Affairs, 24 March 2006 A6-
0089/2006 final p 5.
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suspend enforcement of a financial sanction in Article 228. The political (collegiate) nature
of decision-making in Article 226 reinforces this lack of transparency, further justifying and
perpetuating this 'special relationship' founded on secrecy. The refusal to allow access to
correspondence between the Commission and Member States is one example of the practices
being promoted by this approach to enforcement under Article 226. The European
Parliament has repeatedly brought this to the Commission's attention to no avail:
'It is very important that the Commission decides to go public on these issues
[infringements], and to accelerate both the checking process and the reaction
towards Member States who do not fulfil their obligations...conformity
problems are difficult to track, some remain mysteriously hidden in the offices
of the Commission before a complaint of a citizen obliges the Commission to
act.'10 (my emphasis)
It is not simply a problem of negotiation between the Commission and Member States, but
also the form and manner of these negotiations, which render outside scrutiny of Member
State compliance difficult to check.
The approach to Article 226 which relies heavily on private negotiation to achieve effective
enforcement does possess certain advantages, namely that of flexibility. This flexibility is
important in a system of enforcement with limited resources and a degree of information
asymmetry, but flexibility need not be sacrificed in a version of Article 226 that is more
compatible with good governance and legitimacy." There needs to be a balance between the
virtues of flexibility, and the negative consequences of private negotiation. In particular, the
shield of private negotiation conceals Member State infringements from the actors which
might otherwise provide an appropriate check on the discharge of public power, and help to
legitimise the operation ofArticle 226. The Commission has already acknowledged that it is
no longer good enough to deliver effective enforcement alone, and that the legitimacy of the
EU depends on wider considerations:
'The Union is changing as well. It will no longer be judged on its ability to
remove barriers to trade or to complete an internal market; its legitimacy today
depends on involvement and participation'.12
10 Ibid p 15. The reality is that a complainant cannot oblige the Commission to act at all.
11 Whether the operation ofArticle 226 is successful in delivering state compliance is not the central
concern of this thesis. In fact, the argument is quite the opposite - whether Article 226 delivers
effective enforcement is only one facet of the role of Article 226 and should not be focused upon to
the exclusion of everything else. Nonetheless, it would be inaccurate to give the impression that
Article 226 was an absolute failure. In terms of achieving some compliance, notably in relation to
specific technocratic methods of enforcement, particularly the transposition of directives, the
Commission has achieved high levels of success. However, this does not reflect the compliance rate of
all EU norms throughout the Union. Given the problems highlighted in this thesis, it is to some extent
a mystery as to how the EU manages to achieve any compliance at all.
12 Above n 9 p 11.
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There is arguably no idealised solution which will manage to retain all of the virtues of the
historical operation of Article 226, as well as being consistent with notions of legitimacy and
good governance in the EU. However, reform of Article 226 should not be couched in terms
of sacrificing one function for another, say, effective enforcement for accountability. It need
not be a choice between effective enforcement and good governance. Rather, it is a choice
between preserving the fictional 'special relationship' inherent in enforcement via a method
of negotiation, and a method of effective enforcement that is consonant with the principles of
legitimacy and good governance. If something has to give in the design, management and
operation of Article 226, arguably it should not be those aspects of it that contribute to the
legitimacy and good governance of the Union. Is it not better to sacrifice the mirage of a
'close' or 'special relationship' between the Commission and Member States? The key
tension in the current operation of Article 226, is that it is split between being a legal and
political mechanism of enforcement, but does not possess the requisite controls either a
political or legal mechanism demands in order to be compatible with good governance and
legitimacy. This has been summed up by the Parliament thus:
'If it is decided in the Community legal order that Article 226 is essentially a
political procedure - granting powers but not legal obligations to the
Commission - then political control over the guardian of the Treaties on behalf
of EU citizens should be exercised by the Parliament. Discretion may be a
necessary evil in modem government; absolute discretion coupled with an
absolute lack of transparency, however, is fundamentally contrary to the mle of
law.'13
There are two possible solutions to enable the operation ofArticle 226 to better conform to
the standards of good governance and legitimacy. First, there is the method of transforming
Article 226 through law into a mechanism that embraces administrative protections and
controls on the exercise ofpublic power. This would allow the complainant to protect basic
administrative rights, and by doing so, help to transform the way in which the Commission
conducts itself in relation to investigating and prosecuting suspected infringements. Second,
there is the pathway of good governance itself. By actually (rather than nominally)
embracing the principles of good governance set by the Commission into the design,
management and operation ofArticle 226 policy, Article 226 could be transformed into a
more legitimate mechanism of enforcement in the EU. This revitalised enforcement
mechanism would be one that would be more effective, more efficient and more
participatory in nature. It would accommodate other institutional actors into the process of
13 Above n 9 p 17.
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enforcement, and by doing so, create greater accountability of the Commission. This need
not be an either/or solution. In fact, only a mixture of both of these approaches will be
enough to inculcate the standards of legitimacy and good governance that are appropriate to
a Union with constitutional pretensions.
1.3: Plugging the supervisory/accountability gap through law
The rule of law is considered a necessary and vital element of good governance and a
prerequisite to any claims of legitimacy in the EU, and thus the legal regulation of Article
226 could and ought to be improved. There are several areas that might be tackled in order
to plug the supervisory or accountability gap that currently exists in relation to the use of
public power, identified and discussed in Chapter II, by placing further legal constraints on
the operation ofArticle 226. These could be achieved without the necessity for amendment
of Article 226 itself, which seems an unlikely avenue of reform given the Member States'
opposition. The main two deficiencies in Article 226 which ought to be tackled by legal
regulation are the creation of individual administrative rights for those who act as
complainant to the Commission, and transparency in relation to access to Commission
documentation on the administrative phase of Article 226. Self-regulation, i.e. promotion of
good practice by the Commission, and latterly by the Ombudsman, has been insufficient in
these two areas, and consequently outside controls on the Article 226 process have been
underdeveloped.
The individual as guardian
Placing constraints on the discharge ofpublic power under Article 226 could be achieved in
two ways. The emphasis could be placed on court developed principles relating to the
administrative phase of Article 226 such as those of good administration, diligent complaint
handling, and 'natural justice' rights being adopted as the appropriate standard of conduct by
the Commission under Article 226 in respect of those individuals who complain to the
Commission regarding a suspected infringement. However, as Chapter II has highlighted,
the courts have already had various opportunities to bring in the complainant, but have
refused to do so. The Charter of Fundamental Rights might eventually provide some
impetus in respect of encouraging the Court to be more proactive in this regard, although it
seems unlikely that Article 226 will be an area of law in the vanguard of individuals' rights
extension.
Alternatively, the Commission itself could transform the present 'soft law' instruments, such
as the codicil on handling complaints, into legally binding administrative rights for the
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complainant.14 This does not compromise the Commission's exclusive power to prosecute
(or not) Member States, or impose higher standards upon the Commissionto which it has not
alreadly consented. As Chapter VI has highlighted, there are further improvements that
could be made to the codicil which do not dilute the Commission's exclusive prerogative.
Rather, they simply provide a more citizen-friendly approach to citizen-institution
interaction. Making the codicil legally binding merely provides a form of redress for citizens
that the Commission would be forced to take seriously. The European Parliament notes that:
'there is nothing in the Treaty or the case law of the Court of Justice to prevent
the use of appropriate legislative instruments in order to give further rights to
complainants...[the EP] is convinced that this important and exclusive
prerogative should correspond to a duty of transparency and accountability as to
why decisions are taken, notably not to pursue complaints.'15
The Commission is already forced to comply with many of the standards of conduct
recommended by the Parliament and the Ombudsman in relation to complainants under other
Treaty articles, so it would just be a re-alignment of practice rather than creating an extra
burden on the Commission.
The individual does not have to be made a party to the proceedings under Article 226 in
order to act as an appropriate check on the discharge of institutional power. As the
Commission often reminds us, Article 226 is not a form of individual legal redress in the
Treaties. Nor does it need to be. A balance must be struck between the concretisation of
very basic administrative rights in the investigation and complaint handling stages of Article
226, and over juridification of the entire Article 226 process. This is the reason that legal
regulation ofArticle 226 should be restricted to the protection of basic administrative rights,
rather than secondary legislation to regulate the entire administrative process ofArticle 226.
This has the advantage of retaining some necessary flexibility in the administration ofArticle
226, whilst simultaneously compelling the Commission to abide by some very basic, service-
minded, standard of conduct with complainants, like the provision of reasons for decisions.
When secondary legislation is mooted in relation to Article 226, the subject of time-limits is
often used as an example of an area ripe for regulation.16 However, making strict time limits
legally binding would probably be both undesirable and unworkable in practice, particularly
because of the information asymmetry inherent in Commission supervision ofMember State
14 Commission Communication on Relations with the Complainant in Respect of Infringements of
Community Law' COM (2002) 141.
15 Above n 9 p 7.
16 R Mastroianni, 'The Enforcement Procedure under Article 169 of the EC Treaty and the Powers of
the European Commission: Quis Custodiet Custodes?' (1995) 1 European Public Law 535.
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obligations. Although there have been calls from the European Parliament to introduce rigid
timescales into the administrative phase ofArticle 226, this apparent solution to lengthy
delays in the Article 226 process fails to address the underlying issues that contribute to the
average time scale of 54 months from complaint to referral.17 If the internal decision-making
processes were different, and the motivation behind extensive time delays were tackled by
other methods, timescales would be reduced as an inevitable consequence without the need
to sacrifice the element of flexibility that would occur from the introduction of legally
binding time-limits.18
Transparency
The lack of transparency in Article 226 is a matter of both good governance and legal
regulation. The problem with transparency from a legal perspective, i.e. the inability of any
interested party to obtain any documentation in relation to Article 226 files, is a direct result
of the legislation on transparency containing an opt out clause for 'prejudicial' documents,
which might ultimately be used in an action by the Commission against the Member States.
This current situation only assists the Member States in avoidance of their obligations and is
a barrier to the Commission's agenda of 'decentralising' monitoring of the Member States to
the citizens in order to make monitoring more effective and efficient. Furthermore:
'the official reason for this [secrecy] is that the infringement procedure is
prejudicial...and therefore should be covered by certain confidentiality. This is
not a sustainable situation...We know that this is a controversial issue and it is
possible that Council will never accept any transparency in this matter...But
there are a lot of'middle way' measures that could be envisaged.'19
It is interesting that Parliament appears to identify the lack ofprogress in this area not as a
fault of the Commission but rather on the part of the Member States which appear resistant
to claims for greater transparency under Article 226. In any case, there is nothing to prevent
the Commission from providing Parliament with all the information it requires on a
particular case. The Ombudsman can already inspect the Commission's files so it seems
inconsistent that Parliament cannot access the information it requires through the Petitions
Committee.
17 Above n 9.
18 For example, it is clear when the Commission does not indulge/negotiate with Member States ad
infinitum in order to bring them into line, the Article 226 process can be a fairly swift mechanism of
enforcement. This depends on the political will to prosecute the Member State, rather than some
inherent slow process due to a lack of rigid timescales.
19 Above n 9 p 19.
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This is one particular area where an improvement in Article 226 will only come from an
amendment of the legislation as a consequence of pressure from Parliament. It seems
unlikely that the ECJ will simply abandon the long established case law on its own initiative.
The Commission has more to gain than it has to lose in this regard - greater access to
documentation will allow individuals to bring Member States to court in lieu of the
Commission, easing the burden on scarce Commission resources and making enforcement
more efficient and effective. Cases that have been investigated by the Commission, but
where the Commission has concluded there is no infringement, should no longer be
considered prejudicial and information ought to be released about these infringements to
anyone who requests access to the information. This would allow Parliament, interest
groups and individuals the opportunity to pursue Member States through national courts
where possible, armed with all available and necessary information.
1 4: Focusing on change through good governance
The main functions of Article 226 fit comfortably with an agenda of good governance and
improving the legitimacy of the EU. The emphasis on effective enforcement need not be
sacrificed in light of the other functions of control and accountability, debate, regulatory tool
and executive policy choice, but neither can the need for effective enforcement be seen as
the monolithic element of Article 226. A general lack of procedural legitimacy, combined
with an over-reliance on improvement through technocratic initiatives, has undermined the
Commission's attempt to correlate Article 226 with its good governance agenda. Embracing
change through good governance has the advantage of avoiding over-juridification, but
improving Article 226 through good governance will only work if such a strategy is properly
utilised in specific areas. Good governance is not an appropriate solution for individual
administrative rights or access to documents for instance, but is appropriate in formulating
policy standards, better reporting, improving internal procedures and inter-institutional
cooperation.
Effective enforcement and technocratic solutions
The Commission was clear in the WPG that a key area of the good governance agenda was
maximising its activities as guardian of the Treaties. Achieving effective - in the
Commission's terms more 'efficient' - enforcement was a key goal. At the same time, the
practice of the Commission has been somewhat remiss in several key areas under its own
good governance standards. Enabling Member States to avoid paying the fines imposed on
them by the Court of Justice under Article 228 for example, even though the infringement
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had not yet been remedied, is not necessarily the best way to promote the concept of
effective enforcement of obligations.20
The reliance on negotiation by the Commission as the method to achieve effective and
efficient compliance has been counterproductive. Although this has been, and continues to
be, a relevant strategy in the initial stages of an Article 226 investigation in order to bring
Member States quickly into line with Community obligations, it ceases to be an effective
strategy when allowed to continue for a lengthy period of time, or if it involves some
element of dilution of the Member States' obligations in order to achieve a half-baked
solution. If the rationale behind negotiation is that this method of compliance is quicker than
a full court case to the ECJ, than it should not be allowed to continue long after a full court
case would have been heard and decided. Particularly if the Commission speeded up its own
internal decision-making procedures, many cases would be heard before the ECJ far more
quickly than the average time of 54 months.21 It seems clear that it is possible for the
Commission to reach the referral stage within five weeks, even within the current
cumbersome decision-making structure, if the political will exists.22
Over-emphasising the use of technocratic initiatives to enhance the Commission's ability to
monitor the Member States has resulted in exceptional compliance rates in one specific area
ofCommunity law (notification of transposition), and a less convincing approach in relation
to 'visible' infractions - i.e. those infractions that directly affect citizens and result in
complaints to the Commission. These 'misapplication' infractions can never be solved by
technocratic initiatives by their very nature - the legislation may have been transposed on
time (notification achieved), correctly transposed on paper (concordance table checked), but
is nonetheless being implemented in the Member State in an incorrect manner. This still
requires a complaint to bring the Commission's attention to it and an investigation to be
undertaken. It is in these very instances that the Commission should now focus its
'efficiency' agenda, rather than on further designing or improving upon technocratic
solutions. This requires the Commission to address those processes that contribute to
inefficient and ineffective enforcement of these types of infringements - such as methods of
investigation and information procurement, interaction with complainants and internal
decision-making procedures.
20 Case C-278/01 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR1-14141 commented upon by the European
Parliament, above n 9.
21 Above n 9 from initial complaint to referral of ECJ (not conclusion of case).
22 See discussion in Chapter V.
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Internal procedures
There are various problems with the current internal procedures of the Commission. The
split between the political/administrative elements of the Commission both delays and
potentially undermines the legitimacy ofArticle 226 as an enforcement mechanism. This
reflects the key tension ofwhether Article 226 is a political or legal/administrative
mechanism - it cannot function effectively as a mixture of both. Essentially, it currently
operates as a political process masquerading as a legal mechanism which is contradictory to
the good governance agenda. It is a matter of legal interpretation as to whether one Member
State might not be fulfilling its obligations under the Treaties, and although there might
feasibly be many different legal interpretations of a situation, this is not the reason why
certain cases do not progress beyond the political debates of the College ofCommissioners.
On the contrary, this is affected by more nebulous issues such as political bartering between
the Commissioners and the balance ofpower between the individual Commissioners and the
Member States. It is also affected by judgments as to whether prosecution is ultimately
worth the effort. The Commission engages in a cost benefit analysis, calculated on the basis
of economic or political gains. The good governance agenda demands a different approach:
'[The EP] calls on the Commission to place the rule of law and citizens'
experience above purely economic criteria and evaluations'.23
Especially after enlargement, this approach ofpolitical bartering risks creating an uneven,
two tier system of enforcement, with more experienced campaigners evading prosecution
whilst new Member States are subjected to closer scrutiny.
In organisational terms, it would be better if the entire legal case were left at the
administrative level of the DGs, with the necessary input from the Legal Service, insulating
decisions on whether or not to prosecute Member States from individual Commissioners.
This approach would not entirely insulate the enforcement process from politics, but it would
at least be a more efficient and less political decision-making process. The Parliament
suggests an alternative approach, whereby Commissioners would be individually rather than
collectively responsible for authorising the early decisions in the Article 226 process.24
Policy
The policy on enforcement rightly belongs at the level of the College of Commissioners.
This could be better managed from a technocratic point of view in two ways. One way to
introduce more accountability into the Article 226 mechanism would be to create a portfolio
23 Above n 9 p 5.
24 Above n 9 p 20.
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specifically for enforcement across the Community. This would have the advantage of a
specific individual responsible for both the policy, and perhaps the practicalities, of carrying
out the enforcement policy. It would create a visible nexus point between the administration
of enforcement and the College of Commissioners, without all minor decisions relating to
enforcement having to be authorised by the entire Commission. It would create transparency
both internally and externally, and creating a specific point of responsibility would enable
the institutions to interact in a more efficient and effective manner. Particularly with regard
to Parliament monitoring the Commission's activities and the compliance of the Member
States, this would enable more proactive inter-institutional cooperation.
Another improvement to the policy on enforcement would be for the Commission to resist
the temptation to attempt to explain the enforcement policy as if it were coherent and
uniform. The policy would be more transparent, and better reflect the actual practice of the
DGs, if the Commission were to simply acknowledge that the different policy sectors
required different approaches to enforcement altogether. What is necessary in terms of
resources, complaint handling, time-scales and strategy for prosecuting an infringement may
differ between say, DG Environment and DG Fisheries. Each DG could produce their
individual policy statements in the Annual Monitoring Reports. Perpetuating the current
illusion of'one size fits all' undermines any commitment to transparency. The advantage of
reflecting the actual practice of the DGs is that it would enable a proper evaluation of the
Commission's stated policy against its actual practice. Full disclosure of all enforcement
information is already required by each DG (for the Secretariat General), so it would not be
an additional or onerous administrative burden to produce the Annual Reports in this way.
The production of the priority criteria has not really helped shed any light on the construction
or application of the Commission's policy on enforcement. In fact, the European Parliament
is concerned that the Commission has taken this opportunity to somehow dilute its
enforcement responsibilities under Article 226 to only those infringements that 'breach
fundamental principles ofEU law'. This is clearly not the limit of the remit ofArticle 226
according to the Treaties,25 and it is important that any future clarification of policy does not
replicate this approach. This interpretation of the role ofArticle 226 reduces the breadth and
depth of what the Commission could deliver and in particular, Parliament is concerned that
25 Above n 9 p 17.
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the definition ofpriorities should not be used as an excuse for non-prosecution, and thereby
lead to 'a decreased response to citizens' concerns'.26
Transparency and accountability
Greater transparency regarding Article 226 is the gateway to greater accountability within
the process. It is also a key factor of either legal or political legitimacy being introduced into
the enforcement ofMember States obligations. The European Parliament has the task of
guarding the guardians, but it neither has the requisite powers nor information to really meet
this responsibility. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Parliament's own report into
the Commission's activities as guardian of the Treaties. The Commission refused to supply
Parliament with information relating to how much of the Commission's budget was allocated
to its enforcement duties - a fairly basic organisational fact that Parliament ought to have
access to.27 The Commission also refused to divulge to Parliament what its internal
procedures were in relation to how Commission officials dealt with infringement cases. It is
difficult to comprehend how Parliament can really begin to evaluate the Commission's
performance, when it cannot get access to basic organisational information such as how
Commission officials administrate Article 226, and what resources it has available to
perform its duties under the Treaties. If it decided that Article 226 is essentially a political
process, it seems essential that the Community's political body is able to properly regulate
the Commission's handling of its enforcement responsibilities.
The agenda of 'simplification' in the Laeken Declaration has to some extent influenced the
Commission's reporting of its monitoring activities. This has resulted in less detailed (and
less readily available) Annual Monitoring Reports. The more simplified the reports become,
inevitably, the less accurate a picture is presented, making the task of evaluating the
Commission's performance of its guardian duty all the more difficult. Despite the fact that
the Secretariat General is responsible for overall coordination of the Annual Reports,
promises to review the application of the priority criteria were not followed up in the latest
report. This lack of consistency has increased due to the effects of enlargement, as data has
been collated separately for the 'old 15' and the new Member States, making it difficult to
assess or critique any 'overall' picture of the state of compliance across the Union. This
additional data collection and handling has also caused significant delays in production, with
the 2004 Annual Report not being produced until January 2006. The development time
between reporting to Parliament, and actual monitoring activities, further reduces
26 Above n 9 p 5.
27 Above n 9 p 20.
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transparency, the accountability of the Commission, and the accountability of the Member
States.
Resources
The approach of 'less is more' was part and parcel of the WPG and the Laeken Declaration,
with the emphasis being placed on less legislation being produced as a trade off for better
quality and more relevant initiatives, and as a result a more effective deployment of
resources. The Commission has chosen not to dwell on this aspect of its overall good
governance strategy in its policy paper on Article 226, although there is clearly a significant
connection. The connection is rightly made by the European Parliament in its report on the
Commission's activities as guardian of the Treaties. Better quality (and less) legislation is
meaningless unless it is to be backed up by a rigorous approach to enforcement. More
effective enforcement should be seen as integral to the 'less is more' agenda, rather than
being viewed as an inevitable consequence of better regulation.
Enlargement of the EU has brought about both practical and philosophical challenges to
enforcement under Article 226. The current situation is that Commission departments are
understaffed in relation to language capabilities for monitoring new Member States which is
unsustainable and may lead to a two tier system of enforcement in the near future.28
Although resource management in relation to enforcement is a sensitive issue, Parliament
has pointed out that those staff previously dedicated to drafting can now be redeployed to
concentrate on enforcement, but each DG needs to be assessed on its own merit. The
uncomfortable reality is that in many DGs the staff responsible for drafting new legislation
were already dedicated to the task of enforcement, and thus, this suggestion does not create a
wealth of unused resources.29 Targeting 'exposed Directorates' for greater resource
allocation, like those of Environment or Internal Market, would be a sensible way to bring
about effective enforcement at the administrative level.30 However, this strategy would
require a rigorous registration of all complaints and potential infringements in order to
calculate which Directorates are truly 'exposed', as opposed to those which are currently the
best internally structured to deal with infringements, and thereby generate the greatest
figures in the Annual Reports. It would require key information about internal resource
28 Above n 9 p 20 comments on the fact that it is difficult to understand why DG Environment has
only two new members of staff for ten new Member States.
29 Interview, Commission Official A (25 October 2005). It may also be possible to redeploy staff
dedicated to pre-accession monitoring and compliance to the individual DGs.
30
Exposed Directorates meaning those that deal with the highest number of complaints and
infringements.
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allocation for infringements to be made available. This might make interesting reading for
the Member States, as it would become apparent just how much of valuable EU resources
was being utilised to ensure they complied with obligations they had already consented to.
1.5: The potential for a mechanism ofmulti-faceted accountability
The lack of traditional input legitimacy in the EU has given rise to concerns about how the
EU might become more legitimate, more popular and more closely connected to the citizens
of Europe.3' The good governance agenda was in part conceived by the Commission as a
workable solution to the challenge of increasing legitimacy in the EU, and in particular, as a
way to bring citizens closer to the activities of the Community. In its proposals on good
governance, the Commission chose to concentrate on generating support for policy delivery
through what amounted to a combination ofprocedural and technocratic legitimacy. This
approach nominally encompassed the principle of accountability. Elowever, in the detailed
explanation as to how the Article 226 policy was to be designed and managed in the light of
good governance, there was little suggestion as to how the Commission intended to inculcate
greater accountability into the operation of Article 226. This is particularly surprising
because Article 226 is, at its core, a mechanism of accountability designed to bring Member
States into line with their legal obligations.
There is no doubt that significant steps must be taken in order for Article 226 to be
considered a mechanism of enforcement that is consonant with the wider policy ambitions of
good governance and legitimacy in the EU. Nonetheless, Article 226 has great potential not
only to meet the minimum standards described above, but also to become a mechanism of
genuine multi-faceted accountability in the EU. Within Article 226, there is the scope to
deliver much more than is currently conceived of by the institutions/actors that operate it.
The traditional accountability of the Member States to the Commission is not the only type
of accountability in Article 226. There is also the potential for some real accountability of
the Commission to the Parliament, and of the Commission to the citizen via the interaction
with the Ombudsman. There is also the accountability of the Member State to the citizen via
the Commission under Article 226. These other faces of accountability within Article 226
have not been explored to their full potential, and particularly within the terms of reference
of good governance and legitimacy in the EU, these facets of accountability have much to
offer.
31 Whether this is to be achieved by conceiving of different standard of legitimacy derived from 'post-
national democracy' increasing the development of the popular pillar, or asking the citizens what the
EU can do for its citizens is a subject of some debate, see discussion of these issues in Chapter III.
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Member State to Commission
This traditional face ofArticle 226 accountability is the main focus of the Commission in
relation to the documentation and policy statements produced by it in terms of the good
governance agenda. The emphasis on negotiation ought to be replaced with a more
disciplined and automatic approach to enforcement. The 'special relationship' should be
sacrificed in order to arrive at swifter enforcement decisions. A more proactive use of
Article 228 needs to be accepted as the operating norm, rather than the exception. This has
even been (to a limited degree) a strategy that is accepted by the Member States, as
evidenced by the further amendment of Article 228 in the Constitutional Treaty. The
Commission ought to jettison the 'tolerance' ofMember State infractions since:
'many cases of incorrect implementation... re fleet Member States' deliberate
attempts to undermine Community legislation for political, administrative and
economic reasons; in this connection [the EP] notes that the Commission is in
the habit of accepting late intervention by the Member States in order to close
infringement proceedings; calls on the Commission to ask Member States to
guarantee retroactive application of Community provisions which have been
infringed...with immediate recourse to Article 228 in event of persistent failure
to comply.'32
Commission to Parliament
The accountability of the Commission to the Parliament is critical to the legitimisation of
discharge of public power by the Commission under Article 226, whether or not Article 226
is conceived of as either a legal or political mechanism of enforcement. Although the system
ofCommission reporting to the Parliament has been in place since the early 1980s, it has not
been fully utilised by the Parliament in terms of delivering accountability. Although
Parliament reports on the Commission's monitoring activities, meaningful assessment is
blighted by a combination of information asymmetry and an inability to sanction or compel
the Commission to make changes to its administrative activities or its reporting system. It
can only repeatedly request changes, but the Commission is under no obligation to act on
these requests.
Parliament has several suggestions as to how the institutions might improve the operation of
Article 226, including a more integrated approach to the monitoring ofMember State
compliance across the institutions of the EU, rather than it being viewed as an exclusive
activity of the Commission. One of the most useful is the suggestion that Parliament should
be able to initiate Article 226 prosecutions where the Commission refuses to act. Although it
is difficult to imagine how Parliament could do this without an alteration of the Treaties, the
32 Above n 9.
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fact that this is being contemplated at all is an indication that the Commission's previous
practices are no longer to be tolerated. It is clear from the tone of the Report, that Parliament
feels that if there is to be less legislation initiated by the Commission (thereby reducing the
input of Parliament into the political process of the Union), Parliament must shift its
attention and resources to implementation control.33 In particular, the Petitions Committee
states that it has a legitimate role in prosecuting Member States for those infringements
which come to light on the basis of a petition to the Parliament, if the Commission refuses to
prosecute the Member State.
Allowing Parliament the right to prosecute breaches based on a petition would accomplish
numerous objectives. It would reduce the amount of influence wielded by individual
Commissioners in the decision taking process in the administrative phase ofArticle 226. It
would also provide another opportunity for citizens seeking redress for breach of their
European rights, without requiring special standing rights for individual complainants.
Again, this undermines the Commission's 'special relationship' with the Member States, but
perhaps this is a price worth paying. If the Parliament is to guard the guardians, should there
not be some palpable redress if Parliament feels the Commission is not performing its duty
as guardian of the Treaties? This is especially so since according to the Commission:
'Ultimately this [compliance] concerns the citizens themselves. Through
information, participation and access to justice they are to be the actors of a
Community based on the rule of law.'34
An example of the type of case Parliament is referring to is that of the Equitable Life
pensions complaints, where the Parliament was petitioned by numerous UK citizens because
they were unable to find redress for a failure of the UK to fulfil its obligations, specifically to
implement a particular directive. The Parliament took the case to the Commission, who
refused to prosecute the UK government on the basis that the breach took place in the past.
The UK had since implemented the directive, but without retroactive application and
therefore without any benefit for the numerous complainants. Prosecuting past infringements
is possible under the case law of the ECJ and so the Commission was not barred from
initiating Article 226 proceedings, rather it lacked the will to do so. Parliament attempted to
persuade the Commission to redress the situation, but was unsuccessful. The Report notes
that Parliament:
33 Above n 9 p 7.
34 Commission Communication 'Better Monitoring of the Application of Community Law' COM
(2002) 725 final/4. 16.5.2003, p 21.
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'Deplores the Commission's unwillingness to investigate alleged violations of
Community law that lie in the past and have since been remedied such as those
raised in the Equitable Life and Lloyds of London petitions; urges the
Commission to investigate such cases when the alleged failures are said to have
caused significant damage to individuals, since the outcome of such
investigations could be immensely helpful to citizens in obtaining compensation
through appropriate legal channels'.35
Commission to citizen via the Ombudsman
The value of the Ombudsman's intervention in the administration of Article 226 is that it has
uncovered dubious practices in individual cases. However, the inability to translate the
reforms agreed with the Commission into actual practice is unsatisfactory for citizens. The
kind of self-regulation encouraged by the Ombudsman has proved an inadequate method of
ensuring consistent treatment of complainants across the DGs and standards of
administrative interaction between the citizen and institution remain less than ideal.36
The process of encouraging reform in the Commission's administration is best achieved
through the institution of the Ombudsman in two ways. Lirst, by encouraging and
campaigning for wholesale administrative reform across the Union the Ombudsman might
achieve reform in the administration of Article 226 by a process of 'filtration'. Secondly, the
Ombudsman could concentrate on targeting the many administrative processes that could,
and should be, standard practice in the case of any interaction between the Commission and
citizens. Crucially, it is not yet necessary to stray into the arena of human rights. This
undermines the importance of having good procedures in place as standard practice, because
these good procedures uphold the principles of the rule of law and legitimacy within a
system of rule. Reform of Article 226 is not, and should not, be focused on individual
grievance satisfaction by using the 'human rights card' as the ultimate trump. Reform of the
administrative phase of Article 226 should not be a process that is reliant on the
concretisation of rights found in the Charter. This somehow belittles the importance of
having good administrative procedures for its own sake. It is not necessary, nor is it
desirable, to make good administrative practices dependent on proving a breach of a
fundamental rights, in order for the necessity of such practices to be recognised as crucial to
the legitimisation of a system of governance.
33 Above n 9 p 9.
36 The Parliament notes in its report that the Ombudsman is, once again, looking into allegations that
the Commission is not even registering complaints as standard practice.
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A general point of contention in terms of the accountability of the Commission to the citizen
via the Ombudsman is the Ombudsman's inability to change the obligation of Commission
officials to be able to independently answer the Ombudsman's questions. Whilst there might
be genuine reasons why the Commission cannot release information regarding Article 226
cases as a general rule, it seems hard to defend this attitude to the Ombudsman - after all, he
is already allowed to see the Commission's file (where others are prevented). This needs to
be addressed as a matter or urgency, particularly because the Ombudsman represents the
only 'outside' regulation of the Commission's administration of Article 226 at present.
Member State to citizen
Increasing legitimacy, in terms of the popularisation of the EU project is connected to what
the EU can deliver to citizens, in terms of benefits and rights protection.37 Article 226
represents a rare opportunity for the institutions of the EU to connect directly with the
citizens of the EU. There are few opportunities where an EU institution can be seen as
providing a direct service to the citizen, and so it is vital that this opportunity to interact is
not wasted by the Commission. Delivering rights and ensuring citizens can access the
benefits that the EU promotes is a concrete and fundamental way to increase the popularity
of the EU project, particularly where it is the citizens' own Member State that prevents these
benefits from becoming a reality:
'in a moment of serious doubt about the capability of the EU to listen to its
citizens, the ability to ensure the implementation of...legislation, could
represent a way to regain citizens' confidence that should be given the upmost
priority by EU institutions.'38
Article 226 provides the opportunity for citizens to be able to ensure their own Member
States are being held to account when they fail to deliver on EU obligations. Although
referral to the ECJ may not always be the appropriate method to ensure compliance is
quickly obtained, it does have other benefits. Citizens are able to directly invoke their rights
in a national court once a judgment of the ECJ has been delivered on an infringement, even
if the Member State has not yet taken the steps to remedy the breach. It also assists citizens
in obtaining compensation for breach of their rights in the national courts.39
37 See the discussion of Schmitter in this regard discussed in Chapter III.
38 Above n 9 p 15.
39 Certain parallels might be drawn here with the European Court of Human Rights. An ability to hold
the Member State accountable to an outside body reinforces and ensures the delivery of benefits to the
applicants.
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This is a missed opportunity from the Commission's perspective. The Commission ought to
concentrate more on cultivating a 'special relationship' with the citizen, who is the
beneficiary of compliance, rather than the Member State, who is subject to it. If the lack of
co-operation ofMember States is really the only bar to more effective compliance (as the
Commission's Communication suggested), perhaps increasing the use of actions based on
non-cooperation is not the most effective solution. Decentralising the process, by allowing
greater access to information, will enable greater citizen participation in Article 226. This is
resource efficient and reduces the reliance on the accuracy (and rate of) the Member State's
information provision. This approach to selecting Article 226 cases requires the
Commission to prioritise repeated violations of legislation that have generated significant
citizen complaint (for instance, the application of the Environmental Impact Assessment).
This approach requires a conceptualisation of Article 226 as part of an entire package of
'access to justice' measures. It would be particularly effective ifArticle 226 actions could
be launched in instances where there is no other remedy available for the citizen in the
national system, either through no direct effect or a lack of standing.
When Article 226 is evaluated in the light of the contemporary political and legal context of
the EU, it seems clear that there is a significant gap between the way in which the
enforcement mechanism is regulated and operated by the main actors, and the ambition of
delivering good governance and legitimacy in EU policy making. Isolating discussion of
Article 226 from the contemporary legal and political context, by academics and institutional
actors alike, necessarily narrows the expectations of what the enforcement mechanism might
be capable of delivering. To do so reduces the impact, utility and legitimacy of one of the
most important mechanisms of accountability in the EU.
There continues to be a need to ensure the conceptualisation of the role ofArticle 226
accurately reflects the changing political context of the Union. Not only is this mechanism
central to the constitutional architecture of the EU, but it also presents a vital avenue through
which the Union can been seen to be delivering rights directly to its citizens in the face of
Member State non-compliance. This necessity for relevance does not begin and end with the
consideration of Article 226 in light of policy initiatives such as good governance. The next
challenge in relation to enforcement under Article 226 is how the current practices and
policies of the main stakeholders in Article 226 can be adapted in order to accommodate the
enormous challenge presented by enlargement of the Union from 15 to 27 Member States.
The policy and practices relating to enforcement must not only accommodate the
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philosophical challenges imposed by changing political environment, but the practical
difficulties attached to enforcing compliance on the part of 12 additional Member States with
very different legal, administrative and linguistic environments. Although the 'good
governance' proposals on Article 226 were linked to the 'greater good' of enlargement in
order to generate political support, there were no concrete proposals as to how the present
political/legal approach to Article 226 can continue in the face of the inevitable increase in
infractions that will occur across an expanded Union. This is a subject that requires further
investigation by the stakeholders in Article 226 and academic commentators alike.
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Appendix 1 - Interview Data
It was necessary to conduct elite interviews, particularly with regard to the Commission, due
to the nature of the thesis topic, i.e. looking at the behaviour and attitudes of the actors
involved in the infringement process. In relation to the Commission, it was particularly vital
as this was the only means of accessing basic organisational information because of the
difficulty in obtaining access to documentation relating to the infringement process. One of
the central issues in Article 226, in terms of legitimacy and good governance, is the political
and secretive nature of the Commission's handling of infringement investigations and
actions. This restricts the degree to which elite interview data can be cross-checked, because
the information gathered through elite interviews is not available in any other form.
Documents detailing the internal procedures of the Commission are unavailable for public
scrutiny, particularly those documents which detail the internal decision-making process of
Commission officials in the administrative phase of Article 226. Whenever possible, I have
attempted to draw out some common themes across the range of staff and different DGs.
Interviews with other key actors outside of the Commission were primarily used to gather
background information and identify key sources of documentary evidence.
Selection of Commission staff for elite interview
The Commission is currently made of 17 policy focused Directorates General (DGs)1. These
are DG Agriculture and Rural Development, DG Competition, DG Economic and Financial
Affairs, DG Education and Culture, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal
Opportunities, DG Enterprise and Industry, DG Environment, DG Fisheries and Maritime
Affairs, DG Health and Consumer Protection, DG Information Society and Media, DG
Internal Market and Services, DG Justice Freedom and Security, DG Joint Research Centre,
DG Regional Policy, DG Research, DG Taxation and Customs Union, DG Transport and
Energy. Out of these 17 Directorates there are only 10 DGs which generate significant
numbers of Article 226 infringement cases (see Figure 12 below). I selected staff from eight
of these 10 DGs (depending on availability of staff) to use for the purpose of elite interviews.
1 See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs en.htm.
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Figure 12
Article 226 cases by sector (2004)
Source: AnnualMonitoring Report 2004.2
I have interviewed a cross section of both policy fields and staff of different seniority,
ranging from Desk Officers to Unit Heads. The Commission staff agreed to interviewed on
the basis that they would remain completely anonymous, such is the sensitivity of the subject
matter. Accordingly, where reference to interview comments has been made in the thesis,
each official is referred to with the generic title 'Commission Official'. To differentiate
between officials I have assigned each interviewee a letter (Commission Official A etc)
which in no way relates to either the name of the interviewee or the DG. To ensure
confidentiality is respected, I have not identified a particular official's comments alongside a
reference to a DG, since due to the fact that only a small number of staff in each DG deal
with infringements, this may have led to the official being identified by default.
Table 5
Table of Commission Interviews
Interviewee Date
Commission Official A. 25 October 2005
Commission Official B. 25 October 2005
Commission Official C. 25 October 2005
Commission Official D. 25 October 2005
Commission Official E. 24 October 2005
Commission Official F. 24 October 2005
Commission Official G. 26 October 2005
Commission Official H. 26 October 2005
Commission Official I. 6 April 2005
2









Format of interview and data
All of the elite interviews were conducted in the format of semi-structured open interviews3.
Table 6 below contains a sample of the questions asked of Commission officials. A
transcript of the answers has not been included in the Appendix due to issues of
confidentiality4. The general purpose of the interviews was to find out how the actual
practice of conducting infringement investigations and the administrative phase of Article
226 was undertaken, to what extent this differed from any commentary contained in the
Annual Reports, and to try and draw out some common themes across the DGs as to what
factors influenced the way in which individual infringement cases were handled across the
Commission. It was also important to identify the main characteristics of the internal
decision-making procedure, which is not detailed in any available documentation. The main
finding was that outside the formal quarterly meetings of the College of Commissioners,
there appeared to be few consistencies in the organisation and administration of infringement
investigations, and each Directorate's internal culture and organisation heavily influenced its
approach to infringements.
Table 6
A sample of questions asked of all the Commission interviewees.
Standard questions asked across the DGs
Describe the complete process of investigating a suspected infringement when the suspected
infringement comes to light as a result of internal monitoring by DG staff.
Is there a formal internal procedure detailed in the Staff Internal Manual for handling infringement
investigations?
Describe the complete process of investigating a suspected infringement when the suspected
infringement comes to light as a result of a complaint or a Petition from the European Parliament.
Describe the complete decision-making chain from when a suspected infringement is discovered to
eventual referral to the Court of Justice.
Explain the internal structure of [DG]. How many officials deal with infringement investigations? Is
there a dedicated unit?
3 Information was recorded by note-taking rather than recorded by dictaphone to encourage a more
open conversation with Commission officials.
4 This is for the same reason that 'Commission Official A' is used rather than Commission Official
and the name of the DG. Since most answers contain information which identifies the policy field and
particular organisation of each DG, it would indirectly enable identification of the Commission
officials providing the answers.
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How many staff are dedicated solely to dealing with complaints relating to Article 226 infringements?
What factors influence the success or failure of an infringement investigation reaching the judicial
stage ofArticle 226?
To what extent does the formal decision-making role of the College of Commissioners hamper or
facilitate the efficiency of the infringement process?
How does the investigating official relay the substance and facts of the suspected infringement to
College of Commissioners?
To what extent is there co-ordinated action across the DGs to ensure a consistent approach is taken to
handling infringement investigations?
To what extent is decision-making in infringement investigations a political rather than legal decision¬
making process?
What factors affect the viability of infringement case?
To what extent does [Commission official] support the initiative to give greater power to individual
officials to take decisions on whether infringement cases ought to proceed? Does this lead to de-
politicisation of the process, or does it move the political pressure 'downwards'?
To what extent is the Legal Service of the Commission involved in dealing with infringement cases
before the decision is taken by the College to refer the case to the ECJ?
Who dictates the DGs internal policy approach to handling infringements?
What is [DG] your particular difficulty with pursuing infringements investigations?
Is the approach to infringements in [DG] essentially reactive or proactive? What are the pros and cons
of this approach?
To what extent is the difference in background of the internal staff a factor in different approaches to
the decision making in infringement cases?
To what extent has the Commission been working proactively with the Ombudsman in relation to
handling of complaints?
What issues have arisen in relation to the Ombudsman's investigations into complaint handling from
the perspective of Commission officials?
What does the Commission see as the Ombudsman's appropriate role in infringement complaints?
What is the reasoning behind the recent focus on Article 226 cases being initiated for non-cooperation
by the Member States in providing information?
How has the recent case ofCommission v France (Article 228) been received by the Commission?
Does it support this approach of double penalty?
To what extent does the policy field of the DG drive the entire policy and internal management of
infringement investigations?
To what extent does the type of infringement (i.e. non notification, non transposition, inaccurate
transposition, misapplication etc) under consideration affect the decision-making process?
What effect has enlargement had on [DG] ability to effectively pursue infringements?
What is the role of the Secretariat General in the infringement process?
To what extent has the obligation of the DG changed in recent years in relation to collating and
providing information for the Annual Report?
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Other elite interviews
I also interviewed a number of other key actors, detailed in Table 7 below. These interviews
were also conducted in the style of a semi-structured open interview. Data has been quoted




Mr. Olivier Verheecke, Principal Legal Advisor, Office ofEuropean 5 April 2005
Ombudsman.
Mr. Edward Dirrig, Office of Diana Wallis MEP, European Parliament [not 26 October 2005
quoted].
Mr. P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, The European Ombudsman [not quoted]. 29 November 2005
Table 8
Interview, Mr Olivier Verheecke
Principal Legal Advisor, Office of European Ombudsman 5 April 2005.
Why was the Ombudsman initially interested in complaints about the Commission's handling of
Article 226 complaints?
The Ombudsman chose this area in the beginning because there was a large volume of complaints
coming in from citizens in relation to Article 226, and the types of complaints being received were at
a very basic level of administrative procedure (not being informed ofprogress on complaints etc).
This was considered unacceptable.
What types ofcomplaints are included in the category of failure tofulfil obligations under Article
226' complaints to the Ombudsman?
It is true that the way the complaints are classified mean that some complaints relating to Article 226
are put under different categories in Annual Report statistics. The Article 226 complaints category
relates only to those complaints which allege there has been a failure to ensure a Member State fulfils
its obligations under the Treaty. This relates to the substance of the claim itself and where the
Commission has not properly carried out its task as guardian. This is usually formulated using the
terms in the Commission's Communication on Article 226. The Communication contains procedural
guarantees only, although this might not be the only aspect of the complaint, it may be multi-faceted.
Part of the complaint might require the EO to look into whether the complaint has been properly
investigated by the Commission. Although he cannot substitute the eventual judgement of the
Commission since this is a discretionary power, nevertheless the Commission must exercise this
power within the limits of the law and that discretionary power is not a carte blanche. The decision
must be reasoned, and everything must be communicated to the complainant. This reasoning was
developed in the Metro case [Macedonia Metro],
How do you distinguish, forpurposes ofcategorisation, as to what type ofmaladministration is being
alleged where there is more than one type ofmaladministration involved?
It could be true that complaints which relate to a lack of transparency or undue delay by the
Commission in relation to the Article 226 process would not be categorised as an Article 226
complaint, but under a different heading. So straight statistical breakdown from the Annual Report
might not reveal the true number of complaints relating to the process ofArticle 226.
Does the Ombudsman consider that he has achieved all that can be achievedfor complainants in
relation to the Commission's handling ofArticle 226 complaints?
No, this is considered a work in progress and not at all as completely finished. Many new
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developments might be made depending on the types of complaints received, since these complaints
keep coming in, in relation to Article 226.
One of the most important areas to be monitored is the giving of reasons. It is important that the
Commission fully communicates its reasoning as to why it is closing the file or why it considers there
is no infringement.
Why do you think there is still resistance from the Commission in providingfull andfrank reasoning
in Article 226 cases, particularly in relation to reasons why the Commission decides not to pursue the
complaint?
Perhaps due to the Ombudsman's continued work in this area the Commission is keen to give as
neutral a reasoning as possible.
How has the Ombudsman's relationship with the Commission evolved since the first own initiative
inquiry into Article 226?
In the beginning when Ombudsman started the initial inquiries, there was definite resistance to the EO
interference, to the extent that the Commission invoked the case law, to which the Ombudsman
responded that they must exercise their discretionary power within the limits of the law. Over the
years, the Commission has come to collaborate much more with the Ombudsman in this sensitive area
to the extent that the Commission even refers the complainants to the Ombudsman in its
Communication. In the beginning this would have been unthinkable; so it now accepts that the
Ombudsman has the mandate with respect to the procedural steps of the infringement process and this
is a very positive development.
The Commission very much had the attitude that the Article 226 process was a bilateral process
between the Commission and the Member State, but the Ombudsman saw this as a serious problem.
He saw the process very differently as a three way process between the Commission, Member State
and complainant. The person who lodges the complaint is an important factor. They are the people
bringing the complaints to the Commission in the first place. In its role as guardian of the Treaty the
Commission should follow the correct procedures when dealing with these complaints, as well as
taking account of the more general 'spirit of transparency'. It was important that it was not a
completely secret procedure between the Member State and the Commission. It was important that a
proper procedure was adhered to.
A culture change within the Commission cannot happen overnight. It's a long process to change the
approach to infringements from being bilateral and a forum of negotiation, notwithstanding the
Communication. Despite this, there have been steps forward and there has been a considerable
change between when the Ombudsman began and now in re-moulding the process.
Has there been a change in the type ofcomplaints received in relation to Article 226 since the
production of the Communication detailing the complainants 'procedural 'guarantees'?
The two main areas the EO still receives complaints about are undue delay and lack of reasoning. The
Commission takes too long to inform complainant of its decisions or the complainants remain
unconvinced as to the Commission's motivations for closing the file.
Explain the Ombudsman's definition ofmaladministration.
This is a good definition as it covers legality and beyond. The current EO uses this and there is no
problem with it. It could be changed since it is not a legally binding definition - it is only the what the
Ombudsman considers maladministration - so it is not set in stone. The Charter of Fundamental
Rights is not legally binding but breach can be considered as maladministration by the EO.
EO considers it binding on those institutions which proclaimed it - Council, Commission and
Parliament.
Though there is the definition in AR 1997, the CGAB gives a full explanation of this definition, and
this goes further.
Given the nature ofArticle 226 complaints, the Ombudsman's power to compel truthful testimony
from individual Commission Officials is ofvital importance. Is the Ombudsman going to try and
amend the current regulations governing this?
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The Ombudsman may be taking up this point again in the future as it was not satisfactorily resolved
last time amendments were made. The Ombudsman does feel that there might be some problem in
obtaining the truth from officials because of the wording of this provision in the Ombudsman's
governing legislation. The EP and Council must legislate, along with an Opinion from the
Commission is necessary before a change in this legislation can occur.
What will convince the Ombudsman thatfurther work needs to be done in relation to improving the
position ofcomplainants in relation to the Commission's handling ofinfringement complaints?
The first Ombudsman opened the door on Article 226 and this Ombudsman will take the process
forward. This is dependent on the complaints received - though there has already been an Oil there
could be another if the right complaints come in.
The Ombudsman already applies the Charter in other cases (such as the age discrimination case), but
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